Mentalizing Deficits Constrain Belief in a Personal God — TEI-tagged view

Ara Norenzayan, Will M. Gervais, Kali H. Trzesniewski · 2012 · cognitive-science-of-religion · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036880 · TEI xml · tagged edition · index · concepts · authors
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mentalizing3 theory of mind4 mind perception supernatural agent belief in God autism spectrum Empathy Quotient2 Reading the Mind in the Eyes systemizing cognitive theories of religion survey70
Method, as described: individual-differences comparisons and multiple-mediator models across one clinical and three non-clinical samples

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PLoS ONE<title level="j">A work — the journal / venue title.
2012<date>A year or date.

Ara NorenzayanpersName, Will M. GervaispersName, Kali H. TrzesniewskipersName (2012date). “Mentalizing Deficits Constrain Belief in a Personal God.” PLoS ONEtitle·j.

Object of study — mentalizingterm·dom as a cognitive foundation of belief in a personal supernatural agentterm·dom

Research question — whether mentalizingterm·dom mediates associations between the autism spectrumterm·dom or gender and belief in Godterm·dom

Contribution — four-study evidence distinguishing mentalizingterm·dom from systemizingterm·dom, personality, intelligence, scientific interest, and religious attendanceterm·var

Cross-disciplinary analysis
content-tags & facets: phenomenon · claim-type · cross-domain-transfer · mechanism · claim-relation · replication-status · limitation — grounded in the full text
phenomenonthe capacity to represent minds supports intuitive belief in personal gods while cultural and analytic routes also shape belief and disbelief — “A complete scientific account of religious belief and disbelief therefore requires consideration of not only cognitive underpinnings such as mentalizing and other core cognitive biases such as dualistic intuitions and teleological or purpose-driven thinking [12] , [36] . Equally important in explaining their cultural prevalence, supernatural agent beliefs­once cognitively available-can be co-opted for motivational and social functions, because of both their palliative effects on existential anxieties [1] and their facilitative effects on cooperation in large, anonymous groups in a cultural evolutionary process [37] , [38] . Finally, the prevalence and content of supernatural agent beliefs, although constrained by core social cognitive capacities, respond to and fluctuate with socio-demographic conditions across time and cultures [39] . Within this broader theoretical landscape, these studies present new evidence for a social cognitive mechanism underlying one source of individual differences in religious belief.”
claim-typemechanism — “Cognitive approaches to religion emphasize that a reliably developing social cognitive mechanism-mentalizing or theory of mind-is a key foundation that supports the intuitive understanding of God or gods.”
method — evidence — “We used an individual differences approach to test three interrelated cognitive hypotheses: 1) the autistic spectrum is inversely related to belief in God, 2) mentalizing mediates this relation, and 3) mentalizing mediates the long-known, but theoretically ambiguous, gender gap wherein men show reduced religious belief than women.”
object of study — evidence — “Here we examine the hypothesis-long predicted, though currently untested- that mentalizing deficits constrain belief in God.”
research question — evidence — “We used an individual differences approach to test three interrelated cognitive hypotheses: 1) the autistic spectrum is inversely related to belief in God, 2) mentalizing mediates this relation, and 3) mentalizing mediates the long-known, but theoretically ambiguous, gender gap wherein men show reduced religious belief than women.”
contribution — evidence — “We used an individual differences approach to test three interrelated cognitive hypotheses: 1) the autistic spectrum is inversely related to belief in God, 2) mentalizing mediates this relation, and 3) mentalizing mediates the long-known, but theoretically ambiguous, gender gap wherein men show reduced religious belief than women.”
mechanismOrdinary social cognition supplies a basis for representing supernatural minds. — “Specifically, the social-cognitive capacity to represent and reason about minds-termed mentalizing, theory of mind, or mind perception [6] , [7] -also enables the mental representation of God and other supernatural agents [2] , [7] .”mechanisms[0]
mechanismReduced mentalizing weakens intuitive support for personal supernatural agents. — “These lines of evidence suggest that mentally representing supernatural beings (and their mental states) requires mentalizing capacities.”mechanisms[1]
mechanismMentalizing statistically transmits part of the autism-spectrum association with belief. — “In a logistic regression model with autism spectrum predicting belief in a personal God, controlling for gender, age, educational attainment, income, and frequency of religious attendance, for each standard deviation increase in autism scores, participants were only 80% as likely to strongly endorse a personal God, OR = .80, 95% CI = .66, .97, Wald = 5.25, p = .02. Mentalizing emerged again as a significant mediator of this relationship, b MentalizingIndirect = −.20, 95% CI = −.37, −.04, while systemizing did not, b SystemizingIndirect = −.007, 95% CI = −.03, .008 ( Fig. 2A ). Furthermore, neither of the two personality measures were significant mediators, b ConscientiousnessIndirect = −.02, 95% CI = −.07, .02, b AgreeablenessIndirect = −.10, 95% CI = −.20, .004.”mechanisms[2]
mechanismMentalizing also accounts for part of the observed gender difference in belief. — “A gender gap was again observed: men were 47% as likely as women to strongly endorse God, OR = .47, 95% CI = .30, .75, Wald = 10.07, p = .002, controlling for all four covariates and the autism spectrum. As hypothesized, both mentalizing measures independently mediated this gender effect: b EmpathyIndirect = .27, 95% CI = .12, .45, and b MindreadingIndirect = .11, 95% CI = .02, .25 ( Fig. 3B ). In a comprehensive logistic regression model, the two mentalizing measures emerged as significant predictors. Lower education and religious attendance also independently predicted belief in God ( Table 2 ).”mechanisms[3]
mechanismAnalytic processing can suppress intuitions that otherwise make theism compelling. — “Analytic cognitive processing that suppresses or overrides the intuitions that make theism cognitively compelling [34] and exposure to secular cultural contexts lacking cues that one should believe in God or gods [35] also likely promote religious disbelief.”mechanisms[4]
mechanismCultural contexts provide cues that promote or inhibit supernatural-agent belief. — “Analytic cognitive processing that suppresses or overrides the intuitions that make theism cognitively compelling [34] and exposure to secular cultural contexts lacking cues that one should believe in God or gods [35] also likely promote religious disbelief.”mechanisms[5]
senserepresentation - social-cognitive modeling of human and supernatural mental states — “Specifically, the social-cognitive capacity to represent and reason about minds-termed mentalizing, theory of mind, or mind perception [6] , [7] -also enables the mental representation of God and other supernatural agents [2] , [7] .”senses[0]
senseagency - culturally attributed beliefs, desires, concerns, and responsiveness of gods — “Believers intuitively treat gods as intentional agents with mental states who enter into social relationships with humans, using supernatural powers to assuage existential concerns, respond to human desires, and monitor their social behaviour [1] – [5] .”senses[1]
sensebias - ordinary mind-reading distortions carried into inferences about a deity — “When adults form inferences about God's mind, they show the same mentalizing biases that are typically found when reasoning about other peoples' minds [16] – [18] .”senses[2]
senseemotion - a mental state identified and interpreted within the mentalizing capacity — “Empathy has been used extensively to detect individual differences in adult mentalizing tendencies, including perspective taking, interest in others' beliefs and desires, and understanding emotions.”senses[3]
senseprediction - anticipating how another person will feel — “We measured mentalizing with the short self-report version of the Empathy Quotient [28] (22 items, α = .88, M = 23.06, SD = 7.75), which assesses the ability to identify the mental states of others and to react appropriately to them (sample items: “I often find it difficult to judge if someone is rude or polite” (reverse scored). “I am good at predicting how someone will feel.”). We measured systemizing with the short version of the Systemizing Quotient [28] (25 items, α = .84, M = 16.37, SD = 7.99). This scale measures aptitude for, and interest in, reasoning about mechanical and physical objects and processes. Sample items: “I am fascinated by how machines work.” “I find it difficult to understand information the bank sends me on different investment and saving systems” (reverse scored).”senses[4]
sensecontrol - statistical adjustment separating the proposed pathway from demographic and cultural alternatives — “Our findings should be interpreted with some caution; although the results held controlling for several key socio-demographic characteristics, further research conducted in other cultural contexts should assess generalizability of findings [33] .”senses[5]
controlIQ adjustment — held — “In a logistic regression model with autism diagnosis and IQ predicting belief in God, autistic participants were only 11% as likely as neuro-typical controls to strongly endorse God, OR = .11, 95% CI = .01, .96, Wald = 3.98, p = .046, and IQ was unrelated to belief, OR = 1.01, 95% CI = .96, 1.06, Wald = .22, p = .64.” — rules out general intelligence as the explanation for the clinical association — “In a logistic regression model with autism diagnosis and IQ predicting belief in God, autistic participants were only 11% as likely as neuro-typical controls to strongly endorse God, OR = .11, 95% CI = .01, .96, Wald = 3.98, p = .046, and IQ was unrelated to belief, OR = 1.01, 95% CI = .96, 1.06, Wald = .22, p = .64.”controls[0]
controlsystemizing mediator — failed — “First, we tested our autism-related hypothesis ( Fig. 1A ). As hypothesized, higher autism scores predicted lower belief in God, β = −.13, p = .02 (controlling for gender). Critically, as predicted, mentalizing significantly mediated this relationship, b MentalizingIndirect = −.07, 95% CI = −.14, −.01. Systemizing was not a significant mediator, b SystemizingIndirect = .00, 95% CI = −.007, .009.” — rules out rule-based cognitive style as the mediator — “First, we tested our autism-related hypothesis ( Fig. 1A ). As hypothesized, higher autism scores predicted lower belief in God, β = −.13, p = .02 (controlling for gender). Critically, as predicted, mentalizing significantly mediated this relationship, b MentalizingIndirect = −.07, 95% CI = −.14, −.01. Systemizing was not a significant mediator, b SystemizingIndirect = .00, 95% CI = −.007, .009.”controls[1]
controlage, education, income, and attendance covariates — held — “In a logistic regression model with autism spectrum predicting belief in a personal God, controlling for gender, age, educational attainment, income, and frequency of religious attendance, for each standard deviation increase in autism scores, participants were only 80% as likely to strongly endorse a personal God, OR = .80, 95% CI = .66, .97, Wald = 5.25, p = .02. Mentalizing emerged again as a significant mediator of this relationship, b MentalizingIndirect = −.20, 95% CI = −.37, −.04, while systemizing did not, b SystemizingIndirect = −.007, 95% CI = −.03, .008 ( Fig. 2A ). Furthermore, neither of the two personality measures were significant mediators, b ConscientiousnessIndirect = −.02, 95% CI = −.07, .02, b AgreeablenessIndirect = −.10, 95% CI = −.20, .004.” — rules out demographic and participation confounding — “In a logistic regression model with autism spectrum predicting belief in a personal God, controlling for gender, age, educational attainment, income, and frequency of religious attendance, for each standard deviation increase in autism scores, participants were only 80% as likely to strongly endorse a personal God, OR = .80, 95% CI = .66, .97, Wald = 5.25, p = .02. Mentalizing emerged again as a significant mediator of this relationship, b MentalizingIndirect = −.20, 95% CI = −.37, −.04, while systemizing did not, b SystemizingIndirect = −.007, 95% CI = −.03, .008 ( Fig. 2A ). Furthermore, neither of the two personality measures were significant mediators, b ConscientiousnessIndirect = −.02, 95% CI = −.07, .02, b AgreeablenessIndirect = −.10, 95% CI = −.20, .004.”controls[2]
controlAgreeableness and Conscientiousness mediators — failed — “Finally, in a comprehensive logistic regression model predicting high belief in a personal God, including all predictors (autism and gender), covariates (age, education, income, religious attendance), and potential mediating variables (mentalizing, systemizing, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness), mentalizing emerged as a specific, independent, and robust predictor of belief in a personal God, OR = 1.41, Wald = 6.01, p = .01 ( Table 1 ). Older age and religious attendance also independently predicted belief in God; Agreeableness and systemizing were statistically marginal predictors ( Table 1 ).” — rules out religiosity-related personality as the mechanism — “Finally, in a comprehensive logistic regression model predicting high belief in a personal God, including all predictors (autism and gender), covariates (age, education, income, religious attendance), and potential mediating variables (mentalizing, systemizing, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness), mentalizing emerged as a specific, independent, and robust predictor of belief in a personal God, OR = 1.41, Wald = 6.01, p = .01 ( Table 1 ). Older age and religious attendance also independently predicted belief in God; Agreeableness and systemizing were statistically marginal predictors ( Table 1 ).”controls[3]
controlinterest in math, science, and engineering — held — “Third, it is possible that the autism spectrum is associated with interest in math, science, and engineering (IMSE), which in turn reduces religious belief. However, Study 4 statistically controlled for IMSE, which did not independently predict belief in God ( Table 2 ). Similarly, systemizing, a variable closely linked to IMSE, failed as a mediator (Studies 2–3). Fourth, the link between autism and low belief in God was not explained by general intelligence: autism remained a significant predictor of low belief in God even after statistically controlling for IQ (Study 1), and education (Studies 3–4), which is typically correlated with IQ. Fifth, the two basic personality dimensions that are most reliably predictive of religiosity, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness [30] , similarly failed as mediators.” — rules out scientific interest as the source of lower belief — “Third, it is possible that the autism spectrum is associated with interest in math, science, and engineering (IMSE), which in turn reduces religious belief. However, Study 4 statistically controlled for IMSE, which did not independently predict belief in God ( Table 2 ). Similarly, systemizing, a variable closely linked to IMSE, failed as a mediator (Studies 2–3). Fourth, the link between autism and low belief in God was not explained by general intelligence: autism remained a significant predictor of low belief in God even after statistically controlling for IQ (Study 1), and education (Studies 3–4), which is typically correlated with IQ. Fifth, the two basic personality dimensions that are most reliably predictive of religiosity, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness [30] , similarly failed as mediators.”controls[4]
auditmentalizing —causes→ belief in God — Audit 2026-09-28: DOUBTFUL - read against its span and kept, but mentalizing DEFICITS 'may undermine' belief in a personal God; causes is hedged and drops the deficit and its direction. — “It follows that mentalizing deficits, associated with the autistic spectrum and also commonly found in men more than in women, may undermine this intuitive support and reduce belief in a personal God.”concept_edges[0]
relationmentalizing —causes→ belief in God — Mentalizing capacity is proposed to affect belief in a personal deity. — “It follows that mentalizing deficits, associated with the autistic spectrum and also commonly found in men more than in women, may undermine this intuitive support and reduce belief in a personal God.”concept_edges[0]
weightmentalizing —causes→ belief in God — 0.95 — “It follows that mentalizing deficits, associated with the autistic spectrum and also commonly found in men more than in women, may undermine this intuitive support and reduce belief in a personal God.”concept_edges[0]
outcomecontrol — held — “In a logistic regression model with autism diagnosis and IQ predicting belief in God, autistic participants were only 11% as likely as neuro-typical controls to strongly endorse God, OR = .11, 95% CI = .01, .96, Wald = 3.98, p = .046, and IQ was unrelated to belief, OR = 1.01, 95% CI = .96, 1.06, Wald = .22, p = .64.”controls[0]
outcomecontrol — failed — “First, we tested our autism-related hypothesis ( Fig. 1A ). As hypothesized, higher autism scores predicted lower belief in God, β = −.13, p = .02 (controlling for gender). Critically, as predicted, mentalizing significantly mediated this relationship, b MentalizingIndirect = −.07, 95% CI = −.14, −.01. Systemizing was not a significant mediator, b SystemizingIndirect = .00, 95% CI = −.007, .009.”controls[1]
outcomecontrol — held — “In a logistic regression model with autism spectrum predicting belief in a personal God, controlling for gender, age, educational attainment, income, and frequency of religious attendance, for each standard deviation increase in autism scores, participants were only 80% as likely to strongly endorse a personal God, OR = .80, 95% CI = .66, .97, Wald = 5.25, p = .02. Mentalizing emerged again as a significant mediator of this relationship, b MentalizingIndirect = −.20, 95% CI = −.37, −.04, while systemizing did not, b SystemizingIndirect = −.007, 95% CI = −.03, .008 ( Fig. 2A ). Furthermore, neither of the two personality measures were significant mediators, b ConscientiousnessIndirect = −.02, 95% CI = −.07, .02, b AgreeablenessIndirect = −.10, 95% CI = −.20, .004.”controls[2]
outcomecontrol — failed — “Finally, in a comprehensive logistic regression model predicting high belief in a personal God, including all predictors (autism and gender), covariates (age, education, income, religious attendance), and potential mediating variables (mentalizing, systemizing, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness), mentalizing emerged as a specific, independent, and robust predictor of belief in a personal God, OR = 1.41, Wald = 6.01, p = .01 ( Table 1 ). Older age and religious attendance also independently predicted belief in God; Agreeableness and systemizing were statistically marginal predictors ( Table 1 ).”controls[3]
outcomecontrol — held — “Third, it is possible that the autism spectrum is associated with interest in math, science, and engineering (IMSE), which in turn reduces religious belief. However, Study 4 statistically controlled for IMSE, which did not independently predict belief in God ( Table 2 ). Similarly, systemizing, a variable closely linked to IMSE, failed as a mediator (Studies 2–3). Fourth, the link between autism and low belief in God was not explained by general intelligence: autism remained a significant predictor of low belief in God even after statistically controlling for IQ (Study 1), and education (Studies 3–4), which is typically correlated with IQ. Fifth, the two basic personality dimensions that are most reliably predictive of religiosity, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness [30] , similarly failed as mediators.”controls[4]
limitationFurther work in other cultural contexts is needed to assess generalizability. — “Our findings should be interpreted with some caution; although the results held controlling for several key socio-demographic characteristics, further research conducted in other cultural contexts should assess generalizability of findings [33] .”limitations[0]
limitationMost measures relied on self- or observer-report. — “Most of the measures were self-report (or observer-report in Study 1), which are known to have their limitations.”limitations[1]
limitationCorrelational observations do not establish the proposed causal direction. — “Moreover, the correlational natures of the observations are another limitation and preclude definite causal inferences without further experimental research.”limitations[2]
limitationThe clinical comparison was too small for formal mediation testing. — “This study allowed comparison of individuals with autism diagnoses with a matched control group, but the small sample size rendered statistical mediation testing unfeasible.”limitations[3]
limitationThe Study 4 national sample was not representative. — “Although this was not a representative sample, participants' ethnic and religious backgrounds were roughly similar to the general American population, and there was a wide range of educational attainment and religious attendance (see Table 4 for further socio-demographic background information).”limitations[4]
limitationMentalizing deficits are only one of several paths to religious disbelief. — “Finally, we emphasize that our data do not suggest that religious disbelief solely arises through mentalizing deficits; multiple psychological and socio-cultural pathways likely lead to a complex and over-determined phenomenon such as disbelief in God or gods.”limitations[5]
Content tags
content-observations: finding · quantity · variable · definition · key-term — grounded in the full text
findingAutistic adolescents were less likely than matched controls to strongly endorse God. — “In a logistic regression model with autism diagnosis and IQ predicting belief in God, autistic participants were only 11% as likely as neuro-typical controls to strongly endorse God, OR = .11, 95% CI = .01, .96, Wald = 3.98, p = .046, and IQ was unrelated to belief, OR = 1.01, 95% CI = .96, 1.06, Wald = .22, p = .64.”content_tags.findings[0]
findingMentalizing, rather than IQ, predicted belief in the small clinical comparison. — “In this logistic regression model, only mentalizing was a significant predictor: for each standard deviation decrease in mentalizing, participants were only 21% as likely to strongly endorse God, OR = .21, 95% CI = .06, .73, Wald = 6.07, p = .01, and again IQ was not a significant predictor, OR = 1.03, 95% CI = .98, 1.08, Wald = .96, p = .33.”content_tags.findings[1]
findingStudy 2 linked higher autism-spectrum scores to lower belief through mentalizing, not systemizing. — “First, we tested our autism-related hypothesis ( Fig. 1A ). As hypothesized, higher autism scores predicted lower belief in God, β = −.13, p = .02 (controlling for gender). Critically, as predicted, mentalizing significantly mediated this relationship, b MentalizingIndirect = −.07, 95% CI = −.14, −.01. Systemizing was not a significant mediator, b SystemizingIndirect = .00, 95% CI = −.007, .009.”content_tags.findings[2]
findingStudy 3 replicated mentalizing as mediator after demographic and attendance adjustments. — “In a logistic regression model with autism spectrum predicting belief in a personal God, controlling for gender, age, educational attainment, income, and frequency of religious attendance, for each standard deviation increase in autism scores, participants were only 80% as likely to strongly endorse a personal God, OR = .80, 95% CI = .66, .97, Wald = 5.25, p = .02. Mentalizing emerged again as a significant mediator of this relationship, b MentalizingIndirect = −.20, 95% CI = −.37, −.04, while systemizing did not, b SystemizingIndirect = −.007, 95% CI = −.03, .008 ( Fig. 2A ). Furthermore, neither of the two personality measures were significant mediators, b ConscientiousnessIndirect = −.02, 95% CI = −.07, .02, b AgreeablenessIndirect = −.10, 95% CI = −.20, .004.”content_tags.findings[3]
findingNeither systemizing nor the two tested personality traits mediated the Study 3 association. — “Furthermore, neither of the two personality measures were significant mediators, b ConscientiousnessIndirect = −.02, 95% CI = −.07, .02, b AgreeablenessIndirect = −.10, 95% CI = −.20, .004.”content_tags.findings[4]
findingMentalizing independently predicted belief in the comprehensive Study 3 model. — “Finally, in a comprehensive logistic regression model predicting high belief in a personal God, including all predictors (autism and gender), covariates (age, education, income, religious attendance), and potential mediating variables (mentalizing, systemizing, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness), mentalizing emerged as a specific, independent, and robust predictor of belief in a personal God, OR = 1.41, Wald = 6.01, p = .01 ( Table 1 ). Older age and religious attendance also independently predicted belief in God; Agreeableness and systemizing were statistically marginal predictors ( Table 1 ).”content_tags.findings[5]
findingTwo distinct mentalizing measures independently mediated the Study 4 autism association. — “In a logistic regression model, the autistic spectrum inversely predicted belief in God, controlling for gender and the four covariates: for each standard deviation increase in autism scores, participants were only 66% as likely to strongly endorse God, OR = .66, 95% CI = .53, .84, Wald = 12.11, p = .001. The two distinct mentalizing measures significantly and independently mediated this relationship: b EmpathyIndirect = −.25, 95% CI = −.41, −.10, and b MindreadingIndirect = −.07, 95% CI = −.14, −.02 ( Fig. 3A ).”content_tags.findings[6]
findingBoth mentalizing measures also mediated the Study 4 gender difference in belief. — “A gender gap was again observed: men were 47% as likely as women to strongly endorse God, OR = .47, 95% CI = .30, .75, Wald = 10.07, p = .002, controlling for all four covariates and the autism spectrum. As hypothesized, both mentalizing measures independently mediated this gender effect: b EmpathyIndirect = .27, 95% CI = .12, .45, and b MindreadingIndirect = .11, 95% CI = .02, .25 ( Fig. 3B ). In a comprehensive logistic regression model, the two mentalizing measures emerged as significant predictors. Lower education and religious attendance also independently predicted belief in God ( Table 2 ).”content_tags.findings[7]
quantity11% — Study 1 odds of strong endorsement among autistic participants relative to controls — “In a logistic regression model with autism diagnosis and IQ predicting belief in God, autistic participants were only 11% as likely as neuro-typical controls to strongly endorse God, OR = .11, 95% CI = .01, .96, Wald = 3.98, p = .046, and IQ was unrelated to belief, OR = 1.01, 95% CI = .96, 1.06, Wald = .22, p = .64.”content_tags.quantities[0]
quantity327 — Canadian student participants in Study 2 — “In exchange for extra credit in psychology courses, 327 Canadian students ( M Age = 20.0, 66% female) completed a web-based questionnaire. For information about participants' religious backgrounds, see Table 4 .”content_tags.quantities[1]
quantity706 — complete cases in the broad national Study 3 sample — “A broad national sample of Americans was drawn from a US-based online survey tool (Mechanical Turk, Amazon.com). A total of 725 participants were recruited, however incomplete data reduced the sample to N = 706, Age: 18–88, M = 30.23, SD = 10.65, 63% female. Participants came from all 50 states, and had diverse religious backgrounds, educational attainment, levels of income, and levels of religious attendance (see Table 4 for further demographic information).”content_tags.quantities[2]
quantity66% — Study 4 odds of strong endorsement per standard-deviation increase in autism scores — “In a logistic regression model, the autistic spectrum inversely predicted belief in God, controlling for gender and the four covariates: for each standard deviation increase in autism scores, participants were only 66% as likely to strongly endorse God, OR = .66, 95% CI = .53, .84, Wald = 12.11, p = .001. The two distinct mentalizing measures significantly and independently mediated this relationship: b EmpathyIndirect = −.25, 95% CI = −.41, −.10, and b MindreadingIndirect = −.07, 95% CI = −.14, −.02 ( Fig. 3A ).”content_tags.quantities[3]
quantity452 — participants in the broad national Study 4 sample — “A broad national sample of 452 Americans (Age: 18–84, M = 43.06; 50.7% female) was drawn from a paid subject pool administered by a US-based survey company ( www.Zoomerang.com ). Although this was not a representative sample, participants' ethnic and religious backgrounds were roughly similar to the general American population, and there was a wide range of educational attainment and religious attendance (see Table 4 for further socio-demographic background information).”content_tags.quantities[4]
variablebelief in God (dependent measure of endorsement or perceived relationship with a personal deity) — “Participants rated their agreement (0–6) with 10 items selected from the previously validated and widely-used Spiritual Well Being Scale [41] . These items measure belief in, and a perceived relationship with, a personal God ( α = .94, M = 43.88, SD = 18.55). Representative items: “I have a personally meaningful relationship with God,” “I believe that God is concerned about my problems.” Reverse Scored: “I believe that God is impersonal and not interested in my daily situations.” “I don't find much satisfaction in private prayer with God.” Visual inspection revealed a bimodal distribution (Kurtosis = −1.36). Therefore, the measure was median-dichotomized into low believers (51.6%) and high believes (48.4%).”content_tags.variables[0]
variablementalizing (proposed mediator measured by empathy and mind-reading instruments) — “First, participants again completed the self-report version of the Empathy Quotient from Studies 2–3 ( α = .90, M = 22.21, SD = 8.85). Second, participants completed the revised Reading the Mind in the Eyes (RME) task [32] ( α = .71, M = 24.43, SD = 4.91), which consists of a series of 36 pictures of peoples' eyes. Participants are instructed to select which of four words best describes what the person in the picture is thinking or feeling. This task has been used to detect individual differences in advanced adult mentalizing [32] . This latter measure shares neither conceptual resemblance nor method variance with the belief in God measure. The two mentalizing measures were related, but by no means redundant, r (450) = .25, p <.001, and served as independent potential mediators in a multiple mediation model.”content_tags.variables[2]
variablesystemizing (alternative mediator representing rule-based reasoning) — “We measured mentalizing with the short self-report version of the Empathy Quotient [28] (22 items, α = .88, M = 23.06, SD = 7.75), which assesses the ability to identify the mental states of others and to react appropriately to them (sample items: “I often find it difficult to judge if someone is rude or polite” (reverse scored). “I am good at predicting how someone will feel.”). We measured systemizing with the short version of the Systemizing Quotient [28] (25 items, α = .84, M = 16.37, SD = 7.99). This scale measures aptitude for, and interest in, reasoning about mechanical and physical objects and processes. Sample items: “I am fascinated by how machines work.” “I find it difficult to understand information the bank sends me on different investment and saving systems” (reverse scored).”content_tags.variables[3]
variablereligious attendance (covariate separating belief from participation in religious groups) — “We measured age, educational attainment, income level, and frequency of religious attendance. Older age, lower educational attainment, and lower income are often found to be associated with religious belief. The frequency of religious attendance measure was included to subject our hypotheses to a more stringent test, by disentangling belief in God from an associated inclination towards religious social participation.”content_tags.variables[4]
definitionsupernatural agent belief — “Believers intuitively treat gods as intentional agents with mental states who enter into social relationships with humans, using supernatural powers to assuage existential concerns, respond to human desires, and monitor their social behaviour [1] – [5] .”content_tags.definitions[0]
definitionmentalizing — “Specifically, the social-cognitive capacity to represent and reason about minds-termed mentalizing, theory of mind, or mind perception [6] , [7] -also enables the mental representation of God and other supernatural agents [2] , [7] .”content_tags.definitions[1]
definitionEmpathy Quotient — “We measured mentalizing with the short self-report version of the Empathy Quotient [28] (22 items, α = .88, M = 23.06, SD = 7.75), which assesses the ability to identify the mental states of others and to react appropriately to them (sample items: “I often find it difficult to judge if someone is rude or polite” (reverse scored). “I am good at predicting how someone will feel.”). We measured systemizing with the short version of the Systemizing Quotient [28] (25 items, α = .84, M = 16.37, SD = 7.99). This scale measures aptitude for, and interest in, reasoning about mechanical and physical objects and processes. Sample items: “I am fascinated by how machines work.” “I find it difficult to understand information the bank sends me on different investment and saving systems” (reverse scored).”content_tags.definitions[2]
definitionsystemizing — “We measured systemizing with the short version of the Systemizing Quotient [28] (25 items, α = .84, M = 16.37, SD = 7.99).”content_tags.definitions[3]
definitionbelief in a personal God — “Participants rated their agreement (0–6) with 10 items selected from the previously validated and widely-used Spiritual Well Being Scale [41] . These items measure belief in, and a perceived relationship with, a personal God ( α = .94, M = 43.88, SD = 18.55). Representative items: “I have a personally meaningful relationship with God,” “I believe that God is concerned about my problems.” Reverse Scored: “I believe that God is impersonal and not interested in my daily situations.” “I don't find much satisfaction in private prayer with God.” Visual inspection revealed a bimodal distribution (Kurtosis = −1.36). Therefore, the measure was median-dichotomized into low believers (51.6%) and high believes (48.4%).”content_tags.definitions[4]
definitionReading the Mind in the Eyes — “First, participants again completed the self-report version of the Empathy Quotient from Studies 2–3 ( α = .90, M = 22.21, SD = 8.85). Second, participants completed the revised Reading the Mind in the Eyes (RME) task [32] ( α = .71, M = 24.43, SD = 4.91), which consists of a series of 36 pictures of peoples' eyes. Participants are instructed to select which of four words best describes what the person in the picture is thinking or feeling. This task has been used to detect individual differences in advanced adult mentalizing [32] . This latter measure shares neither conceptual resemblance nor method variance with the belief in God measure. The two mentalizing measures were related, but by no means redundant, r (450) = .25, p <.001, and served as independent potential mediators in a multiple mediation model.”content_tags.definitions[5]
Concepts
terms this paper carries, each with the sentence it was cut from — the layer that joins one paper to another. Terms with no quote yet are on CONCEPTS.html.
conceptmentalizing — capacity to represent and reason about minds — “Specifically, the social-cognitive capacity to represent and reason about minds-termed mentalizing, theory of mind, or mind perception [6] , [7] -also enables the mental representation of God and other supernatural agents [2] , [7] .”concepts[0]
concepttheory of mind — not defined in this paper's own words; alternate label for mentalizing — “Specifically, the social-cognitive capacity to represent and reason about minds-termed mentalizing, theory of mind, or mind perception [6] , [7] -also enables the mental representation of God and other supernatural agents [2] , [7] .”concepts[1]
conceptmind perception — not defined in this paper's own words; alternate label for mentalizing — “Specifically, the social-cognitive capacity to represent and reason about minds-termed mentalizing, theory of mind, or mind perception [6] , [7] -also enables the mental representation of God and other supernatural agents [2] , [7] .”concepts[2]
conceptsupernatural agent — not defined in this paper's own words; deity treated as an intentional social being — “Believers intuitively treat gods as intentional agents with mental states who enter into social relationships with humans, using supernatural powers to assuage existential concerns, respond to human desires, and monitor their social behaviour [1] – [5] .”concepts[3]
conceptbelief in God — not defined in this paper's own words; endorsement of or relationship with a personal deity — “Participants rated their agreement (0–6) with 10 items selected from the previously validated and widely-used Spiritual Well Being Scale [41] . These items measure belief in, and a perceived relationship with, a personal God ( α = .94, M = 43.88, SD = 18.55). Representative items: “I have a personally meaningful relationship with God,” “I believe that God is concerned about my problems.” Reverse Scored: “I believe that God is impersonal and not interested in my daily situations.” “I don't find much satisfaction in private prayer with God.” Visual inspection revealed a bimodal distribution (Kurtosis = −1.36). Therefore, the measure was median-dichotomized into low believers (51.6%) and high believes (48.4%).”concepts[4]
conceptautism spectrum — not defined in this paper's own words; diagnosis or measured continuum used as a predictor — “We used the same 5-item belief in God measure used in Study 1 ( α = .81, M = 27.70, SD = 8.06). Participants rated their agreement (1–7) with five different statements. Because the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is oversensitive in large samples, we assessed normality with visual inspection and other tests of normality (skewness = .08), which indicated that this measure was approximately normally distributed in this sample. Predictor Measures: Autism Spectrum and Gender . In addition to gender, we measured the widely used Autism Spectrum Quotient ( α = .73, M = 16.83, SD = 5.96) a 50-item questionnaire that detects normal individual differences in autism for people having normal levels of intelligence [23] . Sample items: “I prefer to do things the same way over and over again.” “I am fascinated by numbers.” “I find social situations easy” (reverse scored).”concepts[5]
conceptEmpathy Quotient — not defined in this paper's own words; self- or observer-report measure of mentalizing — “We measured mentalizing with the short self-report version of the Empathy Quotient [28] (22 items, α = .88, M = 23.06, SD = 7.75), which assesses the ability to identify the mental states of others and to react appropriately to them (sample items: “I often find it difficult to judge if someone is rude or polite” (reverse scored). “I am good at predicting how someone will feel.”). We measured systemizing with the short version of the Systemizing Quotient [28] (25 items, α = .84, M = 16.37, SD = 7.99). This scale measures aptitude for, and interest in, reasoning about mechanical and physical objects and processes. Sample items: “I am fascinated by how machines work.” “I find it difficult to understand information the bank sends me on different investment and saving systems” (reverse scored).”concepts[6]
conceptReading the Mind in the Eyes — not defined in this paper's own words; performance-based measure of adult mentalizing — “First, participants again completed the self-report version of the Empathy Quotient from Studies 2–3 ( α = .90, M = 22.21, SD = 8.85). Second, participants completed the revised Reading the Mind in the Eyes (RME) task [32] ( α = .71, M = 24.43, SD = 4.91), which consists of a series of 36 pictures of peoples' eyes. Participants are instructed to select which of four words best describes what the person in the picture is thinking or feeling. This task has been used to detect individual differences in advanced adult mentalizing [32] . This latter measure shares neither conceptual resemblance nor method variance with the belief in God measure. The two mentalizing measures were related, but by no means redundant, r (450) = .25, p <.001, and served as independent potential mediators in a multiple mediation model.”concepts[7]
conceptsystemizing — not defined in this paper's own words; reasoning about mechanical and rule-governed systems — “We measured mentalizing with the short self-report version of the Empathy Quotient [28] (22 items, α = .88, M = 23.06, SD = 7.75), which assesses the ability to identify the mental states of others and to react appropriately to them (sample items: “I often find it difficult to judge if someone is rude or polite” (reverse scored). “I am good at predicting how someone will feel.”). We measured systemizing with the short version of the Systemizing Quotient [28] (25 items, α = .84, M = 16.37, SD = 7.99). This scale measures aptitude for, and interest in, reasoning about mechanical and physical objects and processes. Sample items: “I am fascinated by how machines work.” “I find it difficult to understand information the bank sends me on different investment and saving systems” (reverse scored).”concepts[8]
conceptcognitive theories of religion — not defined in this paper's own words; accounts of recurring religious belief through ordinary cognitive capacities — “Cognitive approaches to religion emphasize that a reliably developing social cognitive mechanism-mentalizing or theory of mind-is a key foundation that supports the intuitive understanding of God or gods. Present findings bolster this hypothesis, and further demonstrate that mentalizing deficits undermine not only intuitive understanding of God, but belief as well. Furthermore, these findings suggest one reason why, despite rich sociocultural diversity, key aspects of religion reoccur across history and cultures. Additionally, the robust gender gap in religious belief has been recognized for decades, although its origins continue to be vigorously debated [24] – [26] . Our findings contribute to this debate by providing an important and previously overlooked psychological explanation for the overrepresentation of men among disbelievers.”concepts[9]

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Mentalizingterm·dom Deficits Constrain Belief in a Personal Godterm·def Abstract Religious believers intuitively conceptualize deities as intentional agents with mental states who anticipate and respond to human beliefs, desires and concerns. It follows that mentalizingterm·dom deficits, associated with the autistic spectrum and also commonly found in men more than in women, may undermine this intuitive support and reduce belief in a personal Godterm·def. Autistic adolescents expressed less belief in Godterm·dom than did matched neuro-typical controls (Study 1). In a Canadian student sample (Study 2), and two American national samples that controlled for demographic characteristics and other correlates of autism and religiosity (Study 3 and 4), the autism spectrumterm·dom predicted reduced belief in Godterm·dom, and mentalizingterm·dom mediated this relationship. Systemizingterm·dom (Studies 2 and 3) and two personality dimensions related to religious belief, Conscientiousness and Agreeableness (Study 3), failed as mediators. Mentalizingterm·dom also explained the robust and well-known, but theoretically debated, gender gap in religious belief wherein men show reduced religious belief (Studies 2–4).

Introduction Belief in Godterm·dom and other supernatural agentsterm·dom is culturally and historically widespread, and is a deeply affecting aspect of human life [1] . Yet relatively little is known about the cognitive foundations of these complex sociocultural beliefs. Believers intuitively treat gods as intentional agents with mental states who enter into social relationships with humans, using supernatural powers to assuage existential concerns, respond to human desires, and monitor their social behaviour [1] – [5] . Cognitive theories therefore converge on the hypothesis that supernatural agent beliefsterm·def are partly rooted in ordinary human social cognition. Specifically, the social-cognitive capacity to represent and reason about minds-termed mentalizingterm·dom, theory of mindterm·dom, or mind perceptionterm·dom [6] , [7] -also enables the mental representation of God and other supernatural agentsterm·dom [2] , [7] . If mentalizingterm·dom supports the mental representation of supernatural agentsterm·dom, then mentalizingterm·dom deficits associated with the autistic spectrum and also commonly found in men more than in women [6] , [8] , [9] may undermine intuitive support for supernatural agentterm·dom concepts and reduce belief in Godterm·dom [1] , [10] – [13] . Here we examine the hypothesis-long predicted, though currently untested- that mentalizingterm·dom deficits constrain belief in Godterm·dom.

In neuroimaging studies, thinking about [14] and praying to [15] God activates brain regions implicated in mentalizingterm·dom; thus mentalizingterm·dom might be a necessary component of belief in Godterm·dom, without being a sufficient cause. When adults form inferences about God's mind, they show the same mentalizingterm·dom biases that are typically found when reasoning about other peoples' minds [16] – [18] . Developmentally, children's reasoning about God's mental states, and about other non-physical agents, tracks the cognitive development of mentalizingterm·dom tendencies [19] , [20] . Finally, mentalizingterm·dom is deficient at higher levels of the autism spectrumterm·dom [8] , [9] , [21] , [22] , and interestingly men are both more likely to score high on the autism spectrumterm·dom [23] and more likely to be non-believers [24] – [26] . These lines of evidence suggest that mentally representing supernatural beings (and their mental states) requires mentalizingterm·dom capacities. This in turn implies that mentalizingterm·dom deficits would constrain intuitive support for belief in Godterm·dom. Recent unpublished findings by Caldwell-Harris, Murphy, Velazquez, and McNamara (2011) provide some indirect support to this line of reasoning. Adults who reported being diagnosed with autism spectrumterm·dom disorder were more likely than a neuro-typical comparison group to self-identify as atheist and less likely to belong to an organized religion.

The Present Research We used an individual differences approach to test three interrelated cognitive hypotheses: 1) the autistic spectrum is inversely related to belief in Godterm·dom, 2) mentalizingterm·dom mediates this relation, and 3) mentalizingterm·dom mediates the long-known, but theoretically ambiguous, gender gap wherein men show reduced religious belief than women. Study 1 compared religious belief in a sample of adolescents with clinical diagnoses of autism with a neuro-typical sample matched on relevant socio-demographic characteristics. Studies 2–4 replicated and extended our findings to three distinct non-clinical samples that measured autism as a continuous variable rather than as a clinical diagnosis. These studies also enabled formal mediation analyses, in which we tested our hypotheses with multiple mediation bootstrapping based on 9999 resamples [27] , an analytic technique for simultaneously testing multiple potential mediators (thus avoiding the inferential pitfalls of sequential analyses). In all analyses where gender was included, it was coded (female = 0, male = 1), and all other variables were standardized. Studies 2–4 also controlled for additional socio-demographic and psychological variables related to autism, mentalizingterm·dom, and religiosity that addressed several alternative explanations, which we evaluate in the General Discussion.

Ethics Statement For Studies 2–4, approval was obtained from the Behavioral Research Ethics Board (BREB) at the University of British Columbia, and all participants provided written informed consent (for participants who completed the study via the internet, consent was provided by clicking a designated button online; this was approved by the UBC BREB). For Study 1, the parent was given a letter of information and signed a written consent form and the child was given an assent form to read and sign. Approval for the study was obtained from the University of Western Ontario Research Ethics Board.

Results and Discussion Study 1 In a logistic regression model with autism diagnosis and IQ predicting belief in Godterm·dom, autistic participants were only 11% as likely as neuro-typical controls to strongly endorse God, OR = .11, 95% CI = .01, .96, Wald = 3.98, p = .046, and IQ was unrelated to belief, OR = 1.01, 95% CI = .96, 1.06, Wald = .22, p = .64.

This study allowed comparison of individuals with autism diagnoses with a matched control group, but the small sample size rendered statistical mediation testing unfeasible. As an alternative, we entered IQ and parental ratings of adolescent mentalizingterm·dom tendencies (the two were uncorrelated r = .15, p = .50) as independent predictors of belief in Godterm·dom. In this logistic regression model, only mentalizingterm·dom was a significant predictor: for each standard deviation decrease in mentalizingterm·dom, participants were only 21% as likely to strongly endorse God, OR = .21, 95% CI = .06, .73, Wald = 6.07, p = .01, and again IQ was not a significant predictor, OR = 1.03, 95% CI = .98, 1.08, Wald = .96, p = .33.

Study 2 Study 2 utilized a Canadian student sample and measured belief in Godterm·dom, a standard self-report measure of the autism spectrumterm·dom, and both mentalizingterm·dom (The Empathy Quotientterm) and systemizingterm·dom [28] as potential mediators. Empathy has been used extensively to detect individual differences in adult mentalizingterm·dom tendencies, including perspective taking, interest in others' beliefs and desires, and understanding emotions. It is inversely correlated with autism and with being male [8] , [28] . Systemizingterm·dom assesses individual differences in abilities and interests concerning physical and rule-based systems. Because systemizingterm·dom is positively correlated with autism and with being male [28] , but is typically orthogonal to mentalizingterm·dom, it was included as a second potential mediator. Neither mentalizingterm·dom nor systemizingterm·dom has religious content or share conceptual resemblance with the belief in Godterm·dom measure. We tested our two primary hypotheses with autism and gender (respectively) predicting belief in Godterm·dom, and mentalizingterm·dom (Empathy) and systemizingterm·dom as potential mediators.

First, we tested our autism-related hypothesis ( Fig. 1A ). As hypothesized, higher autism scores predicted lower belief in Godterm·dom, β = −.13, p = .02 (controlling for gender). Critically, as predicted, mentalizingterm·dom significantly mediated this relationship, b MentalizingIndirect = −.07, 95% CI = −.14, −.01. Systemizingterm·dom was not a significant mediator, b SystemizingIndirect = .00, 95% CI = −.007, .009.

Study 2: Mentalizingterm·dom, but not systemizingterm·dom, mediated the effects of both autism spectrumterm·dom (A) and gender (B) on belief in Godterm·dom ( N = 327). † p <.10, * p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001. Note. OR = odds ratio; β = standardized beta; b = unstandardized beta. Values in parentheses are mediated effects. Autism Analysis Covariate : Gender. Gender Analysis Covariate : Autism Spectrumterm·dom.

We next examined the effect of gender ( Fig. 1B ). Consistent with past research, there was a trend for men to report weaker belief in Godterm·dom than women (controlling for the autism spectrumterm·dom), b = −.21, p = .08 (this gender gap was significant at p = .05 when autism was not controlled). As hypothesized, there was a significant indirect effect, such that men were lower in mentalizingterm·dom, and in turn lower mentalizingterm·dom predicted lower belief in Godterm·dom, b MentalizingIndirect = .04, 95% CI = .003, .103; there was no significant indirect effect for systemizingterm·dom, b SystemizingIndirect = −.001, 95% CI = −.086, .084, even though gender more strongly predicted systemizingterm·dom ( b = .71) than mentalizingterm·dom ( b = −.21).

Study 3 Study 3 replicated and extended findings from Study 2 to a broad national sample of American adults, controlled for a range of covariates of the autism spectrumterm·dom and religious belief, and used an alternative measure of belief in and a personal relationship with God. We again tested mentalizingterm·dom (The Empathy Quotientterm) and systemizingterm·dom as mediators. In addition, we measured and tested two additional potential mediators. Two of the five basic facets of personality [29] , Conscientiousness and Agreeableness, are reliably related to religious belief and involvement in both previous research [30] , [31] and also in the current sample. Therefore it is plausible that they could also explain links between autism or gender and belief in Godterm·dom.

In a logistic regression model with autism spectrumterm·dom predicting belief in a personal Godterm·def, controlling for gender, age, educational attainment, income, and frequency of religious attendanceterm·var, for each standard deviation increase in autism scores, participants were only 80% as likely to strongly endorse a personal God, OR = .80, 95% CI = .66, .97, Wald = 5.25, p = .02. Mentalizingterm·dom emerged again as a significant mediator of this relationship, b MentalizingIndirect = −.20, 95% CI = −.37, −.04, while systemizingterm·dom did not, b SystemizingIndirect = −.007, 95% CI = −.03, .008 ( Fig. 2A ). Furthermore, neither of the two personality measures were significant mediators, b ConscientiousnessIndirect = −.02, 95% CI = −.07, .02, b AgreeablenessIndirect = −.10, 95% CI = −.20, .004.

Study 3: Mentalizingterm·dom, but not systemizingterm·dom, mediated the effects of both autism spectrumterm·dom (A) and gender (B) on belief in a personal Godterm·def ( N = 706). * p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001. Note. OR = odds ratio; β = standardized beta; b = unstandardized beta. Agreeableness, or Conscientiousness (not shown) also failed as mediators. Values in parentheses are mediated effects. Autism Analysis Covariates : Gender, Age, Education, Income, Religious attendanceterm·var. Gender Analysis Covariates : Autism Spectrumterm·dom, Age, Education, Income, Religious attendanceterm·var.

In a separate logistic regression model, men were only 60% as likely to report strong belief in a personal Godterm·def as women, controlling for the autism spectrumterm·dom, age, income, educational attainment, and frequency of religious attendanceterm·var, OR = .60, 95% CI = .41, .89, Wald = 6.55, p = .01. Replicating the pattern from Study 2, there was a significant indirect effect such that men were lower in mentalizingterm·dom, and in turn lower mentalizingterm·dom scores predicted lower belief in a personal Godterm·def, b MentalizingIndirect = −.15, 95% CI = −.28, −.06 ( Fig. 2B ); there was no significant indirect effect for any other potential mediator, b SystemizingIndirect = −.007, 95% CI = −.03, .008, b ConscientiousnessIndirect = −.02, 95% CI = −.07, .02, b AgreeablenessIndirect = −.10, 95% CI = −.20, .004. It was noteworthy that systemizingterm·dom again failed as a mediator of the gender effect, despite the fact that, once again, gender more strongly predicted systemizingterm·dom ( b = .62) than mentalizingterm·dom ( b = −.33) ( Fig. 2B ).

Finally, in a comprehensive logistic regression model predicting high belief in a personal Godterm·def, including all predictors (autism and gender), covariates (age, education, income, religious attendanceterm·var), and potential mediating variables (mentalizingterm·dom, systemizingterm·dom, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness), mentalizingterm·dom emerged as a specific, independent, and robust predictor of belief in a personal Godterm·def, OR = 1.41, Wald = 6.01, p = .01 ( Table 1 ). Older age and religious attendanceterm·var also independently predicted belief in Godterm·dom; Agreeableness and systemizingterm·dom were statistically marginal predictors ( Table 1 ).

Logistic Regression Model Predicting High Belief in Godterm·dom (Study 3, N = 706).

Study 4 Study 4 again replicated our findings in another national, broad sample of American adults, and controlled for four different covariates (age, education, frequency of religious attendanceterm·var, and a new 3-item measure of interest in math, science, and engineering, or IMSE). In addition to the Empathy Quotientterm, we added a second distinct measure of mentalizing-the performance-based Reading the Mind in the Eyesterm or Mindreading task [32] .

In a logistic regression model, the autistic spectrum inversely predicted belief in Godterm·dom, controlling for gender and the four covariates: for each standard deviation increase in autism scores, participants were only 66% as likely to strongly endorse God, OR = .66, 95% CI = .53, .84, Wald = 12.11, p = .001. The two distinct mentalizingterm·dom measures significantly and independently mediated this relationship: b EmpathyIndirect = −.25, 95% CI = −.41, −.10, and b MindreadingIndirect = −.07, 95% CI = −.14, −.02 ( Fig. 3A ).

Study 4: Two distinct measures of mentalizingterm·dom mediated the effects of both autism spectrumterm·dom (A) and gender (B) on belief in Godterm·dom ( N = 452). * p <.05, ** p <.01, *** p <.001. Note. OR = odds ratio; β = standardized beta; b = unstandardized beta. Values in parentheses are mediated effects. Autism Analysis Covariates : Gender, Age, Education, Religious attendanceterm·var, Interest in math, science, engineering. Gender Analysis Covariates : Autism Spectrumterm·dom, Age, Education, Religious attendanceterm·var, Interest in math, science, engineering.

A gender gap was again observed: men were 47% as likely as women to strongly endorse God, OR = .47, 95% CI = .30, .75, Wald = 10.07, p = .002, controlling for all four covariates and the autism spectrumterm·dom. As hypothesized, both mentalizingterm·dom measures independently mediated this gender effect: b EmpathyIndirect = .27, 95% CI = .12, .45, and b MindreadingIndirect = .11, 95% CI = .02, .25 ( Fig. 3B ). In a comprehensive logistic regression model, the two mentalizingterm·dom measures emerged as significant predictors. Lower education and religious attendanceterm·var also independently predicted belief in Godterm·dom ( Table 2 ).

Logistic Regression Model Predicting High Belief in Godterm·dom (Study 4, N = 452).

General Discussion We found new evidence for an inverse link between the autism spectrumterm·dom and belief in Godterm·dom that was explained by mentalizingterm·dom, as predicted by cognitive theories of religionterm·dom [10] – [13] . Mentalizingterm·dom also explained the widely observed [24] gender gap in religious belief. Our findings should be interpreted with some caution; although the results held controlling for several key socio-demographic characteristics, further research conducted in other cultural contexts should assess generalizability of findings [33] . Most of the measures were self-report (or observer-report in Study 1), which are known to have their limitations. Moreover, the correlational natures of the observations are another limitation and preclude definite causal inferences without further experimental research. Nevertheless, results were robust to various methodological checks, including different sampling strategies, alternative measures of autism, mentalizingterm·dom, and religious belief, and the inclusion of several theoretically relevant control variables addressing several alternative accounts.

Specifically, one alternative is that high levels of autism cause adjustment difficulties in social situations, leading to lower levels of religious attendanceterm·var, which in turn reduce religious belief. Contrary to this prediction, the effect of autism on belief in Godterm·dom remained significant after controlling for religious attendanceterm·var (Studies 3–4), and disappeared only after controlling for mentalizingterm·dom. This demonstrates that the effect of autism on belief exists even after removing the considerable overlap between belief in Godterm·dom and religious attendanceterm·var. Relatedly, the relationship between the autism spectrumterm·dom and belief cannot be solely a by-product of the more challenging social circumstances of autistic individuals, as identical patterns emerged when autism was measured as a continuous variable in a non-clinical sample of university students sharing similar social circumstances (Study 2).

A second possible alternative is reverse-causation: that religious involvement somehow causes higher levels of mentalizingterm·dom, which in turn predict low scores on the autism spectrumterm·dom. One causal path for this alternative is that belief in Godterm·dom encourages greater social involvement in religious groups and activities, which in turn increases mentalizingterm·dom tendencies and decreases the likelihood of being on the autism spectrumterm·dom. This interpretation did not receive support in two studies, because holding constant frequency of religious attendanceterm·var did not eliminate the effect of mentalizingterm·dom on belief in Godterm·dom. Moreover, it fails to account for the gender findings (belief in Godterm·dom cannot cause gender), whereas the mentalizingterm·dom hypothesis parsimoniously explains both the autism and gender effects. Another reverse-causation pathway is that religious involvement leads to greater levels of mentally-simulated social engagement with supernatural agentsterm·dom believed to have elaborate mental states, which in turn encourages more mentalizingterm·dom, and lower autism scores. Future research could test this hypothesis, but we note that this alternative pathway is compatible with the hypothesis that mentalizingterm·dom deficits constrain religious belief.

Third, it is possible that the autism spectrumterm·dom is associated with interest in math, science, and engineering (IMSE), which in turn reduces religious belief. However, Study 4 statistically controlled for IMSE, which did not independently predict belief in Godterm·dom ( Table 2 ). Similarly, systemizingterm·dom, a variable closely linked to IMSE, failed as a mediator (Studies 2–3). Fourth, the link between autism and low belief in Godterm·dom was not explained by general intelligence: autism remained a significant predictor of low belief in Godterm·dom even after statistically controlling for IQ (Study 1), and education (Studies 3–4), which is typically correlated with IQ. Fifth, the two basic personality dimensions that are most reliably predictive of religiosity, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness [30] , similarly failed as mediators.

Cognitive approaches to religion emphasize that a reliably developing social cognitive mechanism-mentalizing or theory of mind-is a key foundation that supports the intuitive understanding of God or gods. Present findings bolster this hypothesis, and further demonstrate that mentalizingterm·dom deficits undermine not only intuitive understanding of God, but belief as well. Furthermore, these findings suggest one reason why, despite rich sociocultural diversity, key aspects of religion reoccur across history and cultures. Additionally, the robust gender gap in religious belief has been recognized for decades, although its origins continue to be vigorously debated [24] – [26] . Our findings contribute to this debate by providing an important and previously overlooked psychological explanation for the overrepresentation of men among disbelievers.

Finally, we emphasize that our data do not suggest that religious disbelief solely arises through mentalizingterm·dom deficits; multiple psychological and socio-cultural pathways likely lead to a complex and over-determined phenomenon such as disbelief in God or gods. Therefore, mentalizingterm·dom deficits are one pathway among several to disbelief. Analytic cognitive processing that suppresses or overrides the intuitions that make theism cognitively compelling [34] and exposure to secular cultural contexts lacking cues that one should believe in God or gods [35] also likely promote religious disbelief. In other words, the present results suggest that disbelief can result from mentalizingterm·dom deficits, but it can also arise from multiple other sources, holding constant mentalizingterm·dom tendencies.

A complete scientific account of religious belief and disbelief therefore requires consideration of not only cognitive underpinnings such as mentalizingterm·dom and other core cognitive biases such as dualistic intuitions and teleological or purpose-driven thinking [12] , [36] . Equally important in explaining their cultural prevalence, supernatural agent beliefsterm·def­once cognitively available-can be co-opted for motivational and social functions, because of both their palliative effects on existential anxieties [1] and their facilitative effects on cooperation in large, anonymous groups in a cultural evolutionary process [37] , [38] . Finally, the prevalence and content of supernatural agent beliefsterm·def, although constrained by core social cognitive capacities, respond to and fluctuate with socio-demographic conditions across time and cultures [39] . Within this broader theoretical landscape, these studies present new evidence for a social cognitive mechanism underlying one source of individual differences in religious belief.

Materials and Methods Study 1 Participants We recruited 12 autistic and 13 neuro-typical adolescents from the same South Florida neighbourhood. Participants were matched on key demographic and socio-economic variables (see Table 3 ). One additional autistic participant was excluded from analyses for failure to answer religious belief items. Families of autism-diagnosed children were contacted through local autism organizations. Autistic participants were diagnosed by registered clinicians based on DSM-IV criteria and were free of additional diagnoses.

Demographic and socio-economic background information in Study 1.

Dependent Measure: Belief in Godterm·dom Participants rated their agreement (1–7) with four different statements (I believe in God; When I am in trouble, I find myself wanting to ask God for help. Reversed-coded items: When people pray they are only talking to themselves; I don't really spend much time thinking about my religious beliefs). One additional item (“I just don't understand religion”) was dropped, because it correlated poorly with the overall scale in this sample, leaving a four-item Intuitive Belief in Godterm·dom scale ( α = .65, M = 5.03, SD = 1.37). (Retaining this item did not significantly alter the overall pattern of results). In previous research [34] , this measure correlated very highly with other scales measuring religious devotion, such as the Intrinsic Religiosity Scale [40] ( r = .65, p<.001), and the Spiritual Well-Being Scale [41] ( r = .82, p<.001). Belief in Godterm·dom was non-normally distributed and negatively skewed (Kolmogorov-Smirnov p = .08, skewness = −.82). Therefore, this variable was median-dichotomized into high believers (60%) and low believers (40%).

Predictor Measures: Autism, Mentalizingterm·dom, and IQ Parents rated their adolescent child using the parental version of the 50-item Autism Spectrumterm·dom Quotient [23] (ASQ) ( α = .91, M = 20.67, SD = 11.67). Representative items from the parental version of the ASQ: “S/he is fascinated by numbers,” “S/he is good at social chit-chat” (reverse-scored). The autistic group ( M = 30.82, SD = 7.39) scored significantly higher on parental ratings of autism than did the neuro-typical control group ( M = 12.08, SD = 6.42), t (22) = 6.65, p = .0001, Cohen's d = 2.84, validating the clinical diagnoses. Mentalizingterm·dom was assessed by the parents' ratings of their child, using the short, 22-item version of the Empathy Quotientterm [28] ( α = .97, M = 17.50, SD = 12.75), which measures perspective taking, interest in inferring others' beliefs and desires, and understanding emotion. Representative items from the parental version of the Empathy Quotientterm: “My child often finds it difficult to judge if someone is rude or polite” (reverse scored), “My child is good at understanding how others feel and what they are thinking.” We assessed General Intelligence (IQ) with the age-appropriate Kauffman Brief Intelligence Test, 2 nd Edition [42] , which consists of both verbal and non-verbal subtests ( M = 92.31, SD = 21.05). None of the items in any of the predictor measures had any religious content. Autism scores were not reliably associated with IQ, r (25) = −.275, p = .19.

Study 2 Participants In exchange for extra credit in psychology courses, 327 Canadian students ( M Age = 20.0, 66% female) completed a web-based questionnaire. For information about participants' religious backgrounds, see Table 4 .

Demographic and socio-economic background information in Studies 2–4.

Dependent Measure: Belief in Godterm·dom We used the same 5-item belief in Godterm·dom measure used in Study 1 ( α = .81, M = 27.70, SD = 8.06). Participants rated their agreement (1–7) with five different statements. Because the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is oversensitive in large samples, we assessed normality with visual inspection and other tests of normality (skewness = .08), which indicated that this measure was approximately normally distributed in this sample. Predictor Measures: Autism Spectrumterm·dom and Gender . In addition to gender, we measured the widely used Autism Spectrumterm·dom Quotient ( α = .73, M = 16.83, SD = 5.96) a 50-item questionnaire that detects normal individual differences in autism for people having normal levels of intelligence [23] . Sample items: “I prefer to do things the same way over and over again.” “I am fascinated by numbers.” “I find social situations easy” (reverse scored).

Potential Mediators: Mentalizingterm·dom and Systemizingterm·dom We measured mentalizingterm·dom with the short self-report version of the Empathy Quotientterm [28] (22 items, α = .88, M = 23.06, SD = 7.75), which assesses the ability to identify the mental states of others and to react appropriately to them (sample items: “I often find it difficult to judge if someone is rude or polite” (reverse scored). “I am good at predicting how someone will feel.”). We measured systemizingterm·dom with the short version of the Systemizingterm·dom Quotient [28] (25 items, α = .84, M = 16.37, SD = 7.99). This scale measures aptitude for, and interest in, reasoning about mechanical and physical objects and processes. Sample items: “I am fascinated by how machines work.” “I find it difficult to understand information the bank sends me on different investment and saving systems” (reverse scored).

Study 3 Participants A broad national sample of Americans was drawn from a US-based online surveyterm·mth tool (Mechanical Turk, Amazon.com). A total of 725 participants were recruited, however incomplete data reduced the sample to N = 706, Age: 18–88, M = 30.23, SD = 10.65, 63% female. Participants came from all 50 states, and had diverse religious backgrounds, educational attainment, levels of income, and levels of religious attendanceterm·var (see Table 4 for further demographic information).

Dependent Measure: Belief in a personal Godterm·def Participants rated their agreement (0–6) with 10 items selected from the previously validated and widely-used Spiritual Well Being Scale [41] . These items measure belief in, and a perceived relationship with, a personal God ( α = .94, M = 43.88, SD = 18.55). Representative items: “I have a personally meaningful relationship with God,” “I believe that God is concerned about my problems.” Reverse Scored: “I believe that God is impersonal and not interested in my daily situations.” “I don't find much satisfaction in private prayer with God.” Visual inspection revealed a bimodal distribution (Kurtosis = −1.36). Therefore, the measure was median-dichotomized into low believers (51.6%) and high believes (48.4%).

Predictor Measures: Autistic Spectrum and Gender In addition to identifying their gender, participants completed the same 50-item self-report version of the ASQ ( α = .80, M = 19.10, SD = 7.03).

Potential Mediators: Mentalizingterm·dom, Systemizingterm·dom, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness We measured mentalizingterm·dom and systemizingterm·dom with the same measures used in Study 2 (Empathy: α = .91, M = 22.87, SD = 9.46; systemizingterm·dom: α = .87, M = 21.53, SD = 9.60). Agreeableness and Conscientiousness were measured using the relevant facets of a standard self-report instrument measuring basic personality dimensions [29] .

Control Measures We measured age, educational attainment, income level, and frequency of religious attendanceterm·var. Older age, lower educational attainment, and lower income are often found to be associated with religious belief. The frequency of religious attendanceterm·var measure was included to subject our hypotheses to a more stringent test, by disentangling belief in Godterm·dom from an associated inclination towards religious social participation.

Study 4 Participants A broad national sample of 452 Americans (Age: 18–84, M = 43.06; 50.7% female) was drawn from a paid subject pool administered by a US-based surveyterm·mth company ( www.Zoomerang.com ). Although this was not a representative sample, participants' ethnic and religious backgrounds were roughly similar to the general American population, and there was a wide range of educational attainment and religious attendanceterm·var (see Table 4 for further socio-demographic background information).

Dependent Measure: Belief in Godterm·dom The same 5-item scale was used from Studies 1–2 ( α = .82, M = 25.71, SD = 7.46). This American sample yielded a markedly non-normal distribution of belief in Godterm·dom scores, as levels of belief in Godterm·dom were generally high (skewness = −.56, kurtosis = −.51). This variable was therefore median-dichotomized into high believers (51% of sample) and low believers (49% of sample).

Predictor Measures: Autistic Spectrum and Gender In addition to identifying their gender, participants completed the same 50-item self-report version of the ASQ [23] ( α = .71, M = 18.60, SD = 6.04).

Potential Mediators: Mentalizingterm·dom First, participants again completed the self-report version of the Empathy Quotientterm from Studies 2–3 ( α = .90, M = 22.21, SD = 8.85). Second, participants completed the revised Reading the Mind in the Eyesterm (RME) task [32] ( α = .71, M = 24.43, SD = 4.91), which consists of a series of 36 pictures of peoples' eyes. Participants are instructed to select which of four words best describes what the person in the picture is thinking or feeling. This task has been used to detect individual differences in advanced adult mentalizingterm·dom [32] . This latter measure shares neither conceptual resemblance nor method variance with the belief in Godterm·dom measure. The two mentalizingterm·dom measures were related, but by no means redundant, r (450) = .25, p <.001, and served as independent potential mediators in a multiple mediation model.

Control Measures We again measured and controlled for age, educational attainment, frequency of religious attendanceterm·var, and added a 3-item measure of interest in math, science, and engineering (IMSE, α = .69, on a 1–7 scale). IMSE was included to assess the possibility that the relationship between autism and belief in Godterm·dom, or gender and belief in Godterm·dom, are byproducts of greater levels of scientific interest among those high on the autism spectrumterm·dom.

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