Yield Trends Are Insufficient to Double Global Crop Production by 2050 — TEI-tagged view

Deepak K. Ray, Nathaniel D. Mueller, Paul C. West, Jonathan A. Foley · 2013 · agricultural science · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0066428 · TEI xml · tagged edition · index · concepts · authors
Where this record's text came from. 2026-08-31 schema-0.3 pass: every quote verified as an exact substring of the staged text and anchored at merge time; concept terms verified present; every edge endpoint an existing node.
Other fields define these differently the same word, defined another way in another discipline
food waste 3 fields · biodiversity 3 fields · population growth 3 fields · maize 3 fields · food security 2 fields · high spatial resolution 2 fields · and 1 more →
Tags on this paper every tag the record carries, whether or not the words occur in the text below — a number is how many papers in the corpus carry that tag; a tag with no number is unique to this paper
global crop production projected demands crop yields2 yield gains clearing more land for agriculture rising demands for crop production increasing human population meat and dairy consumption biofuel consumption global agricultural production food security6 agricultural statistics political units maize4 rice2 wheat3 soybean2 global agricultural calories best-fit linear, non-compounding rates of yield change 2.4% per year rate current rates observed area-weighted global yield 90% confidence region bootstrapped samples2 upper bound of the 90% confidence interval lower bound of our confidence interval worst-case scenario per capita harvested production population growth3 declines in per capita harvested rice significant variations in the rates of yield change yield improvements sustainable intensification more efficient use of current arable lands increase production best management practices closing yield gaps expanding croplands biodiversity8 carbon emissions2 plant-based diets food waste3 large expected demand growth in food annual crop census reports harvested areas average of the latest five years of reported data United Nation's medium variant projections ratio of production to population linear regression39 non-compounding linear percentage rate high spatial resolution2 observational-study83
Method, as described: spatial longitudinal linear-regression analysis with bootstrap projections

Colour legend

PLoS ONE<title level="j">A work — the journal / venue title.
2013<date>A year or date.

Deepak K. RaypersName, Nathaniel D. MuellerpersName, Paul C. WestpersName, Jonathan A. FoleypersName (2013date). “Yield Trends Are Insufficient to Double Global Crop Production by 2050.” PLoS ONEtitle·j.

Object of study — recent spatially resolved yield trends for maizeterm·dom, riceterm·dom, wheatterm·dom, and soybeanterm·dom and their implications for 2050date production

Research question — Are observed crop-yield trends fast enough to double production by 2050date, and where are gains sufficient, slow, or negative?

Contribution — a global, subnational linear-trend analysis and 2050date projection built from roughly 2.5 million crop statistics across about 13,500 political unitsterm·mth

Cross-disciplinary analysis
content-tags & facets: phenomenon · claim-type · cross-domain-transfer · mechanism · claim-relation · replication-status · limitation — grounded in the full text
phenomenoncrop-yield growth that is too slow and spatially uneven to double global production by 2050 — “Numerous studies have shown that feeding a more populated and more prosperous world will roughly require a doubling of agricultural production by 2050 [1] – [7] , translating to a ∼2.4% rate of crop production growth per year. We find that the top four global crops – maize, rice, wheat, and soybean – are currently witnessing average yield improvements only between 0.9 to 1.6 percent per year, far slower than the required rates to double their production by 2050 solely from yield gains. This is because yield improvements are below ∼2.4% per year in many areas of our most important agricultural lands. At these rates maize, rice, wheat and soybean production may increase by ∼67%, ∼42%, ∼38%, and ∼55% respectively, by 2050 globally. There is a 90% chance that the total global production increase from yields alone would be between 34–101% for maize, 21–59% for rice, 4–76% for wheat, and 13–84% for soybean by ∼2050. Thus, if these yield change rates do not increase, land clearing possibly would be needed [3] if global food security is to increase or even maintained”
claim-typeprediction — “We find that yields in these top four crops are increasing at 1.6%, 1.0%, 0.9%, and 1.3% per year, non-compounding rates, respectively, which is less than the 2.4% per year rate required to double global production by 2050. At these rates global production in these crops would increase by ∼67%, ∼42%, ∼38%, and ∼55%, respectively, which is far below what is needed to meet projected demands in 2050”
method — evidence — “We linearly regressed 20 years of crop yields at each of the political units to determine the average linear rates of yield improvement over the observed period. Many previous studies have shown that crop yields change linearly and have used linear regression to project future crop yields [24] – [30] . Here we calculate the non-compounding linear percentage rate by solving a in Equation 1 ; Y is the yield in the year 2008, 2Y is the yield in 2050 (after 42 years)”
object of study — evidence — “Using ∼2.5 million agricultural statistics, collected for ∼13,500 political units across the world, we track four key global crops—maize, rice, wheat, and soybean—that currently produce nearly two-thirds of global agricultural calories”
research question — evidence — “However, several recent studies indicate that yields may no longer be increasing in different regions of the globe [18] – [23] . Yields are no longer improving on 24–39% of our most important cropland areas [23] . Many of these areas are in top crop producing nations, having rising population, increasing affluence, or some combination of these factors [3] , [5] , [19] , [21] – [23] . This may increase difficulty of meeting future crop production goals but key unknowns remain for developing and targeting strategies: how are crop yields changing across the world, where gains in crop yields are able to meet growing demands, and where crop yields are falling behind”
contribution — evidence — “Here we employ ∼2.5 million statistics from a newly developed crop yield and area harvested database covering ∼13,500 political units globally from 1961 to 2008, focusing on trends in the recent two decades [4] , [23] . We determine the rates of yield change in each political unit for the top four global crops: maize, rice, wheat, and soybean. These four crops together produce about two-thirds of current harvested global crop calories [3] , [18] . Using these data, we estimate the best-fit linear, non-compounding rates of yield change between 1989 and 2008 for these crops in each of these political units. Yield change is commonly modeled as a linear function of time [24] – [28] and such models have been used to project future crop yields [28] – [30] . We provide local, country, and global-scale rates of recent crop yield changes to determine where the rates of yield increase could double production by 2050, and where they are insufficient. The impact of negative or even slow rates of yield change in these crops could be severe, especially for low-income countries with rapidly rising population. The underlying data, period analyzed, statistical approach, and comparisons of yield projections are described in the Methods section below, with additional details and analysis in Text S1”
mechanismBELOW-THRESHOLD YIELD GROWTH produces a 2050 shortfall because observed annual rates remain below the approximately 2.4% non-compounding doubling rate — “We find that yields in these top four crops are increasing at 1.6%, 1.0%, 0.9%, and 1.3% per year, non-compounding rates, respectively, which is less than the 2.4% per year rate required to double global production by 2050. At these rates global production in these crops would increase by ∼67%, ∼42%, ∼38%, and ∼55%, respectively, which is far below what is needed to meet projected demands in 2050”mechanisms[0]
mechanismPOPULATION GROWTH can absorb yield-driven production gains, leaving per-capita harvest unchanged or declining — “In the short term, due to population increases from ∼6.7 billion in 2008 to ∼8.0 billion in 2025 [5] , the 1.6% and 1.3% per year global maize and soybean yield improvements may result in no significant change to the per capita global maize and soybean harvests. However, by 2050 there could be an increase. The much lower rates of rice and wheat yield increases, 1.0% and 0.9% per year, respectively, may result in no change to the per capita rice and wheat harvests to 2050. Thus, if we are to boost the production in these top four global crops that are now responsible for directly providing ∼43% of the global dietary energy and ∼40% of its daily protein supply [31] from yield increases alone, we have to immediately determine where and exactly by how much yields are changing. To further understand the yield trend patterns, we also track the rates of yield change within ∼13,500 political units and report the results at the local and country scales”mechanisms[1]
mechanismBOOTSTRAP RESAMPLING at each political unit propagates local yield uncertainty into global confidence bounds — “We provide a range of future yield estimates by bootstrap sampling crop yield data at each of the political units studied for the period 1989 to 2008. The upper bound of the 90% confidence interval ( Table 1 , Figure 1 ) presents a slightly more optimistic scenario, global yields increase at rates of 2.4%, 1.4%, 1.8%, and 2.0% per year for maize, rice, wheat, and soybean, respectively. Yield trends following this upper bound projection could lead to ∼101%, ∼59%, ∼76%, and ∼84% increased production in these crops, respectively. The lower bound of our confidence interval provides us with a “worst-case scenario,” wherein the global average yield of maize, rice, wheat, and soybean would increase at 0.8%, 0.5%, 0.1%, and 0.3% per year, respectively ( Table 1 , Figure 1 ). At these rates global production could only increase by ∼34%, ∼21%, ∼4%, and ∼13% for maize, rice, wheat, and soybean, respectively, by 2050”mechanisms[2]
mechanismLAND EXPANSION can fill part of the production shortfall but transfers the cost to biodiversity and carbon emissions — “Clearly, the world faces a looming and growing agricultural crisis. Yields are not improving fast enough to keep up with projected demands in 2050. However, opportunities do exist to increase production through more efficient use of current arable lands [4] and increasing yield growth rates by spreading best management practices and closing yield gaps under different management regimes [38] – [42] across the globe. A portion of the production shortfall could also be met by expanding croplands, but at a high environmental cost to biodiversity and carbon emissions [4] , [43] – [45] . Alternatively, additional strategies, particularly changing to more plant-based diets and reducing food waste [4] , [46] – [48] can reduce the large expected demand growth in food”mechanisms[3]
mechanismDEMAND-SIDE CHANGE lowers required production growth through more plant-based diets and reduced food waste — “Clearly, the world faces a looming and growing agricultural crisis. Yields are not improving fast enough to keep up with projected demands in 2050. However, opportunities do exist to increase production through more efficient use of current arable lands [4] and increasing yield growth rates by spreading best management practices and closing yield gaps under different management regimes [38] – [42] across the globe. A portion of the production shortfall could also be met by expanding croplands, but at a high environmental cost to biodiversity and carbon emissions [4] , [43] – [45] . Alternatively, additional strategies, particularly changing to more plant-based diets and reducing food waste [4] , [46] – [48] can reduce the large expected demand growth in food”mechanisms[4]
supports the claim that recent crop-yield trends are insufficient to double production by 2050 — “Numerous studies have shown that feeding a more populated and more prosperous world will roughly require a doubling of agricultural production by 2050 [1] – [7] , translating to a ∼2.4% rate of crop production growth per year. We find that the top four global crops – maize, rice, wheat, and soybean – are currently witnessing average yield improvements only between 0.9 to 1.6 percent per year, far slower than the required rates to double their production by 2050 solely from yield gains. This is because yield improvements are below ∼2.4% per year in many areas of our most important agricultural lands. At these rates maize, rice, wheat and soybean production may increase by ∼67%, ∼42%, ∼38%, and ∼55% respectively, by 2050 globally. There is a 90% chance that the total global production increase from yields alone would be between 34–101% for maize, 21–59% for rice, 4–76% for wheat, and 13–84% for soybean by ∼2050. Thus, if these yield change rates do not increase, land clearing possibly would be needed [3] if global food security is to increase or even maintained”claim_relations[0]
extends earlier global crop-yield trend studies — “Here we employ ∼2.5 million statistics from a newly developed crop yield and area harvested database covering ∼13,500 political units globally from 1961 to 2008, focusing on trends in the recent two decades [4] , [23] . We determine the rates of yield change in each political unit for the top four global crops: maize, rice, wheat, and soybean. These four crops together produce about two-thirds of current harvested global crop calories [3] , [18] . Using these data, we estimate the best-fit linear, non-compounding rates of yield change between 1989 and 2008 for these crops in each of these political units. Yield change is commonly modeled as a linear function of time [24] – [28] and such models have been used to project future crop yields [28] – [30] . We provide local, country, and global-scale rates of recent crop yield changes to determine where the rates of yield increase could double production by 2050, and where they are insufficient. The impact of negative or even slow rates of yield change in these crops could be severe, especially for low-income countries with rapidly rising population. The underlying data, period analyzed, statistical approach, and comparisons of yield projections are described in the Methods section below, with additional details and analysis in Text S1”claim_relations[1]
qualifies global average yield trends — “Global trends mask the significant variations in the rates of yield change among and within countries ( Figure 2 ). We determine where the within-country yield change rates are ∼2.4% per year or above (i.e. doubling rates), where the rates are lower, and where yields are decreasing. We briefly describe these areas, emphasizing areas with doubling and decreasing rates as these areas define the places with the greatest opportunity to meeting growing demand or where to target investments. See Figure S10 for continuous rate (non-categorical) maps in kilograms/hectare/year/year”claim_relations[2]
supports targeting yield-growth investment geographically — “Our analysis identifies where yield improvements are on track to double production and where investments should be targeted to increase yields. The observed rates of yield change result from several location-specific, socio-economic, and biophysical factors that are described elsewhere [23] . Many studies illustrate that intensification can be unsustainable [32] – [36] , but several notable projects in Africa [37] and elsewhere [38] have shown that sustainable intensification is possible and necessary to boost global crop production”claim_relations[3]
qualifies yield increase as the sole food-security strategy — “Clearly, the world faces a looming and growing agricultural crisis. Yields are not improving fast enough to keep up with projected demands in 2050. However, opportunities do exist to increase production through more efficient use of current arable lands [4] and increasing yield growth rates by spreading best management practices and closing yield gaps under different management regimes [38] – [42] across the globe. A portion of the production shortfall could also be met by expanding croplands, but at a high environmental cost to biodiversity and carbon emissions [4] , [43] – [45] . Alternatively, additional strategies, particularly changing to more plant-based diets and reducing food waste [4] , [46] – [48] can reduce the large expected demand growth in food”claim_relations[4]
sense`doubling` means a NON-COMPOUNDING LINEAR increase from the 2008 base to twice that yield in 2050, approximately 2.4% per year — “This gives a rate of 2.38% per year or approximately 2.4% per year. For reported numbers at the local- to country- to global-scale the linear percentage changes are the observed changes using 2008 yields as the base year. The actual changes are provided in Data S1 for each crop and country”senses[0]
sense`production projection` holds HARVESTED AREA FIXED at about 2007, so it estimates yield-driven production rather than land-expansion output — “Population data and its projections per country were from the United Nation's medium variant projections [5] . Crop production was determined using the projected crop yields at current observed rates of yield change and harvested areas fixed at ∼2007. Per capita harvested production is the ratio of production to population”senses[1]
sense`per capita harvested production` is PRODUCTION DIVIDED BY POPULATION rather than total national crop output — “Population data and its projections per country were from the United Nation's medium variant projections [5] . Crop production was determined using the projected crop yields at current observed rates of yield change and harvested areas fixed at ∼2007. Per capita harvested production is the ratio of production to population”senses[2]
sense`global trend` is AREA-WEIGHTED and can mask large within-country and between-country variation — “Global trends mask the significant variations in the rates of yield change among and within countries ( Figure 2 ). We determine where the within-country yield change rates are ∼2.4% per year or above (i.e. doubling rates), where the rates are lower, and where yields are decreasing. We briefly describe these areas, emphasizing areas with doubling and decreasing rates as these areas define the places with the greatest opportunity to meeting growing demand or where to target investments. See Figure S10 for continuous rate (non-categorical) maps in kilograms/hectare/year/year”senses[3]
sense`on track` is CONDITIONAL: mapped doubling rates imply doubling only if the observed rates are sustained — “Global trends mask the significant variations in the rates of yield change among and within countries ( Figure 2 ). We determine where the within-country yield change rates are ∼2.4% per year or above (i.e. doubling rates), where the rates are lower, and where yields are decreasing. We briefly describe these areas, emphasizing areas with doubling and decreasing rates as these areas define the places with the greatest opportunity to meeting growing demand or where to target investments. See Figure S10 for continuous rate (non-categorical) maps in kilograms/hectare/year/year”senses[4]
notethe claim that recent crop-yield trends are insufficient to double production by 2050 — The global estimates fall below the stated doubling threshold. — “Numerous studies have shown that feeding a more populated and more prosperous world will roughly require a doubling of agricultural production by 2050 [1] – [7] , translating to a ∼2.4% rate of crop production growth per year. We find that the top four global crops – maize, rice, wheat, and soybean – are currently witnessing average yield improvements only between 0.9 to 1.6 percent per year, far slower than the required rates to double their production by 2050 solely from yield gains. This is because yield improvements are below ∼2.4% per year in many areas of our most important agricultural lands. At these rates maize, rice, wheat and soybean production may increase by ∼67%, ∼42%, ∼38%, and ∼55% respectively, by 2050 globally. There is a 90% chance that the total global production increase from yields alone would be between 34–101% for maize, 21–59% for rice, 4–76% for wheat, and 13–84% for soybean by ∼2050. Thus, if these yield change rates do not increase, land clearing possibly would be needed [3] if global food security is to increase or even maintained”claim_relations[0]
weightthe claim that recent crop-yield trends are insufficient to double production by 2050 — 0.99 — “Numerous studies have shown that feeding a more populated and more prosperous world will roughly require a doubling of agricultural production by 2050 [1] – [7] , translating to a ∼2.4% rate of crop production growth per year. We find that the top four global crops – maize, rice, wheat, and soybean – are currently witnessing average yield improvements only between 0.9 to 1.6 percent per year, far slower than the required rates to double their production by 2050 solely from yield gains. This is because yield improvements are below ∼2.4% per year in many areas of our most important agricultural lands. At these rates maize, rice, wheat and soybean production may increase by ∼67%, ∼42%, ∼38%, and ∼55% respectively, by 2050 globally. There is a 90% chance that the total global production increase from yields alone would be between 34–101% for maize, 21–59% for rice, 4–76% for wheat, and 13–84% for soybean by ∼2050. Thus, if these yield change rates do not increase, land clearing possibly would be needed [3] if global food security is to increase or even maintained”claim_relations[0]
noteearlier global crop-yield trend studies — The study adds high-resolution local, national, and global rates plus 2050 projections. — “Here we employ ∼2.5 million statistics from a newly developed crop yield and area harvested database covering ∼13,500 political units globally from 1961 to 2008, focusing on trends in the recent two decades [4] , [23] . We determine the rates of yield change in each political unit for the top four global crops: maize, rice, wheat, and soybean. These four crops together produce about two-thirds of current harvested global crop calories [3] , [18] . Using these data, we estimate the best-fit linear, non-compounding rates of yield change between 1989 and 2008 for these crops in each of these political units. Yield change is commonly modeled as a linear function of time [24] – [28] and such models have been used to project future crop yields [28] – [30] . We provide local, country, and global-scale rates of recent crop yield changes to determine where the rates of yield increase could double production by 2050, and where they are insufficient. The impact of negative or even slow rates of yield change in these crops could be severe, especially for low-income countries with rapidly rising population. The underlying data, period analyzed, statistical approach, and comparisons of yield projections are described in the Methods section below, with additional details and analysis in Text S1”claim_relations[1]
weightearlier global crop-yield trend studies — 0.95 — “Here we employ ∼2.5 million statistics from a newly developed crop yield and area harvested database covering ∼13,500 political units globally from 1961 to 2008, focusing on trends in the recent two decades [4] , [23] . We determine the rates of yield change in each political unit for the top four global crops: maize, rice, wheat, and soybean. These four crops together produce about two-thirds of current harvested global crop calories [3] , [18] . Using these data, we estimate the best-fit linear, non-compounding rates of yield change between 1989 and 2008 for these crops in each of these political units. Yield change is commonly modeled as a linear function of time [24] – [28] and such models have been used to project future crop yields [28] – [30] . We provide local, country, and global-scale rates of recent crop yield changes to determine where the rates of yield increase could double production by 2050, and where they are insufficient. The impact of negative or even slow rates of yield change in these crops could be severe, especially for low-income countries with rapidly rising population. The underlying data, period analyzed, statistical approach, and comparisons of yield projections are described in the Methods section below, with additional details and analysis in Text S1”claim_relations[1]
noteglobal average yield trends — The subnational maps show that global averages conceal substantial spatial variation. — “Global trends mask the significant variations in the rates of yield change among and within countries ( Figure 2 ). We determine where the within-country yield change rates are ∼2.4% per year or above (i.e. doubling rates), where the rates are lower, and where yields are decreasing. We briefly describe these areas, emphasizing areas with doubling and decreasing rates as these areas define the places with the greatest opportunity to meeting growing demand or where to target investments. See Figure S10 for continuous rate (non-categorical) maps in kilograms/hectare/year/year”claim_relations[2]
notetargeting yield-growth investment geographically — The analysis identifies where rates meet or miss the doubling target. — “Our analysis identifies where yield improvements are on track to double production and where investments should be targeted to increase yields. The observed rates of yield change result from several location-specific, socio-economic, and biophysical factors that are described elsewhere [23] . Many studies illustrate that intensification can be unsustainable [32] – [36] , but several notable projects in Africa [37] and elsewhere [38] have shown that sustainable intensification is possible and necessary to boost global crop production”claim_relations[3]
weighttargeting yield-growth investment geographically — 0.95 — “Our analysis identifies where yield improvements are on track to double production and where investments should be targeted to increase yields. The observed rates of yield change result from several location-specific, socio-economic, and biophysical factors that are described elsewhere [23] . Many studies illustrate that intensification can be unsustainable [32] – [36] , but several notable projects in Africa [37] and elsewhere [38] have shown that sustainable intensification is possible and necessary to boost global crop production”claim_relations[3]
noteyield increase as the sole food-security strategy — The paper also identifies land-use and demand-side alternatives and their costs. — “Clearly, the world faces a looming and growing agricultural crisis. Yields are not improving fast enough to keep up with projected demands in 2050. However, opportunities do exist to increase production through more efficient use of current arable lands [4] and increasing yield growth rates by spreading best management practices and closing yield gaps under different management regimes [38] – [42] across the globe. A portion of the production shortfall could also be met by expanding croplands, but at a high environmental cost to biodiversity and carbon emissions [4] , [43] – [45] . Alternatively, additional strategies, particularly changing to more plant-based diets and reducing food waste [4] , [46] – [48] can reduce the large expected demand growth in food”claim_relations[4]
weightyield increase as the sole food-security strategy — 0.9 — “Clearly, the world faces a looming and growing agricultural crisis. Yields are not improving fast enough to keep up with projected demands in 2050. However, opportunities do exist to increase production through more efficient use of current arable lands [4] and increasing yield growth rates by spreading best management practices and closing yield gaps under different management regimes [38] – [42] across the globe. A portion of the production shortfall could also be met by expanding croplands, but at a high environmental cost to biodiversity and carbon emissions [4] , [43] – [45] . Alternatively, additional strategies, particularly changing to more plant-based diets and reducing food waste [4] , [46] – [48] can reduce the large expected demand growth in food”claim_relations[4]
notecrop yields —contrasted-with→ clearing more land for agriculture — The source uses an explicit rather-than contrast. — “Several studies have shown that global crop production needs to double by 2050 to meet the projected demands from rising population, diet shifts, and increasing biofuels consumption. Boosting crop yields to meet these rising demands, rather than clearing more land for agriculture has been highlighted as a preferred solution to meet this goal”concept_edges[0]
relationcrop yields —contrasted-with→ clearing more land for agriculture — Increasing crop yields is presented as preferable to clearing more land for agriculture. — “Several studies have shown that global crop production needs to double by 2050 to meet the projected demands from rising population, diet shifts, and increasing biofuels consumption. Boosting crop yields to meet these rising demands, rather than clearing more land for agriculture has been highlighted as a preferred solution to meet this goal”concept_edges[0]
auditcrop yields —causes→ food security — Audit 2026-09-28: DOUBTFUL - read against its full span and kept, but attributed: the span reports what 'numerous authors have suggested'. — “Numerous authors have suggested that increasing crop yields, rather than clearing more land for food production, is the most sustainable path for food security [2] , [4] , [9] – [14] . Moreover, crop yield growth has been shown as an effective tool in reducing global poverty and undernourishment, as farmers themselves constitute the vast majority of the poor and the undernourished”concept_edges[1]
effect directioncrop yields —causes→ food security — increases — “Numerous authors have suggested that increasing crop yields, rather than clearing more land for food production, is the most sustainable path for food security [2] , [4] , [9] – [14] . Moreover, crop yield growth has been shown as an effective tool in reducing global poverty and undernourishment, as farmers themselves constitute the vast majority of the poor and the undernourished”concept_edges[1]
evidential statuscrop yields —causes→ food security — literature-backed — “Numerous authors have suggested that increasing crop yields, rather than clearing more land for food production, is the most sustainable path for food security [2] , [4] , [9] – [14] . Moreover, crop yield growth has been shown as an effective tool in reducing global poverty and undernourishment, as farmers themselves constitute the vast majority of the poor and the undernourished”concept_edges[1]
notecrop yields —causes→ food security — A literature-backed causal policy claim rather than a randomized effect. — “Numerous authors have suggested that increasing crop yields, rather than clearing more land for food production, is the most sustainable path for food security [2] , [4] , [9] – [14] . Moreover, crop yield growth has been shown as an effective tool in reducing global poverty and undernourishment, as farmers themselves constitute the vast majority of the poor and the undernourished”concept_edges[1]
relationcrop yields —causes→ food security — Increasing crop yields rather than clearing land is presented as the sustainable path for food security. — “Numerous authors have suggested that increasing crop yields, rather than clearing more land for food production, is the most sustainable path for food security [2] , [4] , [9] – [14] . Moreover, crop yield growth has been shown as an effective tool in reducing global poverty and undernourishment, as farmers themselves constitute the vast majority of the poor and the undernourished”concept_edges[1]
weightcrop yields —causes→ food security — 0.9 — “Numerous authors have suggested that increasing crop yields, rather than clearing more land for food production, is the most sustainable path for food security [2] , [4] , [9] – [14] . Moreover, crop yield growth has been shown as an effective tool in reducing global poverty and undernourishment, as farmers themselves constitute the vast majority of the poor and the undernourished”concept_edges[1]
audityield improvements —causes→ global crop production — Audit 2026-09-28: DOUBTFUL - read against its full span and kept, but the span says yield improvements are on track to double production in places; causes is loose. — “Our analysis identifies where yield improvements are on track to double production and where investments should be targeted to increase yields. The observed rates of yield change result from several location-specific, socio-economic, and biophysical factors that are described elsewhere [23] . Many studies illustrate that intensification can be unsustainable [32] – [36] , but several notable projects in Africa [37] and elsewhere [38] have shown that sustainable intensification is possible and necessary to boost global crop production”concept_edges[2]
effect directionyield improvements —causes→ global crop production — increases — “Our analysis identifies where yield improvements are on track to double production and where investments should be targeted to increase yields. The observed rates of yield change result from several location-specific, socio-economic, and biophysical factors that are described elsewhere [23] . Many studies illustrate that intensification can be unsustainable [32] – [36] , but several notable projects in Africa [37] and elsewhere [38] have shown that sustainable intensification is possible and necessary to boost global crop production”concept_edges[2]
noteyield improvements —causes→ global crop production — The sentence states necessity and a production-boosting effect. — “Our analysis identifies where yield improvements are on track to double production and where investments should be targeted to increase yields. The observed rates of yield change result from several location-specific, socio-economic, and biophysical factors that are described elsewhere [23] . Many studies illustrate that intensification can be unsustainable [32] – [36] , but several notable projects in Africa [37] and elsewhere [38] have shown that sustainable intensification is possible and necessary to boost global crop production”concept_edges[2]
relationyield improvements —causes→ global crop production — Sustainable intensification through yield improvements is described as necessary to boost global crop production. — “Our analysis identifies where yield improvements are on track to double production and where investments should be targeted to increase yields. The observed rates of yield change result from several location-specific, socio-economic, and biophysical factors that are described elsewhere [23] . Many studies illustrate that intensification can be unsustainable [32] – [36] , but several notable projects in Africa [37] and elsewhere [38] have shown that sustainable intensification is possible and necessary to boost global crop production”concept_edges[2]
weightyield improvements —causes→ global crop production — 0.9 — “Our analysis identifies where yield improvements are on track to double production and where investments should be targeted to increase yields. The observed rates of yield change result from several location-specific, socio-economic, and biophysical factors that are described elsewhere [23] . Many studies illustrate that intensification can be unsustainable [32] – [36] , but several notable projects in Africa [37] and elsewhere [38] have shown that sustainable intensification is possible and necessary to boost global crop production”concept_edges[2]
auditpopulation growth —causes→ declines in per capita harvested rice — Audit 2026-09-28: DOUBTFUL - read against its full span and kept, but the span says there COULD be declines in per capita harvested rice; hedged. — “However in Afghanistan, Iraq and Australia due to population growth outpacing production increases from the 2.4%, 0.4%, and 0.3% rates of yield increase per year there could be declines in per capita harvested rice”concept_edges[3]
notepopulation growth —causes→ declines in per capita harvested rice — The paper explicitly uses 'could', so the effect is conditional. — “However in Afghanistan, Iraq and Australia due to population growth outpacing production increases from the 2.4%, 0.4%, and 0.3% rates of yield increase per year there could be declines in per capita harvested rice”concept_edges[3]
relationpopulation growth —causes→ declines in per capita harvested rice — Population growth outpacing production increases could cause declines in per-capita harvested rice. — “However in Afghanistan, Iraq and Australia due to population growth outpacing production increases from the 2.4%, 0.4%, and 0.3% rates of yield increase per year there could be declines in per capita harvested rice”concept_edges[3]
weightpopulation growth —causes→ declines in per capita harvested rice — 0.7 — “However in Afghanistan, Iraq and Australia due to population growth outpacing production increases from the 2.4%, 0.4%, and 0.3% rates of yield increase per year there could be declines in per capita harvested rice”concept_edges[3]
auditmore efficient use of current arable lands —causes→ increase production — Audit 2026-09-28: DOUBTFUL - read against its full span and kept, but the span says opportunities EXIST to increase production through more efficient use of lands; hedged. — “Clearly, the world faces a looming and growing agricultural crisis. Yields are not improving fast enough to keep up with projected demands in 2050. However, opportunities do exist to increase production through more efficient use of current arable lands [4] and increasing yield growth rates by spreading best management practices and closing yield gaps under different management regimes [38] – [42] across the globe. A portion of the production shortfall could also be met by expanding croplands, but at a high environmental cost to biodiversity and carbon emissions [4] , [43] – [45] . Alternatively, additional strategies, particularly changing to more plant-based diets and reducing food waste [4] , [46] – [48] can reduce the large expected demand growth in food”concept_edges[4]
effect directionmore efficient use of current arable lands —causes→ increase production — increases — “Clearly, the world faces a looming and growing agricultural crisis. Yields are not improving fast enough to keep up with projected demands in 2050. However, opportunities do exist to increase production through more efficient use of current arable lands [4] and increasing yield growth rates by spreading best management practices and closing yield gaps under different management regimes [38] – [42] across the globe. A portion of the production shortfall could also be met by expanding croplands, but at a high environmental cost to biodiversity and carbon emissions [4] , [43] – [45] . Alternatively, additional strategies, particularly changing to more plant-based diets and reducing food waste [4] , [46] – [48] can reduce the large expected demand growth in food”concept_edges[4]
notemore efficient use of current arable lands —causes→ increase production — A proposed production-increase mechanism. — “Clearly, the world faces a looming and growing agricultural crisis. Yields are not improving fast enough to keep up with projected demands in 2050. However, opportunities do exist to increase production through more efficient use of current arable lands [4] and increasing yield growth rates by spreading best management practices and closing yield gaps under different management regimes [38] – [42] across the globe. A portion of the production shortfall could also be met by expanding croplands, but at a high environmental cost to biodiversity and carbon emissions [4] , [43] – [45] . Alternatively, additional strategies, particularly changing to more plant-based diets and reducing food waste [4] , [46] – [48] can reduce the large expected demand growth in food”concept_edges[4]
relationmore efficient use of current arable lands —causes→ increase production — More efficient use of current arable lands is one route to increasing production. — “Clearly, the world faces a looming and growing agricultural crisis. Yields are not improving fast enough to keep up with projected demands in 2050. However, opportunities do exist to increase production through more efficient use of current arable lands [4] and increasing yield growth rates by spreading best management practices and closing yield gaps under different management regimes [38] – [42] across the globe. A portion of the production shortfall could also be met by expanding croplands, but at a high environmental cost to biodiversity and carbon emissions [4] , [43] – [45] . Alternatively, additional strategies, particularly changing to more plant-based diets and reducing food waste [4] , [46] – [48] can reduce the large expected demand growth in food”concept_edges[4]
weightmore efficient use of current arable lands —causes→ increase production — 0.9 — “Clearly, the world faces a looming and growing agricultural crisis. Yields are not improving fast enough to keep up with projected demands in 2050. However, opportunities do exist to increase production through more efficient use of current arable lands [4] and increasing yield growth rates by spreading best management practices and closing yield gaps under different management regimes [38] – [42] across the globe. A portion of the production shortfall could also be met by expanding croplands, but at a high environmental cost to biodiversity and carbon emissions [4] , [43] – [45] . Alternatively, additional strategies, particularly changing to more plant-based diets and reducing food waste [4] , [46] – [48] can reduce the large expected demand growth in food”concept_edges[4]
auditplant-based diets —causes→ large expected demand growth in food — Audit 2026-09-28: DOUBTFUL - read against its full span and kept, but the span says plant-based diets CAN reduce the expected demand growth; hedged. — “Clearly, the world faces a looming and growing agricultural crisis. Yields are not improving fast enough to keep up with projected demands in 2050. However, opportunities do exist to increase production through more efficient use of current arable lands [4] and increasing yield growth rates by spreading best management practices and closing yield gaps under different management regimes [38] – [42] across the globe. A portion of the production shortfall could also be met by expanding croplands, but at a high environmental cost to biodiversity and carbon emissions [4] , [43] – [45] . Alternatively, additional strategies, particularly changing to more plant-based diets and reducing food waste [4] , [46] – [48] can reduce the large expected demand growth in food”concept_edges[5]
effect directionplant-based diets —causes→ large expected demand growth in food — reduces — “Clearly, the world faces a looming and growing agricultural crisis. Yields are not improving fast enough to keep up with projected demands in 2050. However, opportunities do exist to increase production through more efficient use of current arable lands [4] and increasing yield growth rates by spreading best management practices and closing yield gaps under different management regimes [38] – [42] across the globe. A portion of the production shortfall could also be met by expanding croplands, but at a high environmental cost to biodiversity and carbon emissions [4] , [43] – [45] . Alternatively, additional strategies, particularly changing to more plant-based diets and reducing food waste [4] , [46] – [48] can reduce the large expected demand growth in food”concept_edges[5]
noteplant-based diets —causes→ large expected demand growth in food — The source says can reduce rather than will eliminate demand growth. — “Clearly, the world faces a looming and growing agricultural crisis. Yields are not improving fast enough to keep up with projected demands in 2050. However, opportunities do exist to increase production through more efficient use of current arable lands [4] and increasing yield growth rates by spreading best management practices and closing yield gaps under different management regimes [38] – [42] across the globe. A portion of the production shortfall could also be met by expanding croplands, but at a high environmental cost to biodiversity and carbon emissions [4] , [43] – [45] . Alternatively, additional strategies, particularly changing to more plant-based diets and reducing food waste [4] , [46] – [48] can reduce the large expected demand growth in food”concept_edges[5]
relationplant-based diets —causes→ large expected demand growth in food — Changing toward plant-based diets can reduce expected demand growth for food. — “Clearly, the world faces a looming and growing agricultural crisis. Yields are not improving fast enough to keep up with projected demands in 2050. However, opportunities do exist to increase production through more efficient use of current arable lands [4] and increasing yield growth rates by spreading best management practices and closing yield gaps under different management regimes [38] – [42] across the globe. A portion of the production shortfall could also be met by expanding croplands, but at a high environmental cost to biodiversity and carbon emissions [4] , [43] – [45] . Alternatively, additional strategies, particularly changing to more plant-based diets and reducing food waste [4] , [46] – [48] can reduce the large expected demand growth in food”concept_edges[5]
weightplant-based diets —causes→ large expected demand growth in food — 0.85 — “Clearly, the world faces a looming and growing agricultural crisis. Yields are not improving fast enough to keep up with projected demands in 2050. However, opportunities do exist to increase production through more efficient use of current arable lands [4] and increasing yield growth rates by spreading best management practices and closing yield gaps under different management regimes [38] – [42] across the globe. A portion of the production shortfall could also be met by expanding croplands, but at a high environmental cost to biodiversity and carbon emissions [4] , [43] – [45] . Alternatively, additional strategies, particularly changing to more plant-based diets and reducing food waste [4] , [46] – [48] can reduce the large expected demand growth in food”concept_edges[5]
auditfood waste —causes→ large expected demand growth in food — Audit 2026-09-28: DOUBTFUL - read against its span and kept, but it is REDUCING food waste that curbs demand growth; the edge drops 'reducing'. — “Clearly, the world faces a looming and growing agricultural crisis. Yields are not improving fast enough to keep up with projected demands in 2050. However, opportunities do exist to increase production through more efficient use of current arable lands [4] and increasing yield growth rates by spreading best management practices and closing yield gaps under different management regimes [38] – [42] across the globe. A portion of the production shortfall could also be met by expanding croplands, but at a high environmental cost to biodiversity and carbon emissions [4] , [43] – [45] . Alternatively, additional strategies, particularly changing to more plant-based diets and reducing food waste [4] , [46] – [48] can reduce the large expected demand growth in food”concept_edges[6]
effect directionfood waste —causes→ large expected demand growth in food — reduces — “Clearly, the world faces a looming and growing agricultural crisis. Yields are not improving fast enough to keep up with projected demands in 2050. However, opportunities do exist to increase production through more efficient use of current arable lands [4] and increasing yield growth rates by spreading best management practices and closing yield gaps under different management regimes [38] – [42] across the globe. A portion of the production shortfall could also be met by expanding croplands, but at a high environmental cost to biodiversity and carbon emissions [4] , [43] – [45] . Alternatively, additional strategies, particularly changing to more plant-based diets and reducing food waste [4] , [46] – [48] can reduce the large expected demand growth in food”concept_edges[6]
notefood waste —causes→ large expected demand growth in food — The source says can reduce rather than will eliminate demand growth. — “Clearly, the world faces a looming and growing agricultural crisis. Yields are not improving fast enough to keep up with projected demands in 2050. However, opportunities do exist to increase production through more efficient use of current arable lands [4] and increasing yield growth rates by spreading best management practices and closing yield gaps under different management regimes [38] – [42] across the globe. A portion of the production shortfall could also be met by expanding croplands, but at a high environmental cost to biodiversity and carbon emissions [4] , [43] – [45] . Alternatively, additional strategies, particularly changing to more plant-based diets and reducing food waste [4] , [46] – [48] can reduce the large expected demand growth in food”concept_edges[6]
relationfood waste —causes→ large expected demand growth in food — Reducing food waste can reduce expected demand growth for food. — “Clearly, the world faces a looming and growing agricultural crisis. Yields are not improving fast enough to keep up with projected demands in 2050. However, opportunities do exist to increase production through more efficient use of current arable lands [4] and increasing yield growth rates by spreading best management practices and closing yield gaps under different management regimes [38] – [42] across the globe. A portion of the production shortfall could also be met by expanding croplands, but at a high environmental cost to biodiversity and carbon emissions [4] , [43] – [45] . Alternatively, additional strategies, particularly changing to more plant-based diets and reducing food waste [4] , [46] – [48] can reduce the large expected demand growth in food”concept_edges[6]
weightfood waste —causes→ large expected demand growth in food — 0.85 — “Clearly, the world faces a looming and growing agricultural crisis. Yields are not improving fast enough to keep up with projected demands in 2050. However, opportunities do exist to increase production through more efficient use of current arable lands [4] and increasing yield growth rates by spreading best management practices and closing yield gaps under different management regimes [38] – [42] across the globe. A portion of the production shortfall could also be met by expanding croplands, but at a high environmental cost to biodiversity and carbon emissions [4] , [43] – [45] . Alternatively, additional strategies, particularly changing to more plant-based diets and reducing food waste [4] , [46] – [48] can reduce the large expected demand growth in food”concept_edges[6]
notecurrent rates —contrasted-with→ 2.4% per year rate — The paper says current rates are not achieving the threshold goal. — “The global average rates of yield increase across ∼13,500 political units are 1.6%, 1.0%, 0.9%, and 1.3% per year for maize, rice, wheat, and soybean, respectively ( Table 1 , Figure 1 ). A ∼2.4% per year rate of yield gains (non-compounding) is needed to double crop production by 2050. Current rates are thus not achieving this goal. At current rates only ∼67%, ∼42%, ∼38%, and ∼55% increases in maize, rice, wheat and soybean production, respectively, is possible by 2050”concept_edges[7]
relationcurrent rates —contrasted-with→ 2.4% per year rate — Current yield-growth rates are compared with the 2.4% annual rate needed to double production. — “The global average rates of yield increase across ∼13,500 political units are 1.6%, 1.0%, 0.9%, and 1.3% per year for maize, rice, wheat, and soybean, respectively ( Table 1 , Figure 1 ). A ∼2.4% per year rate of yield gains (non-compounding) is needed to double crop production by 2050. Current rates are thus not achieving this goal. At current rates only ∼67%, ∼42%, ∼38%, and ∼55% increases in maize, rice, wheat and soybean production, respectively, is possible by 2050”concept_edges[7]
relationincreasing human population → rising demands for crop production — Increasing human population is one of three forces behind rising crop-production demand. — “The world is experiencing rising demands for crop production, stemming from three key forces: increasing human population, meat and dairy consumption from growing affluence, and biofuel consumption”unhoused_relations[0]
relationmeat and dairy consumption → rising demands for crop production — Affluence-driven meat and dairy consumption contributes to rising crop-production demand. — “The world is experiencing rising demands for crop production, stemming from three key forces: increasing human population, meat and dairy consumption from growing affluence, and biofuel consumption”unhoused_relations[1]
relationbiofuel consumption → rising demands for crop production — Biofuel consumption contributes to rising crop-production demand. — “The world is experiencing rising demands for crop production, stemming from three key forces: increasing human population, meat and dairy consumption from growing affluence, and biofuel consumption”unhoused_relations[2]
relationmaize → global agricultural calories — Maize is one of four crops that together produce nearly two-thirds of global agricultural calories. — “Using ∼2.5 million agricultural statistics, collected for ∼13,500 political units across the world, we track four key global crops—maize, rice, wheat, and soybean—that currently produce nearly two-thirds of global agricultural calories”unhoused_relations[3]
relationrice → global agricultural calories — Rice is one of four crops that together produce nearly two-thirds of global agricultural calories. — “Using ∼2.5 million agricultural statistics, collected for ∼13,500 political units across the world, we track four key global crops—maize, rice, wheat, and soybean—that currently produce nearly two-thirds of global agricultural calories”unhoused_relations[4]
relationwheat → global agricultural calories — Wheat is one of four crops that together produce nearly two-thirds of global agricultural calories. — “Using ∼2.5 million agricultural statistics, collected for ∼13,500 political units across the world, we track four key global crops—maize, rice, wheat, and soybean—that currently produce nearly two-thirds of global agricultural calories”unhoused_relations[5]
relationsoybean → global agricultural calories — Soybean is one of four crops that together produce nearly two-thirds of global agricultural calories. — “Using ∼2.5 million agricultural statistics, collected for ∼13,500 political units across the world, we track four key global crops—maize, rice, wheat, and soybean—that currently produce nearly two-thirds of global agricultural calories”unhoused_relations[6]
relationlinear regression → best-fit linear, non-compounding rates of yield change — Linear regression is used to estimate the best-fit non-compounding rate of yield change. — “Here we employ ∼2.5 million statistics from a newly developed crop yield and area harvested database covering ∼13,500 political units globally from 1961 to 2008, focusing on trends in the recent two decades [4] , [23] . We determine the rates of yield change in each political unit for the top four global crops: maize, rice, wheat, and soybean. These four crops together produce about two-thirds of current harvested global crop calories [3] , [18] . Using these data, we estimate the best-fit linear, non-compounding rates of yield change between 1989 and 2008 for these crops in each of these political units. Yield change is commonly modeled as a linear function of time [24] – [28] and such models have been used to project future crop yields [28] – [30] . We provide local, country, and global-scale rates of recent crop yield changes to determine where the rates of yield increase could double production by 2050, and where they are insufficient. The impact of negative or even slow rates of yield change in these crops could be severe, especially for low-income countries with rapidly rising population. The underlying data, period analyzed, statistical approach, and comparisons of yield projections are described in the Methods section below, with additional details and analysis in Text S1”unhoused_relations[7]
relationannual crop census reports → harvested areas — Annual crop census reports supply the harvested-area observations. — “We used annual crop census reports for harvested areas and yield from ∼13,500 political units globally covering 20 years from 1989 to 2008 in this analysis though the database itself covers the years 1961 to 2008. The sum total of these census reports for the 20 years was approximately 1.8 million. Data were collected at three political levels/units depending on data availability: country, state/provinces, and county/district/município/department. Data were not available for all political units for each year. Details of the number of years data was available and its source is given in the Table S1 . For the political units where data was missing for some years we estimated crop harvested and yield information using the average of the latest five years of reported data and constraining them with the reported numbers from the higher political unit as explained further in Text S1 and previous work”unhoused_relations[8]
relationaverage of the latest five years of reported data → political units — The latest-five-year average imputes missing years for political units. — “We used annual crop census reports for harvested areas and yield from ∼13,500 political units globally covering 20 years from 1989 to 2008 in this analysis though the database itself covers the years 1961 to 2008. The sum total of these census reports for the 20 years was approximately 1.8 million. Data were collected at three political levels/units depending on data availability: country, state/provinces, and county/district/município/department. Data were not available for all political units for each year. Details of the number of years data was available and its source is given in the Table S1 . For the political units where data was missing for some years we estimated crop harvested and yield information using the average of the latest five years of reported data and constraining them with the reported numbers from the higher political unit as explained further in Text S1 and previous work”unhoused_relations[9]
relationexpanding croplands → biodiversity — Expanding croplands can meet part of the shortfall at a high cost to biodiversity. — “Clearly, the world faces a looming and growing agricultural crisis. Yields are not improving fast enough to keep up with projected demands in 2050. However, opportunities do exist to increase production through more efficient use of current arable lands [4] and increasing yield growth rates by spreading best management practices and closing yield gaps under different management regimes [38] – [42] across the globe. A portion of the production shortfall could also be met by expanding croplands, but at a high environmental cost to biodiversity and carbon emissions [4] , [43] – [45] . Alternatively, additional strategies, particularly changing to more plant-based diets and reducing food waste [4] , [46] – [48] can reduce the large expected demand growth in food”unhoused_relations[10]
weightexpanding croplands → biodiversity — 0.9 — “Clearly, the world faces a looming and growing agricultural crisis. Yields are not improving fast enough to keep up with projected demands in 2050. However, opportunities do exist to increase production through more efficient use of current arable lands [4] and increasing yield growth rates by spreading best management practices and closing yield gaps under different management regimes [38] – [42] across the globe. A portion of the production shortfall could also be met by expanding croplands, but at a high environmental cost to biodiversity and carbon emissions [4] , [43] – [45] . Alternatively, additional strategies, particularly changing to more plant-based diets and reducing food waste [4] , [46] – [48] can reduce the large expected demand growth in food”unhoused_relations[10]
relationexpanding croplands → carbon emissions — Expanding croplands can meet part of the shortfall at a high cost through carbon emissions. — “Clearly, the world faces a looming and growing agricultural crisis. Yields are not improving fast enough to keep up with projected demands in 2050. However, opportunities do exist to increase production through more efficient use of current arable lands [4] and increasing yield growth rates by spreading best management practices and closing yield gaps under different management regimes [38] – [42] across the globe. A portion of the production shortfall could also be met by expanding croplands, but at a high environmental cost to biodiversity and carbon emissions [4] , [43] – [45] . Alternatively, additional strategies, particularly changing to more plant-based diets and reducing food waste [4] , [46] – [48] can reduce the large expected demand growth in food”unhoused_relations[11]
weightexpanding croplands → carbon emissions — 0.9 — “Clearly, the world faces a looming and growing agricultural crisis. Yields are not improving fast enough to keep up with projected demands in 2050. However, opportunities do exist to increase production through more efficient use of current arable lands [4] and increasing yield growth rates by spreading best management practices and closing yield gaps under different management regimes [38] – [42] across the globe. A portion of the production shortfall could also be met by expanding croplands, but at a high environmental cost to biodiversity and carbon emissions [4] , [43] – [45] . Alternatively, additional strategies, particularly changing to more plant-based diets and reducing food waste [4] , [46] – [48] can reduce the large expected demand growth in food”unhoused_relations[11]
relationupper bound of the 90% confidence interval → lower bound of our confidence interval — The upper confidence bound is the optimistic scenario and the lower bound is the worst-case scenario. — “The upper bound of the 90% confidence interval ( Table 1 , Figure 1 ) presents a slightly more optimistic scenario, global yields increase at rates of 2.4%, 1.4%, 1.8%, and 2.0% per year for maize, rice, wheat, and soybean, respectively. Yield trends following this upper bound projection could lead to ∼101%, ∼59%, ∼76%, and ∼84% increased production in these crops, respectively. The lower bound of our confidence interval provides us with a “worst-case scenario,” wherein the global average yield of maize, rice, wheat, and soybean would increase at 0.8%, 0.5%, 0.1%, and 0.3% per year, respectively ( Table 1 , Figure 1 ). At these rates global production could only increase by ∼34%, ∼21%, ∼4%, and ∼13% for maize, rice, wheat, and soybean, respectively, by 2050”unhoused_relations[12]
relationper capita harvested production → ratio of production to population — Per-capita harvested production is defined as the ratio of production to population. — “Population data and its projections per country were from the United Nation's medium variant projections [5] . Crop production was determined using the projected crop yields at current observed rates of yield change and harvested areas fixed at ∼2007. Per capita harvested production is the ratio of production to population”unhoused_relations[13]
no type for thisincreasing human population → rising demands for crop production — Increasing human population is one of three forces behind rising crop-production demand. — “The world is experiencing rising demands for crop production, stemming from three key forces: increasing human population, meat and dairy consumption from growing affluence, and biofuel consumption”unhoused_relations[0]
no type for thismeat and dairy consumption → rising demands for crop production — Affluence-driven meat and dairy consumption contributes to rising crop-production demand. — “The world is experiencing rising demands for crop production, stemming from three key forces: increasing human population, meat and dairy consumption from growing affluence, and biofuel consumption”unhoused_relations[1]
no type for thisbiofuel consumption → rising demands for crop production — Biofuel consumption contributes to rising crop-production demand. — “The world is experiencing rising demands for crop production, stemming from three key forces: increasing human population, meat and dairy consumption from growing affluence, and biofuel consumption”unhoused_relations[2]
no type for thismaize → global agricultural calories — Maize is one of four crops that together produce nearly two-thirds of global agricultural calories. — “Using ∼2.5 million agricultural statistics, collected for ∼13,500 political units across the world, we track four key global crops—maize, rice, wheat, and soybean—that currently produce nearly two-thirds of global agricultural calories”unhoused_relations[3]
no type for thisrice → global agricultural calories — Rice is one of four crops that together produce nearly two-thirds of global agricultural calories. — “Using ∼2.5 million agricultural statistics, collected for ∼13,500 political units across the world, we track four key global crops—maize, rice, wheat, and soybean—that currently produce nearly two-thirds of global agricultural calories”unhoused_relations[4]
no type for thiswheat → global agricultural calories — Wheat is one of four crops that together produce nearly two-thirds of global agricultural calories. — “Using ∼2.5 million agricultural statistics, collected for ∼13,500 political units across the world, we track four key global crops—maize, rice, wheat, and soybean—that currently produce nearly two-thirds of global agricultural calories”unhoused_relations[5]
no type for thissoybean → global agricultural calories — Soybean is one of four crops that together produce nearly two-thirds of global agricultural calories. — “Using ∼2.5 million agricultural statistics, collected for ∼13,500 political units across the world, we track four key global crops—maize, rice, wheat, and soybean—that currently produce nearly two-thirds of global agricultural calories”unhoused_relations[6]
no type for thislinear regression → best-fit linear, non-compounding rates of yield change — Linear regression is used to estimate the best-fit non-compounding rate of yield change. — “Here we employ ∼2.5 million statistics from a newly developed crop yield and area harvested database covering ∼13,500 political units globally from 1961 to 2008, focusing on trends in the recent two decades [4] , [23] . We determine the rates of yield change in each political unit for the top four global crops: maize, rice, wheat, and soybean. These four crops together produce about two-thirds of current harvested global crop calories [3] , [18] . Using these data, we estimate the best-fit linear, non-compounding rates of yield change between 1989 and 2008 for these crops in each of these political units. Yield change is commonly modeled as a linear function of time [24] – [28] and such models have been used to project future crop yields [28] – [30] . We provide local, country, and global-scale rates of recent crop yield changes to determine where the rates of yield increase could double production by 2050, and where they are insufficient. The impact of negative or even slow rates of yield change in these crops could be severe, especially for low-income countries with rapidly rising population. The underlying data, period analyzed, statistical approach, and comparisons of yield projections are described in the Methods section below, with additional details and analysis in Text S1”unhoused_relations[7]
no type for thisannual crop census reports → harvested areas — Annual crop census reports supply the harvested-area observations. — “We used annual crop census reports for harvested areas and yield from ∼13,500 political units globally covering 20 years from 1989 to 2008 in this analysis though the database itself covers the years 1961 to 2008. The sum total of these census reports for the 20 years was approximately 1.8 million. Data were collected at three political levels/units depending on data availability: country, state/provinces, and county/district/município/department. Data were not available for all political units for each year. Details of the number of years data was available and its source is given in the Table S1 . For the political units where data was missing for some years we estimated crop harvested and yield information using the average of the latest five years of reported data and constraining them with the reported numbers from the higher political unit as explained further in Text S1 and previous work”unhoused_relations[8]
no type for thisaverage of the latest five years of reported data → political units — The latest-five-year average imputes missing years for political units. — “We used annual crop census reports for harvested areas and yield from ∼13,500 political units globally covering 20 years from 1989 to 2008 in this analysis though the database itself covers the years 1961 to 2008. The sum total of these census reports for the 20 years was approximately 1.8 million. Data were collected at three political levels/units depending on data availability: country, state/provinces, and county/district/município/department. Data were not available for all political units for each year. Details of the number of years data was available and its source is given in the Table S1 . For the political units where data was missing for some years we estimated crop harvested and yield information using the average of the latest five years of reported data and constraining them with the reported numbers from the higher political unit as explained further in Text S1 and previous work”unhoused_relations[9]
no type for thisexpanding croplands → biodiversity — Expanding croplands can meet part of the shortfall at a high cost to biodiversity. — “Clearly, the world faces a looming and growing agricultural crisis. Yields are not improving fast enough to keep up with projected demands in 2050. However, opportunities do exist to increase production through more efficient use of current arable lands [4] and increasing yield growth rates by spreading best management practices and closing yield gaps under different management regimes [38] – [42] across the globe. A portion of the production shortfall could also be met by expanding croplands, but at a high environmental cost to biodiversity and carbon emissions [4] , [43] – [45] . Alternatively, additional strategies, particularly changing to more plant-based diets and reducing food waste [4] , [46] – [48] can reduce the large expected demand growth in food”unhoused_relations[10]
no type for thisexpanding croplands → carbon emissions — Expanding croplands can meet part of the shortfall at a high cost through carbon emissions. — “Clearly, the world faces a looming and growing agricultural crisis. Yields are not improving fast enough to keep up with projected demands in 2050. However, opportunities do exist to increase production through more efficient use of current arable lands [4] and increasing yield growth rates by spreading best management practices and closing yield gaps under different management regimes [38] – [42] across the globe. A portion of the production shortfall could also be met by expanding croplands, but at a high environmental cost to biodiversity and carbon emissions [4] , [43] – [45] . Alternatively, additional strategies, particularly changing to more plant-based diets and reducing food waste [4] , [46] – [48] can reduce the large expected demand growth in food”unhoused_relations[11]
no type for thisupper bound of the 90% confidence interval → lower bound of our confidence interval — The upper confidence bound is the optimistic scenario and the lower bound is the worst-case scenario. — “The upper bound of the 90% confidence interval ( Table 1 , Figure 1 ) presents a slightly more optimistic scenario, global yields increase at rates of 2.4%, 1.4%, 1.8%, and 2.0% per year for maize, rice, wheat, and soybean, respectively. Yield trends following this upper bound projection could lead to ∼101%, ∼59%, ∼76%, and ∼84% increased production in these crops, respectively. The lower bound of our confidence interval provides us with a “worst-case scenario,” wherein the global average yield of maize, rice, wheat, and soybean would increase at 0.8%, 0.5%, 0.1%, and 0.3% per year, respectively ( Table 1 , Figure 1 ). At these rates global production could only increase by ∼34%, ∼21%, ∼4%, and ∼13% for maize, rice, wheat, and soybean, respectively, by 2050”unhoused_relations[12]
no type for thisper capita harvested production → ratio of production to population — Per-capita harvested production is defined as the ratio of production to population. — “Population data and its projections per country were from the United Nation's medium variant projections [5] . Crop production was determined using the projected crop yields at current observed rates of yield change and harvested areas fixed at ∼2007. Per capita harvested production is the ratio of production to population”unhoused_relations[13]
limitationthe 2050 projections extrapolate linear trends observed during 1989–2008 — “We linearly regressed 20 years of crop yields at each of the political units to determine the average linear rates of yield improvement over the observed period. Many previous studies have shown that crop yields change linearly and have used linear regression to project future crop yields [24] – [30] . Here we calculate the non-compounding linear percentage rate by solving a in Equation 1 ; Y is the yield in the year 2008, 2Y is the yield in 2050 (after 42 years)”limitations[0]
limitationproduction projections hold harvested area fixed at approximately 2007 levels — “Population data and its projections per country were from the United Nation's medium variant projections [5] . Crop production was determined using the projected crop yields at current observed rates of yield change and harvested areas fixed at ∼2007. Per capita harvested production is the ratio of production to population”limitations[1]
limitationmissing political-unit years are imputed from the latest five reported years and constrained by higher-level totals — “We used annual crop census reports for harvested areas and yield from ∼13,500 political units globally covering 20 years from 1989 to 2008 in this analysis though the database itself covers the years 1961 to 2008. The sum total of these census reports for the 20 years was approximately 1.8 million. Data were collected at three political levels/units depending on data availability: country, state/provinces, and county/district/município/department. Data were not available for all political units for each year. Details of the number of years data was available and its source is given in the Table S1 . For the political units where data was missing for some years we estimated crop harvested and yield information using the average of the latest five years of reported data and constraining them with the reported numbers from the higher political unit as explained further in Text S1 and previous work”limitations[2]
limitationglobal averages mask significant variation among and within countries — “Global trends mask the significant variations in the rates of yield change among and within countries ( Figure 2 ). We determine where the within-country yield change rates are ∼2.4% per year or above (i.e. doubling rates), where the rates are lower, and where yields are decreasing. We briefly describe these areas, emphasizing areas with doubling and decreasing rates as these areas define the places with the greatest opportunity to meeting growing demand or where to target investments. See Figure S10 for continuous rate (non-categorical) maps in kilograms/hectare/year/year”limitations[3]
limitationthe mapped doubling interpretation is conditional on recent yield-change rates being sustained — “Global trends mask the significant variations in the rates of yield change among and within countries ( Figure 2 ). We determine where the within-country yield change rates are ∼2.4% per year or above (i.e. doubling rates), where the rates are lower, and where yields are decreasing. We briefly describe these areas, emphasizing areas with doubling and decreasing rates as these areas define the places with the greatest opportunity to meeting growing demand or where to target investments. See Figure S10 for continuous rate (non-categorical) maps in kilograms/hectare/year/year”limitations[4]
limitationyield-only projections exclude additional production from cropland expansion — “Numerous studies have shown that feeding a more populated and more prosperous world will roughly require a doubling of agricultural production by 2050 [1] – [7] , translating to a ∼2.4% rate of crop production growth per year. We find that the top four global crops – maize, rice, wheat, and soybean – are currently witnessing average yield improvements only between 0.9 to 1.6 percent per year, far slower than the required rates to double their production by 2050 solely from yield gains. This is because yield improvements are below ∼2.4% per year in many areas of our most important agricultural lands. At these rates maize, rice, wheat and soybean production may increase by ∼67%, ∼42%, ∼38%, and ∼55% respectively, by 2050 globally. There is a 90% chance that the total global production increase from yields alone would be between 34–101% for maize, 21–59% for rice, 4–76% for wheat, and 13–84% for soybean by ∼2050. Thus, if these yield change rates do not increase, land clearing possibly would be needed [3] if global food security is to increase or even maintained”limitations[5]
limitationthe analysis evaluates only maize, rice, wheat, and soybean, although they cover roughly two-thirds of crop calories — “Using ∼2.5 million agricultural statistics, collected for ∼13,500 political units across the world, we track four key global crops—maize, rice, wheat, and soybean—that currently produce nearly two-thirds of global agricultural calories”limitations[6]
limitationthe linear fit is sensitive to the number of years analyzed and is compared with alternate regressions in supplementary analyses — “Details of the method used, sensitivity to the number of years analyzed, as well as alternate regression methods are provided in Figures S6 and S9. The advantage of analyzing at high spatial resolution is that yield rates can be summarized for other unique levels. For example, we summarized the results for the Brazilian Legal Amazon ( Figure S12 and Table S2 ). We compared our global numbers with other reported estimates. These comparisons are provided in Table S3”limitations[7]
Concepts
terms this paper carries, each with the sentence it was cut from — the layer that joins one paper to another. Terms with no quote yet are on CONCEPTS.html.
conceptglobal crop production — not defined in this paper's own words; worldwide production of agricultural crops — “Several studies have shown that global crop production needs to double by 2050 to meet the projected demands from rising population, diet shifts, and increasing biofuels consumption. Boosting crop yields to meet these rising demands, rather than clearing more land for agriculture has been highlighted as a preferred solution to meet this goal”concepts[0]
conceptprojected demands — not defined in this paper's own words; anticipated demand for crop production in 2050 — “We find that yields in these top four crops are increasing at 1.6%, 1.0%, 0.9%, and 1.3% per year, non-compounding rates, respectively, which is less than the 2.4% per year rate required to double global production by 2050. At these rates global production in these crops would increase by ∼67%, ∼42%, ∼38%, and ∼55%, respectively, which is far below what is needed to meet projected demands in 2050”concepts[1]
conceptcrop yields — not defined in this paper's own words; harvested output per unit area — “Several studies have shown that global crop production needs to double by 2050 to meet the projected demands from rising population, diet shifts, and increasing biofuels consumption. Boosting crop yields to meet these rising demands, rather than clearing more land for agriculture has been highlighted as a preferred solution to meet this goal”concepts[2]
conceptyield gains — not defined in this paper's own words; increases in crop yield over time — “Global projections. Observed area-weighted global yield 1961–2008 shown using closed circles and projections to 2050 using solid lines for maize, rice, wheat, and soybean. Shading shows the 90% confidence region derived from 99 bootstrapped samples. The dashed line shows the trend of the ∼2.4% yield improvement required each year to double production in these crops by 2050 without bringing additional land under cultivation starting in the base year of 2008”concepts[3]
conceptclearing more land for agriculture — not defined in this paper's own words; expanding agricultural area rather than raising yield — “Several studies have shown that global crop production needs to double by 2050 to meet the projected demands from rising population, diet shifts, and increasing biofuels consumption. Boosting crop yields to meet these rising demands, rather than clearing more land for agriculture has been highlighted as a preferred solution to meet this goal”concepts[4]
conceptrising demands for crop production — not defined in this paper's own words; demand pressure arising from population, diet, and biofuel changes — “The world is experiencing rising demands for crop production, stemming from three key forces: increasing human population, meat and dairy consumption from growing affluence, and biofuel consumption”concepts[5]
conceptincreasing human population — not defined in this paper's own words; population growth as a driver of crop demand — “The world is experiencing rising demands for crop production, stemming from three key forces: increasing human population, meat and dairy consumption from growing affluence, and biofuel consumption”concepts[6]
conceptmeat and dairy consumption — not defined in this paper's own words; affluence-linked animal-product consumption — “The world is experiencing rising demands for crop production, stemming from three key forces: increasing human population, meat and dairy consumption from growing affluence, and biofuel consumption”concepts[7]
conceptbiofuel consumption — not defined in this paper's own words; crop demand for fuel production — “The world is experiencing rising demands for crop production, stemming from three key forces: increasing human population, meat and dairy consumption from growing affluence, and biofuel consumption”concepts[8]
conceptglobal agricultural production — not defined in this paper's own words; world agricultural output required to meet future demand — “By 2050, global agricultural production may need to be increased by 60%–110% to meet these increasing demands [3] , [6] – [7] as well as to provide food security to the ∼870 million now chronically undernourished”concepts[9]
conceptfood security — not defined in this paper's own words; adequate food availability for the global population — “Numerous studies have shown that feeding a more populated and more prosperous world will roughly require a doubling of agricultural production by 2050 [1] – [7] , translating to a ∼2.4% rate of crop production growth per year. We find that the top four global crops – maize, rice, wheat, and soybean – are currently witnessing average yield improvements only between 0.9 to 1.6 percent per year, far slower than the required rates to double their production by 2050 solely from yield gains. This is because yield improvements are below ∼2.4% per year in many areas of our most important agricultural lands. At these rates maize, rice, wheat and soybean production may increase by ∼67%, ∼42%, ∼38%, and ∼55% respectively, by 2050 globally. There is a 90% chance that the total global production increase from yields alone would be between 34–101% for maize, 21–59% for rice, 4–76% for wheat, and 13–84% for soybean by ∼2050. Thus, if these yield change rates do not increase, land clearing possibly would be needed [3] if global food security is to increase or even maintained”concepts[10]
conceptagricultural statistics — not defined in this paper's own words; yield and harvested-area observations used in the analysis — “Using ∼2.5 million agricultural statistics, collected for ∼13,500 political units across the world, we track four key global crops—maize, rice, wheat, and soybean—that currently produce nearly two-thirds of global agricultural calories”concepts[11]
conceptpolitical units — not defined in this paper's own words; country, state/province, and county/district-level spatial units — “We used annual crop census reports for harvested areas and yield from ∼13,500 political units globally covering 20 years from 1989 to 2008 in this analysis though the database itself covers the years 1961 to 2008. The sum total of these census reports for the 20 years was approximately 1.8 million. Data were collected at three political levels/units depending on data availability: country, state/provinces, and county/district/município/department. Data were not available for all political units for each year. Details of the number of years data was available and its source is given in the Table S1 . For the political units where data was missing for some years we estimated crop harvested and yield information using the average of the latest five years of reported data and constraining them with the reported numbers from the higher political unit as explained further in Text S1 and previous work”concepts[12]
conceptmaize — not defined in this paper's own words; one of the four crops analyzed globally — “Using ∼2.5 million agricultural statistics, collected for ∼13,500 political units across the world, we track four key global crops—maize, rice, wheat, and soybean—that currently produce nearly two-thirds of global agricultural calories”concepts[13]
conceptrice — not defined in this paper's own words; one of the four crops analyzed globally — “Using ∼2.5 million agricultural statistics, collected for ∼13,500 political units across the world, we track four key global crops—maize, rice, wheat, and soybean—that currently produce nearly two-thirds of global agricultural calories”concepts[14]
conceptwheat — not defined in this paper's own words; one of the four crops analyzed globally — “Using ∼2.5 million agricultural statistics, collected for ∼13,500 political units across the world, we track four key global crops—maize, rice, wheat, and soybean—that currently produce nearly two-thirds of global agricultural calories”concepts[15]
conceptsoybean — not defined in this paper's own words; one of the four crops analyzed globally — “Using ∼2.5 million agricultural statistics, collected for ∼13,500 political units across the world, we track four key global crops—maize, rice, wheat, and soybean—that currently produce nearly two-thirds of global agricultural calories”concepts[16]
conceptglobal agricultural calories — not defined in this paper's own words; calories produced by crops worldwide — “Using ∼2.5 million agricultural statistics, collected for ∼13,500 political units across the world, we track four key global crops—maize, rice, wheat, and soybean—that currently produce nearly two-thirds of global agricultural calories”concepts[17]
conceptbest-fit linear, non-compounding rates of yield change — not defined in this paper's own words; linear annual yield-change estimates using 2008 as the base — “Here we employ ∼2.5 million statistics from a newly developed crop yield and area harvested database covering ∼13,500 political units globally from 1961 to 2008, focusing on trends in the recent two decades [4] , [23] . We determine the rates of yield change in each political unit for the top four global crops: maize, rice, wheat, and soybean. These four crops together produce about two-thirds of current harvested global crop calories [3] , [18] . Using these data, we estimate the best-fit linear, non-compounding rates of yield change between 1989 and 2008 for these crops in each of these political units. Yield change is commonly modeled as a linear function of time [24] – [28] and such models have been used to project future crop yields [28] – [30] . We provide local, country, and global-scale rates of recent crop yield changes to determine where the rates of yield increase could double production by 2050, and where they are insufficient. The impact of negative or even slow rates of yield change in these crops could be severe, especially for low-income countries with rapidly rising population. The underlying data, period analyzed, statistical approach, and comparisons of yield projections are described in the Methods section below, with additional details and analysis in Text S1”concepts[18]
concept2.4% per year rate — not defined in this paper's own words; the approximate non-compounding yield-growth threshold for doubling by 2050 — “The global average rates of yield increase across ∼13,500 political units are 1.6%, 1.0%, 0.9%, and 1.3% per year for maize, rice, wheat, and soybean, respectively ( Table 1 , Figure 1 ). A ∼2.4% per year rate of yield gains (non-compounding) is needed to double crop production by 2050. Current rates are thus not achieving this goal. At current rates only ∼67%, ∼42%, ∼38%, and ∼55% increases in maize, rice, wheat and soybean production, respectively, is possible by 2050”concepts[19]
conceptcurrent rates — not defined in this paper's own words; observed recent global crop-yield growth rates — “The global average rates of yield increase across ∼13,500 political units are 1.6%, 1.0%, 0.9%, and 1.3% per year for maize, rice, wheat, and soybean, respectively ( Table 1 , Figure 1 ). A ∼2.4% per year rate of yield gains (non-compounding) is needed to double crop production by 2050. Current rates are thus not achieving this goal. At current rates only ∼67%, ∼42%, ∼38%, and ∼55% increases in maize, rice, wheat and soybean production, respectively, is possible by 2050”concepts[20]
conceptobserved area-weighted global yield — not defined in this paper's own words; the area-weighted worldwide yield series — “Global projections. Observed area-weighted global yield 1961–2008 shown using closed circles and projections to 2050 using solid lines for maize, rice, wheat, and soybean. Shading shows the 90% confidence region derived from 99 bootstrapped samples. The dashed line shows the trend of the ∼2.4% yield improvement required each year to double production in these crops by 2050 without bringing additional land under cultivation starting in the base year of 2008”concepts[21]
concept90% confidence region — not defined in this paper's own words; projection uncertainty region derived from bootstrap samples — “Global projections. Observed area-weighted global yield 1961–2008 shown using closed circles and projections to 2050 using solid lines for maize, rice, wheat, and soybean. Shading shows the 90% confidence region derived from 99 bootstrapped samples. The dashed line shows the trend of the ∼2.4% yield improvement required each year to double production in these crops by 2050 without bringing additional land under cultivation starting in the base year of 2008”concepts[22]
conceptbootstrapped samples — not defined in this paper's own words; resampled political-unit yield histories used for uncertainty — “Global projections. Observed area-weighted global yield 1961–2008 shown using closed circles and projections to 2050 using solid lines for maize, rice, wheat, and soybean. Shading shows the 90% confidence region derived from 99 bootstrapped samples. The dashed line shows the trend of the ∼2.4% yield improvement required each year to double production in these crops by 2050 without bringing additional land under cultivation starting in the base year of 2008”concepts[23]
conceptupper bound of the 90% confidence interval — not defined in this paper's own words; the optimistic boundary of projected yield growth — “We provide a range of future yield estimates by bootstrap sampling crop yield data at each of the political units studied for the period 1989 to 2008. The upper bound of the 90% confidence interval ( Table 1 , Figure 1 ) presents a slightly more optimistic scenario, global yields increase at rates of 2.4%, 1.4%, 1.8%, and 2.0% per year for maize, rice, wheat, and soybean, respectively. Yield trends following this upper bound projection could lead to ∼101%, ∼59%, ∼76%, and ∼84% increased production in these crops, respectively. The lower bound of our confidence interval provides us with a “worst-case scenario,” wherein the global average yield of maize, rice, wheat, and soybean would increase at 0.8%, 0.5%, 0.1%, and 0.3% per year, respectively ( Table 1 , Figure 1 ). At these rates global production could only increase by ∼34%, ∼21%, ∼4%, and ∼13% for maize, rice, wheat, and soybean, respectively, by 2050”concepts[24]
conceptlower bound of our confidence interval — not defined in this paper's own words; the pessimistic boundary of projected yield growth — “The lower bound of our confidence interval provides us with a “worst-case scenario,” wherein the global average yield of maize, rice, wheat, and soybean would increase at 0.8%, 0.5%, 0.1%, and 0.3% per year, respectively ( Table 1 , Figure 1 ). At these rates global production could only increase by ∼34%, ∼21%, ∼4%, and ∼13% for maize, rice, wheat, and soybean, respectively, by 2050”concepts[25]
conceptworst-case scenario — not defined in this paper's own words; production projection at the lower confidence bound — “The lower bound of our confidence interval provides us with a “worst-case scenario,” wherein the global average yield of maize, rice, wheat, and soybean would increase at 0.8%, 0.5%, 0.1%, and 0.3% per year, respectively ( Table 1 , Figure 1 ). At these rates global production could only increase by ∼34%, ∼21%, ∼4%, and ∼13% for maize, rice, wheat, and soybean, respectively, by 2050”concepts[26]
conceptper capita harvested production — not defined in this paper's own words; crop production divided by population — “Population data and its projections per country were from the United Nation's medium variant projections [5] . Crop production was determined using the projected crop yields at current observed rates of yield change and harvested areas fixed at ∼2007. Per capita harvested production is the ratio of production to population”concepts[27]
conceptpopulation growth — not defined in this paper's own words; growth that can outpace yield-driven production — “However in Afghanistan, Iraq and Australia due to population growth outpacing production increases from the 2.4%, 0.4%, and 0.3% rates of yield increase per year there could be declines in per capita harvested rice”concepts[28]
conceptdeclines in per capita harvested rice — not defined in this paper's own words; reductions in harvested rice per person — “However in Afghanistan, Iraq and Australia due to population growth outpacing production increases from the 2.4%, 0.4%, and 0.3% rates of yield increase per year there could be declines in per capita harvested rice”concepts[29]
conceptsignificant variations in the rates of yield change — not defined in this paper's own words; within- and between-country spatial heterogeneity — “Global trends mask the significant variations in the rates of yield change among and within countries ( Figure 2 ). We determine where the within-country yield change rates are ∼2.4% per year or above (i.e. doubling rates), where the rates are lower, and where yields are decreasing. We briefly describe these areas, emphasizing areas with doubling and decreasing rates as these areas define the places with the greatest opportunity to meeting growing demand or where to target investments. See Figure S10 for continuous rate (non-categorical) maps in kilograms/hectare/year/year”concepts[30]
conceptyield improvements — not defined in this paper's own words; positive changes in crop yield — “Our analysis identifies where yield improvements are on track to double production and where investments should be targeted to increase yields. The observed rates of yield change result from several location-specific, socio-economic, and biophysical factors that are described elsewhere [23] . Many studies illustrate that intensification can be unsustainable [32] – [36] , but several notable projects in Africa [37] and elsewhere [38] have shown that sustainable intensification is possible and necessary to boost global crop production”concepts[31]
conceptsustainable intensification — not defined in this paper's own words; raising production sustainably on existing agricultural land — “Our analysis identifies where yield improvements are on track to double production and where investments should be targeted to increase yields. The observed rates of yield change result from several location-specific, socio-economic, and biophysical factors that are described elsewhere [23] . Many studies illustrate that intensification can be unsustainable [32] – [36] , but several notable projects in Africa [37] and elsewhere [38] have shown that sustainable intensification is possible and necessary to boost global crop production”concepts[32]
conceptmore efficient use of current arable lands — not defined in this paper's own words; production gains through better use of land already cultivated — “Clearly, the world faces a looming and growing agricultural crisis. Yields are not improving fast enough to keep up with projected demands in 2050. However, opportunities do exist to increase production through more efficient use of current arable lands [4] and increasing yield growth rates by spreading best management practices and closing yield gaps under different management regimes [38] – [42] across the globe. A portion of the production shortfall could also be met by expanding croplands, but at a high environmental cost to biodiversity and carbon emissions [4] , [43] – [45] . Alternatively, additional strategies, particularly changing to more plant-based diets and reducing food waste [4] , [46] – [48] can reduce the large expected demand growth in food”concepts[33]
conceptincrease production — not defined in this paper's own words; raising crop output on current arable land — “Clearly, the world faces a looming and growing agricultural crisis. Yields are not improving fast enough to keep up with projected demands in 2050. However, opportunities do exist to increase production through more efficient use of current arable lands [4] and increasing yield growth rates by spreading best management practices and closing yield gaps under different management regimes [38] – [42] across the globe. A portion of the production shortfall could also be met by expanding croplands, but at a high environmental cost to biodiversity and carbon emissions [4] , [43] – [45] . Alternatively, additional strategies, particularly changing to more plant-based diets and reducing food waste [4] , [46] – [48] can reduce the large expected demand growth in food”concepts[34]
conceptbest management practices — not defined in this paper's own words; management practices proposed for diffusion across regions — “Clearly, the world faces a looming and growing agricultural crisis. Yields are not improving fast enough to keep up with projected demands in 2050. However, opportunities do exist to increase production through more efficient use of current arable lands [4] and increasing yield growth rates by spreading best management practices and closing yield gaps under different management regimes [38] – [42] across the globe. A portion of the production shortfall could also be met by expanding croplands, but at a high environmental cost to biodiversity and carbon emissions [4] , [43] – [45] . Alternatively, additional strategies, particularly changing to more plant-based diets and reducing food waste [4] , [46] – [48] can reduce the large expected demand growth in food”concepts[35]
conceptclosing yield gaps — not defined in this paper's own words; reducing the difference between attainable and realized yields — “Clearly, the world faces a looming and growing agricultural crisis. Yields are not improving fast enough to keep up with projected demands in 2050. However, opportunities do exist to increase production through more efficient use of current arable lands [4] and increasing yield growth rates by spreading best management practices and closing yield gaps under different management regimes [38] – [42] across the globe. A portion of the production shortfall could also be met by expanding croplands, but at a high environmental cost to biodiversity and carbon emissions [4] , [43] – [45] . Alternatively, additional strategies, particularly changing to more plant-based diets and reducing food waste [4] , [46] – [48] can reduce the large expected demand growth in food”concepts[36]
conceptexpanding croplands — not defined in this paper's own words; meeting production shortfalls by adding cropland — “Clearly, the world faces a looming and growing agricultural crisis. Yields are not improving fast enough to keep up with projected demands in 2050. However, opportunities do exist to increase production through more efficient use of current arable lands [4] and increasing yield growth rates by spreading best management practices and closing yield gaps under different management regimes [38] – [42] across the globe. A portion of the production shortfall could also be met by expanding croplands, but at a high environmental cost to biodiversity and carbon emissions [4] , [43] – [45] . Alternatively, additional strategies, particularly changing to more plant-based diets and reducing food waste [4] , [46] – [48] can reduce the large expected demand growth in food”concepts[37]
conceptbiodiversity — not defined in this paper's own words; one environmental dimension harmed by cropland expansion — “Clearly, the world faces a looming and growing agricultural crisis. Yields are not improving fast enough to keep up with projected demands in 2050. However, opportunities do exist to increase production through more efficient use of current arable lands [4] and increasing yield growth rates by spreading best management practices and closing yield gaps under different management regimes [38] – [42] across the globe. A portion of the production shortfall could also be met by expanding croplands, but at a high environmental cost to biodiversity and carbon emissions [4] , [43] – [45] . Alternatively, additional strategies, particularly changing to more plant-based diets and reducing food waste [4] , [46] – [48] can reduce the large expected demand growth in food”concepts[38]
conceptcarbon emissions — not defined in this paper's own words; one environmental cost of cropland expansion — “Clearly, the world faces a looming and growing agricultural crisis. Yields are not improving fast enough to keep up with projected demands in 2050. However, opportunities do exist to increase production through more efficient use of current arable lands [4] and increasing yield growth rates by spreading best management practices and closing yield gaps under different management regimes [38] – [42] across the globe. A portion of the production shortfall could also be met by expanding croplands, but at a high environmental cost to biodiversity and carbon emissions [4] , [43] – [45] . Alternatively, additional strategies, particularly changing to more plant-based diets and reducing food waste [4] , [46] – [48] can reduce the large expected demand growth in food”concepts[39]
conceptplant-based diets — not defined in this paper's own words; dietary shift proposed to reduce demand growth — “Clearly, the world faces a looming and growing agricultural crisis. Yields are not improving fast enough to keep up with projected demands in 2050. However, opportunities do exist to increase production through more efficient use of current arable lands [4] and increasing yield growth rates by spreading best management practices and closing yield gaps under different management regimes [38] – [42] across the globe. A portion of the production shortfall could also be met by expanding croplands, but at a high environmental cost to biodiversity and carbon emissions [4] , [43] – [45] . Alternatively, additional strategies, particularly changing to more plant-based diets and reducing food waste [4] , [46] – [48] can reduce the large expected demand growth in food”concepts[40]
conceptfood waste — not defined in this paper's own words; avoidable food loss whose reduction can lower demand growth — “Clearly, the world faces a looming and growing agricultural crisis. Yields are not improving fast enough to keep up with projected demands in 2050. However, opportunities do exist to increase production through more efficient use of current arable lands [4] and increasing yield growth rates by spreading best management practices and closing yield gaps under different management regimes [38] – [42] across the globe. A portion of the production shortfall could also be met by expanding croplands, but at a high environmental cost to biodiversity and carbon emissions [4] , [43] – [45] . Alternatively, additional strategies, particularly changing to more plant-based diets and reducing food waste [4] , [46] – [48] can reduce the large expected demand growth in food”concepts[41]
conceptlarge expected demand growth in food — not defined in this paper's own words; future food-demand growth that demand-side strategies can reduce — “Clearly, the world faces a looming and growing agricultural crisis. Yields are not improving fast enough to keep up with projected demands in 2050. However, opportunities do exist to increase production through more efficient use of current arable lands [4] and increasing yield growth rates by spreading best management practices and closing yield gaps under different management regimes [38] – [42] across the globe. A portion of the production shortfall could also be met by expanding croplands, but at a high environmental cost to biodiversity and carbon emissions [4] , [43] – [45] . Alternatively, additional strategies, particularly changing to more plant-based diets and reducing food waste [4] , [46] – [48] can reduce the large expected demand growth in food”concepts[42]
conceptannual crop census reports — not defined in this paper's own words; the source of harvested-area and yield observations — “We used annual crop census reports for harvested areas and yield from ∼13,500 political units globally covering 20 years from 1989 to 2008 in this analysis though the database itself covers the years 1961 to 2008. The sum total of these census reports for the 20 years was approximately 1.8 million. Data were collected at three political levels/units depending on data availability: country, state/provinces, and county/district/município/department. Data were not available for all political units for each year. Details of the number of years data was available and its source is given in the Table S1 . For the political units where data was missing for some years we estimated crop harvested and yield information using the average of the latest five years of reported data and constraining them with the reported numbers from the higher political unit as explained further in Text S1 and previous work”concepts[43]
conceptharvested areas — not defined in this paper's own words; crop area observations from annual censuses — “We used annual crop census reports for harvested areas and yield from ∼13,500 political units globally covering 20 years from 1989 to 2008 in this analysis though the database itself covers the years 1961 to 2008. The sum total of these census reports for the 20 years was approximately 1.8 million. Data were collected at three political levels/units depending on data availability: country, state/provinces, and county/district/município/department. Data were not available for all political units for each year. Details of the number of years data was available and its source is given in the Table S1 . For the political units where data was missing for some years we estimated crop harvested and yield information using the average of the latest five years of reported data and constraining them with the reported numbers from the higher political unit as explained further in Text S1 and previous work”concepts[44]
conceptaverage of the latest five years of reported data — not defined in this paper's own words; imputation value for political units with missing years — “We used annual crop census reports for harvested areas and yield from ∼13,500 political units globally covering 20 years from 1989 to 2008 in this analysis though the database itself covers the years 1961 to 2008. The sum total of these census reports for the 20 years was approximately 1.8 million. Data were collected at three political levels/units depending on data availability: country, state/provinces, and county/district/município/department. Data were not available for all political units for each year. Details of the number of years data was available and its source is given in the Table S1 . For the political units where data was missing for some years we estimated crop harvested and yield information using the average of the latest five years of reported data and constraining them with the reported numbers from the higher political unit as explained further in Text S1 and previous work”concepts[45]
conceptUnited Nation's medium variant projections — not defined in this paper's own words; country population projection series used in the analysis — “Population data and its projections per country were from the United Nation's medium variant projections [5] . Crop production was determined using the projected crop yields at current observed rates of yield change and harvested areas fixed at ∼2007. Per capita harvested production is the ratio of production to population”concepts[46]
conceptratio of production to population — not defined in this paper's own words; the definition of per-capita harvested production — “Population data and its projections per country were from the United Nation's medium variant projections [5] . Crop production was determined using the projected crop yields at current observed rates of yield change and harvested areas fixed at ∼2007. Per capita harvested production is the ratio of production to population”concepts[47]
conceptlinear regression — not defined in this paper's own words; trend model used to estimate and project yield change — “We linearly regressed 20 years of crop yields at each of the political units to determine the average linear rates of yield improvement over the observed period. Many previous studies have shown that crop yields change linearly and have used linear regression to project future crop yields [24] – [30] . Here we calculate the non-compounding linear percentage rate by solving a in Equation 1 ; Y is the yield in the year 2008, 2Y is the yield in 2050 (after 42 years)”concepts[48]
conceptnon-compounding linear percentage rate — not defined in this paper's own words; annual percentage change computed from a linear yield path — “We linearly regressed 20 years of crop yields at each of the political units to determine the average linear rates of yield improvement over the observed period. Many previous studies have shown that crop yields change linearly and have used linear regression to project future crop yields [24] – [30] . Here we calculate the non-compounding linear percentage rate by solving a in Equation 1 ; Y is the yield in the year 2008, 2Y is the yield in 2050 (after 42 years)”concepts[49]
concepthigh spatial resolution — not defined in this paper's own words; analysis at detailed political-unit scale — “Details of the method used, sensitivity to the number of years analyzed, as well as alternate regression methods are provided in Figures S6 and S9. The advantage of analyzing at high spatial resolution is that yield rates can be summarized for other unique levels. For example, we summarized the results for the Brazilian Legal Amazon ( Figure S12 and Table S2 ). We compared our global numbers with other reported estimates. These comparisons are provided in Table S3”concepts[50]

Full text — tagged

Yield Trends Are Insufficient to Double Global Crop Productionterm·dom by 2050date Abstract Several studies have shown that global crop productionterm·dom needs to double by 2050date to meet the projected demandsterm·dom from rising population, diet shifts, and increasing biofuels consumption. Boosting crop yieldsterm·dom to meet these rising demands, rather than clearing more land for agricultureterm·dom has been highlighted as a preferred solution to meet this goal. However, we first need to understand how crop yieldsterm·dom are changing globally, and whether we are on track to double production by 2050date. Using ∼2.5 million agricultural statisticsterm·mth, collected for ∼13,500 political unitsterm·mth across the world, we track four key global crops—maizeterm·dom, riceterm·dom, wheatterm·dom, and soybeanterm·dom—that currently produce nearly two-thirds of global agricultural caloriesterm·dom. We find that yields in these top four crops are increasing at 1.6%, 1.0%, 0.9%, and 1.3% per year, non-compounding rates, respectively, which is less than the 2.4% per year rateterm·dom required to double global production by 2050date. At these rates global production in these crops would increase by ∼67%, ∼42%, ∼38%, and ∼55%, respectively, which is far below what is needed to meet projected demandsterm·dom in 2050date. We present detailed maps to identify where rates must be increased to boost crop production and meet rising demands.

Introduction The world is experiencing rising demands for crop productionterm·dom, stemming from three key forces: increasing human populationterm·dom, meat and dairy consumptionterm·dom from growing affluence, and biofuel consumptionterm·dom [1] – [5] . By 2050date, global agricultural productionterm·dom may need to be increased by 60%–110% to meet these increasing demands [3] , [6] – [7] as well as to provide food securityterm·dom to the ∼870 million now chronically undernourished [8] . The only peer-reviewed estimate [3] suggests that crop demand may increase by 100%–110% between 2005 and 2050date. Numerous authors have suggested that increasing crop yieldsterm·dom, rather than clearing more land for food production, is the most sustainable path for food securityterm·dom [2] , [4] , [9] – [14] . Moreover, crop yieldterm·dom growth has been shown as an effective tool in reducing global poverty and undernourishment, as farmers themselves constitute the vast majority of the poor and the undernourished [15] – [17] .

However, several recent studies indicate that yields may no longer be increasing in different regions of the globe [18] – [23] . Yields are no longer improving on 24–39% of our most important cropland areas [23] . Many of these areas are in top crop producing nations, having rising population, increasing affluence, or some combination of these factors [3] , [5] , [19] , [21] – [23] . This may increase difficulty of meeting future crop production goals but key unknowns remain for developing and targeting strategies: how are crop yieldsterm·dom changing across the world, where gains in crop yieldsterm·dom are able to meet growing demands, and where crop yieldsterm·dom are falling behind.

Here we employ ∼2.5 million statistics from a newly developed crop yieldterm·dom and area harvested database covering ∼13,500 political unitsterm·mth globally from 1961 to 2008, focusing on trends in the recent two decades [4] , [23] . We determine the rates of yield change in each political unitterm·mth for the top four global crops: maizeterm·dom, riceterm·dom, wheatterm·dom, and soybeanterm·dom. These four crops together produce about two-thirds of current harvested global crop calories [3] , [18] . Using these data, we estimate the best-fit linear, non-compounding rates of yield changeterm·mth between 1989 and 2008 for these crops in each of these political unitsterm·mth. Yield change is commonly modeled as a linear function of time [24] – [28] and such models have been used to project future crop yieldsterm·dom [28] – [30] . We provide local, country, and global-scale rates of recent crop yieldterm·dom changes to determine where the rates of yield increase could double production by 2050date, and where they are insufficient. The impact of negative or even slow rates of yield change in these crops could be severe, especially for low-income countries with rapidly rising population. The underlying data, period analyzed, statistical approach, and comparisons of yield projections are described in the Methods section below, with additional details and analysis in Text S1 .

Results The global average rates of yield increase across ∼13,500 political unitsterm·mth are 1.6%, 1.0%, 0.9%, and 1.3% per year for maizeterm·dom, riceterm·dom, wheatterm·dom, and soybeanterm·dom, respectively ( Table 1 , Figure 1 ). A ∼2.4% per year rateterm·dom of yield gainsterm·dom (non-compounding) is needed to double crop production by 2050date. Current ratesterm·dom are thus not achieving this goal. At current ratesterm·dom only ∼67%, ∼42%, ∼38%, and ∼55% increases in maizeterm·dom, riceterm·dom, wheatterm·dom and soybeanterm·dom production, respectively, is possible by 2050date.

Global summary for maizeterm·dom, riceterm·dom, wheatterm·dom, and soybeanterm·dom.

Global projections. Observed area-weighted global yieldterm·mth 1961–2008 shown using closed circles and projections to 2050date using solid lines for maizeterm·dom, riceterm·dom, wheatterm·dom, and soybeanterm·dom. Shading shows the 90% confidence regionterm·mth derived from 99 bootstrapped samplesterm·mth. The dashed line shows the trend of the ∼2.4% yield improvementterm·dom required each year to double production in these crops by 2050date without bringing additional land under cultivation starting in the base year of 2008.

We provide a range of future yield estimates by bootstrap sampling crop yieldterm·dom data at each of the political unitsterm·mth studied for the period 1989 to 2008. The upper bound of the 90% confidence intervalterm·mth ( Table 1 , Figure 1 ) presents a slightly more optimistic scenario, global yields increase at rates of 2.4%, 1.4%, 1.8%, and 2.0% per year for maizeterm·dom, riceterm·dom, wheatterm·dom, and soybeanterm·dom, respectively. Yield trends following this upper bound projection could lead to ∼101%, ∼59%, ∼76%, and ∼84% increased production in these crops, respectively. The lower bound of our confidence intervalterm·mth provides us with a “worst-case scenarioterm·dom,” wherein the global average yield of maizeterm·dom, riceterm·dom, wheatterm·dom, and soybeanterm·dom would increase at 0.8%, 0.5%, 0.1%, and 0.3% per year, respectively ( Table 1 , Figure 1 ). At these rates global production could only increase by ∼34%, ∼21%, ∼4%, and ∼13% for maizeterm·dom, riceterm·dom, wheatterm·dom, and soybeanterm·dom, respectively, by 2050date. Further, the yield trajectory diverges, especially for riceterm·dom and wheatterm·dom from the 2.4% per year rateterm·dom ( Figure 1 ). See Figure S1 for spatial maps of r 2 at each political unitterm·mth and statistical diagnostic tests ( Text S1 and Figures S2 , S3 , S4 , S5 , S6 , S7 , S8 , S9 ).

In the short term, due to population increases from ∼6.7 billion in 2008 to ∼8.0 billion in 2025 [5] , the 1.6% and 1.3% per year global maizeterm·dom and soybeanterm·dom yield improvementsterm·dom may result in no significant change to the per capita global maizeterm·dom and soybeanterm·dom harvests. However, by 2050date there could be an increase. The much lower rates of riceterm·dom and wheatterm·dom yield increases, 1.0% and 0.9% per year, respectively, may result in no change to the per capita riceterm·dom and wheatterm·dom harvests to 2050date. Thus, if we are to boost the production in these top four global crops that are now responsible for directly providing ∼43% of the global dietary energy and ∼40% of its daily protein supply [31] from yield increases alone, we have to immediately determine where and exactly by how much yields are changing. To further understand the yield trend patterns, we also track the rates of yield change within ∼13,500 political unitsterm·mth and report the results at the local and country scales.

Global trends mask the significant variations in the rates of yield changeterm·dom among and within countries ( Figure 2 ). We determine where the within-country yield change rates are ∼2.4% per year or above (i.e. doubling rates), where the rates are lower, and where yields are decreasing. We briefly describe these areas, emphasizing areas with doubling and decreasing rates as these areas define the places with the greatest opportunity to meeting growing demand or where to target investments. See Figure S10 for continuous rate (non-categorical) maps in kilograms/hectare/year/year. The influence of observed yields in 2008 on the percent rate of change is described in Figure S11 and related Text S1 .

Maps of observed rates of percent yield changes per year. Global map of current percentage rates of changes in (a) maizeterm·dom, (b) riceterm·dom, (c) wheatterm·dom, and (d) soybeanterm·dom yields. Red areas show where yields are declining whereas the fluorescent green areas show where rates of yield increase – if sustained – would double production by 2050date.

North and Central America Most of North Dakota and Mississippi, northeastern South Dakota, northwestern Minnesota, and some isolated counties in other United States (U. S.) states are witnessing ∼2.4% per year or greater rates of maizeterm·dom yield gainsterm·dom. Similar doubling rates in maizeterm·dom yields are found in the states of Chihuahua, coastal Sinaloa, most of Michoacán and Guanajuato and isolated areas of few other Mexican states as well as El Salvador. Maizeterm·dom yields are decreasing in parts of the U. S. Great Plains states (southern South Dakota, Kansas, Eastern Colorado and parts of southeastern Texas), eastern Mexico (San Luis Potosí, northern Durango, southeastern Coahuila, Nuevo León and Tamaulipas), and in Haiti and Guatemala ( Figure 2a ). The resultant impact is that the United States has the highest national rates of maizeterm·dom yield improvementterm·dom in this region of the world (in kg/ha/year 2 ) followed by Canada, then Cuba, and Mexico ( Data S1 ). In Central American countries such as Honduras and Nicaragua, where maizeterm·dom now provides ∼27%, and ∼25% of daily dietary energy, respectively [31] , and in Panama (∼7% of dietary energy), the production gains from their slower 0.5% per year yield improvementterm·dom rates could be less than those required to keep pace with their population growthterm·dom (in per capita harvested productionterm·mth terms). In Guatemala, where maizeterm·dom now provides ∼36% of dietary energy [31] the yield trends are already negative (−0.7% per year), and as the population is projected to substantially increase [5] , a steeper fall in the per capita harvested maizeterm·dom could occur.

Riceterm·dom yield doubling rates are found only in some isolated areas of North and Central America. The United States has the highest overall riceterm·dom yield improvementterm·dom rates (1.2% per year), followed by Mexico (1.1% per year). In Nicaragua and Panama where riceterm·dom supplies ∼16% and ∼24% of dietary energy respectively, the per capita riceterm·dom harvests could fall due to their population growthterm·dom [5] outpacing their 0.9% and 0.2% per year riceterm·dom yield improvementterm·dom rates ( Figure 2b ). Elsewhere in the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, and Haiti, where riceterm·dom provides 16–22% of their daily dietary energy, yields are declining at rates of −0.1% to −0.6% per year. The per capita riceterm·dom production is likely to increase only in Cuba, where riceterm·dom yields are increasing 0.9% per year [31] and the population is projected to fall [5] .

Wheatterm·dom yields are increasing at ∼2.4% per year or greater only in some counties in the U. S., (mainly in eastern South Dakota, parts of Nebraska, northeastern Kansas, western Mississippi, and Louisiana) ( Figure 2c ). Wheatterm·dom yields are decreasing in many parts of the U. S. Great Plains (Montana, western parts of North Dakota, South Dakota, Kansas and Texas and eastern Colorado). In Mexico, areas with doubling rates in wheatterm·dom yields are observed only in the state of Zacatecas. Nationally, wheatterm·dom yields in Canada, United States, and Mexico are increasing at 1.3%, 0.8% and 1.1% per year, respectively.

Most areas in the U. S. show increasing soybeanterm·dom yields, with doubling rates in North Dakota, isolated areas of South Dakota, Nebraska, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Georgia ( Figure 2d ). Soybeanterm·dom yields are decreasing in Kansas, Oklahoma and Texas. Canada and the United States have yields increasing at 0.2% and 1.2% per year, respectively.

South America Most maizeterm·dom areas in South America are achieving doubling rates, with the exception of isolated municípios in Brazil. The overall impact of these varied subnational rates is that maizeterm·dom yields are increasing at 1.7–4% per year in Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, and Brazil and may result in significantly higher per capita maizeterm·dom harvests. Other South American countries such as Venezuela, Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador, where maizeterm·dom provides 2–14% of dietary energy, are achieving yield increases of 1.8–3% per year but due to their population growthterm·dom [5] may result in no significant changes to their per capita maizeterm·dom harvests at least in the short term.

Riceterm·dom is grown throughout in South America and yields are improving in most areas ( Figure 2b ). Riceterm·dom yield rates are at doubling levels however only in the Cesar and Tolima departments of Colombia, and isolated municípios especially in the states of Pará, Maranhão, and Mato Grosso in Brazil and some areas of Paraguay, Uruguay and Argentina. Decreasing rates of riceterm·dom yield are found in northeastern Brazil. The overall impact of these subnational rates of riceterm·dom yield changes is: national riceterm·dom yields are improving fast in Brazil, Peru, Colombia, Uruguay, and Argentina (1.6–2.7% per year). But due to population growthterm·dom [5] , yield increases alone may be unable to boost the per capita riceterm·dom harvested in Peru, Argentina and Ecuador in the short term (∼2025). Elsewhere in Venezuela and Bolivia (where riceterm·dom supplies 8–19% of daily dietary energy and riceterm·dom yields are improving at 1.1–1.4% per year) per capita harvested riceterm·dom could remain unchanged to 2050date. In Suriname, where riceterm·dom provides ∼25% of dietary energy, the very low rates of riceterm·dom yield improvementterm·dom, 0.2% per year, may even lead to decreased per capita riceterm·dom harvests. In Brazil, Uruguay, Guyana, and Paraguay where riceterm·dom now supplies ∼11%, ∼7%, ∼29%, and ∼2% of dietary energy respectively, the per capita riceterm·dom harvested could increase.

Large extents of doubling wheatterm·dom yield rates occur only in Argentina and Chile. Wheatterm·dom yields are decreasing in parts of Peru and in Santiago del Estero in Argentina. The national trends as a consequence: Argentine and Chilean wheatterm·dom yields are increasing at 1.5% and 1.9% per year respectively and may result in increased per capita wheatterm·dom harvests (wheatterm·dom provided ∼25% and ∼30% of dietary energy, respectively). In Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Uruguay, yields are increasing at 0.1–1.5% per year and may lead to unchanged per capita harvests, (8–31% of dietary energy is now supplied from wheatterm·dom in these four countries). Per capita wheatterm·dom harvests could decrease in: Bolivia, Peru, and Paraguay due to lower yield gainsterm·dom of 0.5–1.6% per year.

With the exception of Bolivia and Paraguay, soybeanterm·dom yields are increasing at doubling rates, particularly in many areas of Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, and Uruguay. Soybeanterm·dom yields are increasing 1.5–2.4% per year in these countries.

Europe Almost everywhere in Europe, except in Moldova, maizeterm·dom yields are increasing but rates of ∼2.4% per year are found only in Portugal, the Czech Republic, and Belarus. In Moldova, southern Romania (counties in south and southwest region) and Pomeranian province in Poland maizeterm·dom yields are deceasing and have led national maizeterm·dom yields to change at −4.9% per year in Moldova, 0.7% per year in Romania, and 1.1% per year in Poland. Due to rising maizeterm·dom yields of 0.8–3.0% per year, the per capita harvested maizeterm·dom could increase in many European countries by 2050date.

Riceterm·dom is harvested in only a few European countries and yields are increasing at 0.2–1.5% per year. See Data S1 for the numbers.

Wheatterm·dom is an important food crop in Europe and harvested in almost all European countries. However, in Eastern Europe (Ukraine, Moldova, southern Romania, Bulgaria, parts of Hungary and Slovak Republic), southern France, and northeastern Spain wheatterm·dom yields are generally decreasing with the exception of a few regions where yield increases are at doubling rates. Consequently, national wheatterm·dom yield improvementsterm·dom in European countries are generally <1% per year, with the exception of Estonia (1.5% per year). Even though wheatterm·dom yield improvementsterm·dom are low, the per capita harvested wheatterm·dom may increase in some of these European countries because of population declines in Estonia, Germany, Latvia, and Lithuania [5] . Unfortunately, in many other European countries, the low production gains from yield improvementterm·dom will likely be offset by increasing population, resulting in nearly unchanged per capita wheatterm·dom harvests. Yields are decreasing in many eastern European countries throughout, where wheatterm·dom comprises 24–36% of the dietary energy.

Soybeanterm·dom yields are increasing at doubling rates only in small areas in Romania, and in central Italy soybeanterm·dom yields are decreasing. See Data S1 for actual national numbers.

Africa Africa is a continent of contrasts with regards to rates of maizeterm·dom yield change. For example, maizeterm·dom yields are increasing ∼2.4% per year in the Nigerian states of Yobe and Adamawa. Similar maizeterm·dom yield improvementterm·dom rates are found in some other isolated areas of WestpersName African nations, Ethiopia, Angola, South Africa, and Madagascar. But maizeterm·dom yields are decreasing in Morocco, Chad, Somalia, Kenya, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Burundi, and Democratic Republic of Congo. Elsewhere, rates of yield improvementterm·dom are lower than population growthterm·dom, suggesting that production per capita is likely to decline. These trends are particularly troubling in countries such as Burundi, Chad, Kenya, Morocco, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, where yields are decreasing −0.2% to −7.6% per year, population is rising [5] , and maizeterm·dom accounts for 5–51% of calorie intake. The only African countries that may witness an increase in per capita maizeterm·dom harvests due to faster maizeterm·dom yield increases are Angola, Ivory Coast, and Mozambique, where yields are increasing at rates of 2.9%, 4.1%, and 3.2% per year, respectively.

In Ivory Coast, Togo and Benin in WestpersName Africa, and in Rwanda, riceterm·dom yield changes are at doubling rates. In contrast, yields are decreasing more than 1% per year in Gambia and 3% per year in Nigeria. Nearly 8% of the dietary energy in Nigeria is supplied from riceterm·dom [31] . The per capita riceterm·dom harvests could decrease in almost all the important riceterm·dom consuming African nations, e.g., Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Nigeria, and Tanzania, unless yields are boosted further. Only in Ivory Coast there could be an increase on account of its ∼2.6% per year yield increases.

Wheatterm·dom, while grown in only an extremely small area of Africa, though in many countries, is generally increasing yields at high rates. In Angola, Eritrea Malawi, Nigeria, Algeria, Sudan, and South Africa, yields are growing at doubling rates (2.4–3.4% per year).

In Nigeria, and Mpumalanga province of South Africa soybeanterm·dom yields are increasing at doubling rates whereas in Zimbabwe, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Rwanda yields are decreasing.

Asia and Australasia Maizeterm·dom yields are generally increasing across Asia. Yield improvementterm·dom rates are currently on track to double production in some parts of Iran, Pakistan, India, China, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Turkey ( Figure 2a ). In China, Laos, Philippines, Australia, India, Pakistan, and in Turkey, the per capita maizeterm·dom harvested could remain unchanged in the short term but could increase by 2050date. In a few countries such as Nepal, Kyrgyzstan, Iraq, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, and in New Zealand the slower rates of maizeterm·dom yield improvementsterm·dom of 1.3%, 0.3%, 0.9%, 1.1%, 1.6%, and 0.5% per year respectively can result in declines in per capita maizeterm·dom harvests on account of population growthterm·dom [5] . The per capita maizeterm·dom harvests could increase in Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand Iran, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Azerbaijan, and in Bhutan [5] .

Riceterm·dom areas with doubling yield rates are found only in some local areas within Afghanistan, India, Bangladesh, Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia. Significant rates of riceterm·dom yield declines are found in parts of India (especially in parts of Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Tamil Nadu) and in North Korea. The ∼1% per year overall riceterm·dom yield increase in India could result in no significant change to the overall per capita riceterm·dom harvested but in China this may remain as only a short term (∼2025) problem. Riceterm·dom provides ∼30% and ∼27% of the dietary energy in India and China respectively now. On the other hand in the world's third largest riceterm·dom producer, Indonesia where ∼49% of dietary energy is provided by riceterm·dom, yield improvementterm·dom rates are much lower at 0.4% per year. The other important Asian riceterm·dom producers may behave in the following way: no significant change in per capita riceterm·dom harvests in Pakistan, Nepal, Malaysia, and South Korea; no significant increase in Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Turkey and Bhutan only in the short term, and declines in the Philippines in the long term (∼2050date). However in Afghanistan, Iraq and Australia due to population growthterm·dom outpacing production increases from the 2.4%, 0.4%, and 0.3% rates of yield increase per year there could be declines in per capita harvested riceterm·dom. In North Korea, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and in Turkmenistan yields are declining at −2%, −1.9%, −0.3%, and −1.5% per year respectively. Elsewhere, the per capita riceterm·dom harvested could increase: Bangladesh, Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and in Iran due to production increases from high rates of yield improvementterm·dom (1–2.6% per year) outpacing their population growthterm·dom [5] , and in Japan due to small yield improvementterm·dom rates (0.5% per year) and small population decreases.

Wheatterm·dom yields are increasing at doubling rates in parts of Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan, but only in small parts of the top producing countries of China and India. Wheatterm·dom yields are decreasing in many areas of India, especially in the states of Madhya Pradesh and Uttaranchal, and in the countries of Kyrgyzstan, and Mongolia, and in the Beijing province of China. Large areas with wheatterm·dom yield decreases are also found in Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria, and Western Australia, in Australia. The consequence of these wheatterm·dom yield change rates is diverse. Per capita wheatterm·dom production could increase in many countries, including China, Iran, and North Korea, because yield increases exceed projected population increases. In contrast, decreases in per capita harvests could occur in: Afghanistan, Georgia, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and in Australia.

Soybeanterm·dom yields are increasing at ∼2.4% throughout China, including the provinces of Jilin, Guangxi, and Guangdong, but are decreasing in Yunnan and Ningxia. Yields are increasing at doubling rates in local areas within Maharashtra in India. In contrast, yields are generally decreasing in the neighboring state of Madhya Pradesh. Doubling rates of soybeanterm·dom yields are also found in Laos and Vietnam, but in North Korea, and Cambodia, yields are decreasing.

Discussion and Conclusions Numerous studies have shown that feeding a more populated and more prosperous world will roughly require a doubling of agricultural production by 2050date [1] – [7] , translating to a ∼2.4% rate of crop production growth per year. We find that the top four global crops – maizeterm·dom, riceterm·dom, wheatterm·dom, and soybeanterm·dom – are currently witnessing average yield improvementsterm·dom only between 0.9 to 1.6 percent per year, far slower than the required rates to double their production by 2050date solely from yield gainsterm·dom. This is because yield improvementsterm·dom are below ∼2.4% per year in many areas of our most important agricultural lands. At these rates maizeterm·dom, riceterm·dom, wheatterm·dom and soybeanterm·dom production may increase by ∼67%, ∼42%, ∼38%, and ∼55% respectively, by 2050date globally. There is a 90% chance that the total global production increase from yields alone would be between 34–101% for maizeterm·dom, 21–59% for riceterm·dom, 4–76% for wheatterm·dom, and 13–84% for soybeanterm·dom by ∼2050date. Thus, if these yield change rates do not increase, land clearing possibly would be needed [3] if global food securityterm·dom is to increase or even maintained ( Table 1 ).

We found that the top three riceterm·dom and wheatterm·dom producing nations are witnessing very low yield growth rates. China, India and Indonesia are witnessing riceterm·dom yield increases of only 0.7%, 1.0%, and 0.4% improvement per year. China, India, and the U. S., the top three wheatterm·dom producers similarly were witnessing yield increases of only 1.7%, 1.1%, and 0.8% per year, respectively. At these rates we found that yield driven production growth in India and China could result in nearly unchanged per capita riceterm·dom harvests, but decline steeply in Indonesia.

In many of the smaller crop producing nations, maizeterm·dom, riceterm·dom, or wheatterm·dom yield improvementterm·dom rates are below the 2.4% doubling rate. Unfortunately, a high percentage of total calories consumed in these countries are from these four crops. This is particularly true for maizeterm·dom throughout much of Africa (e.g., Kenya, Zambia, Zimbabwe), Central America (e.g., Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama), and parts of Asia (e.g., Nepal, Georgia).

Riceterm·dom provides ∼19% of dietary energy globally. Riceterm·dom provides a higher percentage of total calories consumed in countries such as Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Haiti, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, and North Korea, yet yields are declining, −0.1% to −3.2% per year. Elsewhere riceterm·dom yields are increasing too slowly to overcome the impact of their population growthterm·dom. In some of the world's top riceterm·dom producers, e.g. India and China, the per capita production may remain nearly unchanged. In numerous smaller riceterm·dom producers across the world where riceterm·dom is an important significant provider of daily dietary energy such as in Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, Benin, Togo, Myanmar, Philippines, Malaysia, South Korea, Nepal, and in Sri Lanka, the per capita production may also remain unchanged.

Wheatterm·dom provides ∼19% of global dietary energy. Wheatterm·dom comprises an even larger portion of the diet in some countries where yields are declining, particularly Eastern European countries of Bulgaria, Hungary, Czech Republic, Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine. In many countries, such as Bolivia, Peru, Paraguay, Afghanistan, and Iraq, wheatterm·dom yield increases are too low to maintain their current per capita harvests.

Our analysis identifies where yield improvementsterm·dom are on track to double production and where investments should be targeted to increase yields. The observed rates of yield change result from several location-specific, socio-economic, and biophysical factors that are described elsewhere [23] . Many studies illustrate that intensification can be unsustainable [32] – [36] , but several notable projects in Africa [37] and elsewhere [38] have shown that sustainable intensificationterm·dom is possible and necessary to boost global crop productionterm·dom.

Clearly, the world faces a looming and growing agricultural crisis. Yields are not improving fast enough to keep up with projected demandsterm·dom in 2050date. However, opportunities do exist to increase productionterm·dom through more efficient use of current arable landsterm·dom [4] and increasing yield growth rates by spreading best management practicesterm·dom and closing yield gapsterm·dom under different management regimes [38] – [42] across the globe. A portion of the production shortfall could also be met by expanding croplandsterm·dom, but at a high environmental cost to biodiversityterm·dom and carbon emissionsterm·dom [4] , [43] – [45] . Alternatively, additional strategies, particularly changing to more plant-based dietsterm·dom and reducing food wasteterm·dom [4] , [46] – [48] can reduce the large expected demand growth in foodterm·dom [3] , [4] .

Methods Data We used annual crop census reportsterm·mth for harvested areasterm·mth and yield from ∼13,500 political unitsterm·mth globally covering 20 years from 1989 to 2008 in this analysis though the database itself covers the years 1961 to 2008. The sum total of these census reports for the 20 years was approximately 1.8 million. Data were collected at three political levels/units depending on data availability: country, state/provinces, and county/district/município/department. Data were not available for all political unitsterm·mth for each year. Details of the number of years data was available and its source is given in the Table S1 . For the political unitsterm·mth where data was missing for some years we estimated crop harvested and yield information using the average of the latest five years of reported dataterm·mth and constraining them with the reported numbers from the higher political unitterm·mth as explained further in Text S1 and previous work [23] .

Population data and its projections per country were from the United Nation's medium variant projectionsterm·mth [5] . Crop production was determined using the projected crop yieldsterm·dom at current observed rates of yield change and harvested areasterm·mth fixed at ∼2007. Per capita harvested productionterm·mth is the ratio of production to populationterm·mth and a greater than ±10% change from ∼2007 is considered as significant either in the short- (2025) or long-term (2050date).

Analysis We linearly regressed 20 years of crop yieldsterm·dom at each of the political unitsterm·mth to determine the average linear rates of yield improvementterm·dom over the observed period. Many previous studies have shown that crop yieldsterm·dom change linearly and have used linear regressionterm·mth to project future crop yieldsterm·dom [24] – [30] . Here we calculate the non-compounding linear percentage rateterm·mth by solving a in Equation 1 ; Y is the yield in the year 2008, 2Y is the yield in 2050date (after 42 years): This gives a rate of 2.38% per year or approximately 2.4% per year. For reported numbers at the local- to country- to global-scale the linear percentage changes are the observed changes using 2008 yields as the base year. The actual changes are provided in Data S1 for each crop and country.

Details of the method used, sensitivity to the number of years analyzed, as well as alternate regression methods are provided in Figures S6 and S9. The advantage of analyzing at high spatial resolutionterm·mth is that yield rates can be summarized for other unique levels. For example, we summarized the results for the Brazilian Legal Amazon ( Figure S12 and Table S2 ). We compared our global numbers with other reported estimates. These comparisons are provided in Table S3 .

Supporting Information Global maps of the coefficient of variation (r 2 ) for maizeterm·dom, riceterm·dom, wheatterm·dom, and soybeanterm·dom when fitted to 20 years of yield information at each political unitterm·mth analyzed.

(TIFF) Click here for additional data file.

Global maps of normality of the data for maizeterm·dom, riceterm·dom, wheatterm·dom, and soybeanterm·dom at each political unitterm·mth analyzed from the Lilliefors test (green colors show where the normality assumptions are not violated at p>0.05 and red colors where they are violated at p≤0.05).

(TIFF) Click here for additional data file.

Global maps of autocorrelation of the data for maizeterm·dom, riceterm·dom, wheatterm·dom, and soybeanterm·dom at each political unitterm·mth analyzed from the Durbin-Watson test (green colors show where the autocorrelation assumptions are violated at p>0.05 and red colors where they hold at p≤0.05).

(TIFF) Click here for additional data file.

Diagnostic plots for a linear fit (r 2 = 0.49, p<0.01) to soybeanterm·dom yield data in the United States. Subplots show a) model fit and standard 95% confidence interval, b) QQ plot, c) residuals versus fitted values, and d) residuals versus lagged residuals. Durbin-Watson test for autocorrelation: p = 0.66. Lilliefors test for normality of yield data: p>0.5.

(TIFF) Click here for additional data file.

Diagnostic plots for a linear fit (r 2 = 0.49, p<0.01) to maizeterm·dom yield data in Angola. Subplots show a) model fit and standard 95% confidence interval, b) QQ plot, c) residuals versus fitted values, and d) residuals versus lagged residuals. Durbin-Watson test for autocorrelation: p<0.05. Lilliefors test for normality of yield data: p>0.5.

(TIFF) Click here for additional data file.

Parsimoniously fitted yields at each of the political unitsterm·mth and using them to project global crop yieldsterm·dom to the year 2025.

(TIFF) Click here for additional data file.

Diagnostic plots for a quadratic fit (r 2 = 0.60, p<0.01) to maizeterm·dom yield data in Angola. Subplots show a) model fit and standard 95% confidence interval, b) QQ plot, c) residuals versus fitted values, and d) residuals versus lagged residuals. Durbin-Watson test for autocorrelation: p = 0.08.

(TIFF) Click here for additional data file.

Consequences of extrapolating linear and quadratic maizeterm·dom yield models for Angola to 2050date.

(TIFF) Click here for additional data file.

Global maizeterm·dom, riceterm·dom, wheatterm·dom, and soybeanterm·dom yield fitted to 15 and 25 years of data and using it to project yields to the year 2025. Dashed lines correspond to analysis using 15 years of data (1994–2008), dotted lines correspond to using 25 years of data (1984–2008), and solid lines correspond to using 20 years of data (1989–2008). Due to the similarity in results in some cases all lines are not clearly distinguishable from each other always.

(TIFF) Click here for additional data file.

Rates of yield change in kg/ha/year/year.

(TIFF) Click here for additional data file.

Year 2008 yields.

(TIFF) Click here for additional data file.

Similar to Figure 1 in the main text but only for the Brazilian Legal Amazon.

(TIFF) Click here for additional data file.

Country data source, number of political unitsterm·mth analyzed per country, time frame and number of official statistics collected per crop for the period 1989 to 2008.

(DOCX) Click here for additional data file.

Current yields, projections and production for the Brazilian Legal Amazon.

(DOCX) Click here for additional data file.

Comparison with the future U. S. crop yieldsterm·dom reported by the USDA-ERS [91] (maizeterm·dom, wheatterm·dom, and soybeanterm·dom were reported in bushels per acre, riceterm·dom in pounds per acres from USDA-ERS and converted to ton/ha), and global wheatterm·dom yields reported by the FAO-OECD [90].

(DOCX) Click here for additional data file.

Additional Data, Model Fitting, Rates, and Inter-comparison information.

(DOC) Click here for additional data file.

Rates observed for each crop and country.

(XLSX) Click here for additional data file.

Acknowledgments We thank George Allez for help in collecting and digitizing a portion of the data, James Gerber for help with Figure 2, and Emily Cassidy for directing us to the Food and Agricultural Organization's Food Balance Sheets. This work also benefitted from the comments of the FoleypersName lab members.

Funding Statement Research support was provided by a grant from the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation, and by the Institute on the Environment, along with previous funding from National Aeronautics and Space Administration's - NASA's - Interdisciplinary Earth Science program. This work also benefitted from contributions by General Mills, Mosaic, Cargill, Google, PepsiCo, and Kellogg to support stakeholder outreach and public engagement. N.D.M. was supported by a NSF graduate fellowship. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.

References Associated Data Supplementary Materials Global maps of the coefficient of variation (r 2 ) for maizeterm·dom, riceterm·dom, wheatterm·dom, and soybeanterm·dom when fitted to 20 years of yield information at each political unitterm·mth analyzed.

(TIFF) Click here for additional data file.

Global maps of normality of the data for maizeterm·dom, riceterm·dom, wheatterm·dom, and soybeanterm·dom at each political unitterm·mth analyzed from the Lilliefors test (green colors show where the normality assumptions are not violated at p>0.05 and red colors where they are violated at p≤0.05).

(TIFF) Click here for additional data file.

Global maps of autocorrelation of the data for maizeterm·dom, riceterm·dom, wheatterm·dom, and soybeanterm·dom at each political unitterm·mth analyzed from the Durbin-Watson test (green colors show where the autocorrelation assumptions are violated at p>0.05 and red colors where they hold at p≤0.05).

(TIFF) Click here for additional data file.

Diagnostic plots for a linear fit (r 2 = 0.49, p<0.01) to soybeanterm·dom yield data in the United States. Subplots show a) model fit and standard 95% confidence interval, b) QQ plot, c) residuals versus fitted values, and d) residuals versus lagged residuals. Durbin-Watson test for autocorrelation: p = 0.66. Lilliefors test for normality of yield data: p>0.5.

(TIFF) Click here for additional data file.

Diagnostic plots for a linear fit (r 2 = 0.49, p<0.01) to maizeterm·dom yield data in Angola. Subplots show a) model fit and standard 95% confidence interval, b) QQ plot, c) residuals versus fitted values, and d) residuals versus lagged residuals. Durbin-Watson test for autocorrelation: p<0.05. Lilliefors test for normality of yield data: p>0.5.

(TIFF) Click here for additional data file.

Parsimoniously fitted yields at each of the political unitsterm·mth and using them to project global crop yieldsterm·dom to the year 2025.

(TIFF) Click here for additional data file.

Diagnostic plots for a quadratic fit (r 2 = 0.60, p<0.01) to maizeterm·dom yield data in Angola. Subplots show a) model fit and standard 95% confidence interval, b) QQ plot, c) residuals versus fitted values, and d) residuals versus lagged residuals. Durbin-Watson test for autocorrelation: p = 0.08.

(TIFF) Click here for additional data file.

Consequences of extrapolating linear and quadratic maizeterm·dom yield models for Angola to 2050date.

(TIFF) Click here for additional data file.

Global maizeterm·dom, riceterm·dom, wheatterm·dom, and soybeanterm·dom yield fitted to 15 and 25 years of data and using it to project yields to the year 2025. Dashed lines correspond to analysis using 15 years of data (1994–2008), dotted lines correspond to using 25 years of data (1984–2008), and solid lines correspond to using 20 years of data (1989–2008). Due to the similarity in results in some cases all lines are not clearly distinguishable from each other always.

(TIFF) Click here for additional data file.

Rates of yield change in kg/ha/year/year.

(TIFF) Click here for additional data file.

Year 2008 yields.

(TIFF) Click here for additional data file.

Similar to Figure 1 in the main text but only for the Brazilian Legal Amazon.

(TIFF) Click here for additional data file.

Country data source, number of political unitsterm·mth analyzed per country, time frame and number of official statistics collected per crop for the period 1989 to 2008.

(DOCX) Click here for additional data file.

Current yields, projections and production for the Brazilian Legal Amazon.

(DOCX) Click here for additional data file.

Comparison with the future U. S. crop yieldsterm·dom reported by the USDA-ERS [91] (maizeterm·dom, wheatterm·dom, and soybeanterm·dom were reported in bushels per acre, riceterm·dom in pounds per acres from USDA-ERS and converted to ton/ha), and global wheatterm·dom yields reported by the FAO-OECD [90].

(DOCX) Click here for additional data file.

Additional Data, Model Fitting, Rates, and Inter-comparison information.

(DOC) Click here for additional data file.

Rates observed for each crop and country.

(XLSX) Click here for additional data file.

Interpretive notes.
• Highlighted spans are tagged entities: persName (author), title (venue), placeName (place), date (year), and term (a key concept: domain / ai / method).
• Eponymous or retrospective terms (e.g. “Nash equilibrium”, “segregation”) do not appear in the original source and so are not highlighted — a deliberate choice (see Report 4).
• Some entries begin with a word in capitals. EVIDENCE CORRECTED means the finding still stands and it was our quotation that was wrong — it has been replaced. RETRACTED means the entry itself was wrong; it stays on the page, marked, with its reason, rather than being deleted. WITHDRAWN AND REPLACED means a corrected version of it appears in the entries below. Each mark carries its own reason, because the reasons differ from one entry to the next. An entry we have WITHDRAWN is removed from this page and kept in the record, with its reason. A line reading Audit and a date is a later re-reading of the entry against its whole sentence: DOUBTFUL means it was kept, and the reason says what is loose about it.
• Quotation marks inside the tagger's sentence. Where a tag is the tagger's own sentence, a phrase in quotation marks inside it is borrowed from the paper — the tagger's wording around it is not. The paper's own sentence is the evidence quote shown on the same row, so the borrowing can be checked against the thing borrowed from without leaving this page. Nothing inside quotation marks anywhere on this page is ours: if it is quoted, it is the paper's. Whose words a concept carries. A concept entry records a term the paper itself uses, so the term, the sense given for it, and its evidence are the paper's own words, quoted where the paper fixes them. This is the opposite of a sense entry in the tag table, which is the tagger's sentence about how the paper uses a term. Where a concept entry could not be grounded in the paper's words, the entry says so on its own row.
• Counts: 1 work · 33 date.
Meta-Tagging Project · record ray2013-yield-trends-global-crop-production.
© 2026 Shir Sivroni