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        <title>SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION, THEORY CHANGE, AND EPISTEMIC BOUNDARIES IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE</title>
        <author>Artemi Sokolov</author>
        <author>Leonid Averin</author>
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          <title>SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION, THEORY CHANGE, AND EPISTEMIC BOUNDARIES IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE</title>
          <date>2026</date>
          <publisher>Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)</publisher>
          <idno type="DOI">10.5281/zenodo.20073948</idno>
          
          <idno type="record">sokolov2026-scientific-explanation-theory-chan</idno>
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        <label>critique</label>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
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      <span xml:id="t1" type="phenomenon" ana="#phenomenon" resp="#paper">
        <label>scientific explanation and theory change</label>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
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      <span xml:id="t2" type="method" ana="#method" resp="#paper">
        <label>review</label>
        <term>review</term>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
      </span>
      <span xml:id="t3" type="mechanisms" ana="#mechanisms[0]" resp="#tagger">
        <label>mechanisms</label>
        <term>Objectivity is produced, not presupposed: structuring methods and communities so that criticism, transparency and diverse perspectives circulate prevents any single bias or standpoint from going unchecked, which is what makes objective claims possible in a socially organised practice</term>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
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      <span xml:id="t4" type="mechanisms" ana="#mechanisms[1]" resp="#tagger">
        <label>mechanisms</label>
        <term>Realist commitment survives theory change because what is carried across revolutions is the structural content of superseded theories — their relational organisation, mathematical form and dependency patterns — rather than their full ontology</term>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
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      <span xml:id="t5" type="mechanisms" ana="#mechanisms[2]" resp="#tagger">
        <label>mechanisms</label>
        <term>The pluralisation of explanation was driven by the demand for rigour itself: holding accounts answerable to actual scientific practice forced the abandonment of a single universal schema</term>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
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      <span xml:id="t6" type="limitations" ana="#limitations[0]" resp="#tagger" cert="1.0">
        <label>The account of what a term means is taken from an encyclopedia entry rather than from the literature the entry summarises.</label>
        <note>what this limits: any position attributed here to the incommensurability literature: it is reported from the Stanford Encyclopedia entry on incommensurability rather than from the primary sources that entry summarises</note>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
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      <span xml:id="t7" type="limitations" ana="#limitations[1]" resp="#tagger" cert="1.0">
        <label>The paper reports that competing theories may have no shared standard by which to compare them.</label>
        <note>what this limits: any comparison of two theories drawn from this article: it reports the Kuhnian picture as implying</note>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
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      <span xml:id="t8" type="limitations" ana="#limitations[2]" resp="#tagger" cert="1.0">
        <label>Carrying a result from a model to the thing modelled is stated not to be automatic, even in the easiest case.</label>
        <note>what this limits: any inference from a scientific model to its target: the article reports that even scale models are faithful only</note>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
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      <span xml:id="t9" type="limitations" ana="#limitations[3]" resp="#tagger" cert="1.0">
        <label>One of the paper&#x27;s central terms is reported to name several distinct problems rather than one.</label>
        <note>what this limits: the notion of representation as used in this article: it is reported that no single problem of representation exists and that there are instead multiple distinct issues</note>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
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      <span xml:id="t10" type="concepts" ana="#concepts[0]" resp="#paper">
        <label>scientific explanation</label>
        <term>scientific explanation</term>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
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      <span xml:id="t11" type="concepts" ana="#concepts[1]" resp="#paper">
        <label>deductive-nomological model</label>
        <term>deductive-nomological model</term>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
      </span>
      <span xml:id="t12" type="concepts" ana="#concepts[2]" resp="#paper">
        <label>incommensurability</label>
        <term>incommensurability</term>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
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      <span xml:id="t13" type="concepts" ana="#concepts[3]" resp="#paper">
        <label>scientific realism</label>
        <term>scientific realism</term>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
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      <span xml:id="t14" type="concepts" ana="#concepts[4]" resp="#paper">
        <label>theory change</label>
        <term>theory change</term>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
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      <span xml:id="t15" type="concepts" ana="#concepts[5]" resp="#paper" cert="0.95">
        <label>Mechanistic accounts</label>
        <term>Mechanistic accounts</term>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
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      <span xml:id="t16" type="concepts" ana="#concepts[6]" resp="#paper" cert="0.95">
        <label>unificationist accounts</label>
        <term>unificationist accounts</term>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
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      <span xml:id="t17" type="concepts" ana="#concepts[7]" resp="#paper" cert="0.95">
        <label>pragmatic accounts of explanation</label>
        <term>pragmatic accounts of explanation</term>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
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      <span xml:id="t18" type="concepts" ana="#concepts[8]" resp="#paper" cert="0.95">
        <label>explanatory pluralism</label>
        <term>explanatory pluralism</term>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
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      <span xml:id="t19" type="concepts" ana="#concepts[9]" resp="#paper" cert="0.95">
        <label>underdetermination</label>
        <term>underdetermination</term>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
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      <span xml:id="t20" type="concepts" ana="#concepts[10]" resp="#paper" cert="0.95">
        <label>Constructive empiricism</label>
        <term>Constructive empiricism</term>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
      </span>
      <span xml:id="t21" type="concepts" ana="#concepts[11]" resp="#paper" cert="0.95">
        <label>Structural realism</label>
        <term>Structural realism</term>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
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      <span xml:id="t22" type="concepts" ana="#concepts[12]" resp="#paper" cert="0.95">
        <label>empirical adequacy</label>
        <term>empirical adequacy</term>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
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      <span xml:id="t23" type="concepts" ana="#concepts[13]" resp="#paper" cert="0.95">
        <label>truth about unobservables</label>
        <term>truth about unobservables</term>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
      </span>
      <span xml:id="t24" type="concepts" ana="#concepts[14]" resp="#paper" cert="0.95">
        <label>structural content</label>
        <term>structural content</term>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
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      <span xml:id="t25" type="concepts" ana="#concepts[15]" resp="#paper" cert="0.95">
        <label>full ontology</label>
        <term>full ontology</term>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
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      <span xml:id="t26" type="concepts" ana="#concepts[16]" resp="#paper" cert="0.95">
        <label>objectivity</label>
        <term>objectivity</term>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
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      <span xml:id="t27" type="concepts" ana="#concepts[17]" resp="#paper" cert="0.95">
        <label>elimination of all values and perspectives</label>
        <term>elimination of all values and perspectives</term>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
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      <span xml:id="t28" type="unhoused_relations" ana="#unhoused_relations[0]" resp="#tagger" cert="0.95">
        <label>Constructive empiricism → empirical adequacy</label>
        <note>Constructive empiricism limits theory acceptance to belief in empirical adequacy. This epistemic-standard relation is not is-a, part-of, same-as, distinct-from, contrasted-with, operationalised-as, causes, or renamed-across-fields.</note>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
      </span>
      <span xml:id="t29" type="unhoused_relations" ana="#unhoused_relations[1]" resp="#tagger" cert="0.95">
        <label>Structural realism → structural content</label>
        <note>Structural realism identifies structural content as what may be preserved across theory change. Preservation-across-change is not is-a, part-of, same-as, distinct-from, contrasted-with, operationalised-as, causes, or renamed-across-fields.</note>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
      </span>
      <span xml:id="t30" type="senses" ana="#senses[0]" resp="#tagger" cert="1.0">
        <label>incommensurability - A CHANGED MEANING THAT THEN SPLIT IN TWO: originally lack of common measure, and later divided by philosophical discussion into conceptual and methodological incommensurability, so the word names an older idea and two newer ones at once</label>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
      </span>
      <span xml:id="t31" type="senses" ana="#senses[1]" resp="#tagger" cert="1.0">
        <label>explanation - SEVERAL MODELS, EACH PRESUPPOSING A DIFFERENT IMAGE OF SCIENCE: discussion begins with lawful derivation and later adds causal, mechanistic, unificationist and pragmatic alternatives, and the article says the sequence matters because the models are not interchangeable accounts of one thing</label>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
      </span>
      <span xml:id="t32" type="senses" ana="#senses[2]" resp="#tagger" cert="1.0">
        <label>representation - NOT ONE PROBLEM BUT SEVERAL: the article reports that no single problem of representation exists, so a claim that a model represents its target is selective, purpose-relative and mediated by inference rather than a single relation</label>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
      </span>
      <span xml:id="t33" type="senses" ana="#senses[3]" resp="#tagger" cert="0.95">
        <label>Mechanistic accounts - explain through organized constitution and causal production</label>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
      </span>
      <span xml:id="t34" type="senses" ana="#senses[4]" resp="#tagger" cert="0.95">
        <label>Unificationist accounts - explain apparently different phenomena through a smaller set of patterns or principles</label>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
      </span>
      <span xml:id="t35" type="senses" ana="#senses[5]" resp="#tagger" cert="0.95">
        <label>Pragmatic accounts of explanation - evaluate explanations relative to inquiry roles and explanatory interests</label>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
      </span>
      <span xml:id="t36" type="senses" ana="#senses[6]" resp="#tagger" cert="0.95">
        <label>Explanatory pluralism - multiple models remain necessary across disciplines with different targets and methods</label>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
      </span>
      <span xml:id="t37" type="senses" ana="#senses[7]" resp="#tagger" cert="0.95">
        <label>Underdetermination - the evidence at a time may not determine which beliefs to adopt</label>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
      </span>
      <span xml:id="t38" type="senses" ana="#senses[8]" resp="#tagger" cert="0.95">
        <label>Constructive empiricism - accepting a theory means believing it empirically adequate, not literally true about unobservables</label>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
      </span>
      <span xml:id="t39" type="senses" ana="#senses[9]" resp="#tagger" cert="0.95">
        <label>Structural realism - preserves realist commitment by privileging structural continuity over full ontology</label>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
      </span>
      <span xml:id="t40" type="senses" ana="#senses[10]" resp="#tagger" cert="0.95">
        <label>Empirical adequacy - the scientific aim constructive empiricism endorses</label>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
      </span>
      <span xml:id="t41" type="senses" ana="#senses[11]" resp="#tagger" cert="0.95">
        <label>Truth about unobservables - the aim constructive empiricism contrasts with empirical adequacy</label>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
      </span>
      <span xml:id="t42" type="senses" ana="#senses[12]" resp="#tagger" cert="0.95">
        <label>Structural content - what may survive historical theory change more reliably than ontology</label>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
      </span>
      <span xml:id="t43" type="senses" ana="#senses[13]" resp="#tagger" cert="0.95">
        <label>Full ontology - what structural realism does not claim is reliably retained across discarded theories</label>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
      </span>
      <span xml:id="t44" type="senses" ana="#senses[14]" resp="#tagger" cert="0.95">
        <label>Objectivity - a disciplined communal and methodological achievement, not perspective-free access</label>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
      </span>
      <span xml:id="t45" type="senses" ana="#senses[15]" resp="#tagger" cert="0.95">
        <label>Elimination of all values and perspectives - explicitly rejected as the richer meaning of objectivity</label>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
      </span>
      <span xml:id="t46" type="claim_relations" ana="#claim_relations[0]" resp="#tagger">
        <label>builds-on → Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entries on scientific realism and scientific objectivity</label>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
      </span>
      <span xml:id="t47" type="concept_edges" ana="#concept_edges[0]" resp="#tagger">
        <label>EVIDENCE CORRECTED (RE-GROUNDED) · scientific explanation —operationalised-as→ deductive-nomological model</label>
        <term>scientific explanation</term>
        <term>deductive-nomological model</term>
        <note>EVIDENCE CORRECTED: RE-GROUNDED. The old span began at &#x27;Quotation withheld…&#x27;, dropping the subject that makes it a claim about scientific explanation at all. — strength of the relation: 1
Audit 2026-09-28: DOUBTFUL - read against its full span and kept, but attributed: the span reports how the SEP says modern discussion of explanation began.</note>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
      </span>
      <span xml:id="t48" type="concept_edges" ana="#concept_edges[1]" resp="#tagger">
        <label>scientific realism —contrasted-with→ theory change</label>
        <term>scientific realism</term>
        <term>theory change</term>
        <note>strength of the relation: 1
Audit 2026-09-28: DOUBTFUL - read against its full span and kept, but attributed: the span reports the SEP entry&#x27;s framing of the challenge from theory change.</note>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
      </span>
      <span xml:id="t49" type="concept_edges" ana="#concept_edges[3]" resp="#tagger" cert="0.95">
        <label>empirical adequacy —distinct-from→ truth about unobservables</label>
        <term>empirical adequacy</term>
        <term>truth about unobservables</term>
        <note>the relation itself is separately evidenced · strength of the relation: 1 · note: The article states the contrast directly with &#x27;rather than&#x27;.
Audit 2026-09-28: DOUBTFUL - read against its full span and kept, but attributed: the span reports what constructive empiricism &#x27;can hold&#x27;.</note>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
      </span>
      <span xml:id="t50" type="concept_edges" ana="#concept_edges[4]" resp="#tagger" cert="0.95">
        <label>structural content —distinct-from→ full ontology</label>
        <term>structural content</term>
        <term>full ontology</term>
        <note>the relation itself is separately evidenced · strength of the relation: 0.7 · note: The article says structural content may be what survives, so the relation keeps that modal hedge at 0.7.
Audit 2026-09-28: DOUBTFUL - read against its full span and kept, but the span says structural realism SUGGESTS what science MAY preserve; hedged.</note>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
      </span>
      <span xml:id="t51" type="concept_edges" ana="#concept_edges[5]" resp="#tagger" cert="0.95">
        <label>objectivity —distinct-from→ elimination of all values and perspectives</label>
        <term>objectivity</term>
        <term>elimination of all values and perspectives</term>
        <note>the relation itself is separately evidenced · strength of the relation: 1 · note: The article explicitly says objectivity is not elimination of all values and perspectives, but disciplined management of their influence.</note>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
      </span>
      <span xml:id="t52" type="content_tags" ana="#content_tags.findings[0]" resp="#tagger">
        <label>The article&#x27;s central claim is that philosophy of science should be read not as a hunt for one timeless criterion of rationality but as the study of how explanation, empirical adequacy, objectivity, progress and ontological commitment are coordinated and contested within changing scientific practice.</label>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
      </span>
      <span xml:id="t53" type="content_tags" ana="#content_tags.findings[1]" resp="#tagger">
        <label>Epistemic boundaries are negotiated limits.</label>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
      </span>
      <span xml:id="t54" type="content_tags" ana="#content_tags.findings[2]" resp="#tagger">
        <label>Explanation is increasingly treated as a family of related epistemic achievements rather than one formal relation.</label>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
      </span>
      <span xml:id="t55" type="content_tags" ana="#content_tags.findings[3]" resp="#tagger">
        <label>Realism becomes selective and model-sensitive, objectivity procedural, social and critical, and progress multi-dimensional rather than simply cumulative.</label>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
      </span>
      <span xml:id="t56" type="content_tags" ana="#content_tags.findings[4]" resp="#tagger">
        <label>Science can progress along several dimensions - empirical adequacy, explanatory reach, conceptual articulation, representational power, intervention and critical self-correction - which need not move together.</label>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
      </span>
      <span xml:id="t57" type="content_tags" ana="#content_tags.findings[5]" resp="#tagger">
        <label>The article&#x27;s twofold conclusion is that monistic images of science misdescribe the heterogeneity of its models, methods and history, and that this heterogeneity nevertheless does not license epistemic despair about scientific authority.</label>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
      </span>
      <span xml:id="t58" type="content_tags" ana="#content_tags.findings[6]" resp="#tagger">
        <label>If observation is never fully independent of theoretical commitments, explanation cannot be a simple one-way derivation from pure empirical givens.</label>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
      </span>
      <span xml:id="t59" type="content_tags" ana="#content_tags.findings[7]" resp="#tagger">
        <label>The article characterises the resulting stance of the field as fallibilist without cynicism, historically informed without anti-rationalism, and pluralist without indiscriminateness.</label>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
      </span>
      <span xml:id="t60" type="content_tags" ana="#content_tags.definitions[0]" resp="#tagger">
        <label>scientific realism</label>
        <term>scientific realism</term>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
      </span>
      <span xml:id="t61" type="content_tags" ana="#content_tags.definitions[1]" resp="#tagger">
        <label>constructive empiricism</label>
        <term>constructive empiricism</term>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
      </span>
      <span xml:id="t62" type="content_tags" ana="#content_tags.definitions[2]" resp="#tagger">
        <label>underdetermination</label>
        <term>underdetermination</term>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
      </span>
      <span xml:id="t63" type="content_tags" ana="#content_tags.definitions[3]" resp="#tagger">
        <label>scientific objectivity</label>
        <term>scientific objectivity</term>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
      </span>
      <span xml:id="t64" type="content_tags" ana="#content_tags.definitions[4]" resp="#tagger">
        <label>incommensurability</label>
        <term>incommensurability</term>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
      </span>
      <span xml:id="t65" type="content_tags" ana="#content_tags.definitions[5]" resp="#tagger">
        <label>scientific progress</label>
        <term>scientific progress</term>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
      </span>
      <span xml:id="t66" type="content_tags" ana="#content_tags.definitions[6]" resp="#tagger">
        <label>scientific pluralism</label>
        <term>scientific pluralism</term>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
      </span>
      <span xml:id="t67" type="content_tags" ana="#content_tags.definitions[8]" resp="#tagger">
        <label>deductive-nomological model</label>
        <term>deductive-nomological model</term>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
      </span>
      <span xml:id="t68" type="content_tags" ana="#content_tags.definitions[9]" resp="#tagger">
        <label>syntactic view</label>
        <term>syntactic view</term>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
      </span>
      <span xml:id="t69" type="content_tags" ana="#content_tags.definitions[10]" resp="#tagger">
        <label>semantic view</label>
        <term>semantic view</term>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
      </span>
      <span xml:id="t70" type="content_tags" ana="#content_tags.definitions[11]" resp="#tagger">
        <label>pragmatic view</label>
        <term>pragmatic view</term>
        <note type="quotation-withheld">Quotation withheld because this record is not cleared for redistribution.</note>
      </span>
    </spanGrp>
  </standOff>
  <text>
    <body>
      <p><note type="rights">The full text of this article is not redistributable, so it is
      not included here. The evidence sentences are withheld with it; the tag layer and its
      grounding status remain. The article itself is at https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20073948.</note></p>
    </body>
  </text>
</TEI>
