Artefacts, essentialism and the identification of artworks and technologies — TEI-tagged view

Sadjad SoltanzadehpersName (2026date). “Artefacts, essentialism and the identification of artworks and technologies.” Synthesetitle·j.

Object of study — the metaphysics of artefactsterm - the conditions of artefactualityterm and whether artefactual status can be a defining, non-essential feature of artworksterm and technologies

Research question — whether classifying artworksterm and technologies as artefactsterm is compatible with anti-essentialism about art and technology, and whether artefactualityterm is itself an essential propertyterm

Contribution — the thesis that artefactualityterm is a relationally essential propertyterm, so identifying any object by its artefactual status is an essentialist identificationterm; hence the centrality-of-artefacts position and anti-essentialism are incompatible. Introduces 'artefactual essentialismterm' and three distinctions (creation vs use, kinds vs objects, intrinsic vs relational essentialismterm)

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Artefactsterm, essentialismterm and the identification of artworksterm and technologies Abstract While artistic and technological identities are often regarded as context-dependent and non-essential, artworksterm and technologies are frequently classified as artefactsterm. Here it is argued that these positions are incompatible with each other, and that the latter position is flawed. Artefactualityterm is itself an essential propertyterm, and identifying an object on the basis of its artefactual status entails a commitment to essentialismterm. Artefactsterm cannot represent artworksterm and technologies and cannot be the defining subject matter of a non-essentialist philosophy. These arguments are built on a detailed analysis of the way in which creators’ intentions are constitutive of artefactsterm, as well as three key distinctions: between the contexts of creation and use, between the essentialist identificationterm of kinds and that of individual objects and between the intrinsic and relational forms of essentialismterm.

1 Introduction Art and technology are broad categories that can be manifested in various forms. Despite their diversity, it is possible to discern some recurring positions common to the philosophical study of both art and technology. One of these positions is the centrality of artefactsterm, understood in relation to creators’ intentions, in characterising art and technology. Works of art and technological objects are often classified as species of artefactsterm, and artefactualityterm is seen as a defining feature of artworksterm and technologies. In this way, from an intentionalist perspective, the intention of the artist is considered a key attribute of the ontology of art (Kuspit, 1974; Livingston, 2005; Thomasson, 2004). Artworksterm are commonly classified as artefactsterm (Evnine, 2013; Levinson, 2007), while non-tangible works, such as pieces of music and literature, are categorised as ‘abstract artefactsterm’ (Evnine, 2016, pp. 119–159; Thomasson, 2004, pp. 22–23). Several philosophers have also introduced technical artefactsterm as the subject matter of philosophy of technology (Kroes and Meijers 2006; Franssen et al. 2018; Houkes and Vermaas 2009a). This subject identification has given birth to metaphysical research agendas on technical functions (Houkes & Vermaas, 2010; Kroes, 2012) and the ontological status of artefactsterm and artefactterm kinds (Franssen et al., 2014; Thomasson, 2009). More generally, the philosophy of technology literature is replete with references to artefactsterm, implying the centrality of artefactsterm to the philosophical study of technology.

A second position pertains to the rejection of essentialismterm in favour of a contextual understanding of art and technology. Tillinghast (2004), for instance, presents a detailed discussion on the concept of essenceterm and its relevance to the nature of art. By identifying a particular, evaluative concept of art, she defends anti-essentialism about this concept. Mag Uidhir and Magnus (2011) reject art concept monism in favour of an art concept pluralism that allows recognition of different art concepts for different purposes. Danto refutes the idea that art can be defined by a fixed set of necessary and sufficient conditions. He argues that what makes something an artworkterm is not its physical properties but the artistic theories and interpretations that situate it within the artworld (Danto, 1964). Davies (2009) also rejects essentialismterm by considering the matter, form and mode in which art exists, arguing that works of art are social constructs. Similar sentiments can be seen in the philosophical study of technology and technical artefactsterm. Juvshik (2021) rejects function essentialismterm as the idea that artefactsterm have essencesterm based on their intended functions. He then argues that even the narrow version of function essentialismterm limited to technical artefactsterm, i.e. artefactsterm that have practical functions, is flawed. Houkes and Vermaas (2009b), 2010) engage in an action-theoretic analysis of technical artefactsterm to reject function essentialismterm, arguing that the function of an artefactterm is not an intrinsic property of the artefactterm. And finally, through his notion of ‘multi-stability’ (a phenomenological notion that can roughly be translated into the analytic metaphysics as ‘multiple utilisabilityterm’ (Preston, 2009, p. 215), Ihde (1993, pp. 73 − 8) highlights inadequacies of essentialist understandings of technology by showing that the same object can acquire different identities in different contexts.

So, on the one hand, individual artworksterm and technologies are identified as artefactsterm, and on the other hand, it is argued that an object’s identity as a work of art or a technological object cannot be determined by its essential properties. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that these two positions are incompatible, and that the former position is flawed. This means that artefactsterm cannot represent artworksterm and technologies, and while there have been attempts to provide non-essentialist accounts of art, technology and technical functions, as long as philosophy of art and technology concern themselves with artefactsterm, they cannot fully reject essentialismterm. The paper’s arguments rest on three distinctions. The first distinction is between the contexts of creation and use. Early discussions of the paper contribute to the current literature on the metaphysics of artefactsterm by showing why this distinction is necessary to determine the conditions of artefactualityterm, reconcile some counterintuitive cases and specify the way in which creators’ intentions are constitutive of artefactsterm. Here it is also argued that failure to attend to the conditions of artefactualityterm and make a distinction between the contexts of creation and use leads to a conflation between the category of artefactsterm, on the one hand, and artworksterm and technologies, on the other. The next two distinctions are between the essentialist identificationterm of kinds and the essentialist identificationterm of objects, and between the intrinsic and relational forms of essentialismterm. While the question concerning the essential nature of artefactterm kinds has received some attention, this paper introduces artefactual essentialismterm, which is about the essentialist identificationterm of objects. And while essentialismterm is often assumed and discussed in its intrinsic form, this paper turns to relational essentialismterm. On these grounds, it is concluded that, first, artefactualityterm is irrelevant for categorising an object as a work of art or a technological object, and artefactsterm cannot be the defining subject matter of philosophy of art and technology. Second, artefactualityterm is a relationally essential propertyterm rooted in the historical relationship between an artefactterm and its creators’ intentions. Therefore, identifying an artworkterm, a technology or any other object on the basis of its artefactual status would be an essentialist identificationterm of that object. Yet, it is harder to fully escape artefactual essentialismterm in philosophy of art than in philosophy of technology.

2 Artefactsterm: the modification and intention conditionsterm What are artefactsterm? And what makes something an artefactterm? For something to qualify as an artefactterm, it must jointly satisfy two conditions. These conditions can be referred to as the ‘modification conditionterm’ and the ‘intention conditionterm’. According to the modification conditionterm, it is necessary for an object to undergo some modifications or structural changes to qualify as an artefactterm. The reason why bicycle wheels, sculptors or crowns are categorised as artefactsterm, but gum trees, spiders or rocks are not is that the former group have undergone structural modifications whereas the latter group have not. Hence, it is widely considered that artefactsterm are necessarily modified objects (Devereux, 1977; Hilpinen, 2011; SoltanzadehpersName, 2019; Weitz, 1956).

Structural modifications come in different forms and degrees. This raises the question of whether there is a minimum form or degree of modification required for an object to qualify as an artefactterm. Devereux has specified the types of physical changes that can lead to the creation of artefactsterm. According to him, a natural object cannot become an artefactterm unless it undergoes ‘internal changes’. By an internal change he means ‘a change in the thing itself and not just in its relationship to other things. Changes in size, shape or colour, would count as internal changes; a change in physical location would not’ (Devereux, 1977, p. 135). According to Hilpinen, too, the simplest form of modification that is required for an object to undergo to become an artefactterm is separation. It involves ‘the separation of an object from another object so that one (or both) of the resulting objects can be used for some purpose’ (Hilpinen, 2011). Breaking a branch from a tree trunk and trimming off the side branches and leaves to create a walking stick is a modification that creates an artefactterm by the act of separation. However, picking up a piece of rock from the ground to use it as a doorstop is not an artefact-creating modification because this act does not sufficiently modify the rock. As Hilpinen suggested, objects such as a piece of rock used as a doorstop can be referred to as ‘naturefactsterm’ which are not genuine artefactsterm (ibid.).

Satisfying the modification conditionterm alone does not transform an object into an artefactterm. A branch knocked down by heavy wind undergoes sufficient changes to meet the modification conditionterm, but it is not considered an artefactterm because it was not intended by anyone to become a broken branch. Therefore, in addition to meeting the modification conditionterm, an object must also fulfil the intention conditionterm to qualify as an artefactterm. According to the intention conditionterm, for an object to be an artefactterm, it must be intended to be an artefactterm; its features need to be intended by its creator. A cane made from a tree branch satisfies the intention conditionterm because it was intended to be a cane. Even though the physical properties of the cane may be identical to those of a fallen branch, only the cane qualifies as an artefactterm, because only the cane satisfies the intention conditionterm. Baker (2004), Dipert (1993), Evnine (2016), Hilpinen (1993, 2011) and Thomasson (2007, 2009), among others, have recognised that an adequate definition of artefactsterm must consider creators’ intentions.

3 The two readings of the intention conditionterm The intention conditionterm stipulates that for an object to be an artefactterm, it must be intended to be an artefactterm. But exactly what feature of the artefactterm must be intended? This question leads us to two different readings of the intention conditionterm. On one reading, it is necessary for an artefactterm to have the same physical properties that its creators intended. On the other reading, it is necessary for an artefactterm to have the same function or meaning that its creators intended. The first reading can be referred to as ‘the physical reading of the intention conditionterm’ and the second one as ‘the functional reading of the intention conditionterm’ (SoltanzadehpersName, 2022, pp. 23 − 4). Now the question is: which reading is more persuasive? And in what ways are the intentions of creators constitutive of artefactsterm? The answer to these questions requires further clarification of the two readings of the intention conditionterm.

Consider the example of a spoon that is exclusively used as a baby toy. Here the spoon has physical properties that are intended by its creators, but its function is different from the creators’ intentions. So, on the physical reading of the intention conditionterm, the spoon is an artefactterm. But according to the functional reading, the spoon is not an artefactterm. This conclusion is counterintuitive and works against the functional reading of the intention conditionterm. Now imagine a case where a person throws a glass bottle to the ground to break it into small pieces so that they can use one of the pieces to cut through a thick stack of paper. In this case, the small pieces of glass will have the function that the person intended them to have, but they may not have the exact intended physical structures. In fact, it is almost impossible to plan the shape and size of objects by smashing them onto the ground. So, here on the functional reading of the intention conditionterm, those pieces are artefactsterm, but on the physical reading of the condition, they are not.

Including the spoon used as a baby toy while excluding the broken glass pieces as artefactsterm may seem like an acceptable conclusion. However, this exclusion can make the physical reading of the intention conditionterm too demanding. We may rule out those broken glass pieces as artefactsterm because the creator did not intend their exact shape, but many objects do not turn out to have the exact shape that their creators intend. The spoon used in the previous example may itself be ever so slightly smaller, bigger, heavier or lighter than what its designers intended. Would these differences exclude the spoon from the category of artefactsterm? If yes, then we have reached another counterintuitive conclusion which, this time, works against the physical reading of the intention conditionterm.

One way to escape the above deadlock is to revise the physical reading of the intention conditionterm by making it less demanding. Instead of requiring the creator to have an exact construction plan and execute that plan perfectly, we can allow deviations from a loose construction plan as long as the necessary physical properties of the object are created. Here it would not matter if the spoon is slightly larger or heavier than what the creators had intended. As long as the spoon has the necessary physical structure to work as a spoon, it would satisfy the physical reading of the intention conditionterm. When the physical reading of the intention conditionterm is construed in this less demanding way, the broken glass pieces would also qualify as artefactsterm because they do have the sharp edges required to cut through a thick stack of paper.

Note that the revised, less demanding version of the physical reading of the intention conditionterm in fact relies on the functional reading of the intention conditionterm. Among the various physical properties of an artefactterm, only those properties can be deemed ‘necessary’ that are required for the artefactterm to perform its intended function. The necessary physical properties of a spoon are determined by its function as a handheld utensil that can be used for scooping, transferring or consuming different food. And the necessary physical properties of a cutting tool are determined by its function as a cutting tool; i.e. a handheld object with at least one sharp edge. This means that if we accept this revision, we also automatically accept the functional reading of the intention conditionterm.

Therefore, in the revised physical reading of the intention conditionterm, an object’s artefactual status is determined by (i) the creators’ intention for it to serve the specific function that it serves and (ii) the structural modifications that are made to enable that function. In other words, in this revised physical reading of the intention conditionterm, an object is an artefactterm if it has undergone at least a minimal degree of modifications, and these modifications are intended by its creators for it to serve the function that it serves.

This revised physical reading of the intention conditionterm simplifies the definition of artefactsterm by bringing together both readings of the intention conditionterm. However, it encounters the same problem faced by the functional reading of the intention conditionterm. It cannot explain the artefactual status of objects that perform functions other than what their modified structures were intended to perform, such as the spoon used as a baby toy. This is a problem because many artefactsterm are commonly used in ways that are not intended by their original creators.

Using an artefactterm for purposes other than what its creators had intended is a known phenomenon, often referred to as ‘innovative’ or ‘creative useterm’ (Kroes, 2012, p. 81). Innovative useterm can occur at the level of individual users or become embraced by society at large. Innovative useterm of artefactsterm can also be conceptualised through Preston’s notion of ‘system functionterm’ as distinct from ‘proper functionterm’ (Preston, 2013, pp. 152–160). While proper functionterm refers to what an artefactterm was designed for, system functionterm refers to what an artefactterm actually does (ibid.). For example, a spoon’s proper functionterm is to scoop, transfer or consume food, because that is what it was designed to do. However, being used as a baby toy would be a system functionterm of the spoon, because that is not what the spoon was designed for. Proper functionterm and system functionterm can also overlap. When an artefactterm performs the task it was designed for, that counts as both its proper and system functionterm.

The mismatch between the intentions of original creators and the eventual function or meaning of artefactsterm can sometimes be even more pronounced. At times, the intended physical structure of artefactsterm may be completely irrelevant for the function that they perform. These cases pose yet bigger challenges for the revised physical reading of the intention conditionterm. Consider the case of a credit card that is never activated and is only used to tighten screws. The revised physical reading of the intention conditionterm is unable to explain the artefactualityterm of this credit card. The physical properties that are necessary for an object to perform the function of tightening screws are different from the physical properties that are necessary for an object to perform the function of a credit card as a tool for financial transactions. The necessary physical modifications that are required for an object to function as a credit card are irrelevant for it to tighten screws. The fact that credit cards can be used to tighten screws is coincidental. The sharp corners of a credit card are not necessary features that a product needs to have to function as a tool for financial transactions.

Cases in which the intended physical modifications of artefactsterm are irrelevant for their actual use are also common in modern conceptual art. Consider the readymadesterm of Marcel Duchamp, which were selected from mass-produced, commercially available objects. The intended physical properties of the bicycle wheel that Duchamp used in his work Bicycle Wheel were irrelevant for its role in the artworkterm. The hub and each individual bearing inside it, the spokes or the material the wheel is made of, while necessary for the object to function as a bicycle wheel, are all irrelevant for the artworkterm. In fact, the fact that Bicycle Wheel presents a wheel of a bicycle is not necessary for this artworkterm. A similar artworkterm with a similar artistic meaning could have different physical structures like that of a coat rack, urinal or shovel, which happen to be the subjects of some of other readymadesterm, namely, Trap, Fountain and In Advance of the Broken Arm.

In response to these examples, some may defend the revised physical reading of the intention conditionterm by arguing that when an artist uses an object for their art, they assume the role of a creator, and the object undergoes a new round of modifications. According to this line of reasoning, even though artists may use objects that have already been intentionally modified, the final artworksterm should be viewed as the outcomes of the artists’ own modifications, rather than those of the original engineers. Consequently, the physical structures of artworksterm are to be regarded as products of the intentional modifications of the artists themselves.

However, there are two problems with the above argument. First, in the case of artworksterm such as Duchamp’s readymadesterm, the modifications that are made to commercially available products are very minimal. Here the artist’s interventions do not create new artefactsterm because their modifications do not meet the minimum level of artefact-making modification, as outlined by Devereux (1977) and Hilpinen (2011). Secondly, the above argument misses a fundamental point that in such works, the artist’s intention is specifically not to modify the object. The artist simply adds their signature and submits their work to art galleries. A key characteristic of these works is that the physical structure of the artworkterm cannot be attributed to any intentional act of modification by the artist. Hence, such works cannot be regarded as products of the artist’s intentional modifications. Therefore, the revised physical reading of the intention conditionterm cannot explain the artefactual status of cases where the intended modified properties of the object are irrelevant for its technical function or artistic meaning.

4 Contexts of creation and use Thus far, our attempts to clearly define the conditions that must be met for an object to qualify as an artefactterm, particularly regarding the interpretation of the intention conditionterm to prevent counterintuitive conclusions, have not been successful. In this section, a final amendment is proposed that can help define artefactsterm and avoid such counterintuitive conclusions. This amendment requires differentiating between the context of creationterm (i.e. the context in which the artefactterm is intentionally modified) and the context of useterm.

By making a distinction between the contexts of creation and use, we can assess an object’s status as an artefactterm solely within its context of creationterm and sidestep objections that arise from any discrepancies between the creators’ intentions and the ways in which artefactsterm are actually used. So, as long as an object is intentionally modified by its creators to serve a specific function, it qualifies as an artefactterm, and it retains this status even if the users’ intentions and its system functionterm do not align with the creators’ intentions and its proper functionterm. A spoon that is used as cutlery would be an artefactterm due to its design features, which render it suitable for such use. A spoon that is used as a baby toy would also qualify as an artefactterm, not because it was created for that purpose, but because it was modified by its creators to function as cutlery. The spoon would maintain its artefactual status even if it is incorporated into an artworkterm, used as a religious object or lost in the warehouse of its producers. Whatever happens to the spoon after its transformation into an artefactterm does not alter its artefactual status. Similarly, in this account, the readymadesterm of Duchamp would be artefactsterm because they were originally created with specific physical properties to serve particular functions, even if the creators’ intended functions and the object’s intended physical structure both proved irrelevant for their actual use by the artist. Making a distinction between the contexts of creation and use also means that in this account usefulness is not a criterion of artefactualityterm. In this way, this account differs from those who contend that artefactsterm are by definition useful objects (Houkes & Vermaas, 2010, pp. 148–160).

Our discussions have so far been limited to those artefactsterm that are designed to serve specific functions. Although the actual use of these artefactsterm sometimes deviated from their original design, the intention behind their creation was clear. However, it is also important to acknowledge that not all artefactsterm are created with a specific function or meaning in mind. As noted by Juvshik in his arguments against function essentialismterm, it is not necessary for creators to bestow a particular function or any function at all to their creations for the creations to qualify as artefactsterm (Juvshik, 2021, p. 2962). Many experimental design projects, for example, produce objects simply to explore new materials, forms or concepts, without a specific intended purpose. Modern interactive artworksterm, such as large concave or convex mirrors placed in public spaces, are examples of such artefactsterm. These installations invite the audience to interact with the piece, and the artefactterm’s meaning and function evolve dynamically with each interaction, often with the original creator having no specific intended meaning or utility in mind. In cases where creators do not intend a specific function or meaning, there is no need to appeal to the revised physical reading of the intention conditionterm, as in the absence of an intended function or meaning, the only reading of the intention conditionterm remains the original physical reading.

Therefore, a satisfactory account of artefactsterm requires separating the contexts of modification and use while upholding the modification conditionterm and the (revised) physical reading of the intention conditionterm. This account helps to explain cases of functional change or innovative useterm (where the object’s function differs from the creators’ intentions), cases where the object’s physical structure is not fully determined by the creators (e.g. small cutting tools created by smashing a glass bottle onto the ground) and cases where the specifics of creators’ modifications are irrelevant for the meaning of the artefactterm (e.g. Duchamp’s readymadesterm).

5 Artefactsterm, artworksterm and technologies The conditions of artefactualityterm as laid out here have some ramifications for the metaphysical study of artefactsterm, artworksterm and technologies. First, the distinction between the contexts of creation and use required for the definition of artefactsterm implies that artefactsterm cannot define or represent artworksterm or technologies. As Danto (1964, 1981) has noted, two seemingly identical objects might be classified differently: one as art and the other not. This entails that the artefactual status of an object cannot be sufficient for its classification as an artworkterm; otherwise, both objects would either be included or excluded from the category of artworksterm. On the other hand, it is possible for natural, unmodified objects to qualify as technologies or artworksterm. A piece of rock used as a doorstop qualifies as a technological object, and live horses tethered in an art gallery, such as those of Kounellis’s Untitled (12 Horses), acquire artistic identities. Hence, artefactualityterm is neither necessary nor sufficient for something to be an artworkterm or a technology.

Additionally, when the extensions of these categories overlap (i.e. when artefactsterm acquire artistic or technological identities), their defining characteristics diverge. Factors that confer artistic and technological identities to objects differ from those that constitute artefactualityterm. Objects’ artefactual status is determined in the context of creationterm. In contrast, the artistic or technological identity of objects is determined in the context of useterm. Whether a bicycle wheel, urinal or coat rack is displayed in an art gallery, serves a technical function, or is buried underground without anyone being aware of its existence, affects its status as a work of art or a technological object; but it does not change its status as an artefactterm.

While artefactsterm are necessarily modified objects, artworksterm and technologies do not need to be. New artworksterm and technologies can come into being by simply selecting an existing object and displaying it in an art gallery or using it as a tool. In other words, the modification conditionterm is not a requirement for artworksterm and technologies. Unmodified objects, such as a piece of driftwood presented as a sculpture (Weitz, 1956, p. 33), or a rock used as a hammer (SoltanzadehpersName, 2019, pp. 237-8), can qualify as artworksterm or technologies. Evnine (2013) also reaches a similar conclusion while discussing the ontology of readymadesterm such as Duchamp’s Fountain. In his view, an artworkterm (e.g. a sculpture) can be created by selecting an existing entity (e.g. a urinal) without modifying its structure (ibid., p. 416). The difference here is that based on this paper’s arguments, Fountain does not qualify as a new artefactterm distinct from the urinal. It remains the same artefactterm but it acquires an artistic identity. However, for Evnine, Fountain is not just a new entity as an artworkterm; it is also a new artefactterm, distinct from the urinal it was made from. Treating Fountain as a new artefactterm is rooted in Evnine’s rejection of modification as a necessary condition of artefactualityterm (2016, pp. 110 − 12). In his view, the intention of creators to bring about a new entity is a sufficient condition of artefactualityterm; artefactterm creation does not necessarily involve physical modifications. Accordingly, he treats artworksterm as instances of artefactsterm and considers acts of creating artworksterm as acts of creating new artefactsterm. Accepting Evnine’s view implies that either Kounellis’s horses are artefactsterm, or that they are not an artworkterm. Similarly, his view cannot explain the difference between naturefactsterm and artefactsterm, and would consider all naturefactsterm (e.g. a rock used as a hammer or a broken tree branch used as a walking stick) as artefactsterm. These are counterintuitive conclusions. Modification is a necessary condition for artefactterm creation, but it is not necessary for assigning artistic or technological identities to objects.

Moreover, while artefactual status requires the existence of the creator’s intention, artistic or technological identities can be independent from the intentions of artefactterm creators. Instead, they depend on the intentions and attitudes of those who approach the object in the context of useterm, as works of art or technological objects. The conditions of artefactualityterm discussed in the previous sections are crucial here. Failure to attend to the modification and intention conditionsterm and distinguish between the contexts of creation and use can lead to a conflation between the category of artefactsterm with that of artworksterm and technologies.

On another point, investigating the nature of the relationship between artefactsterm and designers’ intentions also reveals that while artefactterm creation necessarily requires intentional action, the link between artefactsterm and the content of creators’ intentions can be flexible. More specifically, creators do not need to strictly determine the function or physical form of the final product for it to qualify as an artefactterm or for them to be regarded as its creators. In some cases, creators may even intentionally limit their control over the physical form and meaning of their creations and invite elements of randomness and spontaneity. Drip paintings are examples of such artefactsterm. Drip painters deliberately avoid traditional compositional methods that emphasise control over artistic form, and instead allow unpredictable interactions with the paint to shape the final product. So, although the existence of creator intention is required for objects to qualify as artefactsterm, the content of that intention does not need to determine the function or specific form of artefactsterm.

Finally, it is also important to note that the points made in the previous paragraph and throughout this paper pertain solely to the metaphysical study of artefactsterm, artworksterm and technologies. They are not intended as normative claims about how artefactsterm should be created. Nor do they imply any claims about the socially desirable relationship between designers’ intentions and the function or physical form of artefactsterm. In many societies, the production of artefactsterm, especially those intended to be used as technical artefactsterm, is regulated. Regulators may require technical artefactsterm to meet certain specifications in order to be safe and function as claimed by their creators. By enforcing these requirements through safety standards, quality control or certification processes, they strengthen the connection between creators’ intentions and the properties of the final products. This, in turn, helps to establish mechanisms of accountability and allows creators to be held responsible for the features of their products. However, here social desirability is not considered a criterion for a metaphysical account of artefactsterm. Metaphysically, even when an artefactterm’s physical form is not entirely determined by the intentions of its creators, it can still qualify as an artefactterm.

In addition to the points discussed in this section, the analysis of the relationship between artefactualityterm and the context of creationterm supports a central claim of this paper: artefactualityterm is an essential propertyterm, and identifying an artworkterm, a technology or any other object as an artefactterm is an essentialist identificationterm of that object. To reach this conclusion, it is necessary to first distinguish between different forms of essentialismterm.

6 Essenceterm and essentialismterm Essentialismterm in relation to any category, say X, is the idea that all instances of X share a common set of properties that are necessary for their identity as instances of X. These properties constitute the essenceterm of X, and it is the possession of this essenceterm which makes something an instance of X, as opposed to an instance of Y or Z. Hence, the essenceterm of X reveals its identity and answers the ‘What is X?’ question (Fine, 1994, p. 1). Accordingly, an essentialist identificationterm of the category of X is the identification of X through its essenceterm. Identifying silver as a chemical element with the atomic number 47 is an essentialist identificationterm of silver. Being a chemical element with atomic number 47 is considered the essenceterm of silver, and it is this essenceterm which makes any instance of silver an instance of silver, as opposed to instances of copper or iron. Clearly, not all category identifications are essentialist. For example, it is possible for all silver to be naturally present in, or brought to, one specific physical location, such as one particular mine. In that case, silver could be defined as the element that is stored in that location. But this identification is not essentialist, because it relies on a contingent fact.

There are various conceptions of essenceterm, and theories of essentialismterm differ in how they conceptualise what it means for a property to be essential. A common view is that for a property P to be essential to X, it must be necessary that X has P (Fine, 1994). In this view, which is adopted in this paper, essential properties are necessary properties (though not vice versa). So, here an essential propertyterm is one that ‘entities cannot fail to instantiate in case they exist’ (Bovey, 2021, p. 7716). This view explains why identification of silver by referring to the location where it is stored cannot be an essentialist identificationterm of silver.

One can distinguish between the essentialist identificationterm of kinds and the essentialist identificationterm of objects, or as Okasha puts it, between essentialist claims about kinds and essentialist claims about individuals (Okasha, 2002, p. 192). The formulation provided at the beginning of this section pertains to the essentialist identificationterm of kinds. In contrast, the essentialist identificationterm of an object, say O, refers to identifying O based on a set of properties that reveal its nature and it necessarily possesses. For example, identifying a monarch’s silver crown based on its necessary and universal properties (e.g. as a piece of silver with a specific shape and weight) is an essentialist identificationterm of the crown, as a specific object. Clearly, not all object identifications are essentialist. The same crown can be identified in different, non-essentialist ways, for instance, through the museum room where it is currently displayed or the last monarch who wore it.

Moreover, essentialismterm can be understood in relation to either intrinsic or relational properties. ‘Intrinsic essentialismterm’ defines essenceterm in terms of intrinsic properties of a kind or an object. Identifying the natural kind of silver based on its atomic number is an essentialist identificationterm of silver in this sense. This sense of essentialismterm is more common, and it is sometimes assumed that essential properties are, by definition, intrinsic properties. However, essentialismterm can also be defined in relation to extrinsic, relational properties. Identifying a person in relation to their biological parents is an essentialist identificationterm of the individual in this latter sense. This identification relies on relational properties that an individual has with their biological parents. Relational properties are extrinsic properties. But in this case, they are also necessary and context-independent. The biological parents of an individual never change, regardless of their life circumstances.

Essentialismterm defined through relational properties is sometimes discussed in the context of defining biological species and is referred to as ‘relational essentialismterm’ (Ereshefsky, 2022). In biology, relational essentialismterm holds that the essential properties of a species can be determined by their relationships, such as their ecological roles or evolutionary connections (Okasha, 2002). It is argued that biological kinds do not possess an intrinsic essenceterm; instead, their essenceterm is historical and rooted in the species’ origin or evolutionary history (LaPorte, 2004). Relational essentialismterm can also be generalised to other domains. When social, historical or biological relationships serve as necessary and context-independent features of a kind or an object, those relationships qualify as essential properties. This inherent context-independence is what unites the intrinsic and relational forms of essentialismterm. Objects or kinds retain their essential properties regardless of the spatio-temporal contexts in which they appear.

7 Artefactual essentialismterm in philosophy of art and technology The idea that artefactsterm may have essencesterm has been discussed by some others. Evnine (2016, pp. 86–96), for example, has argued that each artefactterm has an essenceterm. This essenceterm is determined in the processes of artefactterm creation by the intentions of the creators to produce objects of certain kinds. Hence, for Evnine, the essenceterm of each artefactterm is the kind to which it belongs. In other words, artefactsterm essentially belong to their artefactual kinds (ibid., p. 86). Even in the case of a prototype where a kind may not yet exist, Evnine argues that one can think of an abstract kind as the essenceterm of the artefactterm. This abstract kind, for example, can be defined as ‘a tool for doing such and such’ (ibid., p. 73). Evnine’s position is incompatible with earlier points made in the Contexts of Creation and Use section. Not all artefactsterm are created with specific function or meaning in mind. Creators’ intention to construct an artefactterm of a particular kind cannot constitute the essenceterm of artefactsterm, because artefactterm creation is not always accompanied by the intention to produce an object of a particular kind. As stipulated by the intention conditionterm, artefactsterm inherently carry their creators’ intentions. However, the intention conditionterm must be interpreted in reference to its physical reading: artefactterm production is more about intentional modification of objects’ physical structure, rather than determining their kind.

Juvshik (2021) and Houkes and Vermaas (2010, pp. 137–160), on the other hand, dispute the idea that artefactsterm have an essenceterm by rejecting function essentialismterm. Function essentialismterm is the view that each artefactterm necessarily has a function that determines what kind of artefactterm it is. The discussions in the Artefactsterm, Technologies and Artworksterm section strengthen the rejection of function essentialismterm because here function is determined in the context of useterm, which makes it contingent and non-essential. Nevertheless, rejecting function essentialismterm does not amount to rejecting essentialist commitments that can arise from identifying objects as artefactsterm. Hence, this section builds on the previous discussions of the paper to argue that artefactualityterm is itself an essential propertyterm, and identifying an artworkterm, a technology or any object based on its artefactual status is an essentialist identificationterm of that object. This conclusion will also mean that regarding artefactsterm as the subject matter of philosophy of art and technology is inconsistent with the anti-essentialist aspirations in these fields.

An object becomes an artefactterm when its creators intentionally modify its physical properties in order for it to serve a particular function. The separation between the contexts of modification and use in defining artefactsterm is crucial here, as it implies that even if an artefactterm never fulfils its intended function, it still qualifies as an artefactterm. Even if it is buried underground, it remains an artefactterm. And even if the artefactterm is physically indistinguishable from a natural, unmodified object, and no one is aware that the object was once intentionally modified, it still retains its status as an artefactterm. The artefactual status of each artefactterm is determined in the context of creationterm, tied to a spatio-temporally fixed location. This historical link between the artefactterm and its context of creationterm is necessary and context-independent. It is part of the identity of the artefactterm. It constitutes the relational essenceterm of the artefactterm. Therefore, when the artefactualityterm of an object is treated as its defining feature, the object is identified via its necessary and context-independent, or in other words, essential properties. The relational essentialismterm arising from identifying an object based on its artefactualityterm can be dubbed artefactual essentialismterm.

In the previous section, a distinction was made between the essential identification of kinds and the essential identification of objects. Based on this distinction, there are two ways in which one can reject essentialismterm in philosophy of art and technology, and this paper’s arguments pertain to both. Rejecting the essential identification of the categories of art and technology is the idea that there is no single property that is necessarily shared by all works of art or by all technological objects. Instead, in different contexts, different properties can confer artistic or technological identities to objects. Early discussions of this paper can be used to reject the idea that all artworksterm or technologies necessarily share the property of being artefactual. On the other hand, rejecting the essential identification of individual artworksterm or technologies requires one not to define an individual work of art or technological object via its necessary and universal (i.e. essential) properties. It is the idea that the identity of any given artworkterm or technology can be determined via its context-dependent properties. Artefactual essentialismterm is a claim about the essential identification of individual objects. When a work of art or technological object is identified as an artefactterm, it is identified in an essentialist way. When a philosopher of art or technology considers artefactualityterm as the defining subject matter of their field, as what defines each individual object that they philosophise about, they are committed to embracing artefactual essentialismterm. To reject artefactual essentialismterm, one must stop identifying artworksterm and technologies based on their artefactual status.

Now the question is whether artefactual essentialismterm can be avoided. Earlier in the paper it was demonstrated that artefactualityterm is not a necessary or sufficient condition for being a work of art or a technological object. Nevertheless, many artworksterm and technologies happen to be artefactsterm. Does this mean that in the case of this large group of artworksterm and technologies, one must accept artefactual essentialismterm? The answer is not straightforward and depends on the availability of other means of identification.

Consider a walking stick. Once the walking stick is identified by its artefactualityterm, tied with its production history, in line with Preston’s notion of proper functionterm, then it is identified in an essentialist way. However, having an essenceterm does not necessitate essentialist identificationsterm. Even if an object is an artefactterm, it may not be necessary for it to be identified through its artefactualityterm. It might be possible to identify the object by its non-essential properties. In the case of technologies, non-essentialist identifications can be achieved by focusing on objects’ immediate utility and impact, in line with Preston’s notion of system functionterm. For example, the walking stick can be identified via its system functionterm as a tool for balance and mobility or for any other purpose that it is used. This functional identification of the walking stick is context-sensitive and does not rely on any essential properties, including its artefactual status. In general, non-essentialist functional identifications are available for technologies because they can be identified via their context-dependent utility and impact. A philosophy of technology that identifies its subject matter based on the context-dependent utility and impact of objects can remain non-essentialist.

Nevertheless, in cases where it is necessary to identify an object as an artefactterm in order to recognise its role and significance, there is no escape from artefactual essentialismterm. Naturalistic paintings, for example, are appreciated as works of art precisely because they are recognised as products of intentional modifications. The meaning of some conceptual artworksterm also depends on their artefactual status. Consider Duchamp’s readymadesterm once again. The readymadesterm were deliberately selected from mass-produced objects. Their artefactualityterm is necessary for their meaning as readymadesterm. Such artworksterm must be identified through their artefactual status. They would lose their artistic significance if they were not identified as artefactsterm; if they were deprived of their artefactual essenceterm. These cases make it hard to fully avoid artefactual essentialismterm in philosophy of art.

8 Conclusion Artefactsterm have gained popularity as a subject of philosophical inquiry, particularly in the study of art and technology. This is to the point that artefactsterm are sometimes regarded as the defining subject matter of these fields; as what artworksterm and technological objects are. At the same time, many philosophers of art and technology reject essentialismterm and argue that artistic and technological identities are context-dependent. Here it was demonstrated that these two positions are incompatible with one another, and that the first position is flawed. Artefactualityterm is a relationally essential propertyterm, and identifying an artworkterm, a technology or any other object on the basis of its artefactual status is an essentialist identificationterm of that object. So, while there have been attempts to provide non-essentialist accounts of art, technology and technical functions, as long as philosophy of technology and art concern themselves with artefactsterm, they cannot fully reject essentialismterm.

Artefactsterm are objects that have been modified to have the physical features that their creators intend them to have. However, an artefactterm’s physical form may not be entirely determined by its creators. Similarly, whether artefactsterm are used as their creators intended is irrelevant for their artefactual status. In a nutshell, while the existence of a creator’s intention is necessary for something to qualify as an artefactterm, the specific content of that intention is not.

There is a strong overlap between artworksterm and technologies, on the one hand, and artefactsterm, on the other. But this overlap is a contingent matter. Artefactualityterm is not a criterion for an object to be an artworkterm or a technology. Kounellis’s Untitled (12 Horses) is an example of a work of art that is not an artefactterm, and a broken tree branch used as a walking stick is an example of a non-artefactual technological object. More specifically, factors that make an object an artefactterm differ from those that make it an artworkterm or a technology. While the artefactual status is determined in the context of creationterm, the artistic or technological status is determined in the context of useterm. And while artefactsterm are necessarily modified, artworksterm and technologies need not be. Failure to recognise the conditions of artefactualityterm and make a distinction between the contexts of creation and use can lead to a conflation between the category of artefactsterm, on the one hand, and artworksterm and technologies, on the other.

Artefactualityterm is an essential propertyterm; a relationally essential one. The artefactual essenceterm lies in the historical relationship between the artefactterm and the context in which it was intentionally modified. When an object is identified as an artefactterm, it is identified by its essential properties. The form of essentialismterm arising from identifying objects on the basis of their artefactual status is called artefactual essentialismterm.

Given the conclusions of this paper, philosophers of art and technology may need to reconsider whether artefactsterm are the right subject matter for non-essentialist accounts. Artefactual essentialismterm can be avoided if individual artworksterm and technologies are not identified on the basis of their artefactual status. But it is easier to avoid artefactual essentialismterm in philosophy of technology than in philosophy of art. When technologies are identified by their immediate utility and impact, their artefactual status can be sidelined. However, sometimes appreciating works of art requires acknowledging them as artefactsterm, as products of intentional modifications. In such cases, the artefactual essenceterm undermines non-essentialist accounts.

Future research can examine other forms of essentialismterm that may exist in the philosophy of art and technology and investigate whether they can be avoided. Exploring other forms of essentialismterm could further clarify the limits of anti-essentialist views.