phenomenon · claim-type · cross-domain-transfer · mechanism · claim-relation · replication-status · limitation — grounded in the full text| phenomenon | visual consciousness (conscious access)— “However, this paper is chiefly concerned with what Block (2005) terms “access consciousness” which is defined as the availability of information for verbal report, voluntary action, and executive processing.” | |
| claim-type | mechanism— “The core notion underlying our model is that conscious access is a fundamentally inferential process that can only occur at a level of processing that is sufficiently temporally deep to integrate information from lower levels of the hierarchy and contextualise processing at these lower levels.” | |
| method — evidence | — “We report simulations demonstrating the model’s ability to reproduce: 1) the electrophysiological and behaviour results observed in previous studies of inattentional blindness; and 2) the previously introduced four-way taxonomy predicted by the GNW, which describes the relationship between consciousness, attention, and sensory signal… | |
| transfer | from the free energy principle / Active Inference: the Active Inference formalism used to cast global neuronal workspace dynamics as approximate Bayesian inference, yielding testable behavioural and neural predictions— “Active Inference, a corollary of the free energy principle (FEP), is a first principles approach to modelling (approximately) Bayes optimal behaviour (Friston; 2010; Friston et al, 2016, 2017a).” | transfers[0] |
| mechanism | Conscious access happens because a temporally deep level of the hierarchy infers and integrates lower-level states over a slow enough timescale to contextualise them and drive extended report behaviour.— “The core notion underlying our model is that conscious access is a fundamentally inferential process that can only occur at a level of processing that is sufficiently temporally deep to integrate information from lower levels of the hierarchy and contextualise processing at these lower levels.” | mechanisms[0] |
| mechanism | Late ERPs arise because the ERP is the time derivative of the depolarisation variable, so a rapid change in high-level belief produces a large late deflection.— “ERPs and local field potentials are modelled as the time derivative (rate of change) of the depolarisation variable because the change in membrane potential over neuronal populations is what generates ERPs.” | mechanisms[1] |
| mechanism | Rapid belief change increases the magnitude of the depolarisation derivative, which is what makes a late component appear.— “When confidence in a state changes rapidly, the derivative of the depolarisation variable increases in magnitude.” | mechanisms[2] |
| mechanism | Expectations act by raising second-level posterior confidence, which magnifies top-down feedback to sensory populations and pushes marginal trials past the ignition threshold.— “Consistent expectations increase second-level posterior confidence to a sufficiently large degree to shift otherwise unconscious trials over the threshold for “ignition” by magnifying the feedback to the first level” | mechanisms[3] |
| extends | the global neuronal workspace (GNW) model— “Here we aim to make progress in overcoming these limitations by advancing an extension of the global neuronal workspace - the predictive global neuronal workspace (PGNW) - that unifies essential aspects of the GNW with the more recent (Bayesian) Active Inference approach to understanding brain function.” | claim_relations[0] |
| builds-on | Hohwy (2013), Whyte (2019), and Friston et al (2012)— “Formalising ideas first introduced by Hohwy (2013), Whyte (2019), and Friston et al (2012), we will argue that conscious access or “ignition” is a fundamentally inferential process that depends upon a level of processing of sufficient temporal depth to contextualise and coordinate lower levels of processing.” | claim_relations[1] |
| contradicts | Fleming's (2019) higher-order state-space (HOSS) model— “Although this is ultimately an empirical question, we regard the explicit representation of the absence of a stimulus in the perceptual state space to be a somewhat unrealistic idealisation.” | claim_relations[2] |
| sense | the P3 - A MARKER WITHDRAWN WITHOUT A REVISION: the claim that it is a specific marker of conscious access is no longer defended, but the abandonment was not accompanied by any theoretical revisions and makes no additional predictions, which the authors call a recognized characteristic of degenerative research programs— “In addition, the abandonment of the P3 as a signature of conscious access was not accompanied by any theoretical revisions and makes no additional behavioural or neurobiological predictions. This situates the GNW in a tenuous position, in which revision primarily explains away contrary results – a recognized characteristic of degenerative… | senses[0] |
| sense | the falsifying evidence - CONDITIONAL ON A PROXY: information is said to be unconsciously maintained by the same structures at least briefly and insofar as multivariate decoding is a defensible proxy for information processing, so the result that overturns the theory is bounded by an instrument assumption stated in its own sentence— “Together these results demonstrate that, contrary to the original formulation of the GNW, information is processed and unconsciously maintained (at least briefly and insofar as multivariate decoding is a defensible proxy for information processing) by the same structures implicated in conscious processing” | senses[1] |
| sense | phenomenology, in this model - SITED TO KEEP IT FALSIFIABLE: the alternative placement would make the presence of a particular phenomenology empirically unfalsifiable, and the authors situate it at the point where lower-level representations update higher-level states to avoid that— “i.e., the presence of a particular phenomenology would become empirically unfalsifiable). To avoid this uncomfortable conclusion, while also keeping sensory phenomenology at the correct timescale, we suggest that phenomenology in our model is most plausibly situated at the point during which (and based on the manner in which) lower-level… | senses[2] |
| sense | the consistent parameter set - FITTED, WITH THE AUTHORS' ARGUMENT FOR WHY IT STILL COUNTS: the values were finetuned to capture behaviour reported in the literature, and the authors argue that no consistent set need have existed, so finding one supports the model— “This should not be a surprise, as we finetuned the parameter values to capture behaviour reported in the empirical literature. However, it is worth noting that it is possible a priori that no consistent set of parameter values could be found to reproduce all of these known empirical results – which would have shown a clear insufficiency of… | senses[3] |
| control | a debrief after phase one measured how many participants had noticed the task-irrelevant square at all — held — rules out that the stimulus was consciously seen - the inattentional-blindness manipulation is checked rather than assumed, and 50 per cent reported not seeing it— “After phase one, participants completed a debrief and 50% of them reported not being aware of the square, replicating the findings of Mack and Rock (1998).” | controls[0] |
| edge | P3 —distinct-from→ conscious access— “This result was recently replicated in a standard masking paradigm (Cohen, et al., 2020) showing unequivocally that the P3 is related to task relevance and is not a necessary signature of conscious access” | concept_edges[0] |
| differs in | task relevance —contrasted-with→ conscious access — which of the two the P3 tracks— “This result was recently replicated in a standard masking paradigm (Cohen, et al., 2020) showing unequivocally that the P3 is related to task relevance and is not a necessary signature of conscious access”— “the P3 is related to task relevance and is not a necessary signature of conscious access” | concept_edges[1] |
| outcome (stated by the tagger, no quotation) | control — held | controls[0] |
| for which use | limitation — every prediction the model makes: WE HAVE DELIBERATELY LIMITED THE SCOPE OF THE MODEL TO EXPERIMENTAL SETTINGS WHERE VISUAL CONSCIOUSNESS IS OPERATIONALISED VIA REPORT— “To make the PGNW testable, we have deliberately limited the scope of the model to experimental settings where visual consciousness is operationalised via report.” | limitations[0] |
| for which use | limitation — the same scope as limitations[0], with the cost: REPORT PARADIGMS COME WITH METHODOLOGICAL DIFFICULTIES— “However, we acknowledge that report paradigms come with methodological difficulties (Tsuchiya et al., 2015).” | limitations[1] |
| for which use | limitation — the modality the theory has been tested in, and what that does to the field: IN LIMITING THE SCOPE OF THE PGNW TO THE VISUAL MODALITY, WE ARE AWARE THAT WE ARE REIFYING THE PERVASIVE BIAS IN CONSCIOUSNESS SCIENCE OF PRIMARILY STUDYING VISION— “By the same token, in limiting the scope of the PGNW to the visual modality, we are aware that we are reifying the pervasive bias in consciousness science of primarily studying vision.” | limitations[2] |
| for which use | limitation — the model's match to the four-way taxonomy, which is not independent confirmation: THIS SHOULD NOT BE A SURPRISE, AS WE FINETUNED THE PARAMETER VALUES TO CAPTURE BEHAVIOUR REPORTED IN THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE— “This should not be a surprise, as we finetuned the parameter values to capture behaviour reported in the empirical literature.” | limitations[3] |
| for which use | limitation — any account of partial awareness: THIS REQUIRES INFORMATION TO SKIP LEVELS OF THE HIERARCHY, WHICH IS ALSO NOT POSSIBLE IN THE PRESENT MODEL— “This requires information to skip levels of the hierarchy, which is also not possible in the present model.” | limitations[4] |
| for which use | limitation — the simulated report frequencies: THEY SHOULD BE INTERPRETED AS DIRECTIONAL HYPOTHESES, AS OPPOSED TO PRECISE PREDICTIONS ABOUT THE PERCENTAGE OF SEEN VS UNSEEN TRIALS— “Finally, it must be highlighted that the behavioural results of the following simulations should be interpreted as directional hypotheses, as opposed to precise predictions about the percentage of seen vs unseen trials.” | limitations[5] |
| for which use | limitation — any appeal to the original global neuronal workspace formulation: the authors state that as experimental paradigms became more sophisticated, two of its predictions have been falsified— “Of greater concern is the fact that, as experimental paradigms have become more sophisticated, two predictions of the original theory have been falsified” | limitations[6] |
| for which use | limitation — the claim that information is unconsciously maintained by the same structures: the authors qualify it as holding— “Together these results demonstrate that, contrary to the original formulation of the GNW, information is processed and unconsciously maintained (at least briefly and insofar as multivariate decoding is a defensible proxy for information processing) by the same structures implicated in conscious processing” | limitations[7] |
| for which use | limitation — any use of the P3 as a signature of conscious access: a masking-paradigm replication is stated to show unequivocally that the P3 is related to task relevance and is not a necessary signature of conscious access— “This result was recently replicated in a standard masking paradigm (Cohen, et al., 2020) showing unequivocally that the P3 is related to task relevance and is not a necessary signature of conscious access” | limitations[8] |
| for which use | limitation — any reading of the GNW's response to the P3 findings— “In addition, the abandonment of the P3 as a signature of conscious access was not accompanied by any theoretical revisions and makes no additional behavioural or neurobiological predictions. This situates the GNW in a tenuous position, in which revision primarily explains away contrary results – a recognized characteristic of degenerative… | limitations[9] |
| for which use | limitation — any neurobiological prediction attributed to the revised computational model of subjective report: the authors state it is too idealised to make them— “However, the modified computational model of subjective report (King & Dehaene, 2014) is too idealised to make neurobiological predictions” | limitations[10] |
| for which use | limitation — the model's placement of phenomenology: the alternative would make the presence of a particular phenomenology empirically unfalsifiable, and the authors state they situate it as they do to avoid that conclusion— “i.e., the presence of a particular phenomenology would become empirically unfalsifiable). To avoid this uncomfortable conclusion, while also keeping sensory phenomenology at the correct timescale, we suggest that phenomenology in our model is most plausibly situated at the point during which (and based on the manner in which) lower-level… | limitations[11] |
| for which use | limitation — any ERP predicted by these simulations: the decay parameter that in empirical work needs to be fit to neuronal or behavioural responses was set to 1 here, and the authors state predicted ERPs can be affected by different values of it— “there is an optional parameter (mdp.erp) that encodes the assumed degree of decay or attenuation in posterior beliefs across timesteps (i.e., before each period of gradient descent following each new observation). In empirical work, this parameter needs to be fit to neuronal or behavioural responses. Here we do not include this parameter… | limitations[12] |
| replication | untested | |
| limitation | Scope deliberately restricted to settings where visual consciousness is operationalised by report.— “To make the PGNW testable, we have deliberately limited the scope of the model to experimental settings where visual consciousness is operationalised via report.” | limitations[0] |
| limitation | Report paradigms themselves carry known methodological problems.— “However, we acknowledge that report paradigms come with methodological difficulties (Tsuchiya et al., 2015).” | limitations[1] |
| limitation | Restricting the model to vision perpetuates the visual bias of consciousness science.— “By the same token, in limiting the scope of the PGNW to the visual modality, we are aware that we are reifying the pervasive bias in consciousness science of primarily studying vision.” | limitations[2] |
| limitation | The match to the four-way taxonomy is partly built in, since parameters were tuned to the published behavioural results.— “This should not be a surprise, as we finetuned the parameter values to capture behaviour reported in the empirical literature.” | limitations[3] |
| limitation | The model cannot represent partial awareness, because information cannot skip hierarchical levels in it.— “This requires information to skip levels of the hierarchy, which is also not possible in the present model.” | limitations[4] |
| limitation | Simulated report frequencies are only directional, not quantitative, predictions.— “Finally, it must be highlighted that the behavioural results of the following simulations should be interpreted as directional hypotheses, as opposed to precise predictions about the percentage of seen vs unseen trials.” | limitations[5] |
| limitation | Two predictions of the theory this paper extends are stated to have been falsified.— “Of greater concern is the fact that, as experimental paradigms have become more sophisticated, two predictions of the original theory have been falsified” | limitations[6] |
| limitation | The falsifying result is qualified inline by whether its instrument is a fair proxy.— “Together these results demonstrate that, contrary to the original formulation of the GNW, information is processed and unconsciously maintained (at least briefly and insofar as multivariate decoding is a defensible proxy for information processing) by the same structures implicated in conscious processing” | limitations[7] |
| limitation | The P3 is reported to track task relevance rather than conscious access.— “This result was recently replicated in a standard masking paradigm (Cohen, et al., 2020) showing unequivocally that the P3 is related to task relevance and is not a necessary signature of conscious access” | limitations[8] |
| limitation | A marker was abandoned without any accompanying theoretical revision, which the authors name as a degenerative pattern.— “In addition, the abandonment of the P3 as a signature of conscious access was not accompanied by any theoretical revisions and makes no additional behavioural or neurobiological predictions. This situates the GNW in a tenuous position, in which revision primarily explains away contrary results – a recognized characteristic of degenerative… | limitations[9] |
| limitation | The replacement model offered for the falsified one is stated to be too idealised for neurobiological predictions.— “However, the modified computational model of subjective report (King & Dehaene, 2014) is too idealised to make neurobiological predictions” | limitations[10] |
| limitation | Where phenomenology sits in the model was chosen to avoid an empirically unfalsifiable consequence.— “i.e., the presence of a particular phenomenology would become empirically unfalsifiable). To avoid this uncomfortable conclusion, while also keeping sensory phenomenology at the correct timescale, we suggest that phenomenology in our model is most plausibly situated at the point during which (and based on the manner in which) lower-level… | limitations[11] |
| limitation | A parameter that empirical work fits to data was fixed by assumption, and it affects the predicted ERPs.— “there is an optional parameter (mdp.erp) that encodes the assumed degree of decay or attenuation in posterior beliefs across timesteps (i.e., before each period of gradient descent following each new observation). In empirical work, this parameter needs to be fit to neuronal or behavioural responses. Here we do not include this parameter… | limitations[12] |
finding · quantity · variable · definition · key-term — grounded in the full text| finding | With one consistent parameter set the simulated agent reproduced the GNW four-way taxonomy behaviourally: weak signal plus absent attention gave chance forced-choice performance and almost no 'seen' reports.— “When signal strength was low and attention absent, the agent displayed chance levels of forced-choice performance (47%) and only reported having seen the square on 10% of trials.” | content_tags.findings[0] |
| finding | Simulated first-level ERPs, corresponding to early components such as P100 and N100, barely changed with visibility.— “Here we found that ERPs at the first level of the model – which correspond to early components such as the P100 and N100 – are relatively unaffected by changes in visibility.” | content_tags.findings[1] |
| finding | Simulated second-level ERPs, corresponding to the late P3, were strongly modulated by visibility, matching the empirical early-versus-late ERP dissociation.— “In contrast, ERPs at the second level – which correspond to late components, and specifically the P3 – appear to be strongly modulated by changes in visibility.” | content_tags.findings[2] |
| finding | The model reproduced the Pitts inattentional-blindness dissociation: only in phase three, when the square was both seen and task-relevant, did a large late P3-like ERP appear.— “Finally, in phase three, when the model was attending to the internal stimulus, the square was reported on 100% of trials and there was a large and late ERP at the second level resembling the P3.” | content_tags.findings[3] |
| finding | The model predicts that visual consciousness will be accompanied by a late ERP whenever high-level confidence changes rapidly.— “it leads to a straightforward prediction; visual consciousness will be accompanied by a late ERP whenever confidence in a particular state at a high level of the hierarchy changes rapidly.” | content_tags.findings[4] |
| finding | Adding prior expectation as a third factor, expectations consistent with the stimulus raised both forced-choice accuracy and the rate of 'seen' reports in every quadrant of the taxonomy.— “Across all taxonomy conditions, we found that consistent prior expectations increased both the accuracy of forced-choice behaviour and the percentage of trials where the model reported having seen the stimulus” | content_tags.findings[5] |
| finding | With a strong attended stimulus, a consistent prior shrank the simulated P3 while an inconsistent prior enlarged it relative to neutral priors. | content_tags.findings[6] |
| finding | The model reconciles univariate ignition results with multivariate decoding of unseen stimuli, because above-baseline firing persists on unconscious trials and would be readable by a classifier even though mean rates are lower. | content_tags.findings[7] |
| quantity | 200 trials — size of the proof-of-principle simulation, half with the square present | content_tags.quantities[0] |
| quantity | 100% — forced-choice and report accuracy of the model under full attention and high signal strength | content_tags.quantities[1] |
| quantity | 47% — chance-level forced-choice accuracy in the weak-signal, attention-absent quadrant | content_tags.quantities[2] |
| quantity | 58% and 61% — forced-choice accuracy when signal strength alone, or attention alone, was raised Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.quantities[3] |
| quantity | 53% — rate at which the calibrated model reported seeing the square in phase one of the simulated inattentional-blindness task, matching the human 50% Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.quantities[4] |
| quantity | 800 — square-present trials simulated for the expectation-extended taxonomy, 100 per prior-by-quadrant cell Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.quantities[5] |
| variable | attention (independent) Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.variables[0] |
| variable | stimulus signal strength (independent) Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.variables[1] |
| variable | prior probability (independent) Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.variables[2] |
| variable | forced choice performance (dependent) Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.variables[3] |
| variable | firing rate (dependent) Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.variables[4] |
| variable | state transition (control) Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.variables[6] |
| definition | global workspace theory (GWT) Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[0] |
| definition | global neuronal workspace (GNW) model Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[1] |
| definition | ignition Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[2] |
| definition | access consciousness Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[3] |
| definition | predictive global neuronal workspace (PGNW) Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[4] |
| definition | Active Inference Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[5] |
| definition | partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP) Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[6] |
| concept | P3 Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[0] |
| concept | conscious access Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[1] |
| concept | task relevance Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[2] |
| concept | multivariate decoding Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[3] |
| concept | degenerative research programs Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[4] |
| concept | phenomenology Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[5] |
| concept | mdp.erp Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[6] |
| variational Bayesian inference | as written: inverted using a variational message passing scheme Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.statistics[0] |
| parameter fitting (grid search) | as written: searching the parameter space to find consistent values Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.statistics[1] |
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