Friderike SpangpersName (2023date). “Compromise in Political Theory..” Political Studies Reviewtitle·j.
Object of study — compromiseterm·dom as a topic of political theory
Research question — what the central features of compromiseterm·dom are, and which of its aspects are disputed
Contribution — a topic-centred reviewterm·mth that first clarifies the concept of compromiseterm·dom and then sets out the debated aspects of it
phenomenon · claim-type · cross-domain-transfer · mechanism · claim-relation · replication-status · limitation — grounded in the full text| phenomenon | compromise as a response to disagreement — “Like consensus, compromise is a possible response to disagreement or conflict.” | |
| claim-type | existence — “But aside from a wide acknowledgment that compromise can constitute a legitimate approach to dealing with disagreement, the literature on compromise is characterized by significant differences and controversies—which is not surprising, given the complexity inherent in the subject of compromise.” | |
| method — evidence | — “Given the growing literature on compromise, a systematic approach to the topic is due.” | |
| object of study — evidence | — “This review article provides a topic-centered overview of the state of compromise in political theory, where compromise is increasingly discussed as a promising approach to dealing with disagreement in politics and society.” | |
| research question — evidence | — “This review article aims to shed light on the complexity of compromise first by clarifying central features of compromise and second by identifying major issues of dispute.” | |
| contribution — evidence | — “The first sections are focused on clarifying the concept of compromise, while the remainder of the article offers different perspectives on those aspects of compromise that are subject to debate.” | |
| mechanism | moral compromise Accepting a moral compromise can cost a person esteem for the other party and for themselves (Benditt). — “Moreover, Theodore Benditt points out that moral compromise can negatively affect one’s sense of self.” | mechanisms[0] |
| mechanism | compromise A compromise can keep a disagreement that continues from escalating into open conflict. — “But even though the parties to a compromise continue disagreeing on a controversial issue, a compromise can prevent their disagreement from spiraling into a full-blown conflict.” | mechanisms[1] |
| mechanism | principled compromisers Principled compromisers may build trust over time and so obtain better long-run outcomes for affected third parties. — “It is, for example, conceivable that principled compromisers are more likely to develop trusting relationships with their interlocutors over time, thus achieving perhaps more favorable outcomes for affected third parties in the long run than pragmatic compromisers.” | mechanisms[2] |
| builds-on | Lepora 2012; Lepora and Goodin 2013 — “More concretely, depending on the kind of concessions on which a compromise is based, we can distinguish between three kinds of compromise: intersection compromise, conjunction compromise, and substitution compromise ( Lepora, 2012 ; Lepora and Goodin, 2013 ).” | claim_relations[0] |
| contradicts | Beerbohm 2018 — “While adding a new perspective on potential shortcomings of more deliberative accounts of compromise, especially in the context of legislation, Beerbohm’s approach remains short on some accounts: It does not, for example, address the question of fairness: Can sharp dealing allow to reach a fair compromise?” | claim_relations[1] |
| builds-on | Ford 2018 — “While the precise consequences of the tripolar conception for principled (and pragmatic) compromise thus require further clarification, Ford’s conception of compromise as a “tripolar affair” constitutes a crucial contribution to our understanding of compromise.” | claim_relations[2] |
| sense | compromise - on the traditional view, the outcome of bargaining in negotiation, not of deliberation — “Traditionally, compromise is considered to be the outcome of negotiation processes during which the involved parties bargain for the best possible outcome.” | senses[0] |
| sense | compromise - an agreement that leaves each party with regret or dissatisfaction — “Compromise also differs from consensus in that the former characteristically involves a sense of regret or dissatisfaction ( Lepora, 2012 ; Lepora and Goodin, 2013 ).” | senses[1] |
| sense | compromise - for deliberative democrats, something reached through the exchange of reasons — “Challenging the traditional “division of labor” between compromise- and consensus-building processes, scholars of deliberative democracy increasingly emphasize a connection between compromise and deliberation.” | senses[2] |
| relation | compromise —distinct-from→ consensus — compromise and consensus both constitute potential solutions to disagreement, they are not the same kind of solution — “But even though compromise and consensus both constitute potential solutions to disagreement, they are not the same kind of solution.” | concept_edges[0] |
| weight | compromise —distinct-from→ consensus — 0.9 — “But even though compromise and consensus both constitute potential solutions to disagreement, they are not the same kind of solution.” | concept_edges[0] |
| relation | consensus —contrasted-with→ compromise — consensus resolves disagreement in an epistemic sense, while compromise resolves disagreement in a practical sense — “It can therefore be said that consensus resolves disagreement in an epistemic sense, while compromise resolves disagreement in a practical sense, that is, by preventing negative consequences of continued disagreement.” | concept_edges[1] |
| weight | consensus —contrasted-with→ compromise — 0.85 — “It can therefore be said that consensus resolves disagreement in an epistemic sense, while compromise resolves disagreement in a practical sense, that is, by preventing negative consequences of continued disagreement.” | concept_edges[1] |
| relation | moral compromise —contrasted-with→ non-moral compromise — In contrast to moral compromise, the realization of non-moral compromise is usually less problematic — “In contrast to moral compromise, the realization of non-moral compromise is usually less problematic, because mere interests tend to be less attached to our sense of integrity, our conception of right and wrong, and they also tend to be less emotionally salient.” | concept_edges[2] |
| weight | moral compromise —contrasted-with→ non-moral compromise — 0.8 — “In contrast to moral compromise, the realization of non-moral compromise is usually less problematic, because mere interests tend to be less attached to our sense of integrity, our conception of right and wrong, and they also tend to be less emotionally salient.” | concept_edges[2] |
| replication | not-applicable | |
| no type for this | intrapersonal compromise → interpersonal compromise — on Lepora's account, a compromise with oneself logically comes before a compromise with another — “Thus understood, intrapersonal compromise consists in a decision on which of the conflicting principles we are willing to sacrifice, and it therefore logically precedes the possibility of achieving an interpersonal compromise: interpersonal compromise requires first an internal compromise between our own principles ( Lepora, 2012 ).” | unhoused_relations[0] |
| limitation | The review treats compromise broadly and leaves open what makes a compromise specifically political. — “While this survey has addressed compromises broadly conceived—covering compromises between individuals, groups, legislators, and so on—more work is needed on the specifics of compromises in politics, starting with the question of what political compromises are.” | limitations[0] |
| limitation | The role of compromise, as distinct from consensus, in consociational democracies is left unclarified. — “However, the precise role of compromise in consociational democracies, and especially its role as distinct from consensus, requires further clarification.” | limitations[1] |
finding · quantity · variable · definition · key-term — grounded in the full text| finding | Work linking compromise and deliberation is growing, so how to compromise is shifting into deliberative terrain. — “Given the mounting work on the connections between compromise and deliberation, it stands to reason that the question of “how to compromise” will increasingly shift into the deliberative terrain.” | content_tags.findings[0] |
| finding | Several theorists hold that no abstract rule can separate acceptable from unacceptable compromises; cases must be judged one by one. — “Margalit (2010) similarly urges a case-by-case evaluation of the merit of concrete compromises, emphasizing that abstract rules cannot cover all possible scenarios in which a normative evaluation of compromise is necessary.” | content_tags.findings[1] |
| finding | The literature agrees that a compromise consists of mutual and voluntary concessions. — “An undisputed feature of compromise is that it consists of mutual and voluntary concessions ( Bellamy et al., 2012 ; Bohman, 1996 ; Jones and O’Flynn, 2012 ; Lepora, 2012 ; Lepora and Goodin, 2013 ; Margalit, 2010 ; May, 2013 ).” | content_tags.findings[2] |
| quantity | four — — “By way of rejecting four arguments in favor of principled compromise (complexity, respect, accommodation, and reciprocity), May argues that moral compromises cannot be justified for other than pragmatic reasons, especially given the fact that moral compromises inevitably involve a moral loss for the compromising person.” | content_tags.quantities[0] |
| key-terms | compromise, consensus, disagreement, deliberation, negotiation, moral compromise, principled compromise, reasonable pluralism, consociational democracy, rotten compromise |
| concept | compromise — a form of agreement that has the purpose of accommodating conflicting views or claims — “In its most basic sense, a compromise can be understood as a form of agreement that has the purpose of accommodating conflicting views or claims.” | concepts[0] |
| concept | consensus — requires the parties to a disagreement to change their minds on the controversial issue — “Unlike compromise, consensus requires the parties to a disagreement to change their minds on the controversial issue.” | concepts[1] |
| concept | intersection compromise — based on overlapping principles, while controversial principles are excluded from the agreement — “Intersection compromise is based on overlapping principles, while controversial principles are excluded from the agreement.” | concepts[2] |
| concept | conjunction compromise — integrates some of the conflicting principles — “One option is a conjunction compromise, which integrates some of the conflicting principles ( Lepora, 2012 ; Lepora and Goodin, 2013 ).” | concepts[3] |
| concept | substitution compromise — consists only of principles that are not part of the original disagreement — “Substitution compromise consists only of principles that are not part of the original disagreement ( Lepora, 2012 ; Lepora and Goodin, 2013 )–it “changes the subject,” so to speak ( Weinstock, 2013 : 545).” | concepts[4] |
| concept | moral compromise — involve principles, that is, beliefs and values that are based on moral convictions and that are often part of one’s identity — “Moral compromise can be understood to involve principles, that is, beliefs and values that are based on moral convictions and that are often part of one’s identity.” | concepts[5] |
| concept | non-moral compromise — pertains to mere interests, including material interests such as income and wealth — “Non-moral compromise, in contrast, pertains to mere interests, including material interests such as income and wealth ( Gutmann and Thompson, 2012 ).” | concepts[6] |
| concept | interpersonal — compromise occurs between different persons who participate in a decision-making process — “In the interpersonal sense, compromise occurs between different persons who participate in a decision-making process ( May, 2013 ).” | concepts[7] |
| concept | intrapersonal — compromise occurs within a person’s head — “In the intrapersonal sense, compromise occurs within a person’s head.” | concepts[8] |
| concept | pragmatic reasons — if we prefer a specific compromise over the alternative of not compromising regarding the consequences that either option yields — “We have pragmatic reasons to compromise if we prefer a specific compromise over the alternative of not compromising regarding the consequences that either option yields.” | concepts[9] |
| concept | rotten compromises — agreements to establish inhumane regimes which exert humiliation and cruelty — “Margalit argues that “rotten compromises,” that is, agreements to establish inhumane regimes which exert humiliation and cruelty, are never justified—not even for the sake of securing international peace.” | concepts[10] |
| concept | deliberative negotiation — negotiation processes that are characterized by deliberative features — “Moreover, Mark Warren and Jane Mansbridge (2016) conceive of compromise as a possible outcome of deliberation as well as “deliberative negotiation”, that is, of negotiation processes that are characterized by deliberative features.” | concepts[11] |
| concept | tripolar sense — including third parties that are affected by a compromise — “However, if we conceive of compromise in a tripolar sense, that is, including third parties that are affected by a compromise, things look differently.” | concepts[12] |
| concept | militant consociational democracy — refuses cooperation, including compromise, with extremist parties on both the right and the left — “As a militant consociational democracy, the Belgian political system refuses cooperation, including compromise, with extremist parties on both the right and the left.” | concepts[13] |
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This reviewterm·mth article provides a topic-centered overview of the state of compromiseterm·dom in political theory, where compromiseterm·dom is increasingly discussed as a promising approach to dealing with disagreementterm·key in politics and society. Given the growing literature on compromiseterm·dom, a systematic approach to the topic is due. The first sections are focused on clarifying the concept of compromiseterm·dom, while the remainder of the article offers different perspectives on those aspects of compromiseterm·dom that are subject to debate.
Introduction In its most basic sense, a compromiseterm·dom can be understood as a form of agreement that has the purpose of accommodating conflicting views or claims. 1 As such, compromiseterm·dom is increasingly discussed in political theory as a legitimate approach to dealing with disagreementterm·key in politics and society ( Baume and Novak, 2020 b; Bellamy, 1999 , 2012 ; Gutmann and Thompson, 2012 ; Mansbridge et al., 2010 ; May, 2005 ; Rostbøll and Scavenius, 2019 ; Warren and Mansbridge, 2016 ; Weinstock, 2006 , 2013 ). 2 But aside from a wide acknowledgment that compromiseterm·dom can constitute a legitimate approach to dealing with disagreementterm·key, the literature on compromiseterm·dom is characterized by significant differences and controversies—which is not surprising, given the complexity inherent in the subject of compromiseterm·dom. This reviewterm·mth article aims to shed light on the complexity of compromiseterm·dom first by clarifying central features of compromiseterm·dom and second by identifying major issues of dispute. 3 The article starts by distinguishing compromiseterm·dom from consensusterm·dom, which simultaneously serves the purpose of presenting those features of compromiseterm·dom that characterize it as a distinct concept. The second section depicts different forms that a compromiseterm·dom can take, thus further expanding on the distinctive features of compromiseterm·dom. Next, the article addresses the question of whether compromiseterm·dom occurs primarily between different persons or whether a person also has to compromiseterm·dom with herself to reach a compromiseterm·dom with others. The fourth section deals with the process of achieving a compromiseterm·dom, thereby portraying a development in the literature from negotiationterm·key to more deliberative processes. The fifth section surveys different views on the controversial question of why we should compromiseterm·dom, including the question of whether compromiseterm·dom is justified for principled or for pragmatic reasonsterm·dom. In the sixth section, the article illustrates different approaches to the limits of compromiseterm·dom, that is, to the question of when a compromiseterm·dom is not justified. The last section outlines areas for future research.
Compromiseterm·dom Versus Consensusterm·dom This section distinguishes compromiseterm·dom from consensusterm·dom. It is important to distinguish between both concepts because they have significant features in common and are therefore easily confused. Like consensusterm·dom, compromiseterm·dom is a possible response to disagreementterm·key or conflict. And like consensusterm·dom, compromiseterm·dom can be placed on the “solution side” within the spectrum of possible responses to disagreementterm·key. As potential solutions to disagreementterm·key, both compromiseterm·dom and consensusterm·dom differ from responses that maintain the status quo of disagreementterm·key or conflict ( Bellamy et al., 2012 ).
But even though compromiseterm·dom and consensusterm·dom both constitute potential solutions to disagreementterm·key, they are not the same kind of solution. Unlike compromiseterm·dom, consensusterm·dom requires the parties to a disagreementterm·key to change their minds on the controversial issue. If a consensusterm·dom is achieved, this means that the disagreeing parties consider the agreement to be better than (or at least as good as) their initial positions ( Bellamy et al., 2012 ; Weinstock, 2006 , 2013 ). Compromiseterm·dom, in contrast, is characterized by the fact that disagreeing parties hold on to their opposing views. As Daniel Weinstock (2013 : 540) puts it, “it does not count as a compromiseterm·dom when you change your mind.” In a compromiseterm·dom, disagreeing parties agree to partially concede their claims to the demands of the other party, but they do not agree with the other party’s demands. 4 It can therefore be said that consensusterm·dom resolves disagreementterm·key in an epistemic sense, while compromiseterm·dom resolves disagreementterm·key in a practical sense, that is, by preventing negative consequences of continued disagreementterm·key. As Manon Westphal (2019) points out, compromisesterm·dom settle a given conflict but do not resolve the underlying disagreementsterm·key. But even though the parties to a compromiseterm·dom continue disagreeing on a controversial issue, a compromiseterm·dom can prevent their disagreementterm·key from spiraling into a full-blown conflict.
Compromiseterm·dom also differs from consensusterm·dom in that the former characteristically involves a sense of regret or dissatisfaction ( Lepora, 2012 ; Lepora and Goodin, 2013 ). Since the parties to a compromiseterm·dom continue to believe that they are right and that the other party is wrong, agreeing on a compromiseterm·dom means agreeing to a solution that will partially realize values that one considers to be wrong. This is especially true for compromisesterm·dom on emotional issues, as is typically the case for issues of moral or political significance. Consensusterm·dom, in contrast, does not involve regret or dissatisfaction. On the contrary, consensusterm·dom (at least theoretically) leaves all parties satisfied, since all parties consider their consensual arrangement to be superior to (or equally good as) their original point of view.
Some scholars therefore claim that consensusterm·dom is normatively superior to compromiseterm·dom. Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson (2012 : 13), for example, state that “few doubt that consensusterm·dom is desirable if it can be found, and most agree that it is usually preferable to the standard form of compromiseterm·dom, which leaves all parties dissatisfied.” Similarly, Philippe Van Parijs (2012 : 480) claims that “even the best compromiseterm·dom (. . .) is still not quite as good as an (unconstrained) consensusterm·dom.”
Yet, even though consensusterm·dom may be generally more desirable than compromiseterm·dom, compromiseterm·dom can be more desirable under certain circumstances. More specifically, compromiseterm·dom can be more desirable than consensusterm·dom because it is more feasible when it comes to dealing with disagreementterm·key in real life ( Bellamy et al., 2012 ; Gutmann and Thompson, 2004 , 2012 ; Westphal, 2019 ). Furthermore, it has been pointed out that compromiseterm·dom is not only more realistic than consensusterm·dom but it can also enhance creativity and problem-solving capacities ( Al Ramiah and Hewstone, 2012 ).
In addition to the argument from feasibility, compromiseterm·dom has been endorsed as a desirable response to what John Rawls (2001 : 4) has called “the fact of reasonable pluralismterm·key.” 5 The argument here is that compromiseterm·dom, but not consensusterm·dom, can accommodate reasonable disagreementsterm·key that are inevitably part of pluralistic societies. More specifically, in the case of reasonable disagreementterm·key, compromiseterm·dom, but not consensusterm·dom, allows for equal concern and respect for the reasonable views that are in conflict ( Bellamy et al., 2012 ). In addition, it can be argued that if parties to a disagreementterm·key have equally reasonable (but irreconcilable) views, consensusterm·dom is not desirable, because it requires an unjustifiable change of mind from those who hold reasonable views. Compromiseterm·dom, in contrast, allows disagreeing parties to hold on to their reasonable views, thus constituting a more desirable solution to reasonable disagreementterm·key. 6 Different Kinds of Compromiseterm·dom An undisputed feature of compromiseterm·dom is that it consists of mutual and voluntary concessions ( Bellamy et al., 2012 ; Bohman, 1996 ; Jones and O’Flynn, 2012 ; Lepora, 2012 ; Lepora and Goodin, 2013 ; Margalit, 2010 ; May, 2013 ). As Van Parijs (2012 : 469) points out “a compromiseterm·dom is an agreement, but not just any agreement. Its distinctiveness resides in the mutual concessions involved.” Concessions can, however, be of different kinds, leading to different kinds of compromiseterm·dom. More concretely, depending on the kind of concessions on which a compromiseterm·dom is based, we can distinguish between three kinds of compromiseterm·dom: intersection compromiseterm·dom, conjunction compromiseterm·dom, and substitution compromiseterm·dom ( Lepora, 2012 ; Lepora and Goodin, 2013 ).
Intersection compromiseterm·dom is based on overlapping principles, while controversial principles are excluded from the agreement. 7 Intersection compromiseterm·dom therefore applies to cases of disagreementterm·key where the involved parties have partially overlapping principles. For example, if party P1 endorses principles A, B, and C, and party P2 endorses principles A, D, and E, an intersection compromiseterm·dom would be based exclusively on principle A, while principles B, C, D, and E would be excluded from the compromiseterm·dom agreement ( Lepora, 2012 ; Lepora and Goodin, 2013 ).
Disagreeing parties might, however, not be willing (or able) to base an agreement exclusively on shared principles; or they might simply not share relevant principles in the first place. In such cases, where no intersection compromiseterm·dom is possible, two other kinds of compromiseterm·dom are available. Both will be illustrated with reference to the following example: Valerie is a committed vegan for ethical reasons. She plans to have brunch with her non-vegan friend Nancy. Nancy desires to eat scrambled eggs (E) with bacon (B), while Valerie desires a plant-based breakfast (P) in a vegan location (L). In this case, Valerie and Nancy do not have overlapping principles on which they could base an intersection compromiseterm·dom. Nancy’s principles (E, B) and Valerie’s principles (P, L) are mutually exclusive: you cannot have eggs and bacon in a vegan restaurant. Two kinds of compromiseterm·dom are available in this case.
One option is a conjunction compromiseterm·dom, which integrates some of the conflicting principles ( Lepora, 2012 ; Lepora and Goodin, 2013 ). 8 In the above example, a conjunction compromiseterm·dom could be a vegetarian (but not vegan) restaurant that offers vegan options. In this case, Nancy would be able to eat eggs, but she would have to refrain from eating bacon, while Valerie would have the option to eat vegan food, but in a non-vegan location. In this conjunction compromiseterm·dom, Valerie gets (P) while sacrificing (L), and Nancy gets (E) while sacrificing (B).
Another option to accommodate Valerie and Nancy’s disagreementterm·key is a substitution compromiseterm·dom. Substitution compromiseterm·dom consists only of principles that are not part of the original disagreementterm·key ( Lepora, 2012 ; Lepora and Goodin, 2013 )–it “changes the subject,” so to speak ( Weinstock, 2013 : 545). For example, a substitution compromiseterm·dom for Valerie and Nancy’s disagreementterm·key could be to skip brunch altogether and have a glass of wine in the evening instead. This solution still qualifies as a compromiseterm·dom, since neither party gets what they initially wanted; and it qualifies as a substitution compromiseterm·dom because it does not involve the conflicting principles (i.e. principles (P) and (L) for Valerie, and principles (E) and (B) for Nancy).
Another important distinction is between compromiseterm·dom that accommodates moral disagreementterm·key (“moral compromiseterm·dom”) and compromiseterm·dom that accommodates non-moral disagreementterm·key (“non-moral compromiseterm·dom”). The conceptual distinction between principles and interests serves as a useful framework for addressing the difference between compromisesterm·dom on moral and non-moral disagreementsterm·key. Moral compromiseterm·dom can be understood to involve principles, that is, beliefs and values that are based on moral convictions and that are often part of one’s identity. Non-moral compromiseterm·dom, in contrast, pertains to mere interests, including material interests such as income and wealth ( Gutmann and Thompson, 2012 ).
Regarding moral compromiseterm·dom, the question arises whether it is realistic to expect disagreeing parties to partially concede what they consider to be morally right, and to partially accept what they consider to be morally wrong. Furthermore, as Lepora emphasizes, not only does a moral compromiseterm·dom require us to partially accept what we consider to be wrong in theory, but it also requires us to partake in (what we consider to be) wrongdoing in practice. Therefore, as Chiara Lepora (2012 : 2) puts it, “from each party’s perspective, compromiseterm·dom necessarily involves interacting with, and sometimes contributing to, wrongdoing.” Moreover, Theodore Benditt points out that moral compromiseterm·dom can negatively affect one’s sense of self. If we accept a moral compromiseterm·dom, we might lose esteem not only for the other party but also for ourselves ( Benditt, 1979 )—we are compromised, as the saying goes.
In contrast to moral compromiseterm·dom, the realization of non-moral compromiseterm·dom is usually less problematic, because mere interests tend to be less attached to our sense of integrity, our conception of right and wrong, and they also tend to be less emotionally salient. Indeed, according to Benditt (1979 : 27–28), “it is much easier to accept a compromiseterm·dom between competing interests—particularly when they are expressible in terms of a numerical scale like money—than between opposed principles which purport to be objectively valid.”
One might object that the very distinction between principles and interests is problematic, especially in the political sphere. 9 Alin Fumurescu (2013 : 19), for example, considers this distinction to be “an almost impossible endeavor” when it comes to politics, because crucial questions, such as budget allocations, can be portrayed as either principles or interests, depending on what is deemed more suitable. In a similar vein, Andrew Sabl (2018 : 274) points out that “every non-trivial political question seems a matter of deep principle to some” and that the distinction between interests and principles is therefore hard to sustain in politics.
Admittedly, the distinction between principles and interests is fuzzy, especially in the political sphere, where, indeed, the question arises of whether there are ever non-moral compromisesterm·dom, that is, compromisesterm·dom that do not, in one way or another, involve principles that are based on moral convictions. While this may be true for political decision-making, strictly speaking (e.g. law-making), compromisesterm·dom more generally speaking (e.g. between citizens) can and should be classified along categories of moral versus non-moral concerns. Otherwise, if there is no distinction between moral and non-moral compromisesterm·dom, we are bound to assume that there is no significant difference between a compromiseterm·dom on, say, the price for a pound of apples and abortion rights. As Benditt (1979 : 32) remarks, however we draw the difference between principles and interests, the point remains that “there is undoubtedly a difference in the character of the conflict when principles and ideals are explicitly involved as opposed to when the parties see the conflict as between interests.” Therefore, while the distinction between principles and interests may be hard to sustain at the political level, it may still apply to compromisesterm·dom in general—even though it is, perhaps, less a question of “either-or,” in the sense that a compromiseterm·dom belongs to either the moral or non-moral domain; and more a question of degree, in the sense that a compromiseterm·dom should be located along a spectrum of moral and less moral matters.
Who Compromisesterm·dom?
Compromiseterm·dom can be conceived of in an interpersonalterm·dom and intrapersonalterm·dom sense. In the interpersonalterm·dom sense, compromiseterm·dom occurs between different persons who participate in a decision-making process ( May, 2013 ). As such, a compromiseterm·dom can be struck between individual citizens or between their representatives, for example, legislators or lawyers ( Jones and O’Flynn, 2012 ). 10 In the intrapersonalterm·dom sense, compromiseterm·dom occurs within a person’s head. This conception of compromiseterm·dom refers to the fact that a person also must compromiseterm·dom with herself if she is to compromiseterm·dom with another person.
Peter Jones and Ian O’Flynn claim that the standard meaning of compromiseterm·dom refers to the interpersonalterm·dom sense. The authors argue that the intrapersonalterm·dom notion of compromiseterm·dom is “figurative and parasitic upon the standard notion of compromiseterm·dom as an interpersonalterm·dom or inter-party matter” ( Jones and O’Flynn, 2012 : 118). Similarly, Simon May (2013) holds that compromiseterm·dom is essentially an interpersonalterm·dom matter.
In contrast, Lepora (2012) argues that intrapersonalterm·dom compromiseterm·dom is, in fact, the more fundamental of both conceptions and logically prior to interpersonalterm·dom compromiseterm·dom. According to her conception of intrapersonalterm·dom compromiseterm·dom, a person compromisesterm·dom with herself if she sacrifices principles that conflict with other principles that she endorses: “in the intra-personal case, the compromiseterm·dom is among principles all of which you harbour but not all of which can be simultaneously pursued” ( Lepora, 2012 : 3). Thus understood, intrapersonalterm·dom compromiseterm·dom consists in a decision on which of the conflicting principles we are willing to sacrifice, and it therefore logically precedes the possibility of achieving an interpersonalterm·dom compromiseterm·dom: interpersonalterm·dom compromiseterm·dom requires first an internal compromiseterm·dom between our own principles ( Lepora, 2012 ).
Taking Lepora’s argument a step further, we might consider that intrapersonalterm·dom compromiseterm·dom can entail the decision to compromiseterm·dom in the first place. This would be the case if, for example, a person’s core principle is to never give up on his ideals—in other words, not to compromiseterm·dom on his values. In this case, the decision to compromiseterm·dom is itself a compromiseterm·dom, because the person decides to compromiseterm·dom on his core principle not to compromiseterm·dom.
How to Compromiseterm·dom?
Traditionally, compromiseterm·dom is considered to be the outcome of negotiationterm·key processes during which the involved parties bargain for the best possible outcome. In contrast, deliberative processes during which the participants exchange reasons for their respective views are deemed appropriate only for achieving consensusterm·dom. This traditional view is deeply anchored in everyday language, where compromiseterm·dom is often tied to negotiationterm·key or bargaining. Furthermore, this view is also represented in the academic literature, for example, when Van Parijs (2012 : 469) states that “ negotiationterm·key can lead to a compromiseterm·dom that avoids the costs and risks of conflict, exit or arbitration, whereas deliberationterm·key can lead to a consensusterm·dom about what is required for a fair solution” (emphasis in original). Similarly, May (2018 : 150) ties compromiseterm·dom to negotiationterm·key by emphasizing that “compromiseterm·dom is the paradigmatic feature of negotiationterm·key.” From this perspective, the idea is that we can achieve a compromiseterm·dom by negotiating or bargaining with our opponents, while deliberationterm·key is only required if we aim for a consensusterm·dom.
Challenging the traditional “division of labor” between compromise- and consensus-building processes, scholars of deliberative democracy increasingly emphasize a connection between compromiseterm·dom and deliberationterm·key. Gutmann and Thompson (2004 : 12), for example, suggest that without deliberationterm·key, “we forsake the possibility of arriving at a genuine moral compromiseterm·dom.” Similarly, Weinstock (2013 : 540) argues that “the attempt to arrive at a compromiseterm·dom is an exercise in moral deliberationterm·key rather than a simple exercise of ‘horse trading’” and that, in the context of pluralist societies, “compromiseterm·dom should be the goal that political deliberationterm·key sets for itself” ( Weinstock, 2017 : 636). Moreover, Mark Warren and Jane Mansbridge (2016) conceive of compromiseterm·dom as a possible outcome of deliberationterm·key as well as “deliberative negotiationterm·dom”, that is, of negotiationterm·key processes that are characterized by deliberative features.
Furthermore, focusing on fair compromiseterm·dom specifically, Peter Jones and Ian O’Flynn (2012 : 127) state that “a substantively fair compromiseterm·dom is more likely to arise if the compromising process takes the form of deliberationterm·key rather than bargaining.” Also addressing fair compromiseterm·dom, Friderike SpangpersName (2021) takes this claim a step further and argues that deliberationterm·key is a structural necessity for achieving a fair compromiseterm·dom and that it would be counterproductive to seek a fair compromiseterm·dom through bargaining or negotiating. Moreover, Michele Moody-Adams (2018 : 191) contends that (principled) compromiseterm·dom “inescapably embodies deliberative ideals such as fairness, mutual respect, and equality of opportunity to influence outcomes” and that such compromisesterm·dom should be integrated into deliberative processes. Given the mounting work on the connections between compromiseterm·dom and deliberationterm·key, it stands to reason that the question of “how to compromiseterm·dom” will increasingly shift into the deliberative terrain.
In contrast to these works, Eric Beerbohm (2018) critiques that deliberative conceptions of compromiseterm·dom are “overly rigoristic” in their condemnation of both misrepresentation and threats. He argues that a prohibition of misrepresentation is unwarranted, since an “asymmetric” distribution of information is part of the legislature and it is not clear why one should correct misconceived ideas: “If, in a compromiseterm·dom setting, my preferred concession seems significant to another party because of their ignorance, why should I have to inform them otherwise?” ( Beerbohm, 2018 : 18). Furthermore, he claims that a requirement to avoid bluffing and threats and to sincerely disclose one’s position may not constitute a sustainable practice for reaching legislative compromiseterm·dom. Instead, Beerbohm argues, the practice of compromiseterm·dom must have room for “sharp dealing” with those that resort to bluffs or threats, thus employing tactics that would otherwise not be considered appropriate.
While adding a new perspective on potential shortcomings of more deliberative accounts of compromiseterm·dom, especially in the context of legislation, Beerbohm’s approach remains short on some accounts: It does not, for example, address the question of fairness: Can sharp dealing allow to reach a fair compromiseterm·dom? If so, how? Moreover, can sharp dealing accommodate minority positions when these seek to rectify an injustice? Furthermore, as Beerbohm (2018 : 44) points out himself, his account of compromiseterm·dom has been developed “from the ground-up, from within a more empirically based picture of what parties to compromiseterm·dom see themselves as doing.” His approach thus also raises a larger, yet unanswered methodological question of whether theories of compromiseterm·dom should be conceived of from an ideal or non-ideal perspective (or both).
Why Compromiseterm·dom?
The question “why compromiseterm·dom?” can be understood in two different ways. First, it can refer to the question of why someone would want to compromiseterm·dom, motivationally speaking. 11 Second, it can refer to the normative question of why, or for which reasons, we should compromiseterm·dom. This section addresses the question in the latter, normative sense.
A prominent debate in political theory revolves around the question of whether compromiseterm·dom is justified for pragmatic or principled reasons. We have pragmatic reasonsterm·dom to compromiseterm·dom if we prefer a specific compromiseterm·dom over the alternative of not compromising regarding the consequences that either option yields. That is, if we agree to a compromiseterm·dom for pragmatic reasonsterm·dom, we assume that the compromiseterm·dom is necessary to achieve goals that are important to us ( May, 2005 ) and that the compromiseterm·dom will improve (or at least not worsen) the status quo ( May, 2013 ). In this context, May has advanced the influential argument that compromiseterm·dom is only justified for pragmatic reasonsterm·dom of this kind. As he puts it, “moral compromiseterm·dom in political life is only ever warranted for pragmatic reasonsterm·dom” ( May, 2005 : 317). By way of rejecting four arguments in favor of principled compromiseterm·key (complexity, respect, accommodation, and reciprocity), May argues that moral compromisesterm·dom cannot be justified for other than pragmatic reasonsterm·dom, especially given the fact that moral compromisesterm·dom inevitably involve a moral loss for the compromising person.
Other theorists, in contrast, argue that compromiseterm·dom can also be justified for principled reasons. More specifically, while May categorically rejects compromiseterm·dom for principled reasons, supporters of principled compromiseterm·key do not tend to categorically reject pragmatic compromiseterm·dom. Rather, they argue that compromiseterm·dom can also be justified for principled reasons. Weinstock (2013 ) distinctly challenges May’s refutation of principled compromiseterm·key by defending four arguments in favor of principled compromiseterm·key: The “argument from political contingency” holds that principled compromiseterm·key can constitute a remedy for unavoidable democratic deficits in securing equal respect and inclusion; the “argument from embeddedness” states that we have a principled reason to compromiseterm·dom if we reject the idea of a “winner-takes-all” society, because compromiseterm·dom allows us to incorporate the concerns of others, even if doing so is not necessary for pragmatic reasonsterm·dom; “the argument from principled consequentialism” proceeds from the idea that “it is sometimes justified to take a consequentialist attitude toward the moral principles that we affirm” ( Weinstock 2013 : 553), so that a compromiseterm·dom can be justified by consequentialist considerations regarding real-world conditions for the realization of our moral principles; and finally, the “argument from epistemic finitude” advances the idea that if we acknowledge the limits of our reasoning capacities, we have a principled reason to compromiseterm·dom, especially if we disagree with persons that we consider to be epistemic peers. In a similar line of thought, addressing the question of how we should deal with deep disagreementsterm·key in pluralistic democracies, Federico Zuolo and Giulia Bistagnino (2018) argue that the recognition of epistemic parity may provide a principled reason for seeking compromiseterm·dom.
Other authors refer to respect as a principled reason for compromiseterm·dom by emphasizing that in situations of reasonable disagreementterm·key, where conflicting principles are equally reasonable and at the same time irreconcilable, compromiseterm·dom can express respect for the diversity of beliefs and values that characterize pluralistic societies ( Bellamy, 1999 , 2012 ; Bellamy et al., 2012 ; Dobel, 1990 ). Moreover, pluralism itself has been invoked as a justification for compromiseterm·dom because compromiseterm·dom “is a kind of agreement that does not deny the plurality of society ” ( Bellamy et al., 2012 : 279, italics in original). Westphal (2019) argues in this context that compromiseterm·dom in pluralistic democracies is both normatively desirable and feasible: It is feasible because it does not require the conflicting parties to resolve their (reasonable) disagreementterm·key, and it is normatively desirable because it can enable co-authorship of the political rules that shape the societies in which they live. Furthermore, Moody-Adams (2018 : 197) points out that democratic ideals require “meaningful respect for the deliverances of individual conscience, along with robust tolerance of at least some of the political conflicts they may produce.” 12 To accommodate resulting conflicts in a cooperative manner, she argues, we need to adopt an attitude that is favorable to principled compromiseterm·key.
In contrast to these accounts, Fumurescu (2013 : 41) advances a critical view on principled compromiseterm·key: He shares John Morley’s concern that by elevating compromiseterm·dom from a political method of last resort to a democratic principle, it has “become an end in itself” and is therefore hard to constrain. Anton Ford (2018 : 71) provides another critical perspective on principled compromiseterm·key, focusing on its logic “that it is sometimes good to offer up concessions even though one is not forced to do so.” Ford acknowledges that this can be a virtuous trait—but only if we conceive of compromiseterm·dom in the standard bipolar sense, that is, focusing on the parties concluding the compromiseterm·dom. However, if we conceive of compromiseterm·dom in a tripolar senseterm·dom, that is, including third parties that are affected by a compromiseterm·dom, things look differently. Indeed, Ford (2018 : 72) argues that from the perspective of those at “the receiving end of injustice,” it would be absurd to choose someone as your representative who compromisesterm·dom as a matter of principle, because principled compromisers “will freely and voluntarily throw their own weight behind the injustice to which you are exposed.” This is problematic not only because the concessions contributing to injustice are not necessary, but also because the act of agreeing to unforced concessions adds further injustice to the affected third parties: “There is, after all, a political agent who is freely and knowingly lending its support to a measure that does them wrong” ( Ford, 2018 : 72).
Yet there may be scenarios where principled compromiseterm·key works in favor of those at the receiving end of injustice. It is, for example, conceivable that principled compromisers are more likely to develop trusting relationships with their interlocutors over time, thus achieving perhaps more favorable outcomes for affected third parties in the long run than pragmatic compromisers. While the precise consequences of the tripolar conception for principled (and pragmatic) compromiseterm·dom thus require further clarification, Ford’s conception of compromiseterm·dom as a “tripolar affair” constitutes a crucial contribution to our understanding of compromiseterm·dom. Not only does it allow for a more encompassing evaluation of political compromisesterm·dom and related questions of representation, but it can also serve as a critical framework for assessing compromisesterm·dom made on behalf of those without a proper political voice.
Limits of Compromiseterm·dom While compromiseterm·dom can be normatively desirable (whether for pragmatic or principled reasons), it is also clear that a compromiseterm·dom is not always justified. But what precisely are the limits of compromiseterm·dom? Under which circumstances is a compromiseterm·dom not justifiable?
In his essay “On Compromiseterm·dom,” Morley specifically sets out to address the limits of compromiseterm·dom. He distinguishes in this context between legitimate and illegitimate compromisesterm·dom, each of which relates to a different attitude. Compromiseterm·dom is legitimate if we remain true to our views while not enforcing them on others. A legitimate compromiser therefore displays the following mindset: “I do not expect you to execute this improvement, or to surrender that prejudice, in my time. But at any rate it shall not be my fault if the improvement remains unknown or rejected.” In contrast, compromiseterm·dom is illegitimate if we pretend to accept what we consider to be untrue. Illegitimate compromiseterm·dom is therefore based on the following mindset: “I cannot persuade you to accept my truth; therefore I will pretend to accept your falsehood” ( Morley, 2004 [1891] : 209).
More recently, Avishai Margalit’s (2010) “On compromiseterm·dom and rotten compromiseterm·key” also discusses the question of limits. Margalit argues that “rotten compromisesterm·dom,” that is, agreements to establish inhumane regimes which exert humiliation and cruelty, are never justified—not even for the sake of securing international peace. According to Margalit, inhumane regimes are never justified because they erode morality and thereby the foundation of treating one another as fellow human beings. But he also states that rotten compromiseterm·key is the only kind of compromiseterm·dom that warrants a categorical prohibition: “Only rotten compromisesterm·dom are bad enough to be avoided at all costs” ( Margalit, 2010 : 160). Indeed, Margalit emphasizes that even morally questionable compromisesterm·dom (except for rotten compromisesterm·dom) are often better than the alternative of not compromising, especially so if a compromiseterm·dom can secure peace. 13 While in Margalit’s account a categorical rejection of compromiseterm·dom is restricted only to the case of rotten compromisesterm·dom, other theorists propose more narrow constraints. Weinstock (2013) , for example, claims that we need to hold our ground against unreasonable persons. 14 Similarly, Richard Bellamy (1999) argues that one should not compromiseterm·dom with those who put forward sexist or racist arguments, or with fanatics who are not willing to justify their views and who do not respect the opinion of others.
Gutmann and Thompson (2012) also invoke disrespect as a potential reason for refusing a compromiseterm·dom. The authors suggest that signs of disrespect, such as threats or manipulation, can warrant denying a compromiseterm·dom, even if that compromiseterm·dom would improve the status quo. However, Gutmann and Thompson also caution against the ambition to devise general criteria for differentiating between desirable and non-desirable compromiseterm·dom. In their view, “it is a mistake to try to find unconditional principles that separate acceptable from unacceptable compromisesterm·dom” ( Gutmann and Thompson 2012 : 49–50). Instead, we are to consider the specifics of the disagreementterm·key in question to determine the justifiability of compromiseterm·dom. Margalit (2010) similarly urges a case-by-case evaluation of the merit of concrete compromisesterm·dom, emphasizing that abstract rules cannot cover all possible scenarios in which a normative evaluation of compromiseterm·dom is necessary. A similar argument is advanced by Benditt (1979) , who emphasizes that the limits of compromiseterm·dom cannot be determined in advance by abstract criteria—an unfortunate situation that, as he claims, often leaves us in a quandary.
Sabl (2018 : 262) approaches the question of limits from yet a different angle by focusing less on “the dispositions of those contemplating compromiseterm·dom” and more on “the circumstances in which they find themselves.” Concretely, he proposes necessity as a normative standard for distinguishing between warranted from unforgivable refusals to compromiseterm·dom. Necessity, in Sabl’s (2018 : 260) account, is related to the prevention of public harm: “Compromiseterm·dom is necessary when inaction by a certain deadline would cause either diffuse but substantial and pervasive harm to the citizenry as a whole, or acute and dangerous harm to a subset of it” (emphasis added). Diffuse but substantial and pervasive harm includes “irreversible damage to the provision of an uncontroversial public good” ( Sabl, 2018 : 260), such as police, prisons, and so on. In contrast, acute and dangerous harm pertains to essential welfare benefits such as subsistence aid or emergency medical care. Refusal to compromiseterm·dom, then, is warranted only if it does not lead to public harm understood in these both senses.
Finally, Matthijs Bogaards’s recent work on militant consociational democracyterm·dom in Belgium provides us with a distinctly political application of the limits to compromiseterm·dom. 15 As a militant consociational democracyterm·dom, the Belgian political system refuses cooperation, including compromiseterm·dom, with extremist parties on both the right and the left. As Bogaards (2020 : 194) puts it, “militant consociational democracyterm·dom limits the possibility to compromiseterm·dom to a certain category of parties, those that are deemed liberally democratic.” These limits to compromiseterm·dom raise questions about the standards of both excluding and including the extreme right. While inclusion is problematic if a party is deemed an enemy of liberal democracy, exclusion clashes with the deliberative democratic ideal of listening to the other side—and indeed, in Belgium, “the other side” has not yet included extreme right voters. Bogaards therefore suggests using citizen deliberationterm·key—which has been successfully employed for bridging linguistic divides—to build bridges between extreme right and mainstream parties, thus also widening the scope for political compromisesterm·dom.
Outlook The subject of consociational democracyterm·key points to further research questions related to compromiseterm·dom. 16 In a nutshell, consociational democracies are characterized by non-majoritarian power distribution, where all relevant segments of society (along socio-economic as well as territorial and cultural cleavages) are represented by elites, “who have to act as prudent leaders” ( Sinardet, 2010 : 349). As such, consociationalism can serve to manage conflicts in divided societies ( Sinardet et al., 2010 ) and it was indeed developed by Arend Lijphart precisely “as a theory of political stability in plural societies” ( Bogaards, 2020 : 177; see also Deschouwer, 2006 ).
Belgium is a classic example for consociational democracyterm·key, also given the central place of compromiseterm·dom for accommodating the linguistic cleavage between the Dutch- and French-speaking population ( Bogaards, 2020 ). However, the precise role of compromiseterm·dom in consociational democracies, and especially its role as distinct from consensusterm·dom, requires further clarification. For example, Kris Deschouwer (2006 : 904) emphasizes that the “fluctuation between conflict and compromiseterm·dom is a fundamental characteristic of the Belgian consociational democracyterm·key” and that the elites’ reliance on complex compromisesterm·dom explains successful conflict management in Belgium. 17 In contrast, Dave Sinardet (2010 : 348) emphasizes that “decision-making by consensusterm·dom” is at the core of Belgian consociationalism, and that conflict regulation is “based on consensusterm·dom between party elites” ( Sinardet, 2010 : 355). 18 Given the centrality that is attributed to both compromiseterm·dom and consensusterm·dom, future research should clarify their respective roles in the context of consociational democracies.
Another area of further research pertains to distinctly political compromisesterm·dom. While this survey has addressed compromisesterm·dom broadly conceived—covering compromisesterm·dom between individuals, groups, legislators, and so on—more work is needed on the specifics of compromisesterm·dom in politics, starting with the question of what political compromisesterm·dom are. As Ford (2018 : 61) points out, there is some ambiguity in the concept of a political decision—such as a compromiseterm·dom—which might be understood “to cover any decision, on any question, made by any political agent” and political agents, in turn, can be understood to include “political parties, activist organizations, trade unions, public officials, and private citizens.” The question therefore arises of what, exactly, makes a compromiseterm·dom political and who are the relevant actors. Furthermore, does political compromiseterm·dom take a distinct shape in the case of intra -personal compromiseterm·dom? For example, in the context of law-making, a politician must balance not only between her own principles, but also between those of her constituents, her party, or national interests. 19 Further research could clarify whether existing accounts of intrapersonalterm·dom compromiseterm·dom sufficiently capture political compromisesterm·dom of this kind and if not, how such accounts might be conceptually expanded.