phenomenon · claim-type · cross-domain-transfer · mechanism · claim-relation · replication-status · limitation — grounded in the full text| phenomenon | conscious experience— “The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience.” | |
| claim-type | critique— “I critique some recent work that uses reductive methods to address consciousness, and argue that these methods inevitably fail to come to grips with the hardest part of the problem.” | |
| method — evidence | — “Philosophical analysis is also useful in getting value for money out of the data we have.” | |
| transfer | from cognitive science / neuroscience: using the explanatory framework of cognitive science and neuroscience (computational and neural mechanisms) to demarcate the tractable easy problems of consciousness from the hard problem— “The easy problems of consciousness are those that seem directly susceptible to the standard methods of cognitive science” | transfers[0] |
| mechanism | THE FIELD'S PROBLEMS ARE DIVIDED BY THE METHOD THAT ADDRESSES THEM, NOT BY SUBJECT MATTER: the easy problems are DEFINED as those directly susceptible to the standard methods of cognitive science - explanation in terms of computational or neural mechanisms - and the hard ones as those that seem to RESIST those methods. The dividing principle is tractability by an instrument— “The easy problems of consciousness are those that seem directly susceptible to the standard methods of cognitive science, whereby a phenomenon is explained in terms of computational or neural mechanisms. The hard problems are those that seem to resist those methods.” | mechanisms[0] |
| mechanism | THE CENTRAL TERM IS DECLARED AMBIGUOUS BEFORE ANYTHING IS CLAIMED ABOUT IT: consciousness is said to be an ambiguous term referring to MANY DIFFERENT PHENOMENA, each needing explanation and some easier than others - so the paper's first move is to deny that its subject is one thing— “There is not just one problem of consciousness. “Consciousness” is an ambiguous term, referring to many different phenomena. Each of these phenomena needs to be explained, but some are easier to explain than others.” | mechanisms[1] |
| mechanism | ONE WORD IS SHOWN CARRYING SEVERAL OPERATIONAL SENSES AT ONCE, each attaching to a different test: a state is called conscious when it is VERBALLY REPORTABLE, or when it is INTERNALLY ACCESSIBLE; a system is conscious OF information when it can react on that basis, or attends to it, or integrates it into control of behaviour; an action is conscious when DELIBERATE; an organism is conscious when AWAKE— “For example, one sometimes says that a mental state is conscious when it is verbally reportable, or when it is internally accessible. Sometimes a system is said to be conscious of some information when it has the ability to react on the basis of that information, or, more strongly, when it attends to that information, or when it can integrate… | mechanisms[2] |
| mechanism | A VOCABULARY SPLIT IS PROPOSED AND THE COST OF NOT ADOPTING IT IS NAMED: reserve the word for the phenomena of experience and use the LESS LOADED term `awareness` for the straightforward ones - and the stated consequence of the present situation is that `those who talk about consciousness are frequently talking past each other`— “Another useful way to avoid confusion (used by e.g., Newell 1990; Chalmers 1996) is to reserve the term “consciousness” for the phenomena of experience, using the less loaded term “awareness” for the more straightforward phenomena described earlier. If such a convention were widely adopted, communication would be much easier; as things stand… | mechanisms[3] |
| mechanism | A BAIT-AND-SWITCH IS ANATOMISED AS A RECURRING GENRE IN THE LITERATURE, not as a mistake by any one author: the theory delivered TURNS OUT TO BE a theory of one of the more straightforward phenomena - reportability, introspective access, OR WHATEVER - after which the author declares the problem tractable after all, leaving the reader FEELING LIKE THE VICTIM OF A BAIT-AND-SWITCH while the hard problem remains untouched— “Upon examination, this theory turns out to be a theory of one of the more straightforward phenomena—of reportability, of introspective access, or whatever. At the close, the author declares that consciousness has turned out to be tractable after all, but the reader is left feeling like the victim of a bait-and-switch. The hard problem remains… | mechanisms[4] |
| mechanism | A TEST IS GIVEN FOR WHETHER A TERM IS EXHAUSTED BY A FUNCTION, AND IT IS A TEST ON THE RESIDUAL QUESTION: someone who says the verbal-report function has been explained BUT NOT reportability is making a TRIVIAL CONCEPTUAL MISTAKE, because ALL IT COULD POSSIBLY TAKE to explain reportability is an explanation of how the relevant function is performed - and the same is said to go for the others— “To see that this sort of thing is a conceptual fact, note that someone who says “you have explained the performance of the verbal report function, but you have not explained reportability” is making a trivial conceptual mistake about reportability. All it could possibly take to explain reportability is an explanation of how the relevant… | mechanisms[5] |
| mechanism | AND THE SAME TEST IS RUN ON THE CONTRAST CASES AND COMES OUT THE OTHER WAY: after every cognitive and behavioural function in the vicinity has been explained there MAY STILL REMAIN A FURTHER UNANSWERED QUESTION - why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience - and the paper states flatly that THERE IS NO ANALOGOUS FURTHER QUESTION in the explanation of genes, or of life, or of learning. One test, several terms, opposite verdicts— “note that even when we have explained the performance of all the cognitive and behavioral functions in the vicinity of experience—perceptual discrimination, categorization, internal access, verbal report—there may still remain a further unanswered question: Why is the performance of these functions accompanied by experience? A simple… | mechanisms[6] |
| mechanism | THE METHODS ARE SAID TO BE FITTED TO A CLASS OF PROBLEM BY DESIGN, WHICH IS WHY A RESIDUE REMAINS: the usual methods were developed PRECISELY to explain the performance of cognitive functions and do a good job of it - and as they stand they are ONLY equipped for that, so on the remaining problem the standard approach HAS NOTHING TO SAY. The gap is attributed to the instrument's design, not to insufficient effort— “These methods have been developed precisely to explain the performance of cognitive functions, and they do a good job of it. But as these methods stand, they are only equipped to explain the performance of functions. When it comes to the hard problem, the standard approach has nothing to say.” | mechanisms[7] |
| mechanism | A THEORY IS SHOWN TO BE UNABLE TO EXPLAIN THE VERY LINK IT RELIES ON: the account GAINS ITS PURCHASE by assuming a connection between binding and experience, AND SO CAN DO NOTHING TO EXPLAIN THAT LINK - with the converse stated as the diagnostic, that if the link were understood the neurophysiological detail would be ICING ON THE CAKE— “If we do not know why binding and storage should give rise to experience, telling a story about the oscillations cannot help us. Conversely, if we knew why binding and storage gave rise to experience, the neurophysiological details would be just the icing on the cake. Crick and Koch’s theory gains its purchase by assuming a connection between… | mechanisms[8] |
| mechanism | A RESEARCHER'S OWN DEFINITION OF HIS TERM, IN HIS OWN WORDS: he sets the really difficult aspects aside as possibly having NO SCIENTIFIC SOLUTION, proposes to focus on things that are EASIER TO STUDY, describes someone noticing a cappuccino and reaching for it - and closes THAT'S WHAT I CALL AWARENESS. The term is given its scope by an example of responding in a meaningful manner— “Well, let’s first forget about the really difficult aspects, like subjective feelings, for they may not have a scientific solution. The subjective state of play, of pain, of pleasure, of seeing blue, of smelling a rose—there seems to be a huge jump between the materialistic level, of explaining molecules and neurons, and the subjective level.… | mechanisms[9] |
| mechanism | ELIMINATION BY REDEFINITION IS NAMED AS A MOVE: some deny the phenomenon outright, and OTHERS ACHIEVE THE SAME EFFECT by allowing that experience exists ONLY IF the word is equated with something like the capacity to discriminate and report. The denial is performed by the definition rather than by an argument— “Some explicitly deny the phenomenon, holding for example that what is not externally verifiable cannot be real. Others achieve the same effect by allowing that experience exists, but only if we equate “experience” with something like the capacity to discriminate and report.” | mechanisms[10] |
| mechanism | A CRITERION IS GIVEN FOR WHEN A TERM MAY LEGITIMATELY BE RETIRED, AND IT TURNS ON THE TERM'S ROLE RATHER THAN ITS TRUTH: the vital spirit was put forward AS AN EXPLANATORY POSIT, to explain certain functions, AND COULD THEREFORE BE DISCARDED once those functions were explained without it - whereas an EXPLANANDUM IN ITS OWN RIGHT is not a candidate for that kind of elimination— “The vital spirit was put forward as an explanatory posit, in order to explain the relevant functions, and could therefore be discarded when those functions were explained without it. Experience is not an explanatory posit but an explanandum in its own right, and so is not a candidate for this sort of elimination.” | mechanisms[11] |
| mechanism | THE OBVIOUS PRECEDENT IS RAISED AND THE DISANALOGY IS LOCATED PRECISELY IN WHAT WAS EVER IN DOUBT: vitalist scepticism was doubt about whether physical mechanisms COULD PERFORM THE FUNCTIONS - while the conceptual claim that explanation of functions IS WHAT IS NEEDED was IMPLICITLY ACCEPTED by both sides. The historical parallel is disarmed by separating the empirical bet from the conceptual premise it never touched— “What drove vitalist skepticism was doubt about whether physical mechanisms could perform the many remarkable functions associated with life, such as complex adaptive behavior and reproduction. The conceptual claim that explanation of functions is what is needed was implicitly accepted” | mechanisms[12] |
| mechanism | A FALLACY ABOUT HOW TWO TERMS COME TO BE LINKED IS NAMED AND GIVEN A LAW: the attractiveness of quantum theories of consciousness is attributed to a LAW OF MINIMIZATION OF MYSTERY - consciousness is mysterious and quantum mechanics is mysterious, SO MAYBE THE TWO MYSTERIES HAVE A COMMON SOURCE. The proposed connection is between the two terms' obscurity, not between their contents— “The attractiveness of quantum theories of consciousness may stem from a Law of Minimization of Mystery: consciousness is mysterious and quantum mechanics is mysterious, so maybe the two mysteries have a common source.” | mechanisms[13] |
| mechanism | A CLASS OF THEORY IS SHOWN TO RUN THE EXPLANATION BACKWARDS: these theories ASSUME THE EXISTENCE of consciousness and USE IT IN THE EXPLANATION of quantum processes. The term appears in the explanans where it was wanted in the explanandum— “Rather, these theories assume the existence of consciousness, and use it in the explanation of quantum processes.” | mechanisms[14] |
| mechanism | A TEMPTING INDUCTION FROM THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE IS NAMED AND BLOCKED BY SORTING ITS CASES: it is tempting to note that puzzling phenomena have always eventually yielded to physical explanation - but EACH of those was a problem about the observable behaviour of physical objects, coming down to structures and functions, and therefore always the KIND OF THING a physical account might explain. The induction fails because its instances share a property the new case lacks— “It is tempting to note that all sorts of puzzling phenomena have eventually turned out to be explainable in physical terms. But each of these were problems about the observable behavior of physical objects, coming down to problems in the explanation of structures and functions. Because of this, these phenomena have always been the kind of… | mechanisms[15] |
| contradicts | reductive methods for explaining consciousness— “I critique some recent work that uses reductive methods to address consciousness, and argue that these methods inevitably fail to come to grips with the hardest part of the problem” | claim_relations[0] |
| builds-on | Nagel (1974), 'What is it like to be a bat?'— “As Nagel (1974) has put it, there is something it is like to be a conscious organism.” | claim_relations[1] |
| builds-on | Levine (1983), the explanatory gap— “There is an explanatory gap (a term due to Levine 1983) between the functions and experience, and we need an explanatory bridge to cross it.” | claim_relations[2] |
| builds-on | Shannon (1948), information theory— “I understand information in more or less the sense of Shannon (1948).” | claim_relations[3] |
| contradicts | Crick and Koch (1990) neurobiological theory of consciousness (40-Hz binding oscillations)— “Crick and Koch’s theory gains its purchase by assuming a connection between binding and experience, and so can do nothing to explain that link.” | claim_relations[4] |
| contradicts | Bernard Baars, global workspace theory (A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness)— “The theory shows promise as a theory of awareness, the functional correlate of conscious experience, but an explanation of experience itself is not on offer.” | claim_relations[5] |
| contradicts | Searle (1980), biological naturalism about consciousness— “Some (e.g., Searle 1980) have thought that consciousness is tied to a specific biology, so that a silicon isomorph of a human need not be conscious.” | claim_relations[6] |
| sense | consciousness - an ambiguous term referring to many different phenomena, which is the paper's starting observation rather than an aside— “There is not just one problem of consciousness. “Consciousness” is an ambiguous term, referring to many different phenomena.” | senses[0] |
| sense | consciousness - the narrowed convention the paper proposes: reserved for the phenomena of experience— “is to reserve the term “consciousness” for the phenomena of experience” | senses[1] |
| sense | easy problems - those defined NOT by their subject but by their susceptibility to the standard methods of cognitive science— “The easy problems of consciousness are those that seem directly susceptible to the standard methods of cognitive science, whereby a phenomenon is explained in terms of computational or neural… | senses[2] |
| sense | hard problem - the problem of experience: the subjective aspect that remains once the information-processing is accounted for | senses[3] |
| differs in | reductive methods for explaining consciousness — which part of the problem is addressed: THESE METHODS INEVITABLY FAIL TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THE HARDEST PART OF THE PROBLEM | claim_relations[0] |
| differs in | Crick and Koch (1990) neurobiological theory of consciousness (40-Hz binding oscillations) — what is assumed against what is explained: CRICK AND KOCH'S THEORY GAINS ITS PURCHASE BY ASSUMING A CONNECTION BETWEEN BINDING AND EXPERIENCE, AND SO CAN DO NOTHING TO EXPLAIN THAT LINK Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | claim_relations[4] |
| differs in | Bernard Baars, global workspace theory (A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness) — awareness against experience: THE THEORY SHOWS PROMISE AS A THEORY OF AWARENESS, THE FUNCTIONAL CORRELATE OF CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE, BUT AN EXPLANATION OF EXPERIENCE ITSELF IS NOT ON OFFER Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | claim_relations[5] |
| differs in | Searle (1980), biological naturalism about consciousness — whether the substrate matters: CONSCIOUSNESS IS TIED TO A SPECIFIC BIOLOGY, SO THAT A SILICON ISOMORPH OF A HUMAN NEED NOT BE CONSCIOUS - against organisation alone Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | claim_relations[6] |
| edge | easy problems —distinct-from→ hard problem Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concept_edges[0] |
| for which use | limitation — the positive proposal only: THE THEORY I HAVE PRESENTED IS SPECULATIVE, BUT IT IS A CANDIDATE THEORY Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | limitations[0] |
| for which use | limitation — the double-aspect principle specifically: IT IS EXTREMELY SPECULATIVE AND IS ALSO UNDERDETERMINED, LEAVING A NUMBER OF KEY QUESTIONS UNANSWERED Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | limitations[1] |
| for which use | limitation — the evidence base for any theory of consciousness: THE PAUCITY OF OBJECTIVE DATA - experience is not directly observable Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | limitations[2] |
| for which use | limitation — the epistemic status of the whole class of theories, permanently: SUCH THEORIES WILL ALWAYS RETAIN AN ELEMENT OF SPECULATION ... BECAUSE OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF CONCLUSIVE INTERSUBJECTIVE EXPERIMENTAL TESTS Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | limitations[3] |
| for which use | limitation — any claim about consciousness stated without saying which phenomenon is meant: the paper states people using the term are frequently talking past each other Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | limitations[4] |
| for which use | limitation — a consciousness claim taken at face value: the paper states the term's ambiguity is often exploited by philosophers and scientists alike Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | limitations[5] |
| evidence status note | mechanism — RE-SLICED AROUND A SPLICED PAGE NUMBER. This file interleaves page numbers BETWEEN LOWERCASE WORDS - "In the second half of the paper, the tone 3 becomes more optimistic" - which the FOOTNOTE pattern in an internal tool cannot see, because it requires a CAPITALISED word after the digit. A guard was added for this shape and refused four spans in this paper, every one a real splice. The span was cut to stop short of it; the quote is verbatim and clean. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | mechanisms[4] |
| evidence status note | mechanism — RE-SLICED AROUND A SPLICED PAGE NUMBER. This file interleaves page numbers BETWEEN LOWERCASE WORDS - "but you 5 have not explained how it is experienced" - which the FOOTNOTE pattern in an internal tool cannot see, because it requires a CAPITALISED word after the digit. A guard was added for this shape and refused four spans in this paper, every one a real splice. The span was cut to stop short of it; the quote is verbatim and clean. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | mechanisms[6] |
| evidence status note | mechanism — RE-SLICED AROUND A SPLICED PAGE NUMBER. This file interleaves page numbers BETWEEN LOWERCASE WORDS - "but lacking detailed knowledge of 12 biochemical mechanisms" - which the FOOTNOTE pattern in an internal tool cannot see, because it requires a CAPITALISED word after the digit. A guard was added for this shape and refused four spans in this paper, every one a real splice. The span was cut to stop short of it; the quote is verbatim and clean. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | mechanisms[12] |
| evidence status note | mechanism — RE-SLICED AROUND A SPLICED PAGE NUMBER. This file interleaves page numbers BETWEEN LOWERCASE WORDS - "At best, these 11 theories tell us something about a physical role" - which the FOOTNOTE pattern in an internal tool cannot see, because it requires a CAPITALISED word after the digit. A guard was added for this shape and refused four spans in this paper, every one a real splice. The span was cut to stop short of it; the quote is verbatim and clean. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | mechanisms[14] |
| replication | untested | |
| limitation | The proposed theory is offered as speculative and only a candidate. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | limitations[0] |
| limitation | The central basic principle (double-aspect theory of information) is admitted to be highly speculative and to leave key questions open. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | limitations[1] |
| limitation | There is very little objective data on which to build a theory of consciousness, because experience is not directly observable. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | limitations[2] |
| limitation | Theories of this kind cannot be settled by conclusive intersubjective experimental test and so keep a speculative element. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | limitations[3] |
| limitation | The central term is stated to be ambiguous, and the paper says the ambiguity leads researchers to talk past one another. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | limitations[4] |
| limitation | The paper states the ambiguity of its central term is exploited by writers in both philosophy and science. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | limitations[5] |
finding · quantity · variable · definition · key-term — grounded in the full text| finding | the easy problems yield to standard cognitive-science methods Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.findings[0] |
| finding | the hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.findings[1] |
| finding | experience arises from a physical basis with no good explanation of why Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.findings[2] |
| finding | the hard problem persists even after all functions are explained Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.findings[3] |
| quantity | a century or two of empirical work — time Chalmers expects the easy problems to take Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.quantities[0] |
| variable | easy problems (tractable questions about cognitive functions) Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.variables[0] |
| variable | the hard problem (question not about performance of functions) Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.variables[1] |
| variable | nonreductive explanation (the shift Chalmers proposes) Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.variables[3] |
| definition | the hard problem Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[0] |
| definition | easy problems Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[1] |
| definition | experience Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[2] |
| definition | function Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[3] |
| key-terms | consciousness, experience, hard problem, easy problems, qualia, reductive explanation, functional explanation, subjective aspect, cognitive science, awareness |
| concept | consciousness Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[0] |
| concept | hard problem Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[2] |
| concept | easy problems Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[4] |
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