Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk

Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky · Econometrica · 1979 · psychology · 10.2307/1914185 · record kahneman-tversky1979-prospect
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Other fields define these differently the same word, defined another way in another discipline
sample-size 5 fields · statistical-significance 2 fields · value 2 fields · variance 2 fields

Tags on this paper

Every tag the record carries, each linking to every other paper in the corpus that carries it. A tag appears here whether or not its words occur in the article — the spans below are only the ones a sentence in this paper licenses. Of the 8 concept tags on this paper, 5 are grounded in a quoted sentence.

prospect theory loss aversion reference dependence probability weighting expected utility theory decision weights stated probabilities carriers of value A THEORY'S NORMATIVE AND DESCRIPTIVE USES ARE SEPARATED AND ONLY ONE IS ATTACKED: expected utility theory is GENERALLY ACCEPTED AS A NORMATIVE MODEL of rational choice and WIDELY APPLIED AS A DESCRIPTIVE MODEL of economic behaviour - so it is assumed both that all reasonable people WOULD WISH to obey the axioms and that most people ACTUALLY DO. Two different claims travel under one theory's name AND THE TARGET IS THE THEORY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED, NOT THE FORMALISM: the paper describes classes of problems in which preferences SYSTEMATICALLY VIOLATE the axioms, and concludes that utility theory AS IT IS COMMONLY INTERPRETED AND APPLIED is not an adequate DESCRIPTIVE model. The qualifier is doing the work - what fails is a use of the theory A PHENOMENON IS NAMED AT THE MOMENT IT IS INTRODUCED, AND THE NAME CARRIES THE MECHANISM: people underweight outcomes that are MERELY PROBABLE compared with outcomes obtained with CERTAINTY, and THIS TENDENCY, CALLED THE CERTAINTY EFFECT, is what contributes to risk aversion for sure gains and risk seeking for sure losses THE SECOND NAMED TENDENCY IS EXPLICITLY A FACT ABOUT DESCRIPTION: people DISCARD COMPONENTS SHARED BY ALL PROSPECTS under consideration, and THIS TENDENCY, CALLED THE ISOLATION EFFECT, LEADS TO INCONSISTENT PREFERENCES WHEN THE SAME CHOICE IS PRESENTED IN DIFFERENT FORMS. The inconsistency is produced by the form, not by the choice A FORMAL OPERATIONALISATION IS REPORTED AS FAILING TO CAPTURE THE INTUITIVE NOTION IT STANDS FOR: the aversion to probabilistic insurance is called A RATHER PUZZLING CONSEQUENCE of the risk aversion hypothesis, and the conclusion drawn is that THE INTUITIVE NOTION OF RISK IS NOT ADEQUATELY CAPTURED BY THE ASSUMED CONCAVITY of the utility function for wealth. The formalism and the word have come apart, and the paper says which is at fault THE CONTRAST CLASS IS DISSOLVED INTO A MATTER OF DEGREE BEFORE ANY NEW TERM IS OFFERED: the aversion to probabilistic insurance is called PARTICULARLY INTRIGUING because ALL INSURANCE IS, IN A SENSE, PROBABILISTIC - even the most avid buyer REMAINS VULNERABLE to many risks his policies do not cover. What looked like two kinds of thing is shown to be one kind at two settings THE THESIS IS STATED IN ONE SENTENCE AND THE DEMONSTRATIONS ARE PROMISED: two prospects that are EQUIVALENT IN PROBABILITIES AND OUTCOMES COULD HAVE DIFFERENT VALUES DEPENDING ON THEIR FORMULATION. Everything else in the section is evidence for that one claim about description THE MECHANISM IS THAT ONE OBJECT ADMITS MORE THAN ONE DECOMPOSITION: to simplify a choice people disregard components the alternatives SHARE and focus on those that DISTINGUISH them - which may produce inconsistent preferences BECAUSE A PAIR OF PROSPECTS CAN BE DECOMPOSED INTO COMMON AND DISTINCTIVE COMPONENTS IN MORE THAN ONE WAY, and different decompositions sometimes lead to different preferences THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TWO FORMULATIONS IS LOCATED IN THE REPRESENTATION ITSELF: the ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCE between the two decision trees is IN THE LOCATION OF THE DECISION NODE - in the standard form the decision maker faces a choice between two RISKY prospects, and in the sequential form between a RISKY AND A RISKLESS one. The same underlying gamble, two diagrams, and the contrast that drives the effect is a feature of the diagram THE EFFECT IS PRESENTED AS FALSIFYING A FOUNDATIONAL SUPPOSITION RATHER THAN AS A CURIOSITY: the reversal of preferences due to the dependency among events is PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT BECAUSE IT VIOLATES THE BASIC SUPPOSITION of a decision-theoretical analysis, THAT CHOICES BETWEEN PROSPECTS ARE DETERMINED SOLELY BY THE PROBABILITIES OF FINAL STATES WHICH REPRESENTATION IS NATURAL IS ITSELF A PROPERTY OF THE PROBLEM, NOT A FREE CHOICE: it is EASY TO THINK OF decision problems MOST NATURALLY REPRESENTED in one of the forms rather than the other - a choice between two risky ventures is likely to be viewed in the standard form, and the paper then gives a problem that is MOST LIKELY TO BE REPRESENTED in the sequential form THE THEORY PUTS A RE-DESCRIPTION STEP BEFORE THE EVALUATION STEP AND MODELS IT SEPARATELY: two phases are distinguished, an early phase of EDITING and a subsequent phase of EVALUATION, and the function of the editing phase is TO ORGANIZE AND REFORMULATE THE OPTIONS so as to simplify subsequent choice. A formal theory of how a problem is restated before it is answered THE REFERENCE POINT THAT DECIDES WHAT COUNTS AS A GAIN IS ITSELF SET BY THE FORMULATION: gains and losses are DEFINED RELATIVE TO SOME NEUTRAL REFERENCE POINT, usually the current asset position - but THE LOCATION OF THE REFERENCE POINT, AND THE CONSEQUENT CODING OF OUTCOMES AS GAINS OR LOSSES, CAN BE AFFECTED BY THE FORMULATION of the offered prospects and by the decision maker's expectations AND THE CONCLUSION IS STATED AS A PROPERTY OF PREFERENCE ORDERS: MANY ANOMALIES OF PREFERENCE RESULT FROM THE EDITING OF PROSPECTS, and MORE GENERALLY THE PREFERENCE ORDER BETWEEN PROSPECTS NEED NOT BE INVARIANT ACROSS CONTEXTS, BECAUSE THE SAME OFFERED PROSPECT COULD BE EDITED IN DIFFERENT WAYS DEPENDING ON THE CONTEXT IN WHICH IT APPEARS. The order is a property of the description as much as of the object prospect utility value gains losses decision probabilities risk certainty value function certainty effect sample-size statistical-significance variance behavioural-experiment

Legend

relation to other work	`claim_relations`	how this paper stands to another: agrees, contradicts, extends, qualifies
claim type	`claim_type`	the shape of the claim: existence, mechanism, method, critique, prediction, null
concept edge	`concept_edges`	an asserted relation between two concepts, with the sentence asserting it
concept	`concepts`	an idea the paper works with, quoted where the paper uses it
content tag	`content_tags`	a finding, definition, quantity, statistic or variable named in the paper
control	`controls`	an experiment run to eliminate a rival explanation
limitation	`limitations`	what the paper says its evidence cannot support
mechanism	`mechanisms`	how the reported effect is said to come about
method	`method`	how the paper produced its evidence
phenomenon	`phenomenon`	the effect or regularity under study
sense	`senses`	a distinct use of a term, quoted where the paper fixes it
transfer	`transfers`	a method or concept carried in from another field

The paper

The full text is not reproduced here. This article is not cleared for redistribution, so the page carries the tag layer only. Its evidence sentences are withheld; the grounding status remains with each tag, and the article itself is at https://doi.org/10.2307/1914185. The reading view exists for the papers whose licence permits it.

Every tag on this page

claim_relations 5 · claim_type 1 · concept_edges 2 · concepts 5 · content_tags 7 · controls 1 · limitations 9 · mechanisms 14 · method 1 · phenomenon 1 · senses 3 · transfers 1

Relations on this page carry a quotation for the claim. Where a relation was separately evidenced — and so tested against the vocabulary for its type — the row says so; none of 2 relations here carry that mark. The rest are the tagger’s reading of the sentence quoted beside them.

facet	tag	field	conf.	whose words
claim_type	mechanism Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above.	`claim_type`		the paper's words
phenomenon	decision making under risk Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above.	`phenomenon`		the paper's words
method	behavioural-experiment Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: behavioural-experiment	`method`		the paper's words
mechanisms	mechanisms Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: A THEORY'S NORMATIVE AND DESCRIPTIVE USES ARE SEPARATED AND ONLY ONE IS ATTACKED: expected utility theory is GENERALLY ACCEPTED AS A NORMATIVE MODEL of rational choice and WIDELY APPLIED AS A DESCRIPTIVE MODEL of economic behaviour - so it is assumed both that all reasonable people WOULD WISH to obey the axioms and that most people ACTUALLY DO. Two different claims travel under one theory's name	`mechanisms[0]`	0.95	the tagger's words
mechanisms	mechanisms Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: AND THE TARGET IS THE THEORY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED, NOT THE FORMALISM: the paper describes classes of problems in which preferences SYSTEMATICALLY VIOLATE the axioms, and concludes that utility theory AS IT IS COMMONLY INTERPRETED AND APPLIED is not an adequate DESCRIPTIVE model. The qualifier is doing the work - what fails is a use of the theory	`mechanisms[1]`	0.95	the tagger's words
mechanisms	mechanisms Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: A PHENOMENON IS NAMED AT THE MOMENT IT IS INTRODUCED, AND THE NAME CARRIES THE MECHANISM: people underweight outcomes that are MERELY PROBABLE compared with outcomes obtained with CERTAINTY, and THIS TENDENCY, CALLED THE CERTAINTY EFFECT, is what contributes to risk aversion for sure gains and risk seeking for sure losses	`mechanisms[2]`	0.95	the tagger's words
mechanisms	mechanisms Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: THE SECOND NAMED TENDENCY IS EXPLICITLY A FACT ABOUT DESCRIPTION: people DISCARD COMPONENTS SHARED BY ALL PROSPECTS under consideration, and THIS TENDENCY, CALLED THE ISOLATION EFFECT, LEADS TO INCONSISTENT PREFERENCES WHEN THE SAME CHOICE IS PRESENTED IN DIFFERENT FORMS. The inconsistency is produced by the form, not by the choice	`mechanisms[3]`	0.95	the tagger's words
mechanisms	mechanisms Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: A FORMAL OPERATIONALISATION IS REPORTED AS FAILING TO CAPTURE THE INTUITIVE NOTION IT STANDS FOR: the aversion to probabilistic insurance is called A RATHER PUZZLING CONSEQUENCE of the risk aversion hypothesis, and the conclusion drawn is that THE INTUITIVE NOTION OF RISK IS NOT ADEQUATELY CAPTURED BY THE ASSUMED CONCAVITY of the utility function for wealth. The formalism and the word have come apart, and the paper says which is at fault	`mechanisms[4]`	0.95	the tagger's words
mechanisms	mechanisms Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. about this quote: The sentence coining 'contingent insurance' is UNQUOTABLE from this file: a running head and page number are spliced into it - "which provides the certainty of coverage for a PROSPECT THEORY 271 specified type of risk". Damage shape 1. The tag was rewritten to stand on the span it has. also in: THE CONTRAST CLASS IS DISSOLVED INTO A MATTER OF DEGREE BEFORE ANY NEW TERM IS OFFERED: the aversion to probabilistic insurance is called PARTICULARLY INTRIGUING because ALL INSURANCE IS, IN A SENSE, PROBABILISTIC - even the most avid buyer REMAINS VULNERABLE to many risks his policies do not cover. What looked like two kinds of thing is shown to be one kind at two settings	`mechanisms[5]`	0.85	the tagger's words
mechanisms	mechanisms Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: THE THESIS IS STATED IN ONE SENTENCE AND THE DEMONSTRATIONS ARE PROMISED: two prospects that are EQUIVALENT IN PROBABILITIES AND OUTCOMES COULD HAVE DIFFERENT VALUES DEPENDING ON THEIR FORMULATION. Everything else in the section is evidence for that one claim about description	`mechanisms[6]`	0.95	the tagger's words
mechanisms	mechanisms Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: THE MECHANISM IS THAT ONE OBJECT ADMITS MORE THAN ONE DECOMPOSITION: to simplify a choice people disregard components the alternatives SHARE and focus on those that DISTINGUISH them - which may produce inconsistent preferences BECAUSE A PAIR OF PROSPECTS CAN BE DECOMPOSED INTO COMMON AND DISTINCTIVE COMPONENTS IN MORE THAN ONE WAY, and different decompositions sometimes lead to different preferences	`mechanisms[7]`	0.95	the tagger's words
mechanisms	mechanisms Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. about this quote: EXTENDED as far as the file allows, then the tag trimmed. The clause "without changing either probabilities or outcomes" is broken across a page boundary by a running head and a figure - "either probabilities or 272 D. KAHNEMAN AND A. TVERSKY 4/_ 4000 ... outcomes" - so it cannot be quoted verbatim and is not claimed. also in: THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TWO FORMULATIONS IS LOCATED IN THE REPRESENTATION ITSELF: the ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCE between the two decision trees is IN THE LOCATION OF THE DECISION NODE - in the standard form the decision maker faces a choice between two RISKY prospects, and in the sequential form between a RISKY AND A RISKLESS one. The same underlying gamble, two diagrams, and the contrast that drives the effect is a feature of the diagram	`mechanisms[8]`	0.85	the tagger's words
mechanisms	mechanisms Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: THE EFFECT IS PRESENTED AS FALSIFYING A FOUNDATIONAL SUPPOSITION RATHER THAN AS A CURIOSITY: the reversal of preferences due to the dependency among events is PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT BECAUSE IT VIOLATES THE BASIC SUPPOSITION of a decision-theoretical analysis, THAT CHOICES BETWEEN PROSPECTS ARE DETERMINED SOLELY BY THE PROBABILITIES OF FINAL STATES	`mechanisms[9]`	0.95	the tagger's words
mechanisms	mechanisms Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: WHICH REPRESENTATION IS NATURAL IS ITSELF A PROPERTY OF THE PROBLEM, NOT A FREE CHOICE: it is EASY TO THINK OF decision problems MOST NATURALLY REPRESENTED in one of the forms rather than the other - a choice between two risky ventures is likely to be viewed in the standard form, and the paper then gives a problem that is MOST LIKELY TO BE REPRESENTED in the sequential form	`mechanisms[10]`	0.95	the tagger's words
mechanisms	mechanisms Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: THE THEORY PUTS A RE-DESCRIPTION STEP BEFORE THE EVALUATION STEP AND MODELS IT SEPARATELY: two phases are distinguished, an early phase of EDITING and a subsequent phase of EVALUATION, and the function of the editing phase is TO ORGANIZE AND REFORMULATE THE OPTIONS so as to simplify subsequent choice. A formal theory of how a problem is restated before it is answered	`mechanisms[11]`	0.95	the tagger's words
mechanisms	mechanisms Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: THE REFERENCE POINT THAT DECIDES WHAT COUNTS AS A GAIN IS ITSELF SET BY THE FORMULATION: gains and losses are DEFINED RELATIVE TO SOME NEUTRAL REFERENCE POINT, usually the current asset position - but THE LOCATION OF THE REFERENCE POINT, AND THE CONSEQUENT CODING OF OUTCOMES AS GAINS OR LOSSES, CAN BE AFFECTED BY THE FORMULATION of the offered prospects and by the decision maker's expectations	`mechanisms[12]`	0.95	the tagger's words
mechanisms	mechanisms Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: AND THE CONCLUSION IS STATED AS A PROPERTY OF PREFERENCE ORDERS: MANY ANOMALIES OF PREFERENCE RESULT FROM THE EDITING OF PROSPECTS, and MORE GENERALLY THE PREFERENCE ORDER BETWEEN PROSPECTS NEED NOT BE INVARIANT ACROSS CONTEXTS, BECAUSE THE SAME OFFERED PROSPECT COULD BE EDITED IN DIFFERENT WAYS DEPENDING ON THE CONTEXT IN WHICH IT APPEARS. The order is a property of the description as much as of the object	`mechanisms[13]`	0.95	the tagger's words
limitations	the analysis is restricted to prospects with objective/standard probabilities Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. what this limits: the scope of the whole treatment: THE PRESENT DISCUSSION IS RESTRICTED TO PROSPECTS WITH SO-CALLED OBJECTIVE OR STANDARD PROBABILITIES	`limitations[0]`		the tagger's words
limitations	The findings rest on hypothetical rather than real choices, which raises validity and generalisability questions the authors acknowledge. Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. what this limits: every empirical result in the paper: THE RELIANCE ON HYPOTHETICAL CHOICES RAISES OBVIOUS QUESTIONS REGARDING THE VALIDITY OF THE METHOD AND THE GENERALIZABILITY OF THE RESULTS	`limitations[1]`		the tagger's words
limitations	The order in which editing operations are applied, and hence the final edited prospect, is not determined by the theory and is left unstudied. Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. what this limits: the determinacy of the model's own predictions: the order of editing operations decides the final edited prospect, and A DETAILED STUDY OF THIS PROBLEM IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE PRESENT TREATMENT	`limitations[2]`		the tagger's words
limitations	The theory's account of insurance and gambling is admittedly incomplete. Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. what this limits: the insurance-and-gambling account specifically: WE FEEL THAT THE PRESENT ANALYSIS FALLS FAR SHORT OF A FULLY ADEQUATE ACCOUNT OF THESE COMPLEX PHENOMENA	`limitations[3]`		the tagger's words
limitations	The treatment covers only the simplest two-prospect choice task, not bidding or other production tasks. Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. what this limits: the task the theory is tested on: THE PRESENT TREATMENT CONCERNS THE SIMPLEST DECISION TASK IN WHICH A PERSON CHOOSES BETWEEN TWO AVAILABLE PROSPECTS	`limitations[4]`		the tagger's words
limitations	How compound or many-outcome prospects are reduced to simple ones has not been investigated. Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. what this limits: any application to compound prospects: THE MANNER IN WHICH COMPLEX OPTIONS, E.G., COMPOUND PROSPECTS, ARE REDUCED TO SIMPLER ONES IS YET TO BE INVESTIGATED	`limitations[5]`		the tagger's words
limitations	The critique is aimed at one of the criticised theory's two stated uses, not at both. Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. what this limits: any claim that this paper refutes expected utility theory: the authors state it is accepted as a normative model of rational choice and separately applied as a descriptive model of economic behavior, and the critique is of the descriptive use	`limitations[6]`	1.0	the tagger's words
limitations	The proposed theory is stated by its own authors to have normatively unacceptable consequences. Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. what this limits: any normative or prescriptive use of prospect theory: the authors state that its	`limitations[7]`	1.0	the tagger's words
limitations	The demonstrations rest on a named academic sample and one national currency. Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. what this limits: any generalisation of these effects to a population: the demonstrations are based on the responses of students and university faculty to hypothetical choice problems, with outcomes denominated in Israeli currency	`limitations[8]`	1.0	the tagger's words
transfers	expected-utility theory, the economists' normative model of choice under risk, taken into psychology as the descriptive model to be tested and then replaced Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above.	`transfers[0]`	0.9	the tagger's words
controls	the same choice problems put to a second population, in Israel, with the pattern of results reported as essentially identical Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. eliminates: the violations of expected utility being a property of one student population or one currency - the same gambles put to a different country produce the same reversals · outcome (stated by the tagger, no quotation): held	`controls[0]`	0.85	the tagger's words
concepts	prospect theory Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: prospect theory	`concepts[0]`		the paper's words
concepts	expected utility theory Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: expected utility theory	`concepts[4]`		the paper's words
concepts	decision weights Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: decision weights	`concepts[5]`		the paper's words
concepts	stated probabilities Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: stated probabilities	`concepts[6]`		the paper's words
concepts	carriers of value Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: carriers of value	`concepts[7]`		the paper's words
senses	expected utility theory - TWO USES UNDER ONE NAME, NAMED IN ONE SENTENCE: accepted as a NORMATIVE model of rational choice - what reasonable people would WISH to do - and applied as a DESCRIPTIVE model of economic behavior - what most people ACTUALLY DO; the paper's critique is of the second use only, and the distinction is carried by those two verbs Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above.	`senses[0]`	1.0	the tagger's words
senses	prospect theory - DESCRIPTIVE, AND SAID BY ITS AUTHORS TO FAIL AS A NORM: it keeps the bilinear form of expected utility theory but attaches values to changes and lets decision weights depart from stated probabilities, and the authors state these departures must lead to normatively unacceptable consequences Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above.	`senses[1]`	1.0	the tagger's words
senses	the carriers of value - CHANGES OF WEALTH, NOT FINAL ASSET POSITIONS: the cornerstone of the theory is that value attaches to changes rather than to states that include current wealth, so every quantity in the model is defined relative to a reference point that the model itself does not fix Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above.	`senses[2]`	1.0	the tagger's words
claim_relations	contradicts → expected utility theory as a descriptive model Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above.	`claim_relations[0]`		the tagger's words
claim_relations	contradicts → expected utility theory as a descriptive model of choice Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above.	`claim_relations[1]`		the tagger's words
claim_relations	builds-on → Markowitz [29] Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above.	`claim_relations[2]`		the tagger's words
claim_relations	extends → Markowitz [29] Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above.	`claim_relations[3]`		the tagger's words
claim_relations	replicates → Allais [2] Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above.	`claim_relations[4]`		the tagger's words
concept_edges	prospect theory —contrasted-with→ expected utility theory Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. differs in: values attached to changes rather than final states, and decision weights that do not coincide with stated probabilities · strength of the relation: 1 also in: prospect theory · expected utility theory	`concept_edges[0]`		the tagger's words
concept_edges	decision weights —distinct-from→ stated probabilities Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. strength of the relation: 1 also in: decision weights · stated probabilities	`concept_edges[1]`		the tagger's words
content_tags	The value function is normally concave for gains, commonly convex for losses, and generally steeper for losses than for gains; overweighting of low probabilities may contribute to the attractiveness of both insurance and gambling. Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above.	`content_tags.findings[1]`	0.85	the tagger's words
content_tags	value function Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: value function	`content_tags.definitions[0]`		the tagger's words
content_tags	decision weights Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: decision weights	`content_tags.definitions[1]`		the tagger's words
content_tags	certainty effect Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: certainty effect	`content_tags.definitions[2]`		the tagger's words
content_tags	sample-size Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: sample-size	`content_tags.statistics[1]`		the tagger's words
content_tags	statistical-significance Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: statistical-significance	`content_tags.statistics[2]`		the tagger's words
content_tags	variance Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: variance	`content_tags.statistics[3]`		the tagger's words

Interpretive choices

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content_tags.findings[0] — quotation withheld — the page has already reproduced as much of this paper as the rights budget allows
NOT MACHINE-VOUCHED: declared-ellipsis - An elided quote: its 2 pieces ('This paper presents a critique of expect' ... 'lities are replaced by decision weights.') are each in our copy of the paper, and the quote marks the cut with an ellipsis, so the joined string is in no copy. Located mechanically, piece by piece.

What was deliberately not tagged, and why, is recorded per paper by the tagger. Where a paper has no such record, this page says so rather than implying that nothing was declined.