Electoral Institutions and Legislative Behavior: Explaining Voting Defection in the European Parliament

Electoral Institutions and Legislative Behavior: Explaining Voting Defection in the European Parliament Simon Hix

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Electoral Institutions and Legislative Behavior: Explaining Voting Defection in the European Parliament 2004 World Politics 10.1353/wp.2004.0012 hix2004-electoral-institutions-and-legisla hix2004-electoral-institutions-and-legisla.txt, the project's staged copy 2505c68fdeba60ef31b2e00cde2ed3cce197cade open-access political-science

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0 spans located by searching the stored text for the quote's exact words, allowing any whitespace between them mechanism Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. legislative voting defection Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. observational-study observational-study Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. mechanisms Centralized candidate selection gives the national leadership a credible power to punish, so the MEP anticipates the cost and complies with national instructions Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. mechanisms The MEP weighs the cost of defecting from each principal and votes for whichever side leaves her better off, an expected-utility calculation Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. mechanisms Where individual candidate votes decide electoral fortunes, reelection-seeking legislators cultivate a personal following independent of the party, which loosens party discipline Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. Statistical significance is inflated by the very large number of vote-decision observations. what this limits: every significance claim in the paper: THE EFFECT OF MOST OF THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES IS HIGHLY SIGNIFICANT, PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF THE LARGE NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. Policy conflict between an MEP's two principals is not observed directly but approximated by survey-based distance measures. what this limits: the policy-conflict variables: THESE ARE PROXY MEASURES OF POLICY CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TWO PARTY PRINCIPALS, built from survey distances rather than observed Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. The party-group coefficients do not generalise to MEPs in the largest national delegations because of how the model is specified. what this limits: the party-group results: BECAUSE OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE MODEL, THESE RESULTS ... APPLY ONLY TO THOSE MEPS WHO ARE NOT MEMBERS OF THE FIVE LARGEST NATIONAL DELEGATIONS Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. One of the two policy-conflict predictors does not yield a clear result for national-party defection. what this limits: the national-party defection result specifically: THE EFFECT OF THE EU-INTEGRATION POLICY DISTANCE ... IS LESS CLEAR Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. A formal category is collapsed into a different one on the basis of how voters behave, not on the rule that defines it: semiopen-list systems are treated as closed-list because voters in practice choose the preordered list. what this limits: the candidate-centred versus party-centred classification of electoral systems: semiopen-list systems are placed with closed-list ones because of observed voter behaviour rather than the rule Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. The key explanatory variable is measured by proxy, and the reason given is endogeneity rather than validity: the observed quantity would be caused by the thing being explained. what this limits: the conflict variable as a measure of conflict in the vote at hand: it is a proxy, adopted because conflict observed in a particular vote is endogenous to the vote decisions being explained Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. One side of the model is assumed non-strategic, and the assumption is adopted because the quantity involved is endogenous. what this limits: the party group's behaviour in this model: it is assumed not to act strategically when issuing voting instructions, while the national party is allowed to Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. The arguments the article sets out to adjudicate are reported as never having been tested. what this limits: the debate over a single European electoral system: the article states the existing arguments have remained normative Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. The merged electoral-system class is a modelling decision resting on a behavioural generalisation - that parties control who gets elected, so voter preferences for individuals rarely matter - and every result for that class inherits it. Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. a vector of 1,031 dummy variables, one for every vote eliminates: that the estimate is driven by the differing defection rates and political salience of particular votes rather than by the electoral institution · outcome (stated by the tagger, no quotation): held Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. policy conflict policy conflict Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. closed-list proportional representation closed-list proportional representation Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. semiopen-list PR systems semiopen-list PR systems Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. roll-call votes roll-call votes Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. closed-list closed-list Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. electoral system - AS FORMAL RULE: semiopen- or ordered-list PR, where voters may vote for the list or for an individual politician Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. electoral system - AS PRACTICE: the same systems classified with closed-list PR, because votes for individual candidates rarely decide who is elected Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. policy conflict - a PROXY measure between the two party principals, preferred over the conflict actually observed in a vote precisely because the observed version is endogenous Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. policy conflict - measured by proxy ON PURPOSE: observed per-vote conflict is rejected as endogenous to the decision being explained, so the construct is measured away from the thing it predicts Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. builds-on → Gabel and Hix (2002), "The European Parliament and Executive Politics in the EU" Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. semiopen-list PR systems —same-as→ closed-list semiopen-list PR systems closed-list differs in: NOTHING THAT MATTERS TO THE OUTCOME, WHICH IS THE POINT: the two are formally distinct - semiopen lists let voters express a preference for individuals - but 'because parties control who gets elected, most semiopen-list PR systems are, IN PRACTICE, very similar to closed-list PR systems'. The formal distinction survives; the behavioural one does not · strength of the relation: 0.8 · note: A FORMAL CATEGORY COLLAPSED INTO ANOTHER ON THE EVIDENCE OF PRACTICE, and the record already carries both readings as senses of 'electoral system' - AS FORMAL RULE and AS PRACTICE. The analysis then treats the merged class as one, so every downstream coefficient depends on this move. Audit 2026-09-28: DOUBTFUL - read against its span and kept, but the span says most semiopen-list systems act like closed-list ones; same-as overstates it. Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. logistic regression logistic regression Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. fixed effects fixed effects Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. predicted probability predicted probability Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. confidence interval confidence interval Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. significance test significance test Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. MEPs elected under institutions that weaken their national party's grip — a candidate-centered electoral system, decentralized candidate selection, and large district magnitude — are less likely to vote against their European party group. Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. The same three institutions push in the opposite direction for the other principal: candidate-centered voting rules, decentralized candidate selection, or a large district each make an MEP more likely to vote against her own national party. Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. An MEP is more likely to vote against her national party only under a candidate-centered system combined with decentralized candidate selection. Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. Longer service in the European Parliament lowers defection from the European party group but raises defection from the national party. Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. Domestic legislative-executive design and territorial structure do not affect how MEPs vote in the European Parliament. Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. Defection is rare overall: MEPs almost always voted with the majorities of both their European party group and their national party. Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. National parties enforce their wishes best under closed-list PR, small districts or centralized candidate selection. Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. closed-list proportional representation (PR) system closed-list proportional representation (PR) system Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. semiopen- or ordered-list PR system semiopen- or ordered-list PR system Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. fully open-list PR system fully open-list PR system Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. single-transferable-vote (STV) system single-transferable-vote (STV) system Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. electoral institutions electoral institutions Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. an MEP's two principals an MEP's two principals Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. defection defection Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. the European Parliament as a laboratory the European Parliament as a laboratory Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. electoral institution variables electoral institution variables Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. Electoral System Electoral System Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. Candidate Selection Candidate Selection Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. District Magnitude District Magnitude Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. policy conflict policy conflict Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. MEP defection MEP defection Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. seniority seniority Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. EPG EPG Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. NP NP Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. VOTE VOTE Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. 1,031 — roll-call votes held in the European Parliament between July 1999 and June 2000, cast by 626 sitting MEPs, producing 645,406 individual vote decisions Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. 396,167 — vote decisions left in the analysis after exclusions, made by 526 MEPs from fifty-five national parties in fourteen member states Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. more than 30 percent — reduction in the probability of voting against one's European party group for an MEP elected under the full set of institutions granting independence from the national party Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. approximately 20 percent — reduction in the probability of voting against one's national party for an MEP elected under the full set of institutions giving the national leadership control Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. 16 percent / 15 percent — EPP members are that much less likely, and PES members that much more likely, than the average MEP to vote against their European party group Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. 33 percent (± 2 percent) — extra likelihood that British Conservative MEPs vote against their European party group relative to the average MEP (Model 3); in Model 8 they are 19 percent (± 7 percent) more likely to defect from their national party Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. 7,504 — double defections in which an MEP voted yes or no directly against both principals — under 2 percent of all analysed vote decisions Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution. One hundred ninety-five MEPs (31 percent of the 626 members) — respondents to the EPRG survey used to build the left-right and EU-integration policy-distance measures Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.

The full text of this article is not redistributable, so it is not included here. The evidence sentences are withheld with it; the tag layer and its grounding status remain. The article itself is at https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2004.0012.