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        <title>An Informal Internet Survey on the Current State of Consciousness Science</title>
        <author>Michel</author>
        <author>Fleming</author>
        <author>Lau</author>
        <author>Lee</author>
        <author>Martinez-Conde</author>
        <author>Passingham</author>
        <author>Peters</author>
        <author>Rahnev</author>
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          <title>An Informal Internet Survey on the Current State of Consciousness Science</title>
          <date>2018</date>
          <publisher>Frontiers in Psychology</publisher>
          <idno type="DOI">10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02134</idno>
          
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      <span xml:id="t1" from="#a1" to="#a2" type="phenomenon" ana="#phenomenon" resp="#paper">researchers&#x27; perceptions of consciousness science as a field</span>
      <span xml:id="t2" from="#a10" to="#a11" type="method" ana="#method" resp="#paper">survey<term>survey</term></span>
      <span xml:id="t3" from="#a49" to="#a51" type="mechanisms" ana="#mechanisms[0]" resp="#tagger">mechanisms<term>Heavy promotion of IIT in popular media shapes the theory preferences of non-experts, who are more exposed to media claims than to the primary literature.</term></span>
      <span xml:id="t4" from="#a52" to="#a53" type="limitations" ana="#limitations[0]" resp="#tagger">The survey was informal and the authors flag its results as substantially limited.</span>
      <span xml:id="t5" from="#a54" to="#a55" type="limitations" ana="#limitations[1]" resp="#tagger">The sample of 249 may be considered small.</span>
      <span xml:id="t6" from="#a58" to="#a59" type="limitations" ana="#limitations[2]" resp="#tagger">Recruitment through social media may have produced selection bias toward people sympathetic to consciousness science.</span>
      <span xml:id="t7" from="#a68" to="#a70" type="limitations" ana="#limitations[3]" resp="#tagger">Several theories (illusionism, quantum theories, eliminative positions) were not offered as options, which may have biased the theory-preference results.</span>
      <span xml:id="t8" from="#a69" to="#a71" type="limitations" ana="#limitations[4]" resp="#tagger" cert="1.0">The answer options offered are stated to have biased the result toward the positions that were listed.<note>what this limits: the reported distribution of preferred theories: the authors state omitted positions were folded into &quot;other&quot; and that this might have biased results toward the listed theories</note></span>
      <span xml:id="t9" from="#a62" to="#a63" type="limitations" ana="#limitations[5]" resp="#tagger" cert="0.9">The selection-bias objection is answered with a result that cuts against the authors&#x27; own field: asked whether their sample was biased in favour of consciousness science, they point out that most participants rated the science of consciousness LESS rigorous than other disciplines, so &#x27;they were not unconditional promoters&#x27;. A finding against interest is used as evidence that the sample is not a cheerleading squad - a defence that only works because the survey asked a question its authors could lose.</span>
      <span xml:id="t10" from="#a66" to="#a67" type="controls" ana="#controls[0]" resp="#tagger" cert="0.9">expertise defined two different ways<note>eliminates: that the expert/non-expert differences are an artefact of where the expertise line was drawn · outcome (stated by the tagger, no quotation): held</note></span>
      <span xml:id="t11" from="#a64" to="#a65" type="controls" ana="#controls[1]" resp="#tagger" cert="0.85">comparing subgroups rather than reading the cohort&#x27;s absolute level<note>eliminates: selection bias from recruiting through social media · outcome (stated by the tagger, no quotation): held</note></span>
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      <span xml:id="t21" from="#a49" to="#a50" type="concepts" ana="#concepts[8]" resp="#paper" cert="0.9">integrated information theory<term>integrated information theory</term></span>
      <span xml:id="t22" from="#a37" to="#a38" type="unhoused_relations" ana="#unhoused_relations[0]" resp="#tagger" cert="0.9">perceived lack of rigor → lack of funding and jobs<note>THE PAPER ASSERTS THAT THIS RELATION DOES NOT HOLD, and no edge type can say so. Every type in the vocabulary asserts that a relation obtains; a stated NON-relation - the field&#x27;s perceived lack of rigor does NOT explain its funding and job difficulties - can only be recorded here or dropped. It is one of the paper&#x27;s main findings.</note></span>
      <span xml:id="t23" from="#a5" to="#a6" type="unhoused_relations" ana="#unhoused_relations[1]" resp="#tagger" cert="0.85">behaviourism → consciousness<note>A DISCIPLINE CONSTITUTED ITSELF BY EXCLUDING A CATEGORY, and the paper records the exclusion being reversed: mentalistic notions were got rid of to make psychology scientific, and &#x27;This proved to be a mistake&#x27;. No type expresses &#x27;excluded-from-the-field-and-later-readmitted&#x27;.</note></span>
      <span xml:id="t24" from="#a66" to="#a67" type="senses" ana="#senses[0]" resp="#tagger" cert="1.0">expertise - operationalised two different ways in the same paper, with results checked against both: more than five articles published, or attendance at the ASSC</span>
      <span xml:id="t25" from="#a18" to="#a21" type="senses" ana="#senses[1]" resp="#tagger" cert="1.0">progress in consciousness science - a perceived quantity: 78% of respondents agreed progress had been made, with no dependence on expertise</span>
      <span xml:id="t26" from="#a7" to="#a9" type="claim_relations" ana="#claim_relations[0]" resp="#tagger" cert="0.95">builds-on → Kitcher (1995)<note>differs in: WHAT COUNTS AS PROGRESS, AND THE BORROWED DEFINITION IS WHAT LICENSES THE SURVEY. &#x27;Scientific progress, however, does not only consist of the advancement of knowledge (Kitcher, 1995). Increased funding ... and the rising STATUS OF SCIENTISTS ... are also fundamental indicators of scientific progress as well as sine qua non conditions for such progress&#x27;. On the narrower sense the paper&#x27;s questions would be off-topic; the wider one makes funding and status measurable indicators rather than context</note></span>
      <span xml:id="t27" from="#a49" to="#a51" type="claim_relations" ana="#claim_relations[1]" resp="#tagger" cert="0.85">explains-away → popular-media promotion of IIT<note>differs in: WHETHER A THEORY PREFERENCE TRACKS THE EVIDENCE OR ITS PRESS. Non-experts rated IIT most promising while experts rated global workspace theory, and the paper&#x27;s proposed explanation is exposure, not merit: &#x27;IIT has been promoted heavily in popular media, with such claims as &quot;[IIT is the] only really promising fundamental theory of consciousness&quot;&#x27;. The paper then declines to settle it - &#x27;we also CANNOT RULE OUT other possibilities ... non-experts may be particularly impressed by MATHEMATICAL COMPLEXITY&#x27;</note></span>
      <span xml:id="t28" from="#a7" to="#a8" type="concept_edges" ana="#concept_edges[0]" resp="#tagger" cert="0.9">scientific progress —operationalised-as→ funding<note>strength of the relation: 0.9 · note: THE PAPER WIDENS ITS OWN OUTCOME MEASURE IN THE INTRODUCTION AND SAYS WHY: progress does not only consist of the advancement of knowledge, so funding and status are taken as indicators of it. Everything the survey then measures follows from that move, and it is argued for rather than assumed.</note><term>scientific progress</term><term>funding</term></span>
      <span xml:id="t29" from="#a7" to="#a8" type="concept_edges" ana="#concept_edges[1]" resp="#tagger" cert="0.9">scientific progress —operationalised-as→ status of scientists<note>strength of the relation: 0.9</note><term>scientific progress</term><term>status of scientists</term></span>
      <span xml:id="t30" from="#a35" to="#a36" type="concept_edges" ana="#concept_edges[3]" resp="#tagger" cert="0.9">perceived lack of rigor —distinct-from→ outgroup bias<note>strength of the relation: 0.9 · note: A RIVAL EXPLANATION RULED OUT BY A NULL: the perception holds regardless of whether the respondent works on consciousness (p = 0.65), so it is not outsiders disparaging insiders - the insiders say it too.</note><term>perceived lack of rigor</term><term>outgroup bias</term></span>
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      <span xml:id="t34" from="#a18" to="#a19" type="content_tags" ana="#content_tags.findings[0]" resp="#tagger">78% of respondents agreed that the scientific study of consciousness has been making progress, and this did not depend on whether the respondent worked on consciousness.</span>
      <span xml:id="t35" from="#a23" to="#a24" type="content_tags" ana="#content_tags.findings[1]" resp="#tagger">36% judged funding harder to obtain for consciousness research than for other neuroscience subfields.</span>
      <span xml:id="t36" from="#a29" to="#a30" type="content_tags" ana="#content_tags.findings[2]" resp="#tagger">About half of respondents said an academic job is harder to get as a consciousness researcher than in other neuroscience subfields.</span>
      <span xml:id="t37" from="#a33" to="#a34" type="content_tags" ana="#content_tags.findings[3]" resp="#tagger">Consciousness research was rated less rigorous than other fields by 34% versus only 8% rating it more rigorous, and experts held this view as much as non-experts.</span>
      <span xml:id="t38" from="#a39" to="#a40" type="content_tags" ana="#content_tags.findings[4]" resp="#tagger">Perceived rigour does not track perceived scarcity: consciousness science was rated more rigorous than social neuroscience (33% vs 10%) yet still harder to fund and to get hired in.</span>
      <span xml:id="t39" from="#a45" to="#a46" type="content_tags" ana="#content_tags.findings[5]" resp="#tagger">Global workspace theory was the most-picked promising theory overall, at 28%.</span>
      <span xml:id="t40" from="#a47" to="#a48" type="content_tags" ana="#content_tags.findings[6]" resp="#tagger">Among non-experts the most promising theory was instead Integrated Information Theory at 22%, and this expert/non-expert split held under both definitions of expertise.</span>
      <span xml:id="t41" from="#a41" to="#a42" type="content_tags" ana="#content_tags.findings[7]" resp="#tagger">Respondents preferred public over private funding for the field by 47% to 6%.</span>
      <span xml:id="t42" from="#a43" to="#a44" type="content_tags" ana="#content_tags.findings[8]" resp="#tagger">44% judged popular-media coverage of consciousness neuroscience less accurate than coverage of other scientific topics, against 5% who judged it more accurate.</span>
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      <span xml:id="t46" from="#a10" to="#a11" type="content_tags" ana="#content_tags.quantities[0]" resp="#tagger">249 — number of respondents who completed the online survey</span>
      <span xml:id="t47" from="#a60" to="#a61" type="content_tags" ana="#content_tags.quantities[1]" resp="#tagger">n = 106 ... n = 143 — number of experts and of non-experts in the sample</span>
      <span xml:id="t48" from="#a12" to="#a13" type="content_tags" ana="#content_tags.quantities[2]" resp="#tagger">80% — share of respondents based in academia</span>
      <span xml:id="t49" from="#a16" to="#a17" type="content_tags" ana="#content_tags.quantities[3]" resp="#tagger">37 — mean age of respondents in years</span>
      <span xml:id="t50" from="#a18" to="#a19" type="content_tags" ana="#content_tags.quantities[4]" resp="#tagger">78% — share agreeing the field has made progress</span>
      <span xml:id="t51" from="#a33" to="#a34" type="content_tags" ana="#content_tags.quantities[5]" resp="#tagger">34% — share rating consciousness work less rigorous than other fields (versus 8% more rigorous)</span>
      <span xml:id="t52" from="#a45" to="#a46" type="content_tags" ana="#content_tags.quantities[6]" resp="#tagger">28% — share overall naming global workspace theory the most promising theory</span>
      <span xml:id="t53" from="#a25" to="#a26" type="content_tags" ana="#content_tags.quantities[7]" resp="#tagger">p = 0.02 — difference between North America- and Europe-based respondents in perceived funding difficulty</span>
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        <p><anchor xml:id="a0"/>fpsyg-09-02134 November 1, 2018 Time: 15:8 # 1 ORIGINAL RESEARCH published: 05 November 2018 doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02134 An Informal Internet Survey on the Current State of Consciousness Science Matthias Michel1*, Stephen M. Fleming2, Hakwan Lau3,4,5, Alan L. F. Lee6*, Susana Martinez-Conde7, Richard E. Passingham8, Megan A. K. Peters9, Dobromir Rahnev10, Claire Sergent11 and Kayuet Liu12 1 Department of Philosophy, Sorbonne Université, Paris, France, 2 Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, United Kingdom, 3 Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA, United States, 4 Brain Research Institute, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA, United States, 5 Department of Psychology, Hong State Key Laboratory of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong, 6 Department of Applied Psychology, Lingnan University, Tuen Mun, Hong Kong, 7 SUNY Downstate Medical Center, State University of New York, New York, NY, United States, 8 Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom, 9 Department of Bioengineering, University of California, Riverside, Riverside, CA, United States, 10 School of Psychology, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, United States, 11 Laboratoire Psychologie de la Perception, Université Paris Descartes, CNRS, Paris, France, 12 Department of Sociology, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA, United States Edited by: Juha Silvanto, University of Westminster, United Kingdom Reviewed by: Ned Block, New York University, United States David Rosenthal, The City University of New York, United States *Correspondence: Matthias Michel matthias.michel.curtil@gmail.com Alan L. F. Lee alanlee@ln.edu.hk Specialty section: This article was submitted to Consciousness Research, a section of the journal Frontiers in Psychology Received: 12 September 2018 Accepted: 16 October 2018 Published: 05 November 2018 Citation: Michel M, Fleming SM, Lau H, Lee ALF, Martinez-Conde S, Passingham RE, Peters MAK, Rahnev D, Sergent C and Liu K (2018) An Informal Internet Survey on the Current State of Consciousness Science. Front. Psychol. 9:2134. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02134 for The scientific study of consciousness emerged as an organized field of research only a few decades ago. As empirical results have begun to enhance our understanding of consciousness, it is important to find out whether other factors, such as funding for consciousness research and status of consciousness scientists, provide a suitable environment the field to grow and develop sustainably. <anchor xml:id="a1"/>We conducted an online survey on people’s views regarding various aspects of the scientific study of consciousness as a field of research.<anchor xml:id="a2"/> 249 participants completed the survey, among which 80% were in academia, and around 40% were experts in consciousness research. Topics covered include the progress made by the field, funding for consciousness research, job opportunities for consciousness researchers, and the scientific rigor of the work done by researchers in the field. <anchor xml:id="a3"/>The majority of respondents (78%) indicated that scientific research on consciousness has been making progress.<anchor xml:id="a4"/> However, most participants perceived obtaining funding and getting a job in the field of consciousness research as more difficult than in other subfields of neuroscience. Overall, work done in consciousness research was perceived to be less rigorous than other neuroscience subfields, but this perceived lack of rigor was not related to the perceived difficulty in finding jobs and obtaining funding. Lastly, we found that, overall, the global workspace theory was perceived to be the most promising (around 28%), while most non-expert researchers (around 22% of non-experts) found the integrated information theory (IIT) most promising. We believe the survey results provide an interesting picture of current opinions from scientists and researchers about the progresses made and the challenges faced by consciousness research as an independent field. They will inspire collective reflection on the future directions regarding funding and job opportunities for the field. Keywords: consciousness, consciousness science, survey, meta-science, consciousness research Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 November 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 2134 fpsyg-09-02134 November 1, 2018 Time: 15:8 # 2 Michel et al. Online Survey on Consciousness Science INTRODUCTION At the beginning of the 20th century, <anchor xml:id="a5"/>behaviorists wanted to constitute psychology as a scientific discipline by getting rid of mentalistic notions such as attention, memory, volition, imagery, and consciousness, which they regarded as mental unscientific (Watson, 1913; Skinner, 1953). This proved to be a mistake<anchor xml:id="a6"/>. With the rise of cognitive science, a wide variety of mental phenomena were progressively reintroduced within the scope of scientific investigation. However, while perceptual mechanisms were extensively studied, little effort was made to understand which mechanisms bring about consciousness of the contents of perception. The scientific study of consciousness became an organized field of research less than 30 years ago. Since then, a large number of empirical findings increased our understanding of consciousness (Block et al., 2014). <anchor xml:id="a7"/>Scientific progress, however, does not only consist of the advancement of knowledge (Kitcher, 1995). Increased funding for consciousness research and the rising status of scientists engaging in the field are also fundamental indicators of scientific progress as well as sine qua non conditions for such progress, and should not be overlooked<anchor xml:id="a8"/>.<anchor xml:id="a9"/> Here, we present the results of a survey designed to investigate the current state of the neuroscience of consciousness in regards to these latter aspects. MATERIALS AND METHODS <anchor xml:id="a10"/>Two hundred and fourty-nine subjects replied to our informal online survey.<anchor xml:id="a11"/> Participants were notified that they would not be compensated for their participation in the survey, and could stop taking the survey at any time. They were also informed that the purpose of the survey was to investigate their attitudes about current research on consciousness. Survey procedures were approved by the UCLA Institutional Review Board. Subjects completed the survey through the online software SurveyMonkey, by using their phone or computer. The survey was advertised through social media (e.g., Facebook, Twitter). As such, the survey did not involve random sampling or counterbalancing of question order, and it is also difficult to assess response rate; we will address these limitations further in Section “Discussion.” The survey was conducted between January 29, 2018 and February 14, 2018. We asked 23 questions to the participants. We collected demographic data on the following: age, region, gender, year of highest degree, current position, number of publications, number of publications related to consciousness, number of publications on consciousness in public media, primary domain of expertise, conferences on consciousness attended (ASSC or Tucson), total amount of grants received for studying consciousness, overall amount of grants received. explanation of Other questions concerned the possibility of a complete in the consciousness, progress biological to neuroscience thanks understanding of and psychology, improvement in the field of consciousness science, theories of consciousness perceived as most promising, consciousness experimental rigor of the work on consciousness compared to other subfields in neuroscience, difficulty of successfully competing for funding while studying consciousness compared to other neuroscience subfields, difficulty of the job market in consciousness science compared to other neuroscience the subfields, preference for public or private funding of work on consciousness, accuracy of popular media articles on consciousness, and perceived benefits of popular media article on consciousness. For a full list of details of questions asked, please see Supplementary Data. RESULTS Of the 249 respondents, as many as 59% were active scholars (with &gt;5 publications), and 29% were either tenure track or tenured academics. <anchor xml:id="a12"/>Overall, 80% of our participants were in academia.<anchor xml:id="a13"/> <anchor xml:id="a14"/>We achieved a good balance between experts in the field (43%, defined both as having attended ASSC—a conference organized by a professional society—or having published &gt;5 papers on the topic), versus non-experts.<anchor xml:id="a15"/> 30% of participants were neuroscientists, 4% computer scientists, 20% philosophers, 37% psychologists, and 9% were working in other areas (humanities or natural/engineer sciences). 31% of the participants were primarily based in North America and 54% were based in Europe. <anchor xml:id="a16"/>On average, participants were 37 years old.<anchor xml:id="a17"/> 30% of participants were female, and 65% male (with 1% “Other” and 4% “Refuse to disclose”). See Supplementary Data for details. Progress <anchor xml:id="a18"/>A great majority of participants (78%) agreed that progress has been made in the scientific study of consciousness.<anchor xml:id="a19"/> <anchor xml:id="a20"/>This result appears to hold regardless of whether one studies consciousness or not, as we found no dependence between expertise and perceived progress in the field<anchor xml:id="a21"/> [chi-squared tests, p = 0.32].<anchor xml:id="a22"/> Funding <anchor xml:id="a23"/>Many participants (36%) judged it more difficult to obtain funding for consciousness research than for other subfields of neuroscience they were familiar with (Figure 1).<anchor xml:id="a24"/> <anchor xml:id="a25"/>This was especially true for participants based primarily in North America, compared to those based primarily in Europe [Wilcoxon ranksum test: p = 0.02].<anchor xml:id="a26"/> <anchor xml:id="a27"/>We found no significant difference between experts and non-experts on the perceived difficulty of obtaining funding for studying consciousness [chi-squared test; p = 0.67].<anchor xml:id="a28"/> Jobs <anchor xml:id="a29"/>About half of participants reported that is more difficult to find a job in academia as a consciousness researcher than in other neuroscience subfields.<anchor xml:id="a30"/> Neuroscientists were more likely than those in other fields to respond that finding a job in consciousness science is more difficult compared to other subfields in neuroscience (Figure 2). We they believe it Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 November 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 2134 fpsyg-09-02134 November 1, 2018 Time: 15:8 # 3 Michel et al. Online Survey on Consciousness Science <anchor xml:id="a31"/>FIGURE 1 | Responses to the question “Compared to some other subfields in neuroscience, how difficult is it to successfully compete for funding for doing empirical work on consciousness?” by primary region in which the respondents are based.<anchor xml:id="a32"/> FIGURE 2 | Responses to the question “Compared to some other subfields in neuroscience, how difficult do you think it is for students and postdocs working primarily on consciousness to compete for faculty/independent principal investigator positions?” by area of expertise of the respondent. found no significant difference between experts and nonexperts on perceived job-market difficulty [chi-squared test; p = 0.38]. Rigor <anchor xml:id="a33"/>More participants considered the work done in the field less rigorous than in other fields (34%), rather than the other way round (8%).<anchor xml:id="a34"/> <anchor xml:id="a35"/>This was true regardless of whether respondents worked on consciousness or not [chi-squared test; p = 0.65], which indicates that this is not just an outgroup bias; even experts within the field perceive lack of rigor as a problem<anchor xml:id="a36"/>. <anchor xml:id="a37"/>This perceived lack of rigor does not explain the lack of funding and jobs, however<anchor xml:id="a38"/>. <anchor xml:id="a39"/>The field of consciousness was seen as similarly or more rigorous than fields such as social neuroscience (33% reported consciousness science as “more rigorous” than social neuroscience, versus only 10% who reported it as “less rigorous”), again both by experts as well as non-experts.<anchor xml:id="a40"/> Nonetheless, respondents reported that funding and jobs are found with greater difficulty for consciousness science than for social neuroscience (31% considered it more difficult to obtain funding for studying consciousness than social neuroscience, versus 6% who found it less difficult; 41% perceived the job Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 November 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 2134 fpsyg-09-02134 November 1, 2018 Time: 15:8 # 4 Michel et al. Online Survey on Consciousness Science market as more difficult for those who study consciousness compared to social neuroscience, versus 3% who found it less difficult). Role of Private Funding and Media <anchor xml:id="a41"/>A large proportion of participants agreed that, for the healthy development of the field, public funding should be preferred over private funding (47 vs. 6%).<anchor xml:id="a42"/> This may be related to the concern that private funders might be misinformed by the depiction of the neuroscience of consciousness in popular media. <anchor xml:id="a43"/>Indeed, 44% of participants considered the representation of the neuroscience of consciousness in popular media to be less accurate than the representation of other scientific topics, whereas only 5% found it more accurate.<anchor xml:id="a44"/> The below section contains a possibly relevant and interesting example of media influence. Theories Perceived as Most Promising We asked participants to rate which consciousness theory they perceived to be most promising. <anchor xml:id="a45"/>Overall, the global workspace theory (Dehaene and Changeux, 2011; Dehaene et al., 2014) was seen as the most promising theory of consciousness (28%).<anchor xml:id="a46"/> <anchor xml:id="a47"/>On the other hand, among nonexperts only, IIT [Integrated Information Theory; (Oizumi et al., 2014; Tononi et al., 2016)] was considered to be the most promising theory (22% of non-experts); this was true whether expertise was defined as having published more than five articles on consciousness (chi-squared test, p &lt; 0.05), or attending ASSC at least once (chi-squared test, p &lt; 0.05).<anchor xml:id="a48"/> <anchor xml:id="a49"/>We suspect that one explanation for this may be that IIT has been promoted heavily in popular media, with such claims as “[IIT is the] only really promising fundamental theory of consciousness,” appearing in influential media outlets1. Nonexperts may be particularly influenced by these claims<anchor xml:id="a50"/>. We also cannot rule out other possibilities, however, such that non-experts may be particularly impressed by mathematical complexity (a feature of IIT relative to other theories presented in our survey).<anchor xml:id="a51"/> For further details about the responses to each of the questions asked, please see Supplementary Data. DISCUSSION The field of consciousness research is perceived as making progress. However, the field also faces significant challenges that could overthrow the progress accomplished so far. <anchor xml:id="a52"/>We emphasize that this survey was informal and that our results are subject to significant limitations.<anchor xml:id="a53"/> <anchor xml:id="a54"/>For example, the sample size of 249 participants may be considered small.<anchor xml:id="a55"/> <anchor xml:id="a56"/>However, we note that the typical attendance to ASSC is under 500 people. Hence, relative to the size of the field, including over a 100 experts plus a group of non-experts of similar size is not uninformative<anchor xml:id="a57"/>. <anchor xml:id="a58"/>Moreover, since the survey was advertised through social media, the opinions of our participants might reflect some degree of selection bias.<anchor xml:id="a59"/> It is possible that respondents selected through social media could be more sympathetic to the overall project of a neuroscience of consciousness than the overall scientific 1See, e.g., http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/21/science/21consciousness.html, https://qz.com/709969/2300-years-later-platos-theory-of-consciousness-is-beingbacked-up-by-neuroscience/, https://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/howmuch-consciousness-does-an-iphone-have, or https://www.huffingtonpost.com/ bobby-azarian/post_10079_b_8160914.html. FIGURE 3 | Comparison between answers from experts and non-experts to the question: “To the extent that you have read/heard about them, which of the following theories seem most promising to you?” GW, Global Workspace Theory; HOT, Higher-Order Theory; IIT, Integrated Information Theory; LR, Local Recurrence Theory. Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 November 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 2134 fpsyg-09-02134 November 1, 2018 Time: 15:8 # 5 Michel et al. Online Survey on Consciousness Science population. <anchor xml:id="a60"/>However, as can be seen in the data, e.g., Figure 3, a fairly broad group of experts were included in the survey (n = 106), in addition to a good number of non-experts (n = 143).<anchor xml:id="a61"/> The comparisons made in the report highlight that many of the perceived notions about the field are common to both groups. <anchor xml:id="a62"/>It could be argued that in our sampling, participants may be biased in favor of consciousness science, because those who answered the survey were probably interested in consciousness science in the first place. But it is important to note that most participants considered that the science of consciousness was less rigorous than work done in other disciplines. While this does not mean that respondents were uninterested in consciousness, it does suggests that they were not unconditional promoters of consciousness research<anchor xml:id="a63"/>. Importantly, many of the interesting results concern comparisons between experts and non-experts within the cohort. <anchor xml:id="a64"/>Biases that apply to the entire cohort should affect overall patterns, but not the comparisons between subgroups (where biases should be largely subtracted out).<anchor xml:id="a65"/> Finally, as we noted above, the sample size is not small relative to the size of the field. One could also argue that our definitions of the categories of “experts” and “non-experts” do not correctly represent expertise on consciousness science. However, non-experts did appear to have a lower degree of knowledge of the field than experts, as they selected “don’t know” answers more often on all questions (as reflected, for example, in Figure 3). Moreover, <anchor xml:id="a66"/>our results did not significantly vary depending on how we defined expertise (either as publishing more than five articles on consciousness, or as attending to the ASSC at least once).<anchor xml:id="a67"/> <anchor xml:id="a68"/>Finally, <anchor xml:id="a69"/>when questioning preferred theories, we did not represent illusionism, quantum theories of consciousness, or the view that no satisfying theory of consciousness can be developed.<anchor xml:id="a70"/> As such, these theories were only represented indirectly, as belonging to the category “other.” This might have biased results in favor of the various theories explicitly represented.<anchor xml:id="a71"/> Although we note that this could be a problem, it is unlikely that any of the four theories that we presented should have particularly benefited from this limitation. Hence, the overall distribution of preferences between theories would probably have been preserved even if all theories of consciousness were represented. Moreover, even if the absence of some theories such as illusionism or quantum theories of consciousness might have biased the choice in favor of represented theories, this bias probably did not affect the overall pattern of responses as a function of expertise. Overall, despite these caveats, this survey provides an interesting picture of the current opinion of a group of scientists on the progresses and challenges in the field of consciousness, and we hope that it might spark a collective reflection on the future of funding policies in the domain. ETHICS STATEMENT study was carried out This in accordance with the recommendations from of the UCLA Office of the Human Research Protection Program. The protocol was approved by the UCLA Institutional Review Board. AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS MM and HL contributed to the conception and design of the study. MM organized the database, performed the statistical analysis, and wrote the first draft of the manuscript. All authors contributed to manuscript revision, read, and approved the submitted version. SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL for this article can be found at: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg. The Supplementary Material online 2018.02134/full#supplementary-material<anchor xml:id="a72"/></p>
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