Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness

David J. Chalmers · Journal of Consciousness Studies · 1995 · philosophy · record chalmers1995-hard-problem
tag layer · index · concepts · authors · עברית

Where this record's text came from. faceted 2026-08 by reading the locally held text (pdftext); every evidence string verified as an exact substring of that text before merging. Claim type is 'critique' because the paper's own framing of its contribution is a negative argument against reductive explanation; the positive half (three psychophysical principles) is presented as a candidate rather than an established mechanism, so it was not tagged 'mechanism'. method is 'conceptual-analysis' (with thought-experiments) rather than any item on the suggested list, since the paper collects no data of its own; the closest listed label, 'review', would misdescribe it. Replication status is 'untested' - the paper reports no empirical test of its own claims and none is possible on its own account. The Crick-and-Koch and Baars relations are tagged 'contradicts' because the paper denies those theories explain the target phenomenon, not because it disputes their empirical findings. 2026-08-14 and 2026-08-17 schema-0.3 passes: every quote verified as an exact substring of the staged text and anchored at merge time; concept terms verified present; every edge endpoint an existing node.

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Other fields define these differently the same word, defined another way in another discipline
consciousness 10 fields · function 4 fields · awareness 3 fields · qualia 2 fields

Tags on this paper

Every tag the record carries, each linking to every other paper in the corpus that carries it. A tag appears here whether or not its words occur in the article — the spans below are only the ones a sentence in this paper licenses. Of the 5 concept tags on this paper, 3 are grounded in a quoted sentence.

consciousness qualia hard problem subjective experience easy problems THE FIELD'S PROBLEMS ARE DIVIDED BY THE METHOD THAT ADDRESSES THEM, NOT BY SUBJECT MATTER: the easy problems are DEFINED as those directly susceptible to the standard methods of cognitive science - explanation in terms of computational or neural mechanisms - and the hard ones as those that seem to RESIST those methods. The dividing principle is tractability by an instrument THE CENTRAL TERM IS DECLARED AMBIGUOUS BEFORE ANYTHING IS CLAIMED ABOUT IT: consciousness is said to be an ambiguous term referring to MANY DIFFERENT PHENOMENA, each needing explanation and some easier than others - so the paper's first move is to deny that its subject is one thing ONE WORD IS SHOWN CARRYING SEVERAL OPERATIONAL SENSES AT ONCE, each attaching to a different test: a state is called conscious when it is VERBALLY REPORTABLE, or when it is INTERNALLY ACCESSIBLE; a system is conscious OF information when it can react on that basis, or attends to it, or integrates it into control of behaviour; an action is conscious when DELIBERATE; an organism is conscious when AWAKE A VOCABULARY SPLIT IS PROPOSED AND THE COST OF NOT ADOPTING IT IS NAMED: reserve the word for the phenomena of experience and use the LESS LOADED term `awareness` for the straightforward ones - and the stated consequence of the present situation is that `those who talk about consciousness are frequently talking past each other` A BAIT-AND-SWITCH IS ANATOMISED AS A RECURRING GENRE IN THE LITERATURE, not as a mistake by any one author: the theory delivered TURNS OUT TO BE a theory of one of the more straightforward phenomena - reportability, introspective access, OR WHATEVER - after which the author declares the problem tractable after all, leaving the reader FEELING LIKE THE VICTIM OF A BAIT-AND-SWITCH while the hard problem remains untouched A TEST IS GIVEN FOR WHETHER A TERM IS EXHAUSTED BY A FUNCTION, AND IT IS A TEST ON THE RESIDUAL QUESTION: someone who says the verbal-report function has been explained BUT NOT reportability is making a TRIVIAL CONCEPTUAL MISTAKE, because ALL IT COULD POSSIBLY TAKE to explain reportability is an explanation of how the relevant function is performed - and the same is said to go for the others AND THE SAME TEST IS RUN ON THE CONTRAST CASES AND COMES OUT THE OTHER WAY: after every cognitive and behavioural function in the vicinity has been explained there MAY STILL REMAIN A FURTHER UNANSWERED QUESTION - why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience - and the paper states flatly that THERE IS NO ANALOGOUS FURTHER QUESTION in the explanation of genes, or of life, or of learning. One test, several terms, opposite verdicts THE METHODS ARE SAID TO BE FITTED TO A CLASS OF PROBLEM BY DESIGN, WHICH IS WHY A RESIDUE REMAINS: the usual methods were developed PRECISELY to explain the performance of cognitive functions and do a good job of it - and as they stand they are ONLY equipped for that, so on the remaining problem the standard approach HAS NOTHING TO SAY. The gap is attributed to the instrument's design, not to insufficient effort A THEORY IS SHOWN TO BE UNABLE TO EXPLAIN THE VERY LINK IT RELIES ON: the account GAINS ITS PURCHASE by assuming a connection between binding and experience, AND SO CAN DO NOTHING TO EXPLAIN THAT LINK - with the converse stated as the diagnostic, that if the link were understood the neurophysiological detail would be ICING ON THE CAKE A RESEARCHER'S OWN DEFINITION OF HIS TERM, IN HIS OWN WORDS: he sets the really difficult aspects aside as possibly having NO SCIENTIFIC SOLUTION, proposes to focus on things that are EASIER TO STUDY, describes someone noticing a cappuccino and reaching for it - and closes THAT'S WHAT I CALL AWARENESS. The term is given its scope by an example of responding in a meaningful manner ELIMINATION BY REDEFINITION IS NAMED AS A MOVE: some deny the phenomenon outright, and OTHERS ACHIEVE THE SAME EFFECT by allowing that experience exists ONLY IF the word is equated with something like the capacity to discriminate and report. The denial is performed by the definition rather than by an argument A CRITERION IS GIVEN FOR WHEN A TERM MAY LEGITIMATELY BE RETIRED, AND IT TURNS ON THE TERM'S ROLE RATHER THAN ITS TRUTH: the vital spirit was put forward AS AN EXPLANATORY POSIT, to explain certain functions, AND COULD THEREFORE BE DISCARDED once those functions were explained without it - whereas an EXPLANANDUM IN ITS OWN RIGHT is not a candidate for that kind of elimination THE OBVIOUS PRECEDENT IS RAISED AND THE DISANALOGY IS LOCATED PRECISELY IN WHAT WAS EVER IN DOUBT: vitalist scepticism was doubt about whether physical mechanisms COULD PERFORM THE FUNCTIONS - while the conceptual claim that explanation of functions IS WHAT IS NEEDED was IMPLICITLY ACCEPTED by both sides. The historical parallel is disarmed by separating the empirical bet from the conceptual premise it never touched A FALLACY ABOUT HOW TWO TERMS COME TO BE LINKED IS NAMED AND GIVEN A LAW: the attractiveness of quantum theories of consciousness is attributed to a LAW OF MINIMIZATION OF MYSTERY - consciousness is mysterious and quantum mechanics is mysterious, SO MAYBE THE TWO MYSTERIES HAVE A COMMON SOURCE. The proposed connection is between the two terms' obscurity, not between their contents A CLASS OF THEORY IS SHOWN TO RUN THE EXPLANATION BACKWARDS: these theories ASSUME THE EXISTENCE of consciousness and USE IT IN THE EXPLANATION of quantum processes. The term appears in the explanans where it was wanted in the explanandum A TEMPTING INDUCTION FROM THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE IS NAMED AND BLOCKED BY SORTING ITS CASES: it is tempting to note that puzzling phenomena have always eventually yielded to physical explanation - but EACH of those was a problem about the observable behaviour of physical objects, coming down to structures and functions, and therefore always the KIND OF THING a physical account might explain. The induction fails because its instances share a property the new case lacks experience reductive explanation functional explanation subjective aspect cognitive science awareness the hard problem function nonreductive explanation conceptual-analysis

Legend

relation to other work	`claim_relations`	how this paper stands to another: agrees, contradicts, extends, qualifies
claim type	`claim_type`	the shape of the claim: existence, mechanism, method, critique, prediction, null
concept edge	`concept_edges`	an asserted relation between two concepts, with the sentence asserting it
concept	`concepts`	an idea the paper works with, quoted where the paper uses it
content tag	`content_tags`	a finding, definition, quantity, statistic or variable named in the paper
limitation	`limitations`	what the paper says its evidence cannot support
mechanism	`mechanisms`	how the reported effect is said to come about
method	`method`	how the paper produced its evidence
phenomenon	`phenomenon`	the effect or regularity under study
sense	`senses`	a distinct use of a term, quoted where the paper fixes it
transfer	`transfers`	a method or concept carried in from another field

The paper

The full text is not reproduced here. This article is not cleared for redistribution, so the page carries the tag layer only. Its evidence sentences are withheld; the grounding status remains with each tag, and the article itself is at https://consc.net/papers/facing.pdf. The reading view exists for the papers whose licence permits it.

Every tag on this page

claim_relations 7 · claim_type 1 · concept_edges 1 · concepts 3 · content_tags 12 · limitations 6 · mechanisms 16 · method 1 · phenomenon 1 · senses 4 · transfers 1

Relations on this page carry a quotation for the claim. Where a relation was separately evidenced — and so tested against the vocabulary for its type — the row says so; none of 1 relation here carry that mark. The rest are the tagger’s reading of the sentence quoted beside them.

This record holds no controls. A layer is empty when the tagger recorded nothing in it — which is not the same as the paper having nothing to record.

facet	tag	field	conf.	whose words
claim_type	critique Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above.	`claim_type`		the paper's words
phenomenon	conscious experience Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above.	`phenomenon`		the paper's words
method	conceptual-analysis Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: conceptual-analysis	`method`		the paper's words
mechanisms	mechanisms Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: THE FIELD'S PROBLEMS ARE DIVIDED BY THE METHOD THAT ADDRESSES THEM, NOT BY SUBJECT MATTER: the easy problems are DEFINED as those directly susceptible to the standard methods of cognitive science - explanation in terms of computational or neural mechanisms - and the hard ones as those that seem to RESIST those methods. The dividing principle is tractability by an instrument	`mechanisms[0]`	0.85	the tagger's words
mechanisms	mechanisms Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: THE CENTRAL TERM IS DECLARED AMBIGUOUS BEFORE ANYTHING IS CLAIMED ABOUT IT: consciousness is said to be an ambiguous term referring to MANY DIFFERENT PHENOMENA, each needing explanation and some easier than others - so the paper's first move is to deny that its subject is one thing	`mechanisms[1]`	0.95	the tagger's words
mechanisms	mechanisms Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: ONE WORD IS SHOWN CARRYING SEVERAL OPERATIONAL SENSES AT ONCE, each attaching to a different test: a state is called conscious when it is VERBALLY REPORTABLE, or when it is INTERNALLY ACCESSIBLE; a system is conscious OF information when it can react on that basis, or attends to it, or integrates it into control of behaviour; an action is conscious when DELIBERATE; an organism is conscious when AWAKE	`mechanisms[2]`	0.95	the tagger's words
mechanisms	mechanisms Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: A VOCABULARY SPLIT IS PROPOSED AND THE COST OF NOT ADOPTING IT IS NAMED: reserve the word for the phenomena of experience and use the LESS LOADED term `awareness` for the straightforward ones - and the stated consequence of the present situation is that `those who talk about consciousness are frequently talking past each other`	`mechanisms[3]`	0.95	the tagger's words
mechanisms	mechanisms Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. about this quote: RE-SLICED AROUND A SPLICED PAGE NUMBER. This file interleaves page numbers BETWEEN LOWERCASE WORDS - "In the second half of the paper, the tone 3 becomes more optimistic" - which the FOOTNOTE pattern in an internal tool cannot see, because it requires a CAPITALISED word after the digit. A guard was added for this shape and refused four spans in this paper, every one a real splice. The span was cut to stop short of it; the quote is verbatim and clean. also in: A BAIT-AND-SWITCH IS ANATOMISED AS A RECURRING GENRE IN THE LITERATURE, not as a mistake by any one author: the theory delivered TURNS OUT TO BE a theory of one of the more straightforward phenomena - reportability, introspective access, OR WHATEVER - after which the author declares the problem tractable after all, leaving the reader FEELING LIKE THE VICTIM OF A BAIT-AND-SWITCH while the hard problem remains untouched	`mechanisms[4]`	0.85	the tagger's words
mechanisms	mechanisms Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: A TEST IS GIVEN FOR WHETHER A TERM IS EXHAUSTED BY A FUNCTION, AND IT IS A TEST ON THE RESIDUAL QUESTION: someone who says the verbal-report function has been explained BUT NOT reportability is making a TRIVIAL CONCEPTUAL MISTAKE, because ALL IT COULD POSSIBLY TAKE to explain reportability is an explanation of how the relevant function is performed - and the same is said to go for the others	`mechanisms[5]`	0.85	the tagger's words
mechanisms	mechanisms Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. about this quote: RE-SLICED AROUND A SPLICED PAGE NUMBER. This file interleaves page numbers BETWEEN LOWERCASE WORDS - "but you 5 have not explained how it is experienced" - which the FOOTNOTE pattern in an internal tool cannot see, because it requires a CAPITALISED word after the digit. A guard was added for this shape and refused four spans in this paper, every one a real splice. The span was cut to stop short of it; the quote is verbatim and clean. also in: AND THE SAME TEST IS RUN ON THE CONTRAST CASES AND COMES OUT THE OTHER WAY: after every cognitive and behavioural function in the vicinity has been explained there MAY STILL REMAIN A FURTHER UNANSWERED QUESTION - why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience - and the paper states flatly that THERE IS NO ANALOGOUS FURTHER QUESTION in the explanation of genes, or of life, or of learning. One test, several terms, opposite verdicts	`mechanisms[6]`	0.85	the tagger's words
mechanisms	mechanisms Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: THE METHODS ARE SAID TO BE FITTED TO A CLASS OF PROBLEM BY DESIGN, WHICH IS WHY A RESIDUE REMAINS: the usual methods were developed PRECISELY to explain the performance of cognitive functions and do a good job of it - and as they stand they are ONLY equipped for that, so on the remaining problem the standard approach HAS NOTHING TO SAY. The gap is attributed to the instrument's design, not to insufficient effort	`mechanisms[7]`	0.95	the tagger's words
mechanisms	mechanisms Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: A THEORY IS SHOWN TO BE UNABLE TO EXPLAIN THE VERY LINK IT RELIES ON: the account GAINS ITS PURCHASE by assuming a connection between binding and experience, AND SO CAN DO NOTHING TO EXPLAIN THAT LINK - with the converse stated as the diagnostic, that if the link were understood the neurophysiological detail would be ICING ON THE CAKE	`mechanisms[8]`	0.95	the tagger's words
mechanisms	mechanisms Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: A RESEARCHER'S OWN DEFINITION OF HIS TERM, IN HIS OWN WORDS: he sets the really difficult aspects aside as possibly having NO SCIENTIFIC SOLUTION, proposes to focus on things that are EASIER TO STUDY, describes someone noticing a cappuccino and reaching for it - and closes THAT'S WHAT I CALL AWARENESS. The term is given its scope by an example of responding in a meaningful manner	`mechanisms[9]`	0.85	the tagger's words
mechanisms	mechanisms Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: ELIMINATION BY REDEFINITION IS NAMED AS A MOVE: some deny the phenomenon outright, and OTHERS ACHIEVE THE SAME EFFECT by allowing that experience exists ONLY IF the word is equated with something like the capacity to discriminate and report. The denial is performed by the definition rather than by an argument	`mechanisms[10]`	0.95	the tagger's words
mechanisms	mechanisms Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: A CRITERION IS GIVEN FOR WHEN A TERM MAY LEGITIMATELY BE RETIRED, AND IT TURNS ON THE TERM'S ROLE RATHER THAN ITS TRUTH: the vital spirit was put forward AS AN EXPLANATORY POSIT, to explain certain functions, AND COULD THEREFORE BE DISCARDED once those functions were explained without it - whereas an EXPLANANDUM IN ITS OWN RIGHT is not a candidate for that kind of elimination	`mechanisms[11]`	0.95	the tagger's words
mechanisms	mechanisms Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. about this quote: RE-SLICED AROUND A SPLICED PAGE NUMBER. This file interleaves page numbers BETWEEN LOWERCASE WORDS - "but lacking detailed knowledge of 12 biochemical mechanisms" - which the FOOTNOTE pattern in an internal tool cannot see, because it requires a CAPITALISED word after the digit. A guard was added for this shape and refused four spans in this paper, every one a real splice. The span was cut to stop short of it; the quote is verbatim and clean. also in: THE OBVIOUS PRECEDENT IS RAISED AND THE DISANALOGY IS LOCATED PRECISELY IN WHAT WAS EVER IN DOUBT: vitalist scepticism was doubt about whether physical mechanisms COULD PERFORM THE FUNCTIONS - while the conceptual claim that explanation of functions IS WHAT IS NEEDED was IMPLICITLY ACCEPTED by both sides. The historical parallel is disarmed by separating the empirical bet from the conceptual premise it never touched	`mechanisms[12]`	0.85	the tagger's words
mechanisms	mechanisms Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: A FALLACY ABOUT HOW TWO TERMS COME TO BE LINKED IS NAMED AND GIVEN A LAW: the attractiveness of quantum theories of consciousness is attributed to a LAW OF MINIMIZATION OF MYSTERY - consciousness is mysterious and quantum mechanics is mysterious, SO MAYBE THE TWO MYSTERIES HAVE A COMMON SOURCE. The proposed connection is between the two terms' obscurity, not between their contents	`mechanisms[13]`	0.95	the tagger's words
mechanisms	mechanisms Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. about this quote: RE-SLICED AROUND A SPLICED PAGE NUMBER. This file interleaves page numbers BETWEEN LOWERCASE WORDS - "At best, these 11 theories tell us something about a physical role" - which the FOOTNOTE pattern in an internal tool cannot see, because it requires a CAPITALISED word after the digit. A guard was added for this shape and refused four spans in this paper, every one a real splice. The span was cut to stop short of it; the quote is verbatim and clean. also in: A CLASS OF THEORY IS SHOWN TO RUN THE EXPLANATION BACKWARDS: these theories ASSUME THE EXISTENCE of consciousness and USE IT IN THE EXPLANATION of quantum processes. The term appears in the explanans where it was wanted in the explanandum	`mechanisms[14]`	0.85	the tagger's words
mechanisms	mechanisms Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: A TEMPTING INDUCTION FROM THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE IS NAMED AND BLOCKED BY SORTING ITS CASES: it is tempting to note that puzzling phenomena have always eventually yielded to physical explanation - but EACH of those was a problem about the observable behaviour of physical objects, coming down to structures and functions, and therefore always the KIND OF THING a physical account might explain. The induction fails because its instances share a property the new case lacks	`mechanisms[15]`	0.95	the tagger's words
limitations	The proposed theory is offered as speculative and only a candidate. Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. what this limits: the positive proposal only: THE THEORY I HAVE PRESENTED IS SPECULATIVE, BUT IT IS A CANDIDATE THEORY	`limitations[0]`		the tagger's words
limitations	The central basic principle (double-aspect theory of information) is admitted to be highly speculative and to leave key questions open. Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. what this limits: the double-aspect principle specifically: IT IS EXTREMELY SPECULATIVE AND IS ALSO UNDERDETERMINED, LEAVING A NUMBER OF KEY QUESTIONS UNANSWERED	`limitations[1]`		the tagger's words
limitations	There is very little objective data on which to build a theory of consciousness, because experience is not directly observable. Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. what this limits: the evidence base for any theory of consciousness: THE PAUCITY OF OBJECTIVE DATA - experience is not directly observable	`limitations[2]`		the tagger's words
limitations	Theories of this kind cannot be settled by conclusive intersubjective experimental test and so keep a speculative element. Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. what this limits: the epistemic status of the whole class of theories, permanently: SUCH THEORIES WILL ALWAYS RETAIN AN ELEMENT OF SPECULATION ... BECAUSE OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF CONCLUSIVE INTERSUBJECTIVE EXPERIMENTAL TESTS	`limitations[3]`		the tagger's words
limitations	The central term is stated to be ambiguous, and the paper says the ambiguity leads researchers to talk past one another. Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. what this limits: any claim about consciousness stated without saying which phenomenon is meant: the paper states people using the term are frequently talking past each other	`limitations[4]`	1.0	the tagger's words
limitations	The paper states the ambiguity of its central term is exploited by writers in both philosophy and science. Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. what this limits: a consciousness claim taken at face value: the paper states the term's ambiguity is often exploited by philosophers and scientists alike	`limitations[5]`	1.0	the tagger's words
transfers	using the explanatory framework of cognitive science and neuroscience (computational and neural mechanisms) to demarcate the tractable easy problems of consciousness from the hard problem Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above.	`transfers[0]`		the tagger's words
concepts	consciousness Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: consciousness	`concepts[0]`		the paper's words
concepts	hard problem Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: hard problem	`concepts[2]`		the paper's words
concepts	easy problems Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: easy problems	`concepts[4]`		the paper's words
senses	consciousness - an ambiguous term referring to many different phenomena, which is the paper's starting observation rather than an aside Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above.	`senses[0]`	1.0	the tagger's words
senses	consciousness - the narrowed convention the paper proposes: reserved for the phenomena of experience Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above.	`senses[1]`	1.0	the tagger's words
senses	easy problems - those defined NOT by their subject but by their susceptibility to the standard methods of cognitive science Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above.	`senses[2]`	1.0	the tagger's words
senses	hard problem - the problem of experience: the subjective aspect that remains once the information-processing is accounted for Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above.	`senses[3]`	1.0	the tagger's words
claim_relations	contradicts → reductive methods for explaining consciousness Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. differs in: which part of the problem is addressed: THESE METHODS INEVITABLY FAIL TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THE HARDEST PART OF THE PROBLEM	`claim_relations[0]`		the tagger's words
claim_relations	builds-on → Nagel (1974), 'What is it like to be a bat?' Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above.	`claim_relations[1]`		the tagger's words
claim_relations	builds-on → Levine (1983), the explanatory gap Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above.	`claim_relations[2]`		the tagger's words
claim_relations	builds-on → Shannon (1948), information theory Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above.	`claim_relations[3]`		the tagger's words
claim_relations	contradicts → Crick and Koch (1990) neurobiological theory of consciousness (40-Hz binding oscillations) Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. differs in: what is assumed against what is explained: CRICK AND KOCH'S THEORY GAINS ITS PURCHASE BY ASSUMING A CONNECTION BETWEEN BINDING AND EXPERIENCE, AND SO CAN DO NOTHING TO EXPLAIN THAT LINK	`claim_relations[4]`		the tagger's words
claim_relations	contradicts → Bernard Baars, global workspace theory (A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness) Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. differs in: awareness against experience: THE THEORY SHOWS PROMISE AS A THEORY OF AWARENESS, THE FUNCTIONAL CORRELATE OF CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE, BUT AN EXPLANATION OF EXPERIENCE ITSELF IS NOT ON OFFER	`claim_relations[5]`		the tagger's words
claim_relations	contradicts → Searle (1980), biological naturalism about consciousness Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. differs in: whether the substrate matters: CONSCIOUSNESS IS TIED TO A SPECIFIC BIOLOGY, SO THAT A SILICON ISOMORPH OF A HUMAN NEED NOT BE CONSCIOUS - against organisation alone	`claim_relations[6]`		the tagger's words
concept_edges	easy problems —distinct-from→ hard problem Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. strength of the relation: 1 also in: easy problems · hard problem	`concept_edges[0]`		the tagger's words
content_tags	a century or two — time Chalmers expects the easy problems to take Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above.	`content_tags.quantities[0]`		the tagger's words
content_tags	the easy problems yield to standard cognitive-science methods Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above.	`content_tags.findings[0]`		the tagger's words
content_tags	the hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above.	`content_tags.findings[1]`		the tagger's words
content_tags	experience arises from a physical basis with no good explanation of why Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above.	`content_tags.findings[2]`		the tagger's words
content_tags	the hard problem persists even after all functions are explained Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above.	`content_tags.findings[3]`		the tagger's words
content_tags	easy problems Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: easy problems	`content_tags.variables[0]`		the tagger's words
content_tags	the hard problem Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: the hard problem	`content_tags.variables[1]`		the tagger's words
content_tags	nonreductive explanation Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: nonreductive explanation	`content_tags.variables[3]`		the tagger's words
content_tags	the hard problem Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: the hard problem	`content_tags.definitions[0]`		the tagger's words
content_tags	easy problems Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: easy problems	`content_tags.definitions[1]`		the tagger's words
content_tags	experience Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: experience	`content_tags.definitions[2]`		the tagger's words
content_tags	function Quotation withheld — this record is not cleared for redistribution. The sentence is in the paper at the link above. also in: function	`content_tags.definitions[3]`		the tagger's words

Interpretive choices

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What was deliberately not tagged, and why, is recorded per paper by the tagger. Where a paper has no such record, this page says so rather than implying that nothing was declined.