Artefacts, essentialism and the identification of artworks and technologies

Abstract

While artistic and technological identities are often regarded as context-dependent and non-essential, artworks and technologies are frequently classified as artefacts. Here it is argued that these positions are incompatible with each other, and that the latter position is flawed. Artefactuality is itself an essential property, and identifying an object on the basis of its artefactual status entails a commitment to essentialism. Artefacts cannot represent artworks and technologies and cannot be the defining subject matter of a non-essentialist philosophy. These arguments are built on a detailed analysis of the way in which creators’ intentions are constitutive of artefacts, as well as three key distinctions: between the contexts of creation and use, between the essentialist identification of kinds and that of individual objects and between the intrinsic and relational forms of essentialism.

1 Introduction

Art and technology are broad categories that can be manifested in various forms. Despite their diversity, it is possible to discern some recurring positions common to the philosophical study of both art and technology. One of these positions is the centrality of artefacts, understood in relation to creators’ intentions, in characterising art and technology. Works of art and technological objects are often classified as species of artefacts, and artefactuality is seen as a defining feature of artworks and technologies. In this way, from an intentionalist perspective, the intention of the artist is considered a key attribute of the ontology of art (Kuspit, 1974; Livingston, 2005; Thomasson, 2004). Artworks are commonly classified as artefacts (Evnine, 2013; Levinson, 2007), while non-tangible works, such as pieces of music and literature, are categorised as ‘abstract artefacts’ (Evnine, 2016, pp. 119–159; Thomasson, 2004, pp. 22–23). Several philosophers have also introduced technical artefacts as the subject matter of philosophy of technology (Kroes and Meijers 2006; Franssen et al. 2018; Houkes and Vermaas 2009a). This subject identification has given birth to metaphysical research agendas on technical functions (Houkes & Vermaas, 2010; Kroes, 2012) and the ontological status of artefacts and artefact kinds (Franssen et al., 2014; Thomasson, 2009). More generally, the philosophy of technology literature is replete with references to artefacts, implying the centrality of artefacts to the philosophical study of technology.

A second position pertains to the rejection of essentialism in favour of a contextual understanding of art and technology. Tillinghast (2004), for instance, presents a detailed discussion on the concept of essence and its relevance to the nature of art. By identifying a particular, evaluative concept of art, she defends anti-essentialism about this concept. Mag Uidhir and Magnus (2011) reject art concept monism in favour of an art concept pluralism that allows recognition of different art concepts for different purposes. Danto refutes the idea that art can be defined by a fixed set of necessary and sufficient conditions. He argues that what makes something an artwork is not its physical properties but the artistic theories and interpretations that situate it within the artworld (Danto, 1964). Davies (2009) also rejects essentialism by considering the matter, form and mode in which art exists, arguing that works of art are social constructs. Similar sentiments can be seen in the philosophical study of technology and technical artefacts. Juvshik (2021) rejects function essentialism as the idea that artefacts have essences based on their intended functions. He then argues that even the narrow version of function essentialism limited to technical artefacts, i.e. artefacts that have practical functions, is flawed. Houkes and Vermaas (2009b), 2010) engage in an action-theoretic analysis of technical artefacts to reject function essentialism, arguing that the function of an artefact is not an intrinsic property of the artefact. And finally, through his notion of ‘multi-stability’ (a phenomenological notion that can roughly be translated into the analytic metaphysics as ‘multiple utilisability’ (Preston, 2009, p. 215), Ihde (1993, pp. 73 − 8) highlights inadequacies of essentialist understandings of technology by showing that the same object can acquire different identities in different contexts.

So, on the one hand, individual artworks and technologies are identified as artefacts, and on the other hand, it is argued that an object’s identity as a work of art or a technological object cannot be determined by its essential properties. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that these two positions are incompatible, and that the former position is flawed. This means that artefacts cannot represent artworks and technologies, and while there have been attempts to provide non-essentialist accounts of art, technology and technical functions, as long as philosophy of art and technology concern themselves with artefacts, they cannot fully reject essentialism. The paper’s arguments rest on three distinctions. The first distinction is between the contexts of creation and use. Early discussions of the paper contribute to the current literature on the metaphysics of artefacts by showing why this distinction is necessary to determine the conditions of artefactuality, reconcile some counterintuitive cases and specify the way in which creators’ intentions are constitutive of artefacts. Here it is also argued that failure to attend to the conditions of artefactuality and make a distinction between the contexts of creation and use leads to a conflation between the category of artefacts, on the one hand, and artworks and technologies, on the other. The next two distinctions are between the essentialist identification of kinds and the essentialist identification of objects, and between the intrinsic and relational forms of essentialism. While the question concerning the essential nature of artefact kinds has received some attention, this paper introduces artefactual essentialism, which is about the essentialist identification of objects. And while essentialism is often assumed and discussed in its intrinsic form, this paper turns to relational essentialism. On these grounds, it is concluded that, first, artefactuality is irrelevant for categorising an object as a work of art or a technological object, and artefacts cannot be the defining subject matter of philosophy of art and technology. Second, artefactuality is a relationally essential property rooted in the historical relationship between an artefact and its creators’ intentions. Therefore, identifying an artwork, a technology or any other object on the basis of its artefactual status would be an essentialist identification of that object. Yet, it is harder to fully escape artefactual essentialism in philosophy of art than in philosophy of technology.

2 Artefacts: the modification and intention conditions

What are artefacts? And what makes something an artefact? For something to qualify as an artefact, it must jointly satisfy two conditions. These conditions can be referred to as the ‘modification condition’ and the ‘intention condition’. According to the modification condition, it is necessary for an object to undergo some modifications or structural changes to qualify as an artefact. The reason why bicycle wheels, sculptors or crowns are categorised as artefacts, but gum trees, spiders or rocks are not is that the former group have undergone structural modifications whereas the latter group have not. Hence, it is widely considered that artefacts are necessarily modified objects (Devereux, 1977; Hilpinen, 2011; Soltanzadeh, 2019; Weitz, 1956).

Structural modifications come in different forms and degrees. This raises the question of whether there is a minimum form or degree of modification required for an object to qualify as an artefact. Devereux has specified the types of physical changes that can lead to the creation of artefacts. According to him, a natural object cannot become an artefact unless it undergoes ‘internal changes’. By an internal change he means ‘a change in the thing itself and not just in its relationship to other things. Changes in size, shape or colour, would count as internal changes; a change in physical location would not’ (Devereux, 1977, p. 135). According to Hilpinen, too, the simplest form of modification that is required for an object to undergo to become an artefact is separation. It involves ‘the separation of an object from another object so that one (or both) of the resulting objects can be used for some purpose’ (Hilpinen, 2011). Breaking a branch from a tree trunk and trimming off the side branches and leaves to create a walking stick is a modification that creates an artefact by the act of separation. However, picking up a piece of rock from the ground to use it as a doorstop is not an artefact-creating modification because this act does not sufficiently modify the rock. As Hilpinen suggested, objects such as a piece of rock used as a doorstop can be referred to as ‘naturefacts’ which are not genuine artefacts (ibid.).

Satisfying the modification condition alone does not transform an object into an artefact. A branch knocked down by heavy wind undergoes sufficient changes to meet the modification condition, but it is not considered an artefact because it was not intended by anyone to become a broken branch. Therefore, in addition to meeting the modification condition, an object must also fulfil the intention condition to qualify as an artefact. According to the intention condition, for an object to be an artefact, it must be intended to be an artefact; its features need to be intended by its creator. A cane made from a tree branch satisfies the intention condition because it was intended to be a cane. Even though the physical properties of the cane may be identical to those of a fallen branch, only the cane qualifies as an artefact, because only the cane satisfies the intention condition. Baker (2004), Dipert (1993), Evnine (2016), Hilpinen (1993, 2011) and Thomasson (2007, 2009), among others, have recognised that an adequate definition of artefacts must consider creators’ intentions.

3 The two readings of the intention condition

The intention condition stipulates that for an object to be an artefact, it must be intended to be an artefact. But exactly what feature of the artefact must be intended? This question leads us to two different readings of the intention condition. On one reading, it is necessary for an artefact to have the same physical properties that its creators intended. On the other reading, it is necessary for an artefact to have the same function or meaning that its creators intended. The first reading can be referred to as ‘the physical reading of the intention condition’ and the second one as ‘the functional reading of the intention condition’ (Soltanzadeh, 2022, pp. 23 − 4). Now the question is: which reading is more persuasive? And in what ways are the intentions of creators constitutive of artefacts? The answer to these questions requires further clarification of the two readings of the intention condition.

Consider the example of a spoon that is exclusively used as a baby toy. Here the spoon has physical properties that are intended by its creators, but its function is different from the creators’ intentions. So, on the physical reading of the intention condition, the spoon is an artefact. But according to the functional reading, the spoon is not an artefact. This conclusion is counterintuitive and works against the functional reading of the intention condition. Now imagine a case where a person throws a glass bottle to the ground to break it into small pieces so that they can use one of the pieces to cut through a thick stack of paper. In this case, the small pieces of glass will have the function that the person intended them to have, but they may not have the exact intended physical structures. In fact, it is almost impossible to plan the shape and size of objects by smashing them onto the ground. So, here on the functional reading of the intention condition, those pieces are artefacts, but on the physical reading of the condition, they are not.

Including the spoon used as a baby toy while excluding the broken glass pieces as artefacts may seem like an acceptable conclusion. However, this exclusion can make the physical reading of the intention condition too demanding. We may rule out those broken glass pieces as artefacts because the creator did not intend their exact shape, but many objects do not turn out to have the exact shape that their creators intend. The spoon used in the previous example may itself be ever so slightly smaller, bigger, heavier or lighter than what its designers intended. Would these differences exclude the spoon from the category of artefacts? If yes, then we have reached another counterintuitive conclusion which, this time, works against the physical reading of the intention condition.

One way to escape the above deadlock is to revise the physical reading of the intention condition by making it less demanding. Instead of requiring the creator to have an exact construction plan and execute that plan perfectly, we can allow deviations from a loose construction plan as long as the necessary physical properties of the object are created. Here it would not matter if the spoon is slightly larger or heavier than what the creators had intended. As long as the spoon has the necessary physical structure to work as a spoon, it would satisfy the physical reading of the intention condition. When the physical reading of the intention condition is construed in this less demanding way, the broken glass pieces would also qualify as artefacts because they do have the sharp edges required to cut through a thick stack of paper.

Note that the revised, less demanding version of the physical reading of the intention condition in fact relies on the functional reading of the intention condition. Among the various physical properties of an artefact, only those properties can be deemed ‘necessary’ that are required for the artefact to perform its intended function. The necessary physical properties of a spoon are determined by its function as a handheld utensil that can be used for scooping, transferring or consuming different food. And the necessary physical properties of a cutting tool are determined by its function as a cutting tool; i.e. a handheld object with at least one sharp edge. This means that if we accept this revision, we also automatically accept the functional reading of the intention condition.

Therefore, in the revised physical reading of the intention condition, an object’s artefactual status is determined by (i) the creators’ intention for it to serve the specific function that it serves and (ii) the structural modifications that are made to enable that function. In other words, in this revised physical reading of the intention condition, an object is an artefact if it has undergone at least a minimal degree of modifications, and these modifications are intended by its creators for it to serve the function that it serves.

This revised physical reading of the intention condition simplifies the definition of artefacts by bringing together both readings of the intention condition. However, it encounters the same problem faced by the functional reading of the intention condition. It cannot explain the artefactual status of objects that perform functions other than what their modified structures were intended to perform, such as the spoon used as a baby toy. This is a problem because many artefacts are commonly used in ways that are not intended by their original creators.

Using an artefact for purposes other than what its creators had intended is a known phenomenon, often referred to as ‘innovative’ or ‘creative use’ (Kroes, 2012, p. 81). Innovative use can occur at the level of individual users or become embraced by society at large. Innovative use of artefacts can also be conceptualised through Preston’s notion of ‘system function’ as distinct from ‘proper function’ (Preston, 2013, pp. 152–160). While proper function refers to what an artefact was designed for, system function refers to what an artefact actually does (ibid.). For example, a spoon’s proper function is to scoop, transfer or consume food, because that is what it was designed to do. However, being used as a baby toy would be a system function of the spoon, because that is not what the spoon was designed for. Proper function and system function can also overlap. When an artefact performs the task it was designed for, that counts as both its proper and system function.

The mismatch between the intentions of original creators and the eventual function or meaning of artefacts can sometimes be even more pronounced. At times, the intended physical structure of artefacts may be completely irrelevant for the function that they perform. These cases pose yet bigger challenges for the revised physical reading of the intention condition. Consider the case of a credit card that is never activated and is only used to tighten screws. The revised physical reading of the intention condition is unable to explain the artefactuality of this credit card. The physical properties that are necessary for an object to perform the function of tightening screws are different from the physical properties that are necessary for an object to perform the function of a credit card as a tool for financial transactions. The necessary physical modifications that are required for an object to function as a credit card are irrelevant for it to tighten screws. The fact that credit cards can be used to tighten screws is coincidental. The sharp corners of a credit card are not necessary features that a product needs to have to function as a tool for financial transactions.

Cases in which the intended physical modifications of artefacts are irrelevant for their actual use are also common in modern conceptual art. Consider the readymades of Marcel Duchamp, which were selected from mass-produced, commercially available objects. The intended physical properties of the bicycle wheel that Duchamp used in his work Bicycle Wheel were irrelevant for its role in the artwork. The hub and each individual bearing inside it, the spokes or the material the wheel is made of, while necessary for the object to function as a bicycle wheel, are all irrelevant for the artwork. In fact, the fact that Bicycle Wheel presents a wheel of a bicycle is not necessary for this artwork. A similar artwork with a similar artistic meaning could have different physical structures like that of a coat rack, urinal or shovel, which happen to be the subjects of some of other readymades, namely, Trap, Fountain and In Advance of the Broken Arm.

In response to these examples, some may defend the revised physical reading of the intention condition by arguing that when an artist uses an object for their art, they assume the role of a creator, and the object undergoes a new round of modifications. According to this line of reasoning, even though artists may use objects that have already been intentionally modified, the final artworks should be viewed as the outcomes of the artists’ own modifications, rather than those of the original engineers. Consequently, the physical structures of artworks are to be regarded as products of the intentional modifications of the artists themselves.

However, there are two problems with the above argument. First, in the case of artworks such as Duchamp’s readymades, the modifications that are made to commercially available products are very minimal. Here the artist’s interventions do not create new artefacts because their modifications do not meet the minimum level of artefact-making modification, as outlined by Devereux (1977) and Hilpinen (2011). Secondly, the above argument misses a fundamental point that in such works, the artist’s intention is specifically not to modify the object. The artist simply adds their signature and submits their work to art galleries. A key characteristic of these works is that the physical structure of the artwork cannot be attributed to any intentional act of modification by the artist. Hence, such works cannot be regarded as products of the artist’s intentional modifications. Therefore, the revised physical reading of the intention condition cannot explain the artefactual status of cases where the intended modified properties of the object are irrelevant for its technical function or artistic meaning.

4 Contexts of creation and use

Thus far, our attempts to clearly define the conditions that must be met for an object to qualify as an artefact, particularly regarding the interpretation of the intention condition to prevent counterintuitive conclusions, have not been successful. In this section, a final amendment is proposed that can help define artefacts and avoid such counterintuitive conclusions. This amendment requires differentiating between the context of creation (i.e. the context in which the artefact is intentionally modified) and the context of use.

By making a distinction between the contexts of creation and use, we can assess an object’s status as an artefact solely within its context of creation and sidestep objections that arise from any discrepancies between the creators’ intentions and the ways in which artefacts are actually used. So, as long as an object is intentionally modified by its creators to serve a specific function, it qualifies as an artefact, and it retains this status even if the users’ intentions and its system function do not align with the creators’ intentions and its proper function. A spoon that is used as cutlery would be an artefact due to its design features, which render it suitable for such use. A spoon that is used as a baby toy would also qualify as an artefact, not because it was created for that purpose, but because it was modified by its creators to function as cutlery. The spoon would maintain its artefactual status even if it is incorporated into an artwork, used as a religious object or lost in the warehouse of its producers. Whatever happens to the spoon after its transformation into an artefact does not alter its artefactual status. Similarly, in this account, the readymades of Duchamp would be artefacts because they were originally created with specific physical properties to serve particular functions, even if the creators’ intended functions and the object’s intended physical structure both proved irrelevant for their actual use by the artist. Making a distinction between the contexts of creation and use also means that in this account usefulness is not a criterion of artefactuality. In this way, this account differs from those who contend that artefacts are by definition useful objects (Houkes & Vermaas, 2010, pp. 148–160).

Our discussions have so far been limited to those artefacts that are designed to serve specific functions. Although the actual use of these artefacts sometimes deviated from their original design, the intention behind their creation was clear. However, it is also important to acknowledge that not all artefacts are created with a specific function or meaning in mind. As noted by Juvshik in his arguments against function essentialism, it is not necessary for creators to bestow a particular function or any function at all to their creations for the creations to qualify as artefacts (Juvshik, 2021, p. 2962). Many experimental design projects, for example, produce objects simply to explore new materials, forms or concepts, without a specific intended purpose. Modern interactive artworks, such as large concave or convex mirrors placed in public spaces, are examples of such artefacts. These installations invite the audience to interact with the piece, and the artefact’s meaning and function evolve dynamically with each interaction, often with the original creator having no specific intended meaning or utility in mind. In cases where creators do not intend a specific function or meaning, there is no need to appeal to the revised physical reading of the intention condition, as in the absence of an intended function or meaning, the only reading of the intention condition remains the original physical reading.

Therefore, a satisfactory account of artefacts requires separating the contexts of modification and use while upholding the modification condition and the (revised) physical reading of the intention condition. This account helps to explain cases of functional change or innovative use (where the object’s function differs from the creators’ intentions), cases where the object’s physical structure is not fully determined by the creators (e.g. small cutting tools created by smashing a glass bottle onto the ground) and cases where the specifics of creators’ modifications are irrelevant for the meaning of the artefact (e.g. Duchamp’s readymades).

5 Artefacts, artworks and technologies

The conditions of artefactuality as laid out here have some ramifications for the metaphysical study of artefacts, artworks and technologies. First, the distinction between the contexts of creation and use required for the definition of artefacts implies that artefacts cannot define or represent artworks or technologies. As Danto (1964, 1981) has noted, two seemingly identical objects might be classified differently: one as art and the other not. This entails that the artefactual status of an object cannot be sufficient for its classification as an artwork; otherwise, both objects would either be included or excluded from the category of artworks. On the other hand, it is possible for natural, unmodified objects to qualify as technologies or artworks. A piece of rock used as a doorstop qualifies as a technological object, and live horses tethered in an art gallery, such as those of Kounellis’s Untitled (12 Horses), acquire artistic identities. Hence, artefactuality is neither necessary nor sufficient for something to be an artwork or a technology.

Additionally, when the extensions of these categories overlap (i.e. when artefacts acquire artistic or technological identities), their defining characteristics diverge. Factors that confer artistic and technological identities to objects differ from those that constitute artefactuality. Objects’ artefactual status is determined in the context of creation. In contrast, the artistic or technological identity of objects is determined in the context of use. Whether a bicycle wheel, urinal or coat rack is displayed in an art gallery, serves a technical function, or is buried underground without anyone being aware of its existence, affects its status as a work of art or a technological object; but it does not change its status as an artefact.

While artefacts are necessarily modified objects, artworks and technologies do not need to be. New artworks and technologies can come into being by simply selecting an existing object and displaying it in an art gallery or using it as a tool. In other words, the modification condition is not a requirement for artworks and technologies. Unmodified objects, such as a piece of driftwood presented as a sculpture (Weitz, 1956, p. 33), or a rock used as a hammer (Soltanzadeh, 2019, pp. 237-8), can qualify as artworks or technologies. Evnine (2013) also reaches a similar conclusion while discussing the ontology of readymades such as Duchamp’s Fountain. In his view, an artwork (e.g. a sculpture) can be created by selecting an existing entity (e.g. a urinal) without modifying its structure (ibid., p. 416). The difference here is that based on this paper’s arguments, Fountain does not qualify as a new artefact distinct from the urinal. It remains the same artefact but it acquires an artistic identity. However, for Evnine, Fountain is not just a new entity as an artwork; it is also a new artefact, distinct from the urinal it was made from. Treating Fountain as a new artefact is rooted in Evnine’s rejection of modification as a necessary condition of artefactuality (2016, pp. 110 − 12). In his view, the intention of creators to bring about a new entity is a sufficient condition of artefactuality; artefact creation does not necessarily involve physical modifications. Accordingly, he treats artworks as instances of artefacts and considers acts of creating artworks as acts of creating new artefacts. Accepting Evnine’s view implies that either Kounellis’s horses are artefacts, or that they are not an artwork. Similarly, his view cannot explain the difference between naturefacts and artefacts, and would consider all naturefacts (e.g. a rock used as a hammer or a broken tree branch used as a walking stick) as artefacts. These are counterintuitive conclusions. Modification is a necessary condition for artefact creation, but it is not necessary for assigning artistic or technological identities to objects.

Moreover, while artefactual status requires the existence of the creator’s intention, artistic or technological identities can be independent from the intentions of artefact creators. Instead, they depend on the intentions and attitudes of those who approach the object in the context of use, as works of art or technological objects. The conditions of artefactuality discussed in the previous sections are crucial here. Failure to attend to the modification and intention conditions and distinguish between the contexts of creation and use can lead to a conflation between the category of artefacts with that of artworks and technologies.

On another point, investigating the nature of the relationship between artefacts and designers’ intentions also reveals that while artefact creation necessarily requires intentional action, the link between artefacts and the content of creators’ intentions can be flexible. More specifically, creators do not need to strictly determine the function or physical form of the final product for it to qualify as an artefact or for them to be regarded as its creators. In some cases, creators may even intentionally limit their control over the physical form and meaning of their creations and invite elements of randomness and spontaneity. Drip paintings are examples of such artefacts. Drip painters deliberately avoid traditional compositional methods that emphasise control over artistic form, and instead allow unpredictable interactions with the paint to shape the final product. So, although the existence of creator intention is required for objects to qualify as artefacts, the content of that intention does not need to determine the function or specific form of artefacts.

Finally, it is also important to note that the points made in the previous paragraph and throughout this paper pertain solely to the metaphysical study of artefacts, artworks and technologies. They are not intended as normative claims about how artefacts should be created. Nor do they imply any claims about the socially desirable relationship between designers’ intentions and the function or physical form of artefacts. In many societies, the production of artefacts, especially those intended to be used as technical artefacts, is regulated. Regulators may require technical artefacts to meet certain specifications in order to be safe and function as claimed by their creators. By enforcing these requirements through safety standards, quality control or certification processes, they strengthen the connection between creators’ intentions and the properties of the final products. This, in turn, helps to establish mechanisms of accountability and allows creators to be held responsible for the features of their products. However, here social desirability is not considered a criterion for a metaphysical account of artefacts. Metaphysically, even when an artefact’s physical form is not entirely determined by the intentions of its creators, it can still qualify as an artefact.

In addition to the points discussed in this section, the analysis of the relationship between artefactuality and the context of creation supports a central claim of this paper: artefactuality is an essential property, and identifying an artwork, a technology or any other object as an artefact is an essentialist identification of that object. To reach this conclusion, it is necessary to first distinguish between different forms of essentialism.

6 Essence and essentialism

Essentialism in relation to any category, say X, is the idea that all instances of X share a common set of properties that are necessary for their identity as instances of X. These properties constitute the essence of X, and it is the possession of this essence which makes something an instance of X, as opposed to an instance of Y or Z. Hence, the essence of X reveals its identity and answers the ‘What is X?’ question (Fine, 1994, p. 1). Accordingly, an essentialist identification of the category of X is the identification of X through its essence. Identifying silver as a chemical element with the atomic number 47 is an essentialist identification of silver. Being a chemical element with atomic number 47 is considered the essence of silver, and it is this essence which makes any instance of silver an instance of silver, as opposed to instances of copper or iron. Clearly, not all category identifications are essentialist. For example, it is possible for all silver to be naturally present in, or brought to, one specific physical location, such as one particular mine. In that case, silver could be defined as the element that is stored in that location. But this identification is not essentialist, because it relies on a contingent fact.

There are various conceptions of essence, and theories of essentialism differ in how they conceptualise what it means for a property to be essential. A common view is that for a property P to be essential to X, it must be necessary that X has P (Fine, 1994). In this view, which is adopted in this paper, essential properties are necessary properties (though not vice versa). So, here an essential property is one that ‘entities cannot fail to instantiate in case they exist’ (Bovey, 2021, p. 7716). This view explains why identification of silver by referring to the location where it is stored cannot be an essentialist identification of silver.

One can distinguish between the essentialist identification of kinds and the essentialist identification of objects, or as Okasha puts it, between essentialist claims about kinds and essentialist claims about individuals (Okasha, 2002, p. 192). The formulation provided at the beginning of this section pertains to the essentialist identification of kinds. In contrast, the essentialist identification of an object, say O, refers to identifying O based on a set of properties that reveal its nature and it necessarily possesses. For example, identifying a monarch’s silver crown based on its necessary and universal properties (e.g. as a piece of silver with a specific shape and weight) is an essentialist identification of the crown, as a specific object. Clearly, not all object identifications are essentialist. The same crown can be identified in different, non-essentialist ways, for instance, through the museum room where it is currently displayed or the last monarch who wore it.

Moreover, essentialism can be understood in relation to either intrinsic or relational properties. ‘Intrinsic essentialism’ defines essence in terms of intrinsic properties of a kind or an object. Identifying the natural kind of silver based on its atomic number is an essentialist identification of silver in this sense. This sense of essentialism is more common, and it is sometimes assumed that essential properties are, by definition, intrinsic properties. However, essentialism can also be defined in relation to extrinsic, relational properties. Identifying a person in relation to their biological parents is an essentialist identification of the individual in this latter sense. This identification relies on relational properties that an individual has with their biological parents. Relational properties are extrinsic properties. But in this case, they are also necessary and context-independent. The biological parents of an individual never change, regardless of their life circumstances.

Essentialism defined through relational properties is sometimes discussed in the context of defining biological species and is referred to as ‘relational essentialism’ (Ereshefsky, 2022). In biology, relational essentialism holds that the essential properties of a species can be determined by their relationships, such as their ecological roles or evolutionary connections (Okasha, 2002). It is argued that biological kinds do not possess an intrinsic essence; instead, their essence is historical and rooted in the species’ origin or evolutionary history (LaPorte, 2004). Relational essentialism can also be generalised to other domains. When social, historical or biological relationships serve as necessary and context-independent features of a kind or an object, those relationships qualify as essential properties. This inherent context-independence is what unites the intrinsic and relational forms of essentialism. Objects or kinds retain their essential properties regardless of the spatio-temporal contexts in which they appear.

7 Artefactual essentialism in philosophy of art and technology

The idea that artefacts may have essences has been discussed by some others. Evnine (2016, pp. 86–96), for example, has argued that each artefact has an essence. This essence is determined in the processes of artefact creation by the intentions of the creators to produce objects of certain kinds. Hence, for Evnine, the essence of each artefact is the kind to which it belongs. In other words, artefacts essentially belong to their artefactual kinds (ibid., p. 86). Even in the case of a prototype where a kind may not yet exist, Evnine argues that one can think of an abstract kind as the essence of the artefact. This abstract kind, for example, can be defined as ‘a tool for doing such and such’ (ibid., p. 73). Evnine’s position is incompatible with earlier points made in the Contexts of Creation and Use section. Not all artefacts are created with specific function or meaning in mind. Creators’ intention to construct an artefact of a particular kind cannot constitute the essence of artefacts, because artefact creation is not always accompanied by the intention to produce an object of a particular kind. As stipulated by the intention condition, artefacts inherently carry their creators’ intentions. However, the intention condition must be interpreted in reference to its physical reading: artefact production is more about intentional modification of objects’ physical structure, rather than determining their kind.

Juvshik (2021) and Houkes and Vermaas (2010, pp. 137–160), on the other hand, dispute the idea that artefacts have an essence by rejecting function essentialism. Function essentialism is the view that each artefact necessarily has a function that determines what kind of artefact it is. The discussions in the Artefacts, Technologies and Artworks section strengthen the rejection of function essentialism because here function is determined in the context of use, which makes it contingent and non-essential. Nevertheless, rejecting function essentialism does not amount to rejecting essentialist commitments that can arise from identifying objects as artefacts. Hence, this section builds on the previous discussions of the paper to argue that artefactuality is itself an essential property, and identifying an artwork, a technology or any object based on its artefactual status is an essentialist identification of that object. This conclusion will also mean that regarding artefacts as the subject matter of philosophy of art and technology is inconsistent with the anti-essentialist aspirations in these fields.

An object becomes an artefact when its creators intentionally modify its physical properties in order for it to serve a particular function. The separation between the contexts of modification and use in defining artefacts is crucial here, as it implies that even if an artefact never fulfils its intended function, it still qualifies as an artefact. Even if it is buried underground, it remains an artefact. And even if the artefact is physically indistinguishable from a natural, unmodified object, and no one is aware that the object was once intentionally modified, it still retains its status as an artefact. The artefactual status of each artefact is determined in the context of creation, tied to a spatio-temporally fixed location. This historical link between the artefact and its context of creation is necessary and context-independent. It is part of the identity of the artefact. It constitutes the relational essence of the artefact. Therefore, when the artefactuality of an object is treated as its defining feature, the object is identified via its necessary and context-independent, or in other words, essential properties. The relational essentialism arising from identifying an object based on its artefactuality can be dubbed artefactual essentialism.

In the previous section, a distinction was made between the essential identification of kinds and the essential identification of objects. Based on this distinction, there are two ways in which one can reject essentialism in philosophy of art and technology, and this paper’s arguments pertain to both. Rejecting the essential identification of the categories of art and technology is the idea that there is no single property that is necessarily shared by all works of art or by all technological objects. Instead, in different contexts, different properties can confer artistic or technological identities to objects. Early discussions of this paper can be used to reject the idea that all artworks or technologies necessarily share the property of being artefactual. On the other hand, rejecting the essential identification of individual artworks or technologies requires one not to define an individual work of art or technological object via its necessary and universal (i.e. essential) properties. It is the idea that the identity of any given artwork or technology can be determined via its context-dependent properties. Artefactual essentialism is a claim about the essential identification of individual objects. When a work of art or technological object is identified as an artefact, it is identified in an essentialist way. When a philosopher of art or technology considers artefactuality as the defining subject matter of their field, as what defines each individual object that they philosophise about, they are committed to embracing artefactual essentialism. To reject artefactual essentialism, one must stop identifying artworks and technologies based on their artefactual status.

Now the question is whether artefactual essentialism can be avoided. Earlier in the paper it was demonstrated that artefactuality is not a necessary or sufficient condition for being a work of art or a technological object. Nevertheless, many artworks and technologies happen to be artefacts. Does this mean that in the case of this large group of artworks and technologies, one must accept artefactual essentialism? The answer is not straightforward and depends on the availability of other means of identification.

Consider a walking stick. Once the walking stick is identified by its artefactuality, tied with its production history, in line with Preston’s notion of proper function, then it is identified in an essentialist way. However, having an essence does not necessitate essentialist identifications. Even if an object is an artefact, it may not be necessary for it to be identified through its artefactuality. It might be possible to identify the object by its non-essential properties. In the case of technologies, non-essentialist identifications can be achieved by focusing on objects’ immediate utility and impact, in line with Preston’s notion of system function. For example, the walking stick can be identified via its system function as a tool for balance and mobility or for any other purpose that it is used. This functional identification of the walking stick is context-sensitive and does not rely on any essential properties, including its artefactual status. In general, non-essentialist functional identifications are available for technologies because they can be identified via their context-dependent utility and impact. A philosophy of technology that identifies its subject matter based on the context-dependent utility and impact of objects can remain non-essentialist.

Nevertheless, in cases where it is necessary to identify an object as an artefact in order to recognise its role and significance, there is no escape from artefactual essentialism. Naturalistic paintings, for example, are appreciated as works of art precisely because they are recognised as products of intentional modifications. The meaning of some conceptual artworks also depends on their artefactual status. Consider Duchamp’s readymades once again. The readymades were deliberately selected from mass-produced objects. Their artefactuality is necessary for their meaning as readymades. Such artworks must be identified through their artefactual status. They would lose their artistic significance if they were not identified as artefacts; if they were deprived of their artefactual essence. These cases make it hard to fully avoid artefactual essentialism in philosophy of art.

8 Conclusion

Artefacts have gained popularity as a subject of philosophical inquiry, particularly in the study of art and technology. This is to the point that artefacts are sometimes regarded as the defining subject matter of these fields; as what artworks and technological objects are. At the same time, many philosophers of art and technology reject essentialism and argue that artistic and technological identities are context-dependent. Here it was demonstrated that these two positions are incompatible with one another, and that the first position is flawed. Artefactuality is a relationally essential property, and identifying an artwork, a technology or any other object on the basis of its artefactual status is an essentialist identification of that object. So, while there have been attempts to provide non-essentialist accounts of art, technology and technical functions, as long as philosophy of technology and art concern themselves with artefacts, they cannot fully reject essentialism.

Artefacts are objects that have been modified to have the physical features that their creators intend them to have. However, an artefact’s physical form may not be entirely determined by its creators. Similarly, whether artefacts are used as their creators intended is irrelevant for their artefactual status. In a nutshell, while the existence of a creator’s intention is necessary for something to qualify as an artefact, the specific content of that intention is not.

There is a strong overlap between artworks and technologies, on the one hand, and artefacts, on the other. But this overlap is a contingent matter. Artefactuality is not a criterion for an object to be an artwork or a technology. Kounellis’s Untitled (12 Horses) is an example of a work of art that is not an artefact, and a broken tree branch used as a walking stick is an example of a non-artefactual technological object. More specifically, factors that make an object an artefact differ from those that make it an artwork or a technology. While the artefactual status is determined in the context of creation, the artistic or technological status is determined in the context of use. And while artefacts are necessarily modified, artworks and technologies need not be. Failure to recognise the conditions of artefactuality and make a distinction between the contexts of creation and use can lead to a conflation between the category of artefacts, on the one hand, and artworks and technologies, on the other.

Artefactuality is an essential property; a relationally essential one. The artefactual essence lies in the historical relationship between the artefact and the context in which it was intentionally modified. When an object is identified as an artefact, it is identified by its essential properties. The form of essentialism arising from identifying objects on the basis of their artefactual status is called artefactual essentialism.

Given the conclusions of this paper, philosophers of art and technology may need to reconsider whether artefacts are the right subject matter for non-essentialist accounts. Artefactual essentialism can be avoided if individual artworks and technologies are not identified on the basis of their artefactual status. But it is easier to avoid artefactual essentialism in philosophy of technology than in philosophy of art. When technologies are identified by their immediate utility and impact, their artefactual status can be sidelined. However, sometimes appreciating works of art requires acknowledging them as artefacts, as products of intentional modifications. In such cases, the artefactual essence undermines non-essentialist accounts.

Future research can examine other forms of essentialism that may exist in the philosophy of art and technology and investigate whether they can be avoided. Exploring other forms of essentialism could further clarify the limits of anti-essentialist views.