phenomenon · claim-type · cross-domain-transfer · mechanism · claim-relation · replication-status · limitation — grounded in the full text| phenomenon | philosophical accounts of evidence— “The first part of the book consists of five chapters which deal with philosophical problems surrounding the notion of evidence.” | |
| claim-type | critique— “At the same time, the work demonstrates some potential pitfalls and limits of this approach to philosophy.” | |
| method — evidence | — “The book, or a selection of essays from it, could profitably be used as course material for an advanced seminar in the philosophy of science.” | |
| mechanism | Explanatory adequacy is context-dependent because what it takes to make something understandable varies with the audience's interests and background knowledge, so the same act explains for one hearer and not another— “As Achinstein notes, this makes explanation a context-dependent matter, given that what exactly has to be done to make something understandable to someone may depend on the interests and background knowledge of the person seeking understanding.” | mechanisms[0] |
| contradicts | Peter Achinstein's definition of potential and veridical evidence— “I am not convinced that Achinstein’s proposal offers the simplest way to make sense of the relevant linguistic data.” | claim_relations[0] |
| sense | evidence - BAYESIAN: E is evidence for H exactly when H becomes more probable given E; purely formal, and the account the rest of the argument is aimed at— “Bayesians have a purely formal and entirely straightforward conception of evidence: E is evidence for a hypothesis H if, and only if, the probability of H conditional on E is greater than the unconditional probability of H” | senses[0] |
| sense | evidence - ACHINSTEIN'S, SPLIT IN TWO: the hypothesis must be probable given the evidence, not merely more probable, AND there must be an explanatory connection - probable for POTENTIAL evidence, actually existing for VERIDICAL evidence— “he first distinguishes between two different notions of evidence—potential and veridical evidence—and then goes on to define them in ways that draw not only on probability theory (as does the Bayesian definition) but also on the notion of explanation. To solve the lottery problem, Achinstein requires that for something to count as evidence… | senses[1] |
| sense | evidence - THE REVIEWER'S PURELY PROBABILISTIC DEFINITION: probable given E and more probable than unconditionally, which he argues covers every case the explanatory clause was added for— “For instance, the purely probabilistic definition: E is evidence for H if and only if both H is probable given E and H is more probable given E than it is unconditionally” | senses[2] |
| sense | evidence - CATEGORICAL vs GRADED: the same word is used both for a yes-or-no relation and for a matter of degree, and which one is meant decides whether the lottery case is a problem at all | senses[3] |
| edge | potential evidence —is-a→ evidence Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concept_edges[0] |
| edge | veridical evidence —is-a→ evidence Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concept_edges[1] |
| edge | potential evidence —distinct-from→ veridical evidence Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concept_edges[2] |
| for which use | limitation — an argument that settles a definition by appeal to how the word is ordinarily used: linguistic intuitions rarely point to precisely one analysis, and arbitration between explications has to rest on something other than language-use data Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | limitations[0] |
| for which use | limitation — the lottery counterexample against the Bayesian account: it turns on the CATEGORICAL use of 'evidence', and under the graded use the same information is evidence for John's winning to an exceedingly low degree and for Mary's to a very high one Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | limitations[1] |
| for which use | limitation — the explanation essays in this collection: the reviewer states the theory is no longer influential because of criticisms levelled against it, and that the volume reprints the essays without indicating why the author believes it still stands Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | limitations[2] |
| replication | untested | |
| limitation | Usage data does not settle which analysis of a concept is right, so the choice between rival definitions has to be made on other grounds. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | limitations[0] |
| limitation | The counterexample that motivates the alternative definition only bites under one of the word's two ordinary uses, and dissolves under the other. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | limitations[1] |
| limitation | The book reprints a theory the reviewer says is no longer influential, without answering the criticisms that made it so. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | limitations[2] |
finding · quantity · variable · definition · key-term — grounded in the full text| finding | EVIDENCE CORRECTED (RE-GROUNDED - THE POINTER WAS WRONG, NOT THE CLAIM) · Achinstein's lottery case: John holds one ticket in a fair 100-ticket lottery and Mary holds the other 99. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.findings[0] |
| retracted | finding — RE-GROUNDED - THE POINTER WAS WRONG, NOT THE CLAIM. The old evidence was verbatim, anchored and correctly cut, and it contained NONE of this claim's numbers (100, 99). The paper states the claim in one sentence elsewhere and the tagger did not use it. the project, 2026-08-23: 'WE HAVE SPENT THE DAY VERIFYING THAT QUOTES ARE REAL AND NONE OF IT ASKS WHETHER THEY ARE RELEVANT.' Confirmed by reading the claim, the old span and the candidate together; the candidate carries every number AND the claim's own content words. | content_tags.findings[0] |
| finding | Achinstein's own account replaces probability-raising with a high-probability requirement: the hypothesis must be probable given the putative evidence, not merely more probable than before. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.findings[1] |
| finding | Achinstein additionally requires an explanatory connection between evidence and hypothesis, which need only be probable for potential evidence but must actually obtain for veridical evidence. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.findings[2] |
| finding | Douven's purely probabilistic definition solves the lottery problem and also handles Jim's pill-and-pregnancy case. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.findings[3] |
| finding | Douven allows that the information is not evidence but still a good reason to believe the symptoms will be relieved, which may fuel the intuition that it is evidence. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.findings[4] |
| finding | Achinstein argues that Bayesian and rival philosophical accounts of evidence are too weak to be used in science and wrongly treat evidential status as knowable a priori, whereas two historical case studies show it can be an empirical matter. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.findings[5] |
| finding | Because Achinstein makes the act of explaining central, whether someone explained something depends on that person's intention, so uttering words that in fact produce understanding without the intention to do so is not explaining. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.findings[6] |
| finding | Achinstein's work on explanation is no longer influential, largely because of criticisms leveled against it. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.findings[7] |
| finding | Antirealists who hold out against Perrin's findings come to resemble the skeptic about the external world in general. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.findings[8] |
| definition | purely probabilistic definition Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[2] |
| definition | explanation Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[3] |
| definition | scientific realism Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[4] |
| definition | underdetermination Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[5] |
| definition | theoretical virtues Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[6] |
| definition | potential evidence Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[7] |
| definition | veridical evidence Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[8] |
| concept | evidence Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[0] |
| concept | potential evidence Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[1] |
| concept | veridical evidence Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[2] |
| concept | explanatory connection Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[3] |
| concept | theoretical virtues Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[4] |
When we have changed our mind. Some entries in the table begin with a word in capitals and the reason for it. EVIDENCE CORRECTED — the finding still stands, but we had quoted the wrong sentence from the paper, and the quotation has been replaced with the right one. RETRACTED — the entry itself was wrong; it stays on the page, marked, with the reason, rather than being deleted. WITHDRAWN AND REPLACED — the entry was wrong, and a corrected version of it appears in the entries below. Each mark carries its own reason, in brackets, because the reasons differ from one entry to the next. An entry we have WITHDRAWN is removed from this page and kept in the record, with its reason. A line reading Audit and a date is a later re-reading of the entry against its whole sentence: DOUBTFUL means it was kept, and the reason says what is loose about it. Quotation marks inside the tagger's sentence. Where a tag is the tagger's own sentence, a phrase in quotation marks inside it is borrowed from the paper — the tagger's wording around it is not. The paper's own sentence is the evidence quote for that row; on this page it is withheld with the article, and the article is at its publisher. Nothing inside quotation marks anywhere on this page is ours: if it is quoted, it is the paper's. Whose words a concept carries. A concept entry records a term the paper itself uses, so the term, the sense given for it, and its evidence are the paper's own words, quoted where the paper fixes them. This is the opposite of a sense entry in the tag table, which is the tagger's sentence about how the paper uses a term. Where a concept entry could not be grounded in the paper's words, the entry says so on its own row.
Tag layer © the Meta-Tagging Project, CC BY 4.0. The paper text is © its authors/publisher
and is linked, not reproduced. Excerpts shown are short quotations for identification and verification.
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