phenomenon · claim-type · cross-domain-transfer · mechanism · claim-relation · replication-status · limitation — grounded in the full text| phenomenon | subliminal masked priming— “In this article, we describe our attentional sensitization model and review recent evidence demonstrating attentional influences on subliminal priming, a prototypical example of an automatic process.” | |
| claim-type | mechanism— “According to this model, attentional influences originating from task sets enhance task-relevant unconscious processes while attenuating task-irrelevant unconscious processes.” | |
| method — evidence | — “In the upcoming two parts of this article, we will review latest evidence demonstrating a variety of attentional influences on several forms of unconscious priming.” | |
| transfer | from computational neuroscience / neural network modelling and single-cell neurophysiology: The gain parameter of neural network models, together with attentional gain modulation observed in primate single-cell recordings, is imported as the computational mechanism of the psychological attentional sensitization model— “Gain is a parameter in neural network modeling, which influences the probability that a neuron fires at a given activation level ( Hamker, 2005 ).” | transfers[0] |
| mechanism | Task representations raise the neuronal gain of task-relevant processing pathways and lower it in task-irrelevant ones, so unconscious stimuli are amplified or attenuated according to their congruence with the current task set— “Processing in task-relevant pathways is enhanced by increasing the gain of the neurons in the corresponding areas, whereas processing in task-irrelevant pathways is attenuated by a decrease of the gain ( Reynolds, Pasternak, & Desimone, 2000 ).” | mechanisms[0] |
| mechanism | Prefrontal top-down signals adjust the sensitivity of posterior processing pathways to incoming sensory input, whether or not that input reaches awareness— “unconscious cognition is assumed to be controlled by top-down signals from prefrontal cortex ( Haynes et al., 2007 ) that increase or decrease the sensitivity of processing pathways for incoming sensory input” | mechanisms[1] |
| mechanism | Backward inhibition suppresses the just-abandoned task set while the next task is prepared, which reverses the direction of the sensitization effect at long intervals— “This result pattern is compatible with the notion of a backward inhibition mechanism that suppresses irrelevant task sets in preparation of the next task” | mechanisms[2] |
| mechanism | Attentional sensitization applies to unconscious and conscious stimuli alike, being blind to whether the stimulus is consciously perceived— “We thus assume that an attentional sensitizing mechanism gradually enhances and attenuates stimulus processing irrespective of whether the stimulus is consciously perceived or not” | mechanisms[3] |
| contradicts | classical theories of automaticity (Posner & Snyder, 1975; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977)— “Hence, in contrast to classical theories of automaticity ( Posner & Snyder, 1975 ; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977 ), automatic processes elicited by unconscious visual stimuli are under attentional control to some extent.” | claim_relations[0] |
| builds-on | Kiefer & Martens, 2010— “We have therefore recently developed the attentional sensitization model of unconscious cognition ( Kiefer & Martens, 2010 ) that aims at explaining the various influences of top-down attention on different forms of unconscious automatic processing.” | claim_relations[1] |
| sense | automaticity, CLASSICAL - and the sense worth recording is the OPERATIONAL consequence rather than the phrasing: if automatic processes are autonomous, then a behavioural or neurophysiological effect `has to be INVARIANT in order to index a truly automatic process`. The definition dictates a test, the test is invariance, and invariance is what gets measured. A conceptual assumption turned into an experimental criterion— “Based upon the assumption that automatic processes are autonomous, a behavioral or neurophysiological effect has to be invariant in order to index a “truly automatic” process ( Pessoa, Kastner, & Ungerleider, 2003 ). Such operational definitions of automaticity , which are essentially influenced by the classical view” | senses[0] |
| sense | A DEFINITION REJECTED BECAUSE ITS EXTENSION IS EMPTY. Attention and task demands modulate nearly every effect that has been looked at, so `it is difficult to identify processes that actually meet the classical criteria` - and `the apparent lack of processes that fully meet the criteria of automaticity renders the classical view UNSATISFACTORY`. Not refuted by a counter-example: retired because nothing in the world satisfies it. That is a distinct way for a term to change and the corpus should be able to find the cases— “Given that attention and task demands are frequently found to modulate behavioral and neurophysiological effects, it is difficult to identify processes that actually meet the classical criteria for automaticity. The apparent lack of processes that fully meet the criteria of automaticity renders the classical view of automaticity… | senses[1] |
| sense | automaticity, REVISED - the same word with one criterion removed: automatic now means `does not depend on conscious awareness` and `is initiated without deliberate intention`, and no longer means unmodulable. The paper states the consequence explicitly - unconscious automatic processing and attentional control `is NOT A CONTRADICTION as it has been previously thought`. Two criteria kept, one dropped, and the dropped one is the one that was selecting nothing— “We propose that processing can occur automatically in the sense that it does not depend on conscious awareness and that it is initiated without deliberate intention. However, automatic processing is susceptible to attentional top-down control and is only elicited if the cognitive system is configured accordingly. Thus, unconscious automatic… | senses[2] |
| sense | subliminal priming used as the HARD CASE for a general claim about automaticity: it is the field's prototypical automatic process, so showing four separate top-down influences on it - attentional resources, stimulus expectations, action intentions, task sets - is an argument about automaticity in general rather than about priming. The corpus's central phenomenon serving as somebody else's test object— “We show that subliminal priming (a) depends on attentional resources, (b) is susceptible to stimulus expectations, (c) is influenced by action intentions, and (d) is modulated by task sets. These data suggest that attention enhances or attenuates unconscious visual processes” | senses[3] |
| differs in | attentional sensitization —contrasted-with→ autonomous — WHETHER AN UNCONSCIOUS PROCESS CAN BE REACHED FROM ABOVE - the classical account makes autonomy definitional, this one makes prior attentional configuration a PRECONDITION for the process running at all. Not a weaker version of the same claim: the direction of dependence is reversed— “Classical theories of automaticity assume that automatic processes elicited by unconscious stimuli are autonomous and independent of higher-level cognitive influences. In contrast to these classical conceptions, we argue that automatic processing depends on attentional amplification of task-congruent processing pathways and propose an…— “Classical theories of automaticity assume that automatic processes elicited by unconscious stimuli are autonomous and independent of higher-level cognitive influences” | concept_edges[0] |
| note | attentional sensitization —contrasted-with→ autonomous — THE PAPER'S ARGUMENT, and the abstract states both sides in one sentence pair - 'In contrast to these classical conceptions'. Confidence 0.95.— “Classical theories of automaticity assume that automatic processes elicited by unconscious stimuli are autonomous and independent of higher-level cognitive influences. In contrast to these classical conceptions, we argue that automatic processing depends on attentional amplification of task-congruent processing pathways and propose an… | concept_edges[0] |
| weight | attentional sensitization —contrasted-with→ autonomous — 0.95— “Classical theories of automaticity assume that automatic processes elicited by unconscious stimuli are autonomous and independent of higher-level cognitive influences. In contrast to these classical conceptions, we argue that automatic processing depends on attentional amplification of task-congruent processing pathways and propose an… | concept_edges[0] |
| audit | top-down control —causes→ subliminal priming — Audit 2026-09-28: DOUBTFUL - read against its full span and kept, but attentional manipulations 'MODULATE' subliminal priming; the 'increases' sign is not stated.— “Although the classical view of automaticity is prevailing and still dominates current research, evidence for attentional top-down control of unconscious visual processing has been accumulated during the last years. Several attentional manipulations have been shown to reliably modulate subliminal… | concept_edges[1] |
| effect direction | top-down control —causes→ subliminal priming — increases Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concept_edges[1] |
| note | top-down control —causes→ subliminal priming — The direction is recorded as 'increases' because the paper's own summary is 'enhances OR attenuates' - attention moves the effect in either direction depending on congruence with the task set, which is the point. A 'no-change' reading would be wrong and a purely positive one incomplete; the quote carries both words. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concept_edges[1] |
| weight | top-down control —causes→ subliminal priming — 0.9 Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concept_edges[1] |
| audit | task sets —causes→ subliminal priming — Audit 2026-09-28: DOUBTFUL - read against its full span and kept, but subliminal priming 'is modulated by task sets' and attention 'enhances or attenuates'; the 'increases' sign is not stated. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concept_edges[2] |
| effect direction | task sets —causes→ subliminal priming — increases Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concept_edges[2] |
| note | task sets —causes→ subliminal priming — One of the four enumerated influences, kept as its own edge because 'what the participant is set up to do changes what an unseen stimulus does' is the concrete form of the configuration claim. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concept_edges[2] |
| weight | task sets —causes→ subliminal priming — 0.9 Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concept_edges[2] |
| effect direction | attentional resources —causes→ subliminal priming — increases Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concept_edges[3] |
| note | attentional resources —causes→ subliminal priming — The sharpest of the four against the classical view: a process that consumes attentional resources is not autonomous by anybody's definition. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concept_edges[3] |
| weight | attentional resources —causes→ subliminal priming — 0.9 Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concept_edges[3] |
| replication | untested | |
| limitation | The model's central neural assumption, a prefrontal top-down signal modulating posterior pathway sensitivity, has not yet been tested in detail. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | limitations[0] |
| limitation | The theory is not yet formally specified, so its predictions about the dynamics of attentional control remain imprecise. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | limitations[1] |
finding · quantity · variable · definition · key-term — grounded in the full text| finding | A semantic induction task performed shortly before a masked prime enhanced subsequent subliminal semantic priming in both reaction time and N400, whereas a perceptual induction task attenuated it. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.findings[0] |
| finding | The pattern reversed at the long response-prime interval, with priming present after the perceptual but not the semantic induction task. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.findings[1] |
| finding | Semantic and visuo-motor priming were doubly dissociated by induction task type, with visuo-motor priming appearing only after the perceptual task. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.findings[2] |
| finding | Attentional sensitization operates even within the perceptual domain: only a shape induction task, not a colour one, produced occipito-parietal ERP priming. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.findings[3] |
| finding | A phonological letter-classification induction task, which discourages word reading, abolished subsequent subliminal semantic priming. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.findings[4] |
| quantity | 200 or 800 ms — The two response-prime intervals between the induction-task response and masked prime onset, manipulated to track how the task set decays Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.quantities[0] |
| quantity | about 600 ms — Duration a task representation is claimed (from the task-switching literature) to remain active after task completion, motivating the choice of the two RPIs Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.quantities[1] |
| quantity | 40 targets — Large target set size in the cited Kiesel et al. expectancy manipulation, contrasted with a small four-target set Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.quantities[2] |
| variable | type of induction task (independent) Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.variables[0] |
| variable | RPI (independent) Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.variables[1] |
| variable | subliminal priming effect (dependent) Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.variables[2] |
| definition | attentional sensitization model of unconscious cognition Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[0] |
| definition | gain Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[1] |
| definition | preemptive control Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[2] |
| definition | reactive control Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[3] |
| definition | task set Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[4] |
| definition | conditional automaticity Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[5] |
| definition | masked visuo-motor response priming Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[6] |
| definition | masked semantic priming Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[7] |
| definition | N400 ERP component Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[8] |
| definition | induction task paradigm Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[9] |
| concept | automaticity — not defined in this paper's own words; the term whose criteria this paper rewrites - and the classical version is rejected not for being wrong in principle but for selecting NOTHING: if an automatic effect must be invariant, no measured effect qualifies Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[0] |
| concept | autonomous — not defined in this paper's own words; the criterion being dropped: that an automatic process runs independently of higher-level influence. It is the assumption that forces INVARIANCE as the operational test Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[1] |
| concept | attentional sensitization — not defined in this paper's own words; the replacement account: attention amplifies task-congruent processing pathways in advance, so an unconscious process is elicited ONLY IF the cognitive system has been configured for it. Automatic, but conditional on a prior setting Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[2] |
| concept | top-down control — not defined in this paper's own words; what the classical view said could not reach an automatic process, and what this paper says gates it - the whole dispute in two words Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[3] |
| concept | subliminal priming — not defined in this paper's own words; the test case, and it is chosen precisely because the field treats it as the CLEAREST instance of an automatic process - 'a prototypical example'. If top-down influences reach this, they reach anything Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[4] |
| concept | task sets — not defined in this paper's own words; one of the four top-down factors shown to modulate subliminal priming, and the one that makes the configuration claim concrete: what the participant is set up to do changes what an unseen stimulus does Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[5] |
| concept | attentional resources — not defined in this paper's own words; another of the four - an automatic process in the classical sense should need none, and this one does Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[6] |
When we have changed our mind. Some entries in the table begin with a word in capitals and the reason for it. EVIDENCE CORRECTED — the finding still stands, but we had quoted the wrong sentence from the paper, and the quotation has been replaced with the right one. RETRACTED — the entry itself was wrong; it stays on the page, marked, with the reason, rather than being deleted. WITHDRAWN AND REPLACED — the entry was wrong, and a corrected version of it appears in the entries below. Each mark carries its own reason, in brackets, because the reasons differ from one entry to the next. An entry we have WITHDRAWN is removed from this page and kept in the record, with its reason. A line reading Audit and a date is a later re-reading of the entry against its whole sentence: DOUBTFUL means it was kept, and the reason says what is loose about it. Quotation marks inside the tagger's sentence. Where a tag is the tagger's own sentence, a phrase in quotation marks inside it is borrowed from the paper — the tagger's wording around it is not. The paper's own sentence is the evidence quote for that row; on this page it is withheld with the article, and the article is at its publisher. Nothing inside quotation marks anywhere on this page is ours: if it is quoted, it is the paper's. Whose words a concept carries. A concept entry records a term the paper itself uses, so the term, the sense given for it, and its evidence are the paper's own words, quoted where the paper fixes them. This is the opposite of a sense entry in the tag table, which is the tagger's sentence about how the paper uses a term. Where a concept entry could not be grounded in the paper's words, the entry says so on its own row.
Tag layer © the Meta-Tagging Project, CC BY 4.0. The paper text is © its authors/publisher
and is linked, not reproduced. Excerpts shown are short quotations for identification and verification.
· back to index
· concepts · authors
· עברית
© 2026 Shir Sivroni · ORCID 0009-0000-2597-2824