Electoral Institutions and Legislative Behavior: Explaining Voting Defection in the European Parliament — TEI-tagged view

Simon Hix · 2004 · political-science · doi:10.1353/wp.2004.0012 · full text at the source · TEI xml · tagged edition · index · concepts · authors
Where this record's text came from. faceted 2026-08 by reading the locally held text (pdftext); every evidence string verified as an exact substring of that text before merging. The only explicit self-to-prior-work relation in the text is in a footnote (note 16), and the extraction runs the footnote sentence into the full citation, so the quoted evidence is the leading clause of that footnote rather than a free-standing body sentence; it is an exact substring. Other citations in the article characterise the literature rather than positioning this paper against it, so no further relations were recorded. Method is coded observational-study (large-N fixed-effects logit analysis of recorded roll-call behaviour); the paper also contains a formal decision-theoretic model, which the single method facet cannot capture. 2026-08-14, 2026-08-15 and 2026-08-25 schema-0.3 passes: every quote verified as an exact substring of the staged text and anchored at merge time; concept terms verified present; every edge endpoint an existing node.
Other fields define these differently the same word, defined another way in another discipline
logistic regression 3 fields · confidence interval 2 fields
Tags on this paper every tag the record carries, whether or not the words occur in the text below — a number is how many papers in the corpus carry that tag; a tag with no number is unique to this paper
policy conflict closed-list proportional representation semiopen-list PR systems roll-call votes closed-list observational-study83

Our tag layer for this paper

Cross-disciplinary analysis
content-tags & facets: phenomenon · claim-type · cross-domain-transfer · mechanism · claim-relation · replication-status · limitation — grounded in the full text
phenomenonlegislative voting defection— “Section III proposes a theory of legislative voting in the European Parliament that predicts the circumstances under which an MEP will defect from her parliamentary party or her national party.”
claim-typemechanism— “The results reveal that national parties are more able to enforce their wishes on their MEPs in systems containing electoral institutions that provide these principals with strong controls—specifically, in systems with closed-list proportional representation, small districts, or centralized candidate selection.”
method — evidence— “To explain these MEP defection decisions and to test the predictions of the theoretical model, we can estimate the following fixed-effects logit model:”
mechanismCentralized candidate selection gives the national leadership a credible power to punish, so the MEP anticipates the cost and complies with national instructions— “Following the previous discussion, we can assume that the more centralized the system of candidate selection in the hands of the national party leadership, the more likely it is that the national party will be able to punish that MEP, regardless of the type of electoral system or the size of the MEP's electoral district.”mechanisms[0]
mechanismThe MEP weighs the cost of defecting from each principal and votes for whichever side leaves her better off, an expected-utility calculation— “Accordingly, each MEP makes a vote decision based on the overall expected utility of her action.”mechanisms[1]
mechanismWhere individual candidate votes decide electoral fortunes, reelection-seeking legislators cultivate a personal following independent of the party, which loosens party discipline— “In systems in which votes cast for individual candidates—as opposed to votes cast for a party list—significantly influence each candidate's electoral fortunes, legislators seeking reelection have strategic incentives to cultivate personal support among the electorate.”mechanisms[2]
builds-on Gabel and Hix (2002), "The European Parliament and Executive Politics in the EU"— “This builds on the model in Matthew Gabel and Simon Hix,”claim_relations[0]
senseelectoral system - AS FORMAL RULE: semiopen- or ordered-list PR, where voters may vote for the list or for an individual politician— “Some countries use semiopen- or ordered-list PR systems, in which parties propose preordered lists and voters can either vote for the party list as a whole or for an individual politician.”senses[0]
senseelectoral system - AS PRACTICE: the same systems classified with closed-list PR, because votes for individual candidates rarely decide who is elected— “Accordingly, votes for individual candidates rarely determine which candidates are elected. Therefore, because parties control who gets elected, most semiopen-list PR systems are, in practice, very similar to closed-list PR systems.”senses[1]
sensepolicy conflict - a PROXY measure between the two party principals, preferred over the conflict actually observed in a vote precisely because the observed version is endogenous— “These are proxy measures of policy conflict between the two party principals. This, however, is preferable to using observed conflict in each vote because conflict in a particular vote is endogenous to the MEPs' vote decisions.”senses[2]
sensepolicy conflict - measured by proxy ON PURPOSE: observed per-vote conflict is rejected as endogenous to the decision being explained, so the construct is measured away from the thing it predicts— “CONFL is a vector of two variables that indicates the level of policy conflict between an MEP's national party and her European party group on the two main dimensions of EU politics. These are proxy measures of policy conflict between the two party principals. This, however, is preferable to using observed conflict in each vote because…senses[3]
controla vector of 1,031 dummy variables, one for every vote — held — rules out that the estimate is driven by the differing defection rates and political salience of particular votes rather than by the electoral institution— “VOTE is a vector of 1,031 dummy variables that indicate each vote; these variables are included to control for the effect of varying levels of defection and political salience of each vote.”controls[0]
auditsemiopen-list PR systems —same-as→ closed-list — Audit 2026-09-28: DOUBTFUL - read against its span and kept, but the span says most semiopen-list systems act like closed-list ones; same-as overstates it.— “Accordingly, votes for individual candidates rarely determine which candidates are elected. Therefore, because parties control who gets elected, most semiopen-list PR systems are, in practice, very similar to closed-list PR systems”concept_edges[0]
differs insemiopen-list PR systems —same-as→ closed-list — NOTHING THAT MATTERS TO THE OUTCOME, WHICH IS THE POINT: the two are formally distinct - semiopen lists let voters express a preference for individuals - but 'because parties control who gets elected, most semiopen-list PR systems are, IN PRACTICE, very similar to closed-list PR systems'. The formal distinction survives; the behavioural one does not— “Accordingly, votes for individual candidates rarely determine which candidates are elected. Therefore, because parties control who gets elected, most semiopen-list PR systems are, in practice, very similar to closed-list PR systems”concept_edges[0]
notesemiopen-list PR systems —same-as→ closed-list — A FORMAL CATEGORY COLLAPSED INTO ANOTHER ON THE EVIDENCE OF PRACTICE, and the record already carries both readings as senses of 'electoral system' - AS FORMAL RULE and AS PRACTICE. The analysis then treats the merged class as one, so every downstream coefficient depends on this move.— “Accordingly, votes for individual candidates rarely determine which candidates are elected. Therefore, because parties control who gets elected, most semiopen-list PR systems are, in practice, very similar to closed-list PR systems”concept_edges[0]
weightsemiopen-list PR systems —same-as→ closed-list — 0.8— “Accordingly, votes for individual candidates rarely determine which candidates are elected. Therefore, because parties control who gets elected, most semiopen-list PR systems are, in practice, very similar to closed-list PR systems”concept_edges[0]
outcome (stated by the tagger, no quotation)control — heldcontrols[0]
for which uselimitation — every significance claim in the paper: THE EFFECT OF MOST OF THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES IS HIGHLY SIGNIFICANT, PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF THE LARGE NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS— “The effect of most of the independent variables is highly significant, primarily because of the large number of observations.”limitations[0]
for which uselimitation — the policy-conflict variables: THESE ARE PROXY MEASURES OF POLICY CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TWO PARTY PRINCIPALS, built from survey distances rather than observed— “These are proxy measures of policy conflict between the two party principals.”limitations[1]
for which uselimitation — the party-group results: BECAUSE OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE MODEL, THESE RESULTS ... APPLY ONLY TO THOSE MEPS WHO ARE NOT MEMBERS OF THE FIVE LARGEST NATIONAL DELEGATIONS— “However, because of the structure of the model, these results for the two main European party groups apply only to those MEPs who are not members of the five largest national delegations in these party groups.”limitations[2]
for which uselimitation — the national-party defection result specifically: THE EFFECT OF THE EU-INTEGRATION POLICY DISTANCE ... IS LESS CLEAR— “The effect of the EU-integration policy distance between a national party and its European party group, however, is less clear.”limitations[3]
for which uselimitation — the candidate-centred versus party-centred classification of electoral systems: semiopen-list systems are placed with closed-list ones because of observed voter behaviour rather than the rule— “In most countries employing these systems, however, the overwhelming majority of voters choose to vote for the preordered list rather than for individual politicians. Accordingly, votes for individual candidates rarely determine which candidates are elected. Therefore, because parties control who gets elected, most semiopen-list PR systems…limitations[4]
for which uselimitation — the conflict variable as a measure of conflict in the vote at hand: it is a proxy, adopted because conflict observed in a particular vote is endogenous to the vote decisions being explained— “These are proxy measures of policy conflict between the two party principals. This, however, is preferable to using observed conflict in each vote because conflict in a particular vote is endogenous to the MEPs' vote decisions.”limitations[5]
for which uselimitation — the party group's behaviour in this model: it is assumed not to act strategically when issuing voting instructions, while the national party is allowed to— “because the size of internal conflict is endogenous to the party group majority's position on an issue, I assume that the party group does not act strategically when issuing voting instructions—the majority simply takes a position, which is then communicated to the backbenchers.”limitations[6]
for which uselimitation — the debate over a single European electoral system: the article states the existing arguments have remained normative— “However, these arguments have remained at a normative level and have not been developed theoretically or tested empirically.”limitations[7]
replicationuntested
limitationStatistical significance is inflated by the very large number of vote-decision observations.— “The effect of most of the independent variables is highly significant, primarily because of the large number of observations.”limitations[0]
limitationPolicy conflict between an MEP's two principals is not observed directly but approximated by survey-based distance measures.— “These are proxy measures of policy conflict between the two party principals.”limitations[1]
limitationThe party-group coefficients do not generalise to MEPs in the largest national delegations because of how the model is specified.— “However, because of the structure of the model, these results for the two main European party groups apply only to those MEPs who are not members of the five largest national delegations in these party groups.”limitations[2]
limitationOne of the two policy-conflict predictors does not yield a clear result for national-party defection.— “The effect of the EU-integration policy distance between a national party and its European party group, however, is less clear.”limitations[3]
limitationA formal category is collapsed into a different one on the basis of how voters behave, not on the rule that defines it: semiopen-list systems are treated as closed-list because voters in practice choose the preordered list.— “In most countries employing these systems, however, the overwhelming majority of voters choose to vote for the preordered list rather than for individual politicians. Accordingly, votes for individual candidates rarely determine which candidates are elected. Therefore, because parties control who gets elected, most semiopen-list PR systems…limitations[4]
limitationThe key explanatory variable is measured by proxy, and the reason given is endogeneity rather than validity: the observed quantity would be caused by the thing being explained.— “These are proxy measures of policy conflict between the two party principals. This, however, is preferable to using observed conflict in each vote because conflict in a particular vote is endogenous to the MEPs' vote decisions.”limitations[5]
limitationOne side of the model is assumed non-strategic, and the assumption is adopted because the quantity involved is endogenous.— “because the size of internal conflict is endogenous to the party group majority's position on an issue, I assume that the party group does not act strategically when issuing voting instructions—the majority simply takes a position, which is then communicated to the backbenchers.”limitations[6]
limitationThe arguments the article sets out to adjudicate are reported as never having been tested.— “However, these arguments have remained at a normative level and have not been developed theoretically or tested empirically.”limitations[7]
limitationThe merged electoral-system class is a modelling decision resting on a behavioural generalisation - that parties control who gets elected, so voter preferences for individuals rarely matter - and every result for that class inherits it.— “Accordingly, votes for individual candidates rarely determine which candidates are elected. Therefore, because parties control who gets elected, most semiopen-list PR systems are, in practice, very similar to closed-list PR systems”limitations[8]
Content tags
content-observations: finding · quantity · variable · definition · key-term — grounded in the full text
findingMEPs elected under institutions that weaken their national party's grip — a candidate-centered electoral system, decentralized candidate selection, and large district magnitude — are less likely to vote against their European party group.— “The less control a national party can exert over its MEPs as a result of the electoral institutions—if there is a candidate-centered electoral system, decentralized candidate selection, and a large district magnitude— the less likely it is that an MEP from this party will vote against the majority position of her European party group.”content_tags.findings[0]
findingThe same three institutions push in the opposite direction for the other principal: candidate-centered voting rules, decentralized candidate selection, or a large district each make an MEP more likely to vote against her own national party.— “In all models, if an MEP is elected under candidate-centered voting rules, with decentralized candidate-selection rules, or in a district with a large magnitude, that MEP is more likely to vote against her national party.”content_tags.findings[1]
findingAn MEP is more likely to vote against her national party only under a candidate-centered system combined with decentralized candidate selection.— “An MEP is more likely to vote against her national party only when she is elected under a candidate-centered system with decentralized candidate-selection rules.”content_tags.findings[2]
findingLonger service in the European Parliament lowers defection from the European party group but raises defection from the national party.— “Finally, as expected, the longer an MEP has been in the European Parliament, the less likely it is that she will vote against her European party group, but the more likely it is that she will…content_tags.findings[3]
findingDomestic legislative-executive design and territorial structure do not affect how MEPs vote in the European Parliament.content_tags.findings[4]
findingDefection is rare overall: MEPs almost always voted with the majorities of both their European party group and their national party.content_tags.findings[5]
findingNational parties enforce their wishes best under closed-list PR, small districts or centralized candidate selection.content_tags.findings[6]
quantity1,031 — roll-call votes held in the European Parliament between July 1999 and June 2000, cast by 626 sitting MEPs, producing 645,406 individual vote decisions
Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher.
content_tags.quantities[0]
quantity396,167 — vote decisions left in the analysis after exclusions, made by 526 MEPs from fifty-five national parties in fourteen member states
Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher.
content_tags.quantities[1]
quantitymore than 30 percent — reduction in the probability of voting against one's European party group for an MEP elected under the full set of institutions granting independence from the national party
Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher.
content_tags.quantities[2]
quantityapproximately 20 percent — reduction in the probability of voting against one's national party for an MEP elected under the full set of institutions giving the national leadership control
Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher.
content_tags.quantities[3]
quantity16 percent / 15 percent — EPP members are that much less likely, and PES members that much more likely, than the average MEP to vote against their European party group
Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher.
content_tags.quantities[4]
quantity33 percent (± 2 percent) — extra likelihood that British Conservative MEPs vote against their European party group relative to the average MEP (Model 3); in Model 8 they are 19 percent (± 7 percent) more likely to defect from their national party
Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher.
content_tags.quantities[5]
quantity7,504 — double defections in which an MEP voted yes or no directly against both principals — under 2 percent of all analysed vote decisions
Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher.
content_tags.quantities[6]
quantityOne hundred ninety-five MEPs (31 percent of the 626 members) — respondents to the EPRG survey used to build the left-right and EU-integration policy-distance measures
Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher.
content_tags.quantities[7]
variableelectoral institution variables (independent)
Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher.
content_tags.variables[0]
variableElectoral System (independent)
Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher.
content_tags.variables[1]
variableCandidate Selection (independent)
Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher.
content_tags.variables[2]
variableDistrict Magnitude (independent)
Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher.
content_tags.variables[3]
variablepolicy conflict (independent)
Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher.
content_tags.variables[4]
variableMEP defection (dependent)
Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher.
content_tags.variables[5]
variableseniority (control)
Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher.
content_tags.variables[6]
variableEPG (control)
Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher.
content_tags.variables[7]
variableNP (control)
Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher.
content_tags.variables[8]
variableVOTE (control)
Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher.
content_tags.variables[9]
definitionclosed-list proportional representation (PR) system
Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher.
content_tags.definitions[0]
definitionsemiopen- or ordered-list PR system
Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher.
content_tags.definitions[1]
definitionfully open-list PR system
Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher.
content_tags.definitions[2]
definitionsingle-transferable-vote (STV) system
Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher.
content_tags.definitions[3]
definitionelectoral institutions
Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher.
content_tags.definitions[4]
definitionan MEP's two principals
Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher.
content_tags.definitions[5]
definitiondefection
Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher.
content_tags.definitions[6]
definitionthe European Parliament as a laboratory
Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher.
content_tags.definitions[7]
Concepts
terms this paper carries, each with the sentence it was cut from — the layer that joins one paper to another. Terms with no quote yet are on CONCEPTS.html.
conceptpolicy conflict
Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher.
concepts[0]
conceptclosed-list proportional representation
Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher.
concepts[1]
conceptsemiopen-list PR systems
Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher.
concepts[2]
conceptroll-call votes
Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher.
concepts[3]
conceptclosed-list
Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher.
concepts[4]
Statistics — cross-field join keys
field-invariant statistical terms, used in their statistical sense (gated on a number / symbol / test). A p-value or a standard deviation means the SAME thing in physics, biology, psychology and sociology — so these are the strongest cross-field join keys. Grounded verbatim.
logistic regression as written: fixed-effects logit model
Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher.
content_tags.statistics[0]
fixed effects as written: Fixed effects (dummy variables)
Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher.
content_tags.statistics[1]
predicted probability as written: conditional probability
Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher.
content_tags.statistics[2]
confidence interval as written: 95 percent confidence interval
Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher.
content_tags.statistics[3]
significance test Pr as written: two-tailed test
Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher.
content_tags.statistics[4]

When we have changed our mind. Some entries in the table begin with a word in capitals and the reason for it. EVIDENCE CORRECTED — the finding still stands, but we had quoted the wrong sentence from the paper, and the quotation has been replaced with the right one. RETRACTED — the entry itself was wrong; it stays on the page, marked, with the reason, rather than being deleted. WITHDRAWN AND REPLACED — the entry was wrong, and a corrected version of it appears in the entries below. Each mark carries its own reason, in brackets, because the reasons differ from one entry to the next. An entry we have WITHDRAWN is removed from this page and kept in the record, with its reason. A line reading Audit and a date is a later re-reading of the entry against its whole sentence: DOUBTFUL means it was kept, and the reason says what is loose about it. Quotation marks inside the tagger's sentence. Where a tag is the tagger's own sentence, a phrase in quotation marks inside it is borrowed from the paper — the tagger's wording around it is not. The paper's own sentence is the evidence quote for that row; on this page it is withheld with the article, and the article is at its publisher. Nothing inside quotation marks anywhere on this page is ours: if it is quoted, it is the paper's. Whose words a concept carries. A concept entry records a term the paper itself uses, so the term, the sense given for it, and its evidence are the paper's own words, quoted where the paper fixes them. This is the opposite of a sense entry in the tag table, which is the tagger's sentence about how the paper uses a term. Where a concept entry could not be grounded in the paper's words, the entry says so on its own row.

Tag layer © the Meta-Tagging Project, CC BY 4.0. The paper text is © its authors/publisher and is linked, not reproduced. Excerpts shown are short quotations for identification and verification. · back to index · concepts · authors · עברית
© 2026 Shir Sivroni · ORCID 0009-0000-2597-2824