phenomenon · claim-type · cross-domain-transfer · mechanism · claim-relation · replication-status · limitation — grounded in the full text| phenomenon | the analytic-synthetic distinction— “One is a belief in some fundamental cleavage between truths which are analytic , or grounded in meanings independently of matters of fact and truths which are synthetic , or grounded in fact.” | |
| claim-type | critique— “Both dogmas, I shall argue, are ill founded.” | |
| method — evidence | — “Recognizing then that the notation of definition does not hold the key to synonymy and analyticity, let us look further into synonymy and say no more of definition.” | |
| object of study — evidence | — “Modern empiricism has been conditioned in large part by two dogmas.” | |
| research question — evidence | — “Both dogmas, I shall argue, are ill founded.” | |
| contribution — evidence | — “The unit of empirical significance is the whole of science.” | |
| transfer | from physics: using the physics image of a field of force (with boundary conditions) to model the holistic web of scientific knowledge and its contact with experience— “total science is like a field of force whose boundary conditions are experience” | transfers[0] |
| mechanism | Each proposed explanation of analyticity is shown to presuppose a notion that is itself no clearer than analyticity, so the explanations travel in a circle rather than terminating— “Our argument is not flatly circular, but something like it. It has the form, figuratively speaking, of a closed curve in space.” | mechanisms[0] |
| mechanism | Definition cannot ground synonymy because the lexicographer only records a synonymy that usage already established— “Certainly the "definition" which is the lexicographer's report of an observed synonymy cannot be taken as the ground of the synonymy.” | mechanisms[1] |
| mechanism | Interchangeability salva veritate is too weak in an extensional language and question-begging in a language rich enough to contain 'necessarily'— “In an extensional language, therefore, interchangeability salva veritate is no assurance of cognitive synonymy of the desired type.” | mechanisms[2] |
| mechanism | Appeal to semantical rules fails because 'semantical rule' is itself undefined except by where the phrase is printed— “Semantical rules are distinguishable, apparently, only by the fact of appearing on a page under the heading 'Semantical Rules'; and this heading is itself then meaningless.” | mechanisms[3] |
| mechanism | Because statements meet experience only collectively, any statement can be preserved by revising others, so no statement is analytic in the sense of being immune— “Any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system.” | mechanisms[4] |
| mechanism | The two dogmas support each other: only if confirmation attaches to statements one at a time does a vacuously confirmed statement make sense— “as long as it is taken to be significant in general to speak of the confirmation and infirmation of a statement, it seems significant to speak also of a limiting kind of statement which is vacuously confirmed, ipso facto , come what may; and such a statement is analytic.” | mechanisms[5] |
| contradicts | the analytic-synthetic distinction (first dogma of empiricism)— “That there is such a distinction to be drawn at all is an unempirical dogma of empiricists, a metaphysical article of faith.” | claim_relations[0] |
| contradicts | reductionism / the verification theory of meaning (second dogma)— “our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body” | claim_relations[1] |
| builds-on | Carnap, Der logische Aufbau der Welt— “My countersuggestion, issuing essentially from Carnap's doctrine of the physical world in the Aufbau , is that our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body.” | claim_relations[2] |
| contradicts | Carnap, "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology" (1950)— “Carnap has recognized 12a that he is able to preserve a double standard for ontological questions and scientific hypotheses only by assuming an absolute distinction between the analytic and the synthetic; and I need not say again that this is a distinction which I reject.” | claim_relations[3] |
| extends | the pragmatism of Carnap, Lewis, and others— “Carnap, Lewis, and others take a pragmatic stand on the question of choosing between language forms, scientific frameworks; but their pragmatism leaves off at the imagined boundary between the analytic and the synthetic.” | claim_relations[4] |
| critiques | Carnap's explanation of analyticity by state-descriptions and by semantical rules— “The criterion in terms of state-descriptions is a reconstruction at best of logical truth.” | claim_relations[5] |
| critiques | Kant's formulation of the analytic statement— “This formulation has two shortcomings: it limits itself to statements of subject-predicate form, and it appeals to a notion of containment which is left at a metaphorical level.” | claim_relations[6] |
| critiques | the term-by-term empiricism of Locke and Hume— “Moreover, the doctrine is unnecessarily and intolerably restrictive in the term-by-term critique which it imposes.” | claim_relations[7] |
| extends | Carnap's own treatment of the physical world in the Aufbau— “My countersuggestion, issuing essentially from Carnap's doctrine of the physical world in the Aufbau , is that our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body.” | claim_relations[8] |
| supports | White's essay on the analytic and the synthetic as an untenable dualism— “White's excellent essay "The Analytic and the Synthetic: An Untenable Dualism," in John Dewey: Philosopher of Science and Freedom (New York, 1950), says much of what needed to be said on the topic; but in the present paper I touch on some further aspects of the problem.” | claim_relations[9] |
| sense | analytic - first class, logical truth: true and staying true under every reinterpretation of everything except the logical particles— “If we suppose a prior inventory of logical particles, comprising 'no,' 'un-' 'if,' 'then,' 'and,' etc., then in general a logical truth is a statement which is true and remains true under all reinterpretations of its components other than the logical particles.” | senses[0] |
| sense | analytic - second class, synonymy-dependent: reducible to a logical truth only by putting synonyms for synonyms, and this is the class the paper says cannot be explained— “The characteristic of such a statement is that it can be turned into a logical truth by putting synonyms for synonyms; thus (2) can be turned into (1) by putting 'unmarried man' for its synonym 'bachelor.'” | senses[1] |
| sense | analytic - Kant's sense: the subject already conceptually contains the predicate, a formulation the paper faults for assuming subject-predicate form— “Kant conceived of an analytic statement as one that attributes to its subject no more than is already conceptually contained in the subject.” | senses[2] |
| sense | analytic - Carnap's sense: true under every state-description, which the paper argues reconstructs only logical truth— “A statement is then explained as analytic when it comes out true under every state-description.” | senses[3] |
| sense | analytic - Leibniz's sense: true in all possible worlds, i.e. incapable of being false— “Leibniz spoke of the truths of reason as true in all possible worlds. Picturesqueness aside, this is to say that the truths of reason are those which could not possibly be false.” | senses[4] |
| sense | analytic - the self-contradiction sense: a statement whose denial is self-contradictory, rejected as no clearer than what it explains— “In the same vein we hear analytic statements defined as statements whose denials are self-contradictory.” | senses[5] |
| sense | synonymy - cognitive: the only sense the argument needs, explicitly not identity of psychological association or poetic quality— “Now let us be clear that we are not concerned here with synonymy in the sense of complete identity in psychological associations or poetic quality; indeed no two expressions are synonymous in such a sense. We are concerned only with what may be called cognitive synonymy .” | senses[6] |
| sense | definition - lexicographic report: records a synonymy already implicit in usage, so it cannot be the ground of that synonymy— “Definitions reporting selected instances of synonymy come then as reports upon usage.” | senses[7] |
| sense | definition - explication: improves on the definiendum instead of reporting a synonymy, yet still rests on prior synonymies— “In explication the purpose is not merely to paraphrase the definiendum into an outright synonym, but actually to improve upon the definiendum by refining or supplementing its meaning.” | senses[8] |
| sense | definition - conventional abbreviation: the sole case where synonymy is genuinely created rather than reported— “Here we have a really transparent case of synonymy created by definition; would that all species of synonymy were as intelligible.” | senses[9] |
| sense | reductionism - radical: every meaningful statement translatable into a statement about immediate experience— “The most naive view of the relationship is that it is one of direct report. This is radical reductionism . Every meaningful statement is held to be translatable into a statement (true or false) about immediate experience.” | senses[10] |
| sense | reductionism - attenuated: the surviving supposition that a statement in isolation can be confirmed at all, which the paper says is the form that still does damage— “The dogma of reductionism survives in the supposition that each statement, taken in isolation from its fellows, can admit of confirmation or infirmation at all.” | senses[11] |
| sense | meaning - as against reference: what essence becomes once it is detached from the object and attached to the word— “Meaning is what essence becomes when it is divorced from the object of reference and wedded to the word.” | senses[12] |
| sense | economy - two antagonistic kinds in a formal system: brevity of expression versus poverty of primitive grammar and vocabulary— “In logical and mathematical systems either of two mutually antagonistic types of economy may be striven for, and each has its peculiar practical utility.” | senses[13] |
| differs in | reductionism / the verification theory of meaning (second dogma) — the UNIT of confirmation: OUR STATEMENTS ABOUT THE EXTERNAL WORLD FACE THE TRIBUNAL OF SENSE EXPERIENCE NOT INDIVIDUALLY BUT ONLY AS A CORPORATE BODY - reductionism assigns a range of confirming experience to each statement singly | claim_relations[1] |
| differs in | Carnap, "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology" (1950) — an assumption BOTH parties name: CARNAP HAS RECOGNIZED THAT HE IS ABLE TO PRESERVE A DOUBLE STANDARD FOR ONTOLOGICAL QUESTIONS AND SCIENTIFIC HYPOTHESES ONLY BY ASSUMING AN ABSOLUTE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE ANALYTIC AND THE SYNTHETIC; AND I NEED NOT SAY AGAIN THAT THIS IS A DISTINCTION WHICH I REJECT | claim_relations[3] |
| differs in | Carnap's explanation of analyticity by state-descriptions and by semantical rules — which notion the criterion captures: THE CRITERION IN TERMS OF STATE-DESCRIPTIONS IS A RECONSTRUCTION AT BEST OF LOGICAL TRUTH - it succeeds for logical truth and is being asked to do the work of analyticity | claim_relations[5] |
| differs in | Kant's formulation of the analytic statement — the SCOPE of the formulation and the status of its key term: IT LIMITS ITSELF TO STATEMENTS OF SUBJECT-PREDICATE FORM, AND IT APPEALS TO A NOTION OF CONTAINMENT WHICH IS LEFT AT A METAPHORICAL LEVEL | claim_relations[6] |
| differs in | the term-by-term empiricism of Locke and Hume — term-by-term against holistic: THE DOCTRINE IS UNNECESSARILY AND INTOLERABLY RESTRICTIVE IN THE TERM-BY-TERM CRITIQUE WHICH IT IMPOSES | claim_relations[7] |
| edge | Evening Star —same-as→ Morning Star | concept_edges[0] |
| edge | Evening Star —distinct-from→ Morning Star Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concept_edges[1] |
| differs in | 9 —same-as→ the number of the planets — MEANING. The sentence asserts sameness of ENTITY and denies sameness of MEANING in one breath - which is the distinction the whole paper turns on. 'same-as' unqualified reads as identity of sense, and Quine's point is that identity of reference does not give it. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concept_edges[2] |
| differs in | creature with a heart —distinct-from→ creature with a kidney — THE AXIS IS STATED IN THE SENTENCE, AND IT IS THE WHOLE POINT OF THE EXAMPLE. 'The general terms creature with a heart and creature with a kidney, e.g., are perhaps alike in extension but unlike in meaning.' The two terms are not distinct simpliciter - they are IDENTICAL on one dimension and different on another, and a bare 'distinct-from' records only the second half. Note also that 'extension' and 'intension' differ by one character, which is why these must never be de-duplicated by edit distance. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concept_edges[3] |
| edge | intension —same-as→ meaning Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concept_edges[4] |
| audit | intension —renamed-across-fields→ connotation — Audit 2026-09-28: DOUBTFUL - read against its full span and kept, but the span calls connotation a 'variant vocabulary', not another field's name; renamed-across-fields is loose. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concept_edges[5] |
| audit | extension —renamed-across-fields→ denotation — Audit 2026-09-28: DOUBTFUL - read against its full span and kept, but the span calls denotation a 'variant vocabulary', not another field's name; renamed-across-fields is loose. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concept_edges[6] |
| retracted | EVIDENCE CORRECTED (RE-GROUNDED) · intension —contrasted-with→ extension — RE-GROUNDED. The old span named only one endpoint. This sentence names both and states the contrast in the field's own words - to OPPOSE intension to extension. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concept_edges[7] |
| audit | radical reductionism —is-a→ reductionism — Audit 2026-09-28: DOUBTFUL - read against its full span and kept, but 'reductionism' occurs only inside 'radical reductionism'; is-a rests on the name. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concept_edges[9] |
| audit | EVIDENCE CORRECTED (RE-GROUNDED) · logical truth —part-of→ analytic — Audit 2026-09-28: DOUBTFUL - read against its full span and kept, but the span writes 'logically true' for the first class of analytic statements; endpoint variant. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concept_edges[10] |
| retracted | EVIDENCE CORRECTED (RE-GROUNDED) · logical truth —part-of→ analytic — RE-GROUNDED. The old span listed analytic statements without naming logical truth. This sentence names both IN APPOSITION - 'the first class of analytic statements, THE LOGICAL TRUTHS' - which states the containment as directly as Quine states anything. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concept_edges[10] |
| audit | EVIDENCE CORRECTED (RE-GROUNDED) · cognitive synonymy —operationalised-as→ interchangeability salva veritate — Audit 2026-09-28: DOUBTFUL - read against its full span and kept, but the span offers this as 'a natural suggestion, deserving close examination', which the paper goes on to reject; hedged. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concept_edges[11] |
| evidential status | EVIDENCE CORRECTED (RE-GROUNDED) · cognitive synonymy —operationalised-as→ interchangeability salva veritate — A SUGGESTION UNDER EXAMINATION, NOT A DEFINITION THE ESSAY ENDORSES. Quine offers interchangeability salva veritate as a 'natural suggestion, deserving close examination' and the rest of the paper is the examination that finds it wanting. Without this field the corpus reads as if Two Dogmas defined synonymy this way. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concept_edges[11] |
| retracted | EVIDENCE CORRECTED (RE-GROUNDED) · cognitive synonymy —operationalised-as→ interchangeability salva veritate — RE-GROUNDED. The old span - 'a natural suggestion, deserving close examination…' - states the relation but names NEITHER endpoint as the edge writes them. This span names both and states the same operationalisation. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concept_edges[11] |
| weight | EVIDENCE CORRECTED (RE-GROUNDED) · cognitive synonymy —operationalised-as→ interchangeability salva veritate — 0.4 Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concept_edges[11] |
| audit | analyticity —operationalised-as→ state-description — Audit 2026-09-28: DOUBTFUL - read against its full span and kept, but attributed: the span reports how Carnap tends to explain analyticity. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concept_edges[12] |
| weight | analyticity —operationalised-as→ state-description — 0.4 Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concept_edges[12] |
| audit | EVIDENCE CORRECTED (RE-GROUNDED) · synonymy —operationalised-as→ method of empirical confirmation — Audit 2026-09-28: DOUBTFUL - read against its full span and kept, but attributed: the span says statement synonymy 'is said to be' likeness of confirmation method. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concept_edges[13] |
| retracted | EVIDENCE CORRECTED (RE-GROUNDED) · synonymy —operationalised-as→ method of empirical confirmation — RE-GROUNDED. The old span named only one endpoint. This sentence names both and gives the operationalisation directly. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concept_edges[13] |
| weight | EVIDENCE CORRECTED (RE-GROUNDED) · synonymy —operationalised-as→ method of empirical confirmation — 0.5 Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concept_edges[13] |
| audit | reductionism —same-as→ the analytic and the synthetic — Audit 2026-09-28: DOUBTFUL - read against its span and kept, but the span is cut before it states how reductionism relates to the analytic-synthetic distinction; same-as may overstate it. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concept_edges[15] |
| weight | reductionism —same-as→ the analytic and the synthetic — 0.8 Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concept_edges[15] |
| weight | bachelor —same-as→ unmarried man — 0.6 Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concept_edges[16] |
| audit | RETRACTED (A NEAR-DUPLICATE OF [17] THAT THE FOLD CANNOT SEE) · physical objects —distinct-from→ the gods — Audit 2026-09-28: DOUBTFUL - read against its full span and kept, but the span says the two differ 'only in degree and not in kind'; distinct-from is loose. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concept_edges[19] |
| note | RETRACTED (A NEAR-DUPLICATE OF [17] THAT THE FOLD CANNOT SEE) · physical objects —distinct-from→ the gods — RE-GROUNDS another row of this record: the span stated the relation, the endpoint names did not match its words. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concept_edges[19] |
| relation | RETRACTED (A NEAR-DUPLICATE OF [17] THAT THE FOLD CANNOT SEE) · physical objects —distinct-from→ the gods — the two kinds of posit differ in DEGREE, not in KIND - both are posits Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concept_edges[19] |
| retracted | RETRACTED (A NEAR-DUPLICATE OF [17] THAT THE FOLD CANNOT SEE) · physical objects —distinct-from→ the gods — A NEAR-DUPLICATE OF [17] THAT THE FOLD CANNOT SEE. Same record, same type, same span to the byte - '…objects and the gods differ…' - and the only difference is the endpoint name: 'the gods' here, 'the gods of Homer' at [17]. The fold keys on (from, to, type, evidence), so a looser spelling of one endpoint produces a second edge asserting the identical thing. Keeping [17], which uses the paper's own fuller phrase. NOTE ALSO, and left standing on [17]: the span scopes its own difference - 'ONLY IN DEGREE…' - and 'distinct-from' has no slot for that, so the edge reads as a difference in kind, which is what the sentence denies. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concept_edges[19] |
| weight | RETRACTED (A NEAR-DUPLICATE OF [17] THAT THE FOLD CANNOT SEE) · physical objects —distinct-from→ the gods — 0.15 Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concept_edges[19] |
| for which use | limitation — the applicability of the analytic/synthetic distinction to real cases: I DO NOT KNOW WHETHER THE STATEMENT 'EVERYTHING GREEN IS EXTENDED' IS ANALYTIC Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | limitations[0] |
| for which use | limitation — the proposed formulation of cognitive synonymy: CERTAIN TECHNICAL QUESTIONS ARISE ... OVER CASES OF AMBIGUITY OR HOMONYMY; LET US NOT PAUSE FOR THEM - set aside, not resolved Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | limitations[1] |
| for which use | limitation — the completeness of the survey of rival accounts: NOT ALL THE EXPLANATIONS OF ANALYTICITY KNOWN TO CARNAP AND HIS READERS HAVE BEEN COVERED EXPLICITLY Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | limitations[2] |
| for which use | limitation — the argument's central term: JUST WHAT THIS IS CANNOT BE SAID WITHOUT SUCCESSFULLY FINISHING THE PRESENT STUDY - cognitive synonymy is left uncharacterised inside the paper that turns on it Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | limitations[3] |
| for which use | limitation — the strength of the paper's own conclusion: A BOUNDARY BETWEEN ANALYTIC AND SYNTHETIC STATEMENT SIMPLY HAS NOT BEEN DRAWN - has not, not cannot, and it is cited for the stronger claim Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | limitations[4] |
| for which use | limitation — the notion of germaneness: I ENVISAGE NOTHING MORE THAN A LOOSE ASSOCIATION REFLECTING THE RELATIVE LIKELIHOOD, IN PRACTICE - a loose association, not a defined relation Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | limitations[5] |
| for which use | limitation — the positive account of theory revision: CONSERVATISM FIGURES IN SUCH CHOICES, AND SO DOES THE QUEST FOR SIMPLICITY - named, not specified Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | limitations[6] |
| for which use | limitation — what the classification failure is evidence about: THE TROUBLE IS NOT WITH 'GREEN' OR 'EXTENDED,' BUT WITH 'ANALYTIC' - the fault is the category, not the case Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | limitations[7] |
| replication | untested | |
| no type for this | analytic → synthetic — THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN THESE TWO IS NOT DRAWABLE - the NEGATION of 'distinct-from', and no type we have can express it. All eight types assert that a relation HOLDS; not one can say a relation FAILS, so a paper whose contribution is that a distinction CANNOT BE DRAWN has no home, and the nearest available move records the distinction as holding. That is exactly what the retracted row of this record did: the paper's DENIAL of the boundary quoted as evidence FOR the boundary. REPLACES unhoused_relations[0], WHICH WAS RETRACTED FOR A CLAIM I ADDED AND GOT WRONG. That row paired this with Kumar2016 as a cross-field attestation - two papers, no shared vocabulary, both asserting that two things cannot reliably be told apart. THE KUMAR2016 HALF WAS A MISREADING: I quoted 'the regressors ... may be correlated' and 'may thus be contaminated' as a concession, when reading the full span shows those clauses SET UP A CONTROL THE AUTHORS THEN PASS - 'the correlation coefficient ... was very small (0.04)'. Kumar2016 asserts SEPARABILITY, with a number. The Quine claim here is unaffected and stands on its own span; only the cross-reference was wrong, and it is not repeated here. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | unhoused_relations[1] |
| limitation | the notion of analyticity resists a clear boundary; borderline cases remain undecidable Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | limitations[0] |
| limitation | Technical problems of ambiguity and homonymy for the proposed formulation of cognitive synonymy are set aside rather than solved. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | limitations[1] |
| limitation | Not every explanation of analyticity available in the literature is explicitly addressed. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | limitations[2] |
| limitation | The key notion of cognitive synonymy is left uncharacterised within the paper itself. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | limitations[3] |
| limitation | The paper argues no boundary has been drawn, not that one provably cannot be - the case is the repeated failure of every proposed criterion Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | limitations[4] |
| limitation | Germaneness of a statement to particular experiences is left as a loose association rather than a defined relation Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | limitations[5] |
| limitation | The positive account of what does guide theory revision is left at the level of conservatism and simplicity, not a criterion Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | limitations[6] |
| limitation | The author's own inability to classify a sample statement is offered as evidence about the term rather than about his grasp of it, which is asserted rather than shown Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | limitations[7] |
finding · quantity · variable · definition · key-term — grounded in the full text| finding | Quine argues both central dogmas of empiricism — the analytic/synthetic distinction and reductionism — are ill-founded; abandoning them blurs the boundary between metaphysics and natural science and shifts toward pragmatism. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.findings[0] |
| finding | The supposed analytic/synthetic boundary has never actually been drawn, despite its a priori plausibility. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.findings[1] |
| finding | self-contradictoriness, in the sense needed to define analyticity, needs clarification as much as analyticity itself Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.findings[2] |
| finding | definition rests on synonymy rather than explaining it Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.findings[3] |
| finding | interchangeability salva veritate in an extensional language does not establish cognitive synonymy Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.findings[4] |
| finding | appeal to semantical rules of an artificial language does not clarify analyticity Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.findings[5] |
| finding | the unit of empirical significance is the whole of science, not the individual statement Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.findings[6] |
| finding | no statement is immune to revision Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.findings[7] |
| finding | ontological questions differ from scientific ones only in degree Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.findings[8] |
| finding | abandoning the dogmas blurs the boundary between metaphysics and natural science and shifts philosophy toward pragmatism Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.findings[9] |
| definition | synthetic truths Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[1] |
| definition | reductionism Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[2] |
| definition | logically true statement Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[3] |
| evidence status note | definition — QUOTE RECOVERED FROM THE PAPER'S OWN CHARACTERS. The recorded quote was LETTERS-ONLY IDENTICAL to this stretch of the staged text but not an exact substring of it - spaces, hyphens, ligature glyphs or mathematical operators differed, so it could never anchor. This is the file's own text between the same two letters: not produced by a rule about the damage, copied out of the file. Round-trip checked (the recovered span is letters-only equal to the original) and length-checked. The text as originally recorded is kept in evidence as extracted. | content_tags.definitions[3] |
| definition | logical truth Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[4] |
| definition | extension Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[5] |
| definition | state-description Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[6] |
| definition | reductionism Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[7] |
| definition | verification theory of meaning Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[8] |
| definition | radical reductionism Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[9] |
| definition | explication Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[10] |
| definition | primitive notation Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[11] |
| definition | extensional language Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[12] |
| definition | analytic Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[13] |
| key-terms | analytic, synthetic, dogma, reductionism, empiricism, meaning, synonymy, statement, truths, analyticity, cognitive synonymy, logical truth, state-description, salva veritate, semantical rules, verification theory of meaning, extension, intension, explication, primitive notation, posits, pragmatism, definiendum, definiens |
| concept | cognitive synonymy — not defined in this paper's own words; sameness of meaning in the sense the analyticity argument requires, excluding psychological association and poetic quality Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[6] |
| concept | logical truth — not defined in this paper's own words; a statement true and remaining true under all reinterpretations of its non-logical components Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[7] |
| concept | state-description — not defined in this paper's own words; Carnap's exhaustive assignment of truth values to the atomic statements of a language Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[8] |
| concept | interchangeability salva veritate — not defined in this paper's own words; substitution in all contexts without change of truth value, proposed as a test for synonymy Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[9] |
| concept | extension — The class of all entities of which a general term is true Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[12] |
| concept | physical objects — not defined in this paper's own words; posits admitted for their simplifying power, on the same epistemological footing as myth Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[29] |
| concept | the gods Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[37] |
| claim type | critique — a second reading reaching the same value; recorded: critique Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | alternatives.claim_type |
| method | conceptual-analysis — a second reading reaching the same value; recorded: conceptual-analysis Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | alternatives.method |
When we have changed our mind. Some entries in the table begin with a word in capitals and the reason for it. EVIDENCE CORRECTED — the finding still stands, but we had quoted the wrong sentence from the paper, and the quotation has been replaced with the right one. RETRACTED — the entry itself was wrong; it stays on the page, marked, with the reason, rather than being deleted. WITHDRAWN AND REPLACED — the entry was wrong, and a corrected version of it appears in the entries below. Each mark carries its own reason, in brackets, because the reasons differ from one entry to the next. An entry we have WITHDRAWN is removed from this page and kept in the record, with its reason. A line reading Audit and a date is a later re-reading of the entry against its whole sentence: DOUBTFUL means it was kept, and the reason says what is loose about it. Quotation marks inside the tagger's sentence. Where a tag is the tagger's own sentence, a phrase in quotation marks inside it is borrowed from the paper — the tagger's wording around it is not. The paper's own sentence is the evidence quote for that row; on this page it is withheld with the article, and the article is at its publisher. Nothing inside quotation marks anywhere on this page is ours: if it is quoted, it is the paper's. Whose words a concept carries. A concept entry records a term the paper itself uses, so the term, the sense given for it, and its evidence are the paper's own words, quoted where the paper fixes them. This is the opposite of a sense entry in the tag table, which is the tagger's sentence about how the paper uses a term. Where a concept entry could not be grounded in the paper's words, the entry says so on its own row.
Tag layer © the Meta-Tagging Project, CC BY 4.0. The paper text is © its authors/publisher
and is linked, not reproduced. Excerpts shown are short quotations for identification and verification.
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