phenomenon · claim-type · cross-domain-transfer · mechanism · claim-relation · replication-status · limitation — grounded in the full text| phenomenon | conscious access— “In this review, we outline recent advances made in understanding the delimited issue of conscious access: how does an external or internal piece of information gain access to conscious processing, defined as a reportable subjective experience?” | |
| claim-type | mechanism— “We confront these findings to current theoretical models of conscious processing, including the Global Neuronal Workspace (GNW) model according to which conscious access occurs when incoming information is made globally available to multiple brain systems through a network of neurons with long-range axons densely distributed in prefrontal… | |
| method — evidence | — “The present review focuses on the well-delimited issue of how an external or internal piece of information goes beyond non-conscious processing and gains access to conscious processing, a transition characterized by the existence of a reportable subjective experience.” | |
| transfer | from theoretical physics: the concept of a stochastic phase transition, used to describe the sudden switch of the network into the ignited conscious state— “The transition to the ignited state can be described, in theoretical physics terms, as a stochastic phase transition – a sudden change in neuronal dynamics whose occurrence depends in part on stimulus characteristics and in part on spontaneous fluctuations in activity (Dehaene and Changeux, 2005; Dehaene et al., 2003b).” | transfers[0] |
| transfer | from artificial intelligence: the blackboard architecture - a shared data structure updated by many specialised modules - taken over as the global workspace of consciousness— “However, capitalizing on the earlier concept of a blackboard 22 system in artificial intelligence (a common data structure shared and updated by many specialized modules), Baars (1989) proposed an homunculus-free psychological model where the current conscious content is represented within a distinct mental space called global workspace, with… | transfers[1] |
| mechanism | incoming activity that exceeds a dynamical threshold ignites a self-supporting reverberating cell assembly which sustains the conscious content and broadcasts it to distant sites— “Such a selfconnected system exhibits a dynamical threshold: if the incoming activity carries sufficient weight, it leads to the ignition of a self-supporting, reverberating, temporary, metastable, and distributed cell assembly that represents the current conscious contents and broadcasts it to virtually all distant sites.” | mechanisms[0] |
| mechanism | global broadcasting frees information from encapsulated circuits and makes it available to many processors, including the ones that formulate verbal reports, which is why conscious information is reportable— “Global broadcasting allows information to be more efficiently processed (because it it no longer confined to a subset of non-conscious circuits, but can be flexibly shared by many cortical processors) and to be verbally reported (because these processors include those involved in formulating verbal messages).” | mechanisms[1] |
| mechanism | during ignition the workspace is mobilised as a whole, with the non-selected neurons actively inhibited, which blocks a second simultaneous ignition and produces the serial bottleneck— “Such a disruption occurs because during ignition, the GNW is mobilized as a whole, some GNW neurons being active while the rest is actively inhibited, thus preventing multiple simultaneous ignitions.” | mechanisms[2] |
| mechanism | spontaneous prestimulus fluctuations barely affect the fast feedforward stage but strongly bias the slow NMDA-based reverberating stage, so an identical stimulus ignites on some trials and not others, producing all-or-none perception— “In GNW simulations, prestimulus fluctuations in neural discharges only have a small effect on the early sensory stage, which largely reflects objective stimulus amplitude and duration, but they have a large influence on the second slower stage, which is characterized by NMDA-based reverberating integration and ultimately leads to a bimodal… | mechanisms[3] |
| mechanism | a weak stimulus produces a feedforward wave that cannot recruit enough self-sustaining reverberation, so it dies out before the late global activation and stays subliminal— “For very brief or low-amplitude stimuli, a feedforward wave was seen in the initial thalamic and cortical stages of the simulation, but it died out without triggering the late global activation, because it was not able to gather sufficient selfsustaining reverberant activation (Dehaene and Changeux, 2005).” | mechanisms[4] |
| mechanism | because far more workspace neurons are laterally inhibited than activated, the summed scalp signal during ignition is net positive, which is why conscious access shows up as the positive P3b— “Thus, the model can explain why, during conscious access, the resulting event-related potential is dominated by a positive waveform, the P3b.” | mechanisms[5] |
| builds-on | Crick and Koch (1990) programme on the neural correlates of consciousness— “Following Crick and Koch (Crick and Koch, 1990), we focussed solely here on the simpler and well-studied question of what neurophysiological mechanisms differentiate conscious access to some information from nonconscious processing of the same information.” | claim_relations[0] |
| builds-on | Dehaene et al. (1998a) global neuronal workspace architecture— “The main anatomical premise of the GNW model is that it consists of “a distributed set of cortical neurons characterized by their ability to receive from and send back to homologous neurons in other cortical areas horizontal projections through longrange excitatory axons mostly originating from the pyramidal cells of layers II and III”… | claim_relations[1] |
| sense | conscious access - BY THE OBJECTIVE CRITERION: a stimulus counts as non-conscious only if subjects cannot perform above chance on a direct task, a tradition grounded in signal-detection theory— “According to a long psychophysical tradition, grounded in signal-detection theory, a stimulus should be accepted as non-conscious only if subjects are unable to perform above chance on some direct task of stimulus detection or classification.” | senses[0] |
| sense | conscious access - BY SUBJECTIVE CRITERIA: visibility ratings, or second-order commentaries such as post-decision wagering, adopted BECAUSE the objective criterion fails— “For these reasons, recent alternative approaches emphasize either pure subjective reports, such as ratings of stimulus visibility” | senses[1] |
| sense | attention - James's classic definition, which the review says CONFLATES two processes that are now clearly separable— “The problem with this definition is that it conflates two processes that are now clearly separated” | senses[2] |
| sense | `conscious` - ONE WORD SPLIT BY GRAMMAR, NOT BY FIELD OR BY DATE. `“Conscious” is an ambiguous word. In its intransitive use (e.g. "the patient was still conscious"), it refers to the state of consciousness ... In its transitive use (e.g. "I was not conscious of the red light"), it refers to conscious access.` The disambiguating test is whether the word takes an object. Every other split in this corpus runs across disciplines, across decades, or across languages; this one runs across a syntactic frame, and the paper hands the reader a grammatical test rather than a definition.— “In its intransitive use (e.g. "the patient was still conscious"), it refers to the state of consciousness, also called wakefulness or vigilance, which is thought to vary almost continuously from coma and slow-wave sleep to full vigilance. In its transitive use (e.g. "I was not conscious of the red light"), it refers to… | senses[3] |
| sense | `selection` / `selective attention` - AN ALIAS INTRODUCED IN PASSING AND THEN USED TO BREAK A FOLK IDENTITY. `Selection, also called selective attention, refers to the separation of relevant versus irrelevant information`, and the paper immediately reports that `selection can occur without conscious processing`. The naming matters because the everyday word `attention` carries the implication that attending is being aware, and the paper is dismantling exactly that.— “Selection, also called selective attention, refers to the separation of relevant versus irrelevant information, isolation of an object or spatial location, based on its saliency or relevance to current goals, and amplification of its sensory attributes. Access refers to its conscious “taking possession of the mind”” | senses[4] |
| edge | conscious access —distinct-from→ attention— “Conscious access must be distinguished from the related concept of attention.” | concept_edges[0] |
| note | state of consciousness —same-as→ wakefulness — 'also called' - an explicit alias, both names in the one span.— “In its intransitive use (e.g. "the patient was still conscious"), it refers to the state of consciousness, also called wakefulness or vigilance, which is thought to vary almost continuously from coma and slow-wave sleep to full vigilance. In its transitive use (e.g. "I was not conscious of the red light"), it refers to… | concept_edges[1] |
| note | state of consciousness —same-as→ vigilance — Same 'also called' list. Confidence 0.85 rather than 0.9 because the paper then uses 'vigilance' as a POINT ON the scale ('full vigilance') as well as a name FOR the scale.— “In its intransitive use (e.g. "the patient was still conscious"), it refers to the state of consciousness, also called wakefulness or vigilance, which is thought to vary almost continuously from coma and slow-wave sleep to full vigilance. In its transitive use (e.g. "I was not conscious of the red light"), it refers to… | concept_edges[2] |
| audit | selective attention —distinct-from→ conscious access — Audit 2026-09-28: DOUBTFUL - read against its full span and kept, but the span writes 'selection can occur without conscious processing', not 'selective attention' vs 'conscious access'.— “Empirical evidence indicates that selection can occur without conscious processing” | concept_edges[3] |
| note | selective attention —distinct-from→ conscious access — A DISSOCIATION, and the strongest form of distinctness the paper offers: 'selection can occur without conscious processing'. This is an empirical claim, not a definitional stipulation, which is why it is evidenced by the dissociation sentence and not by the definition.— “Empirical evidence indicates that selection can occur without conscious processing” | concept_edges[3] |
| for which use | limitation — a chance-level performance criterion as the test of non-conscious processing: the review states it tends to overestimate conscious perception, because subjects can perform above chance and still deny perceiving the stimulus— “This strict objective criterion raises problems, however (Persaud et al., 2007; Schurger and Sher, 2008). First, it tends to overestimate conscious perception: there are many conditions in which subjects perform better than chance” | limitations[4] |
| for which use | limitation — a null result on one task as evidence of non-conscious processing: the review states performance can be at chance for some tasks but not others, leaving which tasks count unresolved— “Second, performance can be at chance level for some tasks, but not others, raising the issue of which tasks count as evidence of conscious perception or merely of subliminal processing.” | limitations[5] |
| for which use | limitation — any published claim that a stimulus was processed non-consciously: the review states performance never really falls to zero and that significance often depends on arbitrary choices such as the number of trials used to measure it— “Third, the approach requires accepting the null hypothesis of chance-level performance, yet performance never really falls down to zero, and whether it is significant or not often depends on arbitrary choices such as the number of trials dedicated to its measurement.” | limitations[6] |
| evidential status | mechanism — the paper's own words: can explain why— “Thus, the model can explain why, during conscious access, the resulting event-related potential is dominated by a positive waveform, the P3b.” | mechanisms[5] |
| replication | untested | |
| limitation | The review deliberately covers only conscious access, not higher-order concepts of consciousness— “The present review was deliberately limited to conscious access.” | limitations[0] |
| limitation | Higher-order concepts such as metacognition and self-representation are excluded because the authors judge them insufficiently defined empirically— “Thus, our view is that these concepts, although essential, have not yet received a sufficient empirical and neurophysiological definition to figure in this review.” | limitations[1] |
| limitation | The supporting simulations implement only a small fragment of the proposed architecture— “Although the full GNW architecture was not simulated, four areas were selected and hierarchically interconnected (figure 7).” | limitations[2] |
| limitation | Lesion and TMS evidence does not establish that prefrontal contribution is causally necessary for conscious perception— “While suggestive, these observations do not quite suffice to establish that a frontal contribution is causally necessary for conscious perception.” | limitations[3] |
| limitation | The field's strict operational criterion is stated to OVERESTIMATE the thing it measures: subjects perform above chance while denying they perceived anything.— “This strict objective criterion raises problems, however (Persaud et al., 2007; Schurger and Sher, 2008). First, it tends to overestimate conscious perception: there are many conditions in which subjects perform better than chance” | limitations[4] |
| limitation | Which task counts as evidence is unresolved, because performance can be at chance on one task and not another.— “Second, performance can be at chance level for some tasks, but not others, raising the issue of which tasks count as evidence of conscious perception or merely of subliminal processing.” | limitations[5] |
| limitation | The verdict rests on accepting a null hypothesis, and the review states the significance often depends on an analyst's choice of how many trials to run.— “Third, the approach requires accepting the null hypothesis of chance-level performance, yet performance never really falls down to zero, and whether it is significant or not often depends on arbitrary choices such as the number of trials dedicated to its measurement.” | limitations[6] |
finding · quantity · variable · definition · key-term — grounded in the full text| finding | Across many paradigms, conscious access is marked by three convergent physiological signatures: late amplification of the relevant sensory activity, long-distance cortico-cortical synchronisation in the beta and gamma bands, and ignition of a large-scale prefronto-parietal network.— “In conclusion, human neuroimaging methods and electrophysiological recordings during conscious access, under a broad variety of paradigms, consistently reveal a late amplification of relevant sensory activity, long-distance cortico-cortical synchronisation at beta and gamma frequencies, and "ignition" of a large-scale… | content_tags.findings[0] |
| finding | Subliminal influence shrinks as processing depth increases, leaving only small effects at high-level cognitive and decision stages.— “First, subliminal priming quickly decreases with processing depth, such that only small influences are detectable at higher cognitive and decision levels (Dehaene, 2008; van Gaal et al., 2008).” | content_tags.findings[1] |
| finding | Subliminal priming decays with time and is typically undetectable beyond about 500 ms.— “Second, subliminal priming decreases with elapsed time, and therefore typically ceases to be detectable after 500 ms (Dupoux et al., 2008; Greenwald et al., 1996; Mattler, 2005).” | content_tags.findings[2] |
| finding | Subliminal stimuli do not produce durable or flexible changes in executive control.— “Third, subliminal stimuli typically fail to yield lasting and flexible modifications in executive control.” | content_tags.findings[3] |
| finding | The first 200 ms of visual processing can be fully preserved on trials where subjects deny seeing the stimulus.— “Evidence from the attentional blink also confirms that the first 200 ms of initial visual processing can be fully preserved on trials in which subjects deny seeing a stimulus (Sergent et al., 2005; Vogel et al., 1998)” | content_tags.findings[4] |
| finding | The most consistent ERP correlate of visibility is a late (~300-500 ms), broadly distributed positive component, the P3 or P3b.— “In ERPs, the most consistent correlate of visibility appears to be a late (~300-500 ms) and broadly distributed positive component called P3 or sometimes P3b” | content_tags.findings[5] |
| finding | The proportion of neurons following the reported percept rose from about 20% in V1/V2 to 40% in V4/MT/MST and up to 90% in IT and STS.— “The proportion of such cells increased from about 20% in V1/V2 to 40% in V4, MT or MST, to as high as 90% in IT and STS.” | content_tags.findings[6] |
| finding | Conscious words modulated late activity at 68.8% of intracranial electrode sites versus 24.4% for non-conscious words, showing that conscious access has a brain-wide impact.— “Indeed, seen stimuli had a global impact on late evoked activity virtually anywhere in the cortex: 68.8% of electrode sites, although selected for clinical purposes, were modulated by the presence of conscious words (as opposed to 24.4% of sites for non-conscious words).” | content_tags.findings[7] |
| finding | Transcranial magnetic stimulation over parietal or prefrontal cortex, far from visual areas, can block conscious perception and even make a fixated stimulus subjectively disappear.— “In normal subjects, transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) over either parietal or prefrontal cortex can prevent conscious perception and even trigger a sudden subjective disappearance of visual stimulis during prolonged fixation (Kanai et al., 2008)” | content_tags.findings[8] |
| finding | Patients with focal prefrontal lesions needed stronger stimuli to see a masked target, in proportion to how far the lesion extended into left anterior prefrontal cortex, while their subliminal performance stayed normal.— “We recently made similar observations in patients with focal prefrontal lesions (Del Cul et al., 2009): their masking threshold was significantly elevated, in tight correlation with the degree of expansion of the lesions into left anterior… | content_tags.findings[9] |
| finding | MS patients needed a longer target-mask delay before a masked stimulus became conscious. | content_tags.findings[10] |
| finding | The GNW model predicts, and simulations reproduce, strict seriality of conscious access. | content_tags.findings[11] |
| finding | Only conscious no-go signals triggered broad anterior activation into anterior cingulate, inferior and middle frontal gyrus, dorsolateral prefrontal and inferior parietal cortex. | content_tags.findings[12] |
| finding | Schizophrenic patients show impaired neural signatures of conscious access while their subliminal processing remains normal. | content_tags.findings[13] |
| finding | The review's inventory of empirical markers of conscious access is: all-or-none prefronto-parietal ignition, all-or-none amplification of sensory activation, a late global P3b, late broad-band gamma power increase, enhanced long-distance beta-band phase synchronisation, and enhanced causal coupling between distant areas including a top-down component. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.findings[14] |
| quantity | 68.8% / 24.4% — share of intracranial electrode sites whose late activity was modulated by conscious words versus by non-conscious words Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.quantities[0] |
| quantity | 20% / 40% / 90% — proportion of recorded neurons whose firing followed the consciously perceived image during binocular rivalry, in V1-V2, in V4/MT/MST, and in IT/STS respectively Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.quantities[1] |
| quantity | r²=0.96 — agreement across subjects between conscious perception thresholds estimated from objective performance and from subjective report in visual masking Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.quantities[2] |
| quantity | 86% sensitivity and 97% specificity — accuracy of predicting non-recovery one year after traumatic coma from diffusion tensor and spectroscopic measures of white-matter integrity Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.quantities[3] |
| quantity | 16 times — how many more dendritic spines layer-III pyramidal neurons carry in prefrontal cortex than in V1, cited as morphological support for long-distance integration Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.quantities[4] |
| quantity | ~50% — the level to which global cerebral metabolic activity typically falls in coma and vegetative state relative to normal Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.quantities[5] |
| quantity | 500 ms — elapsed time after which subliminal priming typically ceases to be detectable Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.quantities[6] |
| quantity | ~300-500 ms — latency of the P3/P3b component identified as the most consistent ERP correlate of stimulus visibility Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.quantities[7] |
| variable | attention (control) Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.variables[2] |
| variable | response requirements (control) Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.variables[3] |
| definition | conscious access Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[0] |
| definition | subliminal stimulus Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[1] |
| definition | preconscious stimulus Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[2] |
| definition | masking Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[3] |
| definition | subliminal priming Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[4] |
| definition | attentional blink Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[5] |
| definition | selective attention Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[6] |
| definition | Global Neuronal Workspace Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[7] |
| definition | ignition Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[8] |
| definition | information integration Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[9] |
| definition | MMN Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[10] |
| concept | conscious access Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[0] |
| concept | attention Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[1] |
| concept | post-decision wagering Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[2] |
| concept | state of consciousness — not defined in this paper's own words; the INTRANSITIVE sense of 'conscious' - a graded global condition running from coma to full vigilance, with no object Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[3] |
| concept | wakefulness — not defined in this paper's own words; one of two names the paper gives for the state sense; offered as an alternative label, not as a distinct thing Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[4] |
| concept | vigilance — not defined in this paper's own words; the second alternative label for the same state sense - and the paper then uses it AGAIN as the top of the scale ('full vigilance'), so the word does double duty inside one sentence Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[5] |
| concept | selective attention — not defined in this paper's own words; the alias for 'selection': separating relevant from irrelevant, isolating, and amplifying - all of which the paper says can happen with no consciousness at all Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[6] |
| concept | conscious content — not defined in this paper's own words; what is accessed at a moment, individuated by REPORTABILITY - verbally or by an intended gesture Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[7] |
| Granger causality | as written: Granger causality, a statistical technique that measures whether the time course of signals at one site can forecast the future evolution of signals at another distant site Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.statistics[0] |
| correlation (coefficient of determination) r² | as written: r²=0.96, slope≈1 Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.statistics[1] |
| sensitivity and specificity | as written: 86% sensitivity and 97% specificity Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.statistics[2] |
| independent component analysis | as written: independent component analysis of fMRI data Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.statistics[3] |
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