standOff, and the article is at its publisher via the link below. When we have changed our mind. Some entries in the table begin with a word in capitals and the reason for it. EVIDENCE CORRECTED — the finding still stands, but we had quoted the wrong sentence from the paper, and the quotation has been replaced with the right one. RETRACTED — the entry itself was wrong; it stays on the page, marked, with the reason, rather than being deleted. WITHDRAWN AND REPLACED — the entry was wrong, and a corrected version of it appears in the entries below. Each mark carries its own reason, in brackets, because the reasons differ from one entry to the next. An entry we have WITHDRAWN is removed from this page and kept in the record, with its reason. A line reading Audit and a date is a later re-reading of the entry against its whole sentence: DOUBTFUL means it was kept, and the reason says what is loose about it. Quotation marks inside the tagger's sentence. Where a tag is the tagger's own sentence, a phrase in quotation marks inside it is borrowed from the paper — the tagger's wording around it is not. The paper's own sentence is the evidence quote for that row; on this page it is withheld with the article, and the article is at its publisher. Nothing inside quotation marks anywhere on this page is ours: if it is quoted, it is the paper's. Whose words a concept carries. A concept entry records a term the paper itself uses, so the term, the sense given for it, and its evidence are the paper's own words, quoted where the paper fixes them. This is the opposite of a sense entry in the tag table, which is the tagger's sentence about how the paper uses a term. Where a concept entry could not be grounded in the paper's words, the entry says so on its own row.| relation to other work | claim_relations | how this paper stands to another: agrees, contradicts, extends, qualifies |
| claim type | claim_type | the shape of the claim: existence, mechanism, method, critique, prediction, null |
| concept edge | concept_edges | an asserted relation between two concepts, with the sentence asserting it |
| concept | concepts | an idea the paper works with, quoted where the paper uses it |
| content tag | content_tags | a finding, definition, quantity, statistic or variable named in the paper |
| limitation | limitations | what the paper says its evidence cannot support |
| mechanism | mechanisms | how the reported effect is said to come about |
| method | method | how the paper produced its evidence |
| phenomenon | phenomenon | the effect or regularity under study |
| sense | senses | a distinct use of a term, quoted where the paper fixes it |
Relations on this page carry a quotation for the claim. Where a relation was separately evidenced — and so tested against the vocabulary for its type — the row says so; none of 1 relation here carry that mark. The rest are the tagger’s reading of the sentence quoted beside them.
This record holds no controls. A layer is empty when the tagger recorded nothing in it — which is not the same as the paper having nothing to record.
| facet | tag | field | conf. | whose words |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| claim_type | critique Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. | claim_type | the paper's words | |
| phenomenon | neural correlates of consciousness Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. | phenomenon | the paper's words | |
| method | conceptual-analysis Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: conceptual-analysis | method | the paper's words | |
| mechanisms | mechanisms Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. | mechanisms[0] | the tagger's words | |
| mechanisms | mechanisms Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. | mechanisms[1] | the tagger's words | |
| limitations | The argument shows the current paradigms need re-development, not that no NCC can ever be found. Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. | limitations[0] | the tagger's words | |
| limitations | The paper is neutral between theories of consciousness and does not adjudicate them. Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. | limitations[1] | the tagger's words | |
| limitations | The design is argued to be flawed in the way a carcinogen study would be if every mouse already had the cancer: the property of interest is presupposed in every subject. Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. what this limits: a content-NCC result as evidence about what makes a content conscious: the design presupposes the property whose instantiation is at issue, exactly as a carcinogen study would if the property were already instantiated in all the mice | limitations[2] | 1.0 | the tagger's words |
| limitations | On the author's own account the approach can at best deliver the conditions for a content being SELECTED for consciousness, which is a different question from a content being conscious. Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. what this limits: the content-based NCC literature: at best it finds the minimally sufficient conditions for selection into consciousness, not for a content's being conscious | limitations[3] | 1.0 | the tagger's words |
| limitations | Tightening the experimental control defeats the aim: the better the content is matched, the harder the conscious/unconscious contrast is to sustain. Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. what this limits: a state-based design that matches content across conditions: the better the matching, the harder it becomes to uphold the very contrast the approach depends on | limitations[4] | 1.0 | the tagger's words |
| limitations | The field states that absence of the neural marker cannot be read as absence of the phenomenon. Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. what this limits: a negative NCC finding in a patient: the researchers are explicit that absent thalamocortical or SMA activity | limitations[5] | 1.0 | the tagger's words |
| limitations | A CONTROL GROUP ARGUED AWAY RATHER THAN OMITTED. Owen's case that the vegetative-state patient's sustained SMA response is voluntary rests on its duration and on its changing to order - and the author notes that this logic, if it works, makes a control group unnecessary, since ANY brain activity time-locked to the requests would show the same thing. He calls that consequence puzzling rather than wrong. Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. | limitations[6] | 0.9 | the tagger's words |
| concepts | neural correlates of consciousness Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: neural correlates of consciousness | concepts[0] | the paper's words | |
| concepts | content consciousness Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: content consciousness | concepts[1] | the paper's words | |
| concepts | state consciousness Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: state consciousness | concepts[2] | the paper's words | |
| concepts | unified conscious field Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: unified conscious field | concepts[3] | the paper's words | |
| concepts | binocular rivalry Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: binocular rivalry | concepts[4] | the paper's words | |
| senses | NCC - FOR CONTENT CONSCIOUSNESS: the minimally sufficient neural conditions for a specific, mostly representational content being conscious rather than not being conscious Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. | senses[0] | 1.0 | the tagger's words |
| senses | NCC - FOR STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS: the minimally sufficient conditions for a creature being in an overall conscious state rather than an overall unconscious state - a different contrast, and the paper's whole argument is that the two cannot stand in for each other Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. | senses[1] | 1.0 | the tagger's words |
| senses | state consciousness - A TERM WHOSE SENSE THE AUTHOR CANNOT STATE SUCCINCTLY, and he gives that failure as the core motivation for writing the paper Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. | senses[2] | 1.0 | the tagger's words |
| senses | the field's vocabulary - DECLARED NON-UNIFORM by the author, who then proceeds on the clustering of studies rather than on the terms Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. | senses[3] | 1.0 | the tagger's words |
| claim_relations | extends → Searle (2005) on the content-based NCC approach Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. | claim_relations[0] | the tagger's words | |
| claim_relations | contradicts → Searle (2005) on adopting the state-based approach instead Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. | claim_relations[1] | the tagger's words | |
| concept_edges | unified conscious field —same-as→ state consciousness Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. strength of the relation: 1
Audit 2026-09-28: DOUBTFUL - read against its full span and kept, but Searle's notion is 'supposedly close' to state consciousness, and the author rejects Searle's use; attributed. also in: unified conscious field · state consciousness | concept_edges[0] | the tagger's words | |
| content_tags | Because content-based NCC studies hold the subject's overall conscious state fixed rather than manipulating it, that presupposed conscious state remains an uncontrolled potential cause of the content's being conscious, i.e. a confound. Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. | content_tags.findings[0] | the tagger's words | |
| content_tags | The content-based approach's target is the neural correlate of a content being selected for conscious presentation, assuming an overall conscious state. Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. | content_tags.findings[1] | the tagger's words | |
| content_tags | Researchers can stay neutral about whether the creature is conscious and still gain fruitful results with this method. Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. | content_tags.findings[2] | the tagger's words | |
| content_tags | In state-based studies there is a trade-off: the more carefully conscious content is matched across conditions, the weaker the grounds for believing the two conditions still differ in being conscious versus unconscious rather than being two conscious conditions. Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. | content_tags.findings[3] | the tagger's words | |
| content_tags | On this criterion the mark of consciousness becomes voluntary control rather than phenomenality. Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. | content_tags.findings[4] | the tagger's words | |
| content_tags | The alternative route of inferring state consciousness from the presence of a content NCC also fails, because the content-based approach already assumes the subject is in a conscious state and therefore cannot independently establish it. Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. | content_tags.findings[5] | the tagger's words | |
| content_tags | The paper concludes that neither the content-based nor the state-based paradigm, pursued on its own, can deliver the neural correlates of consciousness. Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. | content_tags.findings[6] | the tagger's words | |
| content_tags | The remedy proposed is not to conjoin the two approaches' results but to build a new paradigm that targets the causal, mechanistic interplay between content processing and overall conscious state across contents and across conscious and unconscious state types. Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. | content_tags.findings[7] | the tagger's words | |
| content_tags | NCC for content consciousness Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: NCC for content consciousness | content_tags.definitions[0] | the tagger's words | |
| content_tags | NCC for states of consciousness Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: NCC for states of consciousness | content_tags.definitions[1] | the tagger's words | |
| content_tags | total NCC Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: total NCC | content_tags.definitions[3] | the tagger's words | |
| content_tags | neural correlates of volition Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: neural correlates of volition | content_tags.definitions[4] | the tagger's words |
Tags that could not be placed in the text:
What was deliberately not tagged, and why, is recorded per paper by the tagger. Where a paper has no such record, this page says so rather than implying that nothing was declined.