phenomenon · claim-type · cross-domain-transfer · mechanism · claim-relation · replication-status · limitation — grounded in the full text| phenomenon | scientific explanation and theory change— “This article examines scientific explanation, theory change, and epistemic boundaries in contemporary philosophy of science.” | |
| claim-type | critique— “The central argument advanced here is that philosophy of science is best understood not as a search for one timeless criterion of scientific rationality, but as an inquiry into how multiple epistemic ideals—explanation, empirical adequacy, objectivity, progress, and ontological commitment—are coordinated, contested, and reinterpreted within… | |
| method — evidence | — “The philosophical history surveyed in this article shows that no simple answer has survived intact.” | |
| mechanism | Objectivity is produced, not presupposed: structuring methods and communities so that criticism, transparency and diverse perspectives circulate prevents any single bias or standpoint from going unchecked, which is what makes objective claims possible in a socially organised practice— “It is what becomes possible when social and methodological arrangements are structured so that no single bias or perspective can easily dominate unchecked.” | mechanisms[0] |
| mechanism | Realist commitment survives theory change because what is carried across revolutions is the structural content of superseded theories — their relational organisation, mathematical form and dependency patterns — rather than their full ontology— “If older successful theories were later rejected, perhaps what survives across scientific revolutions is not the full ontology of those theories but their structural content: the relational organization, mathematical form, or dependency patterns they captured.” | mechanisms[1] |
| mechanism | The pluralisation of explanation was driven by the demand for rigour itself: holding accounts answerable to actual scientific practice forced the abandonment of a single universal schema— “This transformation did not occur because philosophers lost interest in rigor. It occurred because rigor itself required closer responsiveness to the sciences.” | mechanisms[2] |
| builds-on | Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entries on scientific realism and scientific objectivity— “The Stanford Encyclopedia entry on scientific realism makes this point directly by observing that debates about realism are connected to almost everything else in philosophy of science because they concern the very nature of scientific knowledge, while the entry on scientific objectivity similarly treats objectivity as an ideal that… | claim_relations[0] |
| sense | incommensurability - A CHANGED MEANING THAT THEN SPLIT IN TWO: originally lack of common measure, and later divided by philosophical discussion into conceptual and methodological incommensurability, so the word names an older idea and two newer ones at once— “The SEP entry on incommensurability clarifies that the term originally referred to lack of common measure and that later philosophical discussion distinguished conceptual and methodological incommensurability” | senses[0] |
| sense | explanation - SEVERAL MODELS, EACH PRESUPPOSING A DIFFERENT IMAGE OF SCIENCE: discussion begins with lawful derivation and later adds causal, mechanistic, unificationist and pragmatic alternatives, and the article says the sequence matters because the models are not interchangeable accounts of one thing— “modern discussion begins with the deductive-nomological model and its effort to analyze explanation in terms of lawful derivation, but later developments introduced causal, mechanistic, unificationist, and pragmatic alternatives. This historical sequence matters because each model of explanation presupposes a different image of science… | senses[1] |
| sense | representation - NOT ONE PROBLEM BUT SEVERAL: the article reports that no single problem of representation exists, so a claim that a model represents its target is selective, purpose-relative and mediated by inference rather than a single relation— “The representation entry likewise emphasizes that no single problem of representation exists; instead, there are multiple distinct issues about how scientific representations support inference to their targets. These observations have far-reaching consequences. They imply that the representational success of science is selective… | senses[2] |
| sense | Mechanistic accounts - explain through organized constitution and causal production— “Mechanistic accounts respond by focusing less on intertheoretic deduction and more on organized constitution and causal production” | senses[3] |
| sense | Unificationist accounts - explain apparently different phenomena through a smaller set of patterns or principles— “unificationist accounts remained compelling because successful science often explains by showing that apparently different phenomena are manifestations of a smaller set of patterns or principles” | senses[4] |
| sense | Pragmatic accounts of explanation - evaluate explanations relative to inquiry roles and explanatory interests— “A further complication is introduced by pragmatic accounts of explanation, especially those associated with Bas van Fraassen. The SEP archive on twentieth-century scientific explanation notes that one influential pragmatic line is connected with constructive empiricism and the view that the aim of science is empirical adequacy rather than… | senses[5] |
| sense | Explanatory pluralism - multiple models remain necessary across disciplines with different targets and methods— “Contemporary philosophy of science therefore rarely resolves the issue by simple victory of one model over all others. Instead, it treats explanatory pluralism as increasingly unavoidable, especially across disciplines with different explanatory targets and methods” | senses[6] |
| sense | Underdetermination - the evidence at a time may not determine which beliefs to adopt— “The problem of underdetermination adds a further boundary question. The SEP entry on underdetermination states the core idea succinctly: the evidence available at a given time may be insufficient to determine what beliefs we should adopt” | senses[7] |
| sense | Constructive empiricism - accepting a theory means believing it empirically adequate, not literally true about unobservables— “Constructive empiricism offers a more radical restraint. The SEP entry devoted to it states van Fraassen’s core thesis plainly: science aims to give us theories that are empirically adequate, and acceptance of a theory involves belief only that it is empirically adequate. On this view, the success of science does not entitle us to belief in… | senses[8] |
| sense | Structural realism - preserves realist commitment by privileging structural continuity over full ontology— “Structural realism, for example, has been defended partly as a response to historical turnover by suggesting that what science preserves more reliably across theory change may be structural content rather than the full ontology of earlier theories. The SEP entry on structural realism reflects this by presenting structural realism as a major… | senses[9] |
| sense | Empirical adequacy - the scientific aim constructive empiricism endorses— “constructive empiricism, as summarized in the SEP entry devoted to it, can hold that the aim of science is empirical adequacy rather than truth about unobservables” | senses[10] |
| sense | Truth about unobservables - the aim constructive empiricism contrasts with empirical adequacy— “constructive empiricism, as summarized in the SEP entry devoted to it, can hold that the aim of science is empirical adequacy rather than truth about unobservables” | senses[11] |
| sense | Structural content - what may survive historical theory change more reliably than ontology— “Structural realism, for example, has been defended partly as a response to historical turnover by suggesting that what science preserves more reliably across theory change may be structural content rather than the full ontology of earlier theories” | senses[12] |
| sense | Full ontology - what structural realism does not claim is reliably retained across discarded theories— “Structural realism, for example, has been defended partly as a response to historical turnover by suggesting that what science preserves more reliably across theory change may be structural content rather than the full ontology of earlier theories” | senses[13] |
| sense | Objectivity - a disciplined communal and methodological achievement, not perspective-free access— “objectivity is therefore more subtle than older accounts assumed. The SEP entry on scientific objectivity states that objectivity is an ideal according to which scientific claims, methods, and results should not be influenced by particular perspectives, values, or biases. Yet the same entry makes clear that objectivity applies to many aspects… | senses[14] |
| sense | Elimination of all values and perspectives - explicitly rejected as the richer meaning of objectivity— “What contemporary philosophy of science increasingly concludes is that objectivity must be defended in a richer form: not as the elimination of all values and perspectives, but as the disciplined management of their influence through transparent methods, structured criticism, community standards, and responsiveness to empirical… | senses[15] |
| audit | EVIDENCE CORRECTED (RE-GROUNDED) · scientific explanation —operationalised-as→ deductive-nomological model — Audit 2026-09-28: DOUBTFUL - read against its full span and kept, but attributed: the span reports how the SEP says modern discussion of explanation began.— “modern discussion begins with the deductive-nomological model and its effort to analyze explanation in terms of lawful derivation” | concept_edges[0] |
| retracted | EVIDENCE CORRECTED (RE-GROUNDED) · scientific explanation —operationalised-as→ deductive-nomological model — RE-GROUNDED. The old span began at 'modern discussion begins with the deductive-nomological…', dropping the subject that makes it a claim about scientific explanation at all.— “modern discussion begins with the deductive-nomological model and its effort to analyze explanation in terms of lawful derivation”— “modern discussion begins with the deductive-nomological” | concept_edges[0] |
| audit | scientific realism —contrasted-with→ theory change — Audit 2026-09-28: DOUBTFUL - read against its full span and kept, but attributed: the span reports the SEP entry's framing of the challenge from theory change.— “The SEP entry on realism and theory change frames exactly this challenge, noting that the history of science is often invoked against realist epistemic optimism because once successful theories have later been abandoned” | concept_edges[1] |
| audit | empirical adequacy —distinct-from→ truth about unobservables — Audit 2026-09-28: DOUBTFUL - read against its full span and kept, but attributed: the span reports what constructive empiricism 'can hold'.— “constructive empiricism, as summarized in the SEP entry devoted to it, can hold that the aim of science is empirical adequacy rather than truth about unobservables” | concept_edges[3] |
| note | empirical adequacy —distinct-from→ truth about unobservables — The article states the contrast directly with 'rather than'.— “constructive empiricism, as summarized in the SEP entry devoted to it, can hold that the aim of science is empirical adequacy rather than truth about unobservables” | concept_edges[3] |
| audit | structural content —distinct-from→ full ontology — Audit 2026-09-28: DOUBTFUL - read against its full span and kept, but the span says structural realism SUGGESTS what science MAY preserve; hedged.— “Structural realism, for example, has been defended partly as a response to historical turnover by suggesting that what science preserves more reliably across theory change may be structural content rather than the full ontology of earlier theories” | concept_edges[4] |
| note | structural content —distinct-from→ full ontology — The article says structural content may be what survives, so the relation keeps that modal hedge at 0.7.— “Structural realism, for example, has been defended partly as a response to historical turnover by suggesting that what science preserves more reliably across theory change may be structural content rather than the full ontology of earlier theories” | concept_edges[4] |
| weight | structural content —distinct-from→ full ontology — 0.7— “Structural realism, for example, has been defended partly as a response to historical turnover by suggesting that what science preserves more reliably across theory change may be structural content rather than the full ontology of earlier theories” | concept_edges[4] |
| note | objectivity —distinct-from→ elimination of all values and perspectives — The article explicitly says objectivity is not elimination of all values and perspectives, but disciplined management of their influence.— “What contemporary philosophy of science increasingly concludes is that objectivity must be defended in a richer form: not as the elimination of all values and perspectives, but as the disciplined management of their influence through transparent methods, structured criticism, community standards, and responsiveness to empirical… | concept_edges[5] |
| for which use | limitation — any position attributed here to the incommensurability literature: it is reported from the Stanford Encyclopedia entry on incommensurability rather than from the primary sources that entry summarises— “The SEP entry on incommensurability clarifies that the term originally referred to lack of common measure and that later philosophical discussion distinguished conceptual and methodological incommensurability” | limitations[0] |
| for which use | limitation — any comparison of two theories drawn from this article: it reports the Kuhnian picture as implying— “This matters because the Kuhnian picture implies that competing theories may not always be assessable by a single neutral metric” | limitations[1] |
| for which use | limitation — any inference from a scientific model to its target: the article reports that even scale models are faithful only— “The models entry notes explicitly that even scale models, which look like the most straightforward cases of faithful representation, are only faithful in restricted respects and that translating knowledge from a model to its target is not automatic” | limitations[2] |
| for which use | limitation — the notion of representation as used in this article: it is reported that no single problem of representation exists and that there are instead multiple distinct issues— “The representation entry likewise emphasizes that no single problem of representation exists; instead, there are multiple distinct issues about how scientific representations support inference to their targets” | limitations[3] |
| replication | untested | |
| no type for this | Constructive empiricism → empirical adequacy — Constructive empiricism limits theory acceptance to belief in empirical adequacy. This epistemic-standard relation is not is-a, part-of, same-as, distinct-from, contrasted-with, operationalised-as, causes, or renamed-across-fields.— “Constructive empiricism offers a more radical restraint. The SEP entry devoted to it states van Fraassen’s core thesis plainly: science aims to give us theories that are empirically adequate, and acceptance of a theory involves belief only that it is empirically adequate. On this view, the success of science does not entitle us to belief in… | unhoused_relations[0] |
| no type for this | Structural realism → structural content — Structural realism identifies structural content as what may be preserved across theory change. Preservation-across-change is not is-a, part-of, same-as, distinct-from, contrasted-with, operationalised-as, causes, or renamed-across-fields.— “Structural realism, for example, has been defended partly as a response to historical turnover by suggesting that what science preserves more reliably across theory change may be structural content rather than the full… | unhoused_relations[1] |
| limitation | The account of what a term means is taken from an encyclopedia entry rather than from the literature the entry summarises. | limitations[0] |
| limitation | The paper reports that competing theories may have no shared standard by which to compare them. | limitations[1] |
| limitation | Carrying a result from a model to the thing modelled is stated not to be automatic, even in the easiest case. | limitations[2] |
| limitation | One of the paper's central terms is reported to name several distinct problems rather than one. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | limitations[3] |
finding · quantity · variable · definition · key-term — grounded in the full text| finding | The article's central claim is that philosophy of science should be read not as a hunt for one timeless criterion of rationality but as the study of how explanation, empirical adequacy, objectivity, progress and ontological commitment are coordinated and contested within changing scientific practice. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.findings[0] |
| finding | Epistemic boundaries are negotiated limits. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.findings[1] |
| finding | Explanation is increasingly treated as a family of related epistemic achievements rather than one formal relation. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.findings[2] |
| finding | Realism becomes selective and model-sensitive, objectivity procedural, social and critical, and progress multi-dimensional rather than simply cumulative. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.findings[3] |
| finding | Science can progress along several dimensions - empirical adequacy, explanatory reach, conceptual articulation, representational power, intervention and critical self-correction - which need not move together. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.findings[4] |
| finding | The article's twofold conclusion is that monistic images of science misdescribe the heterogeneity of its models, methods and history, and that this heterogeneity nevertheless does not license epistemic despair about scientific authority. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.findings[5] |
| finding | If observation is never fully independent of theoretical commitments, explanation cannot be a simple one-way derivation from pure empirical givens. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.findings[6] |
| finding | The article characterises the resulting stance of the field as fallibilist without cynicism, historically informed without anti-rationalism, and pluralist without indiscriminateness. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.findings[7] |
| definition | scientific realism Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[0] |
| definition | constructive empiricism Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[1] |
| definition | underdetermination Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[2] |
| definition | scientific objectivity Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[3] |
| definition | incommensurability Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[4] |
| definition | scientific progress Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[5] |
| definition | scientific pluralism Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[6] |
| definition | deductive-nomological model Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[8] |
| definition | syntactic view Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[9] |
| definition | semantic view Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[10] |
| definition | pragmatic view Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[11] |
| concept | scientific explanation Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[0] |
| concept | deductive-nomological model Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[1] |
| concept | incommensurability Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[2] |
| concept | scientific realism Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[3] |
| concept | theory change Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[4] |
| concept | Mechanistic accounts — not defined in this paper's own words; explanatory accounts centered on organized constitution and causal production rather than intertheoretic deduction Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[5] |
| concept | unificationist accounts — not defined in this paper's own words; accounts that explain different phenomena as manifestations of fewer patterns or principles Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[6] |
| concept | pragmatic accounts of explanation — not defined in this paper's own words; accounts that assess explanation partly by its role in inquiry and explanatory interests Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[7] |
| concept | explanatory pluralism — not defined in this paper's own words; the increasingly unavoidable use of different explanatory models across disciplines and targets Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[8] |
| concept | underdetermination — not defined in this paper's own words; available evidence may be insufficient to determine what beliefs should be adopted Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[9] |
| concept | Constructive empiricism — not defined in this paper's own words; acceptance requires belief in empirical adequacy, not literal truth about unobservables Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[10] |
| concept | Structural realism — not defined in this paper's own words; retains realist commitment by locating continuity across theory change in structure rather than full ontology Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[11] |
| concept | empirical adequacy — not defined in this paper's own words; constructive empiricism's proposed aim of science Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[12] |
| concept | truth about unobservables — not defined in this paper's own words; the stronger epistemic aim constructive empiricism declines Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[13] |
| concept | structural content — not defined in this paper's own words; relational organization preserved more reliably through historical theory turnover Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[14] |
| concept | full ontology — not defined in this paper's own words; the content structural realism does not claim is reliably preserved across theory change Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[15] |
| concept | objectivity — a disciplined achievement of scientific communities, methods, and practices Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[16] |
| concept | elimination of all values and perspectives — not defined in this paper's own words; what the article says objectivity is not, contrasted with disciplined management of perspectival influence Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[17] |
When we have changed our mind. Some entries in the table begin with a word in capitals and the reason for it. EVIDENCE CORRECTED — the finding still stands, but we had quoted the wrong sentence from the paper, and the quotation has been replaced with the right one. RETRACTED — the entry itself was wrong; it stays on the page, marked, with the reason, rather than being deleted. WITHDRAWN AND REPLACED — the entry was wrong, and a corrected version of it appears in the entries below. Each mark carries its own reason, in brackets, because the reasons differ from one entry to the next. An entry we have WITHDRAWN is removed from this page and kept in the record, with its reason. A line reading Audit and a date is a later re-reading of the entry against its whole sentence: DOUBTFUL means it was kept, and the reason says what is loose about it. Quotation marks inside the tagger's sentence. Where a tag is the tagger's own sentence, a phrase in quotation marks inside it is borrowed from the paper — the tagger's wording around it is not. The paper's own sentence is the evidence quote for that row; on this page it is withheld with the article, and the article is at its publisher. Nothing inside quotation marks anywhere on this page is ours: if it is quoted, it is the paper's. Whose words a concept carries. A concept entry records a term the paper itself uses, so the term, the sense given for it, and its evidence are the paper's own words, quoted where the paper fixes them. This is the opposite of a sense entry in the tag table, which is the tagger's sentence about how the paper uses a term. Where a concept entry could not be grounded in the paper's words, the entry says so on its own row.
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