phenomenon · claim-type · cross-domain-transfer · mechanism · claim-relation · replication-status · limitation — grounded in the full text| phenomenon | masked semantic priming— “In this study, we set out to investigate the influence of different semantic tasks on short-lived masked priming.” | |
| claim-type | critique— “We challenge this view by arguing that some automatic processes may indeed be under intentional control, which is implemented in tasksets that define how the task is to be performed.” | |
| method — evidence | — “Three experiments were conducted to investigate whether and how task-driven intentions influence short-lived priming.” | |
| mechanism | An intention instantiates a task-set that pre-tunes the automatic perceptual-classification-response chain, so masked primes are run through the same task-defined categorization as targets and interfere at the response stage— “Even if participants are not aware of the masked primes, primes are processed in the same way as targets, which creates interference with responses to targets.” | mechanisms[0] |
| mechanism | Above-chance prime discrimination arises because forced-choice responding under uncertainty recruits the very same practised automatic classification processes, not because the primes were consciously seen— “If participants were forced to rely on those processes in the direct test, the intention to classify primes might have led to recruitment of the same automatic classification processes that were practised beforehand.” | mechanisms[1] |
| builds-on | Klinger et al. (2000); Draine & Greenwald, 1998; Greenwald et al., 1995— “To this aim, we adapted a design used by Klinger et al. (2000) that used semantic classification of stimuli, and which is based on a responsewindow paradigm developed by Greenwald and collaborators (e.g., Draine & Greenwald, 1998; Greenwald et al., 1995).” | claim_relations[0] |
| replicates | Klinger et al. (2000), Experiment 1— “Experiment 4 was partly a replication of Experiment 1 in Klinger et al. (2000), which was the basic experiment of the study comprising an affective classification task in the indirect test.” | claim_relations[1] |
| contradicts | Logan, 1988; Pashler & Baylis, 1991; Singley & Anderson, 1989— “It is important to note that several theories of automatic reactions would not postulate much flexibility in such settings (e.g., Logan, 1988; Pashler & Baylis, 1991; Singley & Anderson, 1989). The findings are thus more in line with theories assuming that task-related intentions are implemented in schematic task-sets that are set up… | claim_relations[2] |
| builds-on | Hommel, 2000; Monsell, 1996; Neumann, 1990— “The findings are thus more in line with theories assuming that task-related intentions are implemented in schematic task-sets that are set up before the task starts (e.g., Hommel, 2000; Monsell, 1996; Neumann, 1990).” | claim_relations[3] |
| sense | IT ARGUES IN 2007 WHAT hesselmann2016 OFFERS IN 2016 AS SPECULATION: `Unconscious perception is commonly described as a phenomenon that is not under intentional control and relies on automatic processes. We challenge this view by arguing that some automatic processes may indeed be under intentional control.` hesselmann2016 closes with `SPECULATIVELY, the category task might have DESENSITIZED perceptual pathways ... the shape task SENSITIZED` them, citing Kiefer 2012. This paper made it the thesis of three experiments nine years earlier, and the 2016 paper does not cite it. Two records, one claim, nine years, no link - the corpus can show that without asserting anyone should have known— “Unconscious perception is commonly described as a phenomenon that is not under intentional control and relies on automatic processes” | senses[0] |
| sense | AND THE AWARENESS RESULT CUTS ACROSS Finkbeiner2011 FROM THE OTHER SIDE: `although participants reported not seeing the primes, they were able to classify the primes better than chance using the classification task they had used before with the targets. When a lexical task was used for discrimination in experiment 4, masked primes could however not be discriminated.` The same primes are above chance under one awareness test and at chance under another. Finkbeiner2011 argues the prime-classification task UNDERESTIMATES awareness because it is harder; this shows the answer depends on WHICH TASK, not only how hard. Every subliminal claim in this corpus rests on a single such test— “although participants reported not seeing the primes, they were able to classify the primes better than chance using the classification task they had used before with the targets. When a lexical task was used for discrimination in experiment 4, masked primes could however not be discriminated” | senses[1] |
| sense | AND ONE SENTENCE MAKES THE WHOLE FRAMING AWKWARD: `priming was as pronounced when the primes were visible as when they were invisible.` If visibility does not change the effect, awareness was never the variable. Schmidt2010 reaches the same place from a different paradigm - a qualitative dissociation with the stimuli in plain view - and this is the second record today to arrive there. Two papers, two methods, one conclusion the masked-priming literature is organised against— “Also, priming was as pronounced when the primes were visible as when they were invisible” | senses[2] |
| sense | AND THE MECHANISM IS THE TASK, NOT THE STIMULUS: `In three experiments, we investigated whether the intention to classify the same words with respect to different semantic categories had a differential effect on priming. The results suggest that this was indeed the case: Priming varied with the task in all experiments.` Same words, same masks, same subjects - only the instruction changed, and the priming changed with it. That is a manipulation of the observer rather than of the stimulus, which is rare in this corpus and is why the result bears on what `automatic` can mean— “In three experiments, we investigated whether the intention to classify the same words with respect to different semantic categories had a differential effect on priming. The results suggest that this was indeed the case: Priming varied with the task in all experiments” | senses[3] |
| control | participants were randomly assigned to the evaluative-decision or the animacy-decision task — held — rules out that a difference between the two decision tasks is a difference between the people doing them— “Participants were randomly assigned either to the evaluative decision task (group 1), or to the animacy decision task (group 2).” | controls[0] |
| note | automatic —distinct-from→ intentional control — THE ENTAILMENT THE PAPER BREAKS, AND IT IS THE CLEANEST THING IN THE RECORD. The field treats 'automatic' as implying 'not under intentional control'; Eckstein and Perrig argue 'some automatic…'. So the two properties come apart, and 'distinct-from' says exactly that. Weight 0.95: both terms are in the quote and the separation is the article's whole contribution.— “Unconscious perception is commonly described as a phenomenon that is not under intentional control and relies on automatic processes” | concept_edges[0] |
| weight | automatic —distinct-from→ intentional control — 0.95— “Unconscious perception is commonly described as a phenomenon that is not under intentional control and relies on automatic processes” | concept_edges[0] |
| outcome (stated by the tagger, no quotation) | control — held | controls[0] |
| replication | replicated | |
| limitation | The results do not settle whether the priming effects rest on conscious or nonconscious prime perception.— “Although our findings are clear-cut with respect to the question of intentional control, they are inconclusive with respect to the question whether the effects are due to conscious or nonconscious perception.” | limitations[0] |
| limitation | Experiment 4's masked-vs-unmasked comparison was underpowered for small differences.— “Although statistical tests did not indicate that priming was different in the two masking conditions, it must be noted that power to detect small differences was weak due to small sample sizes.” | limitations[1] |
| limitation | Semantic processing of primes in this paradigm is bounded by what was practised beforehand, limiting claims about semantic depth.— “However, it is important to bear in mind that semantic discrimination of primes is confined to what has been practised before test in this type of paradigm.” | limitations[2] |
finding · quantity · variable · definition · key-term — grounded in the full text| finding | With one and the same word set, masked priming appeared only on the dimension the current task required: valence congruency affected only the valence task and animacy congruency only the animacy task.— “Affect priming was only seen in the valence task, whereas animacy priming was only present in the animacy task. There” | content_tags.findings[0] |
| finding | A brand-new, never-practised classification (a disjunction/conjunction of the two practised categories) produced larger task-relevant priming than the simple single-dimension tasks did.— “Indeed, a planned contrast showed that combined priming was larger in the combined task of Experiment 2 than in the single tasks of Experiment 1, t(24.38, corrected for unequal variances) = 1.91, p = .034 (one-sided).” | content_tags.findings[1] |
| finding | Prime discrimination in the direct test was clearly above chance in both groups (accuracy 0.66 and 0.74).— “In both groups, prime discrimination da was clearly better than chance in the direct test, with overall accuracies of 0.66 and 0.74 for groups 1, resp., 2 (see Table 1).” | content_tags.findings[2] |
| finding | Participants could not discriminate masked word from nonword primes in a lexical decision task.— “In contrast to Experiments 1 and 2, participants were not able to discriminate masked word and nonword primes in a lexical decision task.” | content_tags.findings[3] |
| finding | Unmasking the primes did not cancel priming.— “However, for our purposes it is sufficient to note that un-masking the primes did not lead to cancellation of priming.” | content_tags.findings[4] |
| finding | Amount of priming was unrelated to how well an individual could discriminate the primes.— “However, correlations between priming and prime discrimination were not significantly different from zero (cf., Fig. 1).” | content_tags.findings[5] |
| finding | The main effect of test half was not significant.— “The main effect of Test Half was not significant, F(1, 31) = 2.91, p = .098.” | content_tags.findings[6] |
| quantity | F(1, 22) = 29.85, p < .001 — the task x type-of-priming interaction in Experiment 1, showing priming was confined to the task-relevant dimension— “The predicted interaction of task and type of priming was highly significant, F(1, 22) = 29.85, p < .001.” | content_tags.quantities[0] |
| quantity | F(1, 14) = 20.95, p < .001 — the same interaction in Experiment 3, where the task was switched within subjects every 16 trials— “The predicted interaction of task and type of priming was significant, F(1, 14) = 20.95, p < .001.” | content_tags.quantities[1] |
| quantity | da = 0.42 — prime discrimination in Experiment 3, above chance despite the shortened 42 ms prime— “Discrimination was better than chance in the direct test, with an overall response accuracy of 0.59 (da = 0.42, SDda = 0.44).” | content_tags.quantities[2] |
| quantity | t(7) = 3.51, p = .01 vs t(6) = 1.67, p = .15 — lexical-decision prime discrimination was above zero only for unmasked primes, not for masked ones— “Discrimination in lexical decision for primes was significantly greater than zero in the unmasked priming condition, t(7) = 3.51, p = .01, which was not the case in the masked prime condition, t(6) = 1.67, p = .15 (see also Table 3).” | content_tags.quantities[3] |
| quantity | 0.91 — post-hoc statistical power to detect a borderline-conscious discrimination effect (da = 0.3) in the masked group— “The power of finding such an effect at an alpha level of 0.05 was 0.91, which is satisfactory.” | content_tags.quantities[4] |
| quantity | 482 ms — the deadline within which classification responses had to be produced under the response-window procedure— “These findings of masked priming varying with the task are remarkable because responses had to be given under considerable pressure of time (within 482 ms).” | content_tags.quantities[5] |
| quantity | 56 ms — prime presentation duration in Experiments 1 and 2, between a 156 ms premask and a 14 ms postmask— “The premask (LMFNWQVQGJRDW) was displayed for 156 ms and was immediately followed by the prime (e.g., GEWALT, violence), which was presented in capital letters for 56 ms and then masked (with the string KMWGDWHYHJPKJ) for 14 ms.” | content_tags.quantities[6] |
| quantity | 60% — share of inaccurate responses on incongruent trials even when primes were fully visible— “Even if participants realised that the primes were interfering with their response, they were not able to adjust their responding to filter out the primes’ influence, showing a considerable proportion of 60% inaccurate responses in incongruent trials.” | content_tags.quantities[7] |
| quantity | 26 — number of participants recruited for Experiment 1— “Subjects were 26 students of the Institute of Psychology of the University of Bern who received credit for an introductory psychology course.” | content_tags.quantities[8] |
| variable | test task (independent)— “A 2 · 2 design with the factor ‘test task’ (animacy vs. valence) varied between subjects and the factor ‘type of priming’ (affect vs. animacy) varied within subjects was implemented.” | content_tags.variables[0] |
| variable | prime masking (independent)— “A univariate design with the factor ‘prime masking’ (masked vs. unmasked) varied between subjects was implemented.” | content_tags.variables[1] |
| variable | accuracy of target classification responses (dependent)— “Performance in the indirect test was calculated as mean accuracy of target classification responses within the response window.” | content_tags.variables[2] |
| variable | prime discrimination (dependent)— “The hit rate of group 1 was defined as the proportion of ‘positive’ judgements for positive primes, and the false alarm rate was defined as the proportion of ‘positive’ judgments for negative primes.” | content_tags.variables[3] |
| variable | stimulus set (control)— “To that aim, we investigated variations in priming when tasks were varied, whilst the stimulus set remained the same.” | content_tags.variables[4] |
| definition | priming— “In this paper, we use an operational definition of ‘priming,’ whereby priming refers to the situation where reaction to a target stimulus is influenced by the prime preceding it.” | content_tags.definitions[0] |
| definition | short-lived priming— “In the following, we will use the term short-lived priming to denote priming effects found with such paradigms, which are confined to a high temporal contiguity between prime and target.” | content_tags.definitions[1] |
| definition | priming effect— “In congruency priming experiments, the priming effect is defined as the difference between performance in congruent and incongruent conditions.” | content_tags.definitions[2] |
| definition | affect priming— “Affect priming was defined as the difference in mean accuracy in trials, where prime and target were congruent with respect to valence and mean accuracy in trials, where prime and target were incongruent with respect to valence.” | content_tags.definitions[3] |
| definition | combined priming— “Combined priming was computed as the difference in accuracy of congruent and incongruent prime–target pairs with respect to the task.” | content_tags.definitions[4] |
| definition | task-set— “In this view, an intentional action is implemented by the instantiation of a task-set, which comprises information necessary to start and perform the action.” | content_tags.definitions[5] |
| concept | unconscious perception — not defined in this paper's own words; the thing the paper is about and the description it rejects: 'commonly described as a phenomenon that is not under intentional control and relies on automatic processes'. The sentence is quoted in order to be contradicted | concepts[0] |
| concept | intentional control — not defined in this paper's own words; WHAT THE PAPER PUTS BACK INTO UNCONSCIOUS PROCESSING. Not that the prime is seen, but that what the subject is TRYING TO DO determines which of its attributes get processed - so the same invisible prime primes differently under different task instructions | concepts[1] |
| concept | automatic — not defined in this paper's own words; the property 'unconscious' is usually taken to entail, and the entailment this paper denies: 'some automatic processes may indeed be under intentional control'. Automatic and uncontrollable come apart | concepts[2] |
| concept | masked priming — not defined in this paper's own words; the paradigm, and the one whose awareness check this record complicates: 'the trial sequence typically consists of a prime with pattern or letter masks preceding the visible target' | concepts[3] |
| ANOVA F | as written: ANOVA mixed-model design | content_tags.statistics[0] |
| t-test t | as written: onesample t tests | content_tags.statistics[1] |
| signal detection sensitivity index da | as written: da ... a d0 corrected for unequal variances | content_tags.statistics[2] |
| correlation r | as written: the correlation between priming and da Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.statistics[3] |
| planned contrast t | as written: a planned contrast Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.statistics[4] |
| power analysis | as written: post-hoc power analysis ... using the GPower program Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.statistics[5] |
| alpha level | as written: 5% alpha level Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.statistics[6] |
| standard deviation SD | as written: Standard deviations are given in parentheses Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.statistics[7] |
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