phenomenon · claim-type · cross-domain-transfer · mechanism · claim-relation · replication-status · limitation — grounded in the full text| phenomenon | informative presupposition - a sentence presupposing something the hearer demonstrably does not yet believe, and succeeding anyway— “it is clear that this sentence can quite appropriately and successfully be uttered in a context where it is not already part of the common ground that the speaker has a daughter.” | |
| claim-type | critique— “To be provocative, let me state that there is no local accommodation.” | |
| method — evidence | — “I was commissioned to write a paper on accommodation as a semanticist.” | |
| object of study — evidence | — “Presupposition accommodation is the process by which the context is ad- justed quietly and without fuss to accept the utterance of a sentence that imposes certain requirements on the context in which it is processed.” | |
| research question — evidence | — “I will ask and attempt to answer the following questions: Is accommodation mysterious? Is it magic? Is it needed? How hard is it? Where does it happen? What gets accommodated?” | |
| contribution — evidence | — “I argue that these complaints are mistaken: accommodation is not magic and is needed.” | |
| transfer | from social interaction and politeness: the cases from Thomason of assuming leadership in a group and switching to the familiar pronoun, accommodation as a SOCIAL move imported to explain the conversational one— “Another familiar case, involving even more painful risks, is establishing intimacy, as in beginning to use a familiar pronoun to someone in a language like French or German.” | transfers[0] |
| transfer | from the pragmatics of scalar implicature: the local and intermediate accommodation dispute is aligned with the embedded-implicature debate, and the same grammatical-versus-Gricean split is proposed for both— “As Beaver and Zeevat note, the topic of local/intermediate accommodation has considerable parallels to the ongoing debate about whether there are “em- bedded implicatures”.” | transfers[1] |
| mechanism | an utterance changes the common ground in TWO steps - first the bare fact that it was made becomes common ground, and only then is the asserted proposition added; accommodation happens in the first step— “We see thus that an utterance will affect the common ground in two steps: (i) first, the fact that the utterance was made becomes common ground (and the participants may immediately draw inferences based on that fact, and perhaps adjust the common ground accordingly), (ii) then, assuming that the proper (implicit) negotiation has occurred, the… | mechanisms[0] |
| mechanism | the prior context relevant to interpretation is the context AS CHANGED BY the fact that the speech act was made, which is why the pronoun I has a referent at all— “The prior context that is relevant to the interpretation of a speech act is the context as it is changed by the fact that the speech act was made, but prior to the acceptance or rejection of the speech act.” | mechanisms[1] |
| mechanism | what makes the common ground adjustable is that it is constituted entirely by the participants' beliefs, and beliefs move in response to other people's actions— “What magic there is in accommodation lies in the fact that the common ground is an object that is constituted entirely by the beliefs of the partic- ipants in a conversation, and since people can change their beliefs at least to some extent in response to other people’s actions, the common ground is 8 Thony Gillies (pc) pointed out to me that… | mechanisms[2] |
| mechanism | hearers do not weigh candidate PROPOSITIONS to add; they weigh candidate NEW COMMON GROUNDS by how plausibly the speaker intended them - which is what resolves the Proviso Problem— “What I propose is that we are not evaluating the plausibility of the candidate rescue propositions that might be added to the common ground, but we are evaluating candidates for the new common ground as to how plausible it is that the speaker intends the hearers to move to that new common ground to satisfy the presuppositions of the asserted… | mechanisms[3] |
| mechanism | accommodation fails when the presupposition concerns a fact no mental adjustment can bring into being, such as what the conversation has actually made salient— “More generally, there cannot be accommodation with presuppositions that do not just target what is in the common ground but concern facts in the world that no manner of mental adjustment can bring into being.” | mechanisms[4] |
| mechanism | a present-tense presupposition can be too early to accommodate: since we all know demands that the knowledge hold AT utterance time, which later accommodation cannot supply— “What is required is that at the time of utterance (because of the present tense), we all know that I have a daughter.” | mechanisms[5] |
| mechanism | A DATED COINAGE WITH THE DEFINITION ATTACHED: `Lewis in his score-keeping paper named the phenomenon “Accommodation”: The Rule of Accommodation for Presupposition - If at time t something is said that requires presupposition P to be acceptable, and if P is not presupposed just before t, then ... presupposition P comes into existence at t. (Lewis 1979)` The naming act, the year, and the rule in one place.— “Lewis in his score-keeping paper named the phenomenon “accommodation”: The Rule of Accommodation for Presupposition If at time t something is said that requires presupposition P to be acceptable, and if P is not presupposed just before t, then — ceteris paribus and within certain limits — presupposition P comes into existence at t. (Lewis… | mechanisms[6] |
| mechanism | AND THE TERM WAS BORN AS A SPECIAL CASE OF SOMETHING WIDER, WHICH IS WHY IT COULD TRAVEL: `For Lewis, presupposition accommodation was A SPECIAL CASE OF OTHER ADJUSTMENTS TO THE CONTEXT that are done quietly and without fuss when required.` A narrow technical term carved out of a general conversational phenomenon - and Thomason later takes it back to the general case.— “For Lewis, presupposition accommodation was a special case of other adjust- ments to the context that are done quietly and without fuss when required” | mechanisms[7] |
| mechanism | A NAMED MISREADING OF A DEFINITION, QUOTED AND REBUTTED IN PRINT: `GAUKER (2008) MISUNDERSTANDS the proposal that presuppositions are preconditions that need to be satisfied before the common ground can be updated`, followed by Gauker's own words and then `This is an error`. The corpus rarely catches one author telling another that he has the definition wrong, with both statements quoted.— “Gauker (2008) misun- derstands the proposal that presuppositions are preconditions that need to be satisfied before the common ground can be updated. He writes: “As we have seen, Heim understands a presupposition as a condition that a context must meet in order for a sentence to effect an update. But what happens in real life if the condition… | mechanisms[8] |
| contradicts | Burton-Roberts (1989) and Gauker (1998), that informative presuppositions are fatal to the common ground theory— “Some people, including Burton-Roberts (1989) and Gauker (1998), have thought that this is indeed a fatal problem for the common ground theory.” | claim_relations[0] |
| critiques | Soames (1982), that informative presuppositions undermine every definition requiring the presupposed proposition to be present before the utterance— “But note that this in fact is not what the common ground theory of presupposition says, at least not once we look very closely at what it tries to do.” | claim_relations[1] |
| builds-on | Stalnaker (1998) on the time-dependence of context— “This perspective on the time-dependent nature of presuppositional as- sumptions is made clear by Stalnaker in his more recent work on context dynamics (Stalnaker 1998), emphases added by me:” | claim_relations[2] |
| critiques | the definitional repair by Soames via utterance presupposition— “It is left open why one would be able to reasonably that infer that the speaker thinks that the audience is prepared to add the presupposed proposition P, without objection, to the context against which U is evaluated.” | claim_relations[3] |
| critiques | Beaver (2001), that a set of candidate common grounds handles informative presupposition— “On the confused view, the candidate common grounds are those that for all it is known might be the actual common ground.” | claim_relations[4] |
| contradicts | Berman (1991), that nuclear-scope presuppositions are accommodated into the restrictor— “Beaver (2004) and I argue that there is no such process.” | claim_relations[5] |
| contradicts | Geurts (1996), that the Proviso Problem should be solved by abandoning weak conditional presuppositions— “his recommendation is to give up on theories of presupposition that predict these weak conditional presuppositions.” | claim_relations[6] |
| sense | accommodation - Lewis's rule, where the presupposition COMES INTO EXISTENCE on demand and the process therefore looks like magic— “Lewis’ formulation indeed makes accommodation seem rather magical.” | senses[0] |
| sense | accommodation - the timing account, where nothing appears from nowhere because the requirement falls due at UPDATE time, not before the utterance— “Thus, the common ground must satisfy the presuppositional requirements before the update can be performed, not actually before the utterance occurs.” | senses[1] |
| sense | accommodation - Thomason's SOCIAL sense, the same move by which a person assumes authority or intimacy by acting as if they already had it— “But people can be accommodating, and in fact there are many social situations in which the best way to get what we want is to act as if we already had it.” | senses[2] |
| sense | `presupposition` (Stalnaker's own usage) - AND HE SAYS HIS OWN DEFINITION DOES NOT COVER IT: under pretense `the speaker's presuppositions, in the sense of the term I SHALL USE, WILL NOT FIT THE DEFINITION SKETCHED ABOVE ... THAT IS WHY THE DEFINITION IS ONLY AN APPROXIMATION.` An author stipulating a usage that exceeds the definition he has just given, and labelling the definition an approximation rather than repairing it.— “Where a conversation involves this kind of pretense, the speaker’s presuppositions, in the sense of the term I shall use, will not fit the definition sketched above [to presuppose something is to assume that it is mutually assumed to be true]. That is why the definition is only an approximation” | senses[3] |
| control | the pretense account, on which the speaker merely acts as if the proposition is already common ground — failed— “even on the speaker’s part there is no air of pretense in run-of- the-mill examples, as Stalnaker admits in his 1974 article:11 I am asked by someone who I have just met, “Are you going to lunch?” — rules out the possibility that informative presupposition needs no accommodation because nothing is really being presupposed— “A] speaker may act as if certain propositions are part of the common background when he knows that they are not.” | controls[0] |
| control | utterance presupposition, which relocates the requirement from the speaker to the utterance — failed— “I think that Soames’ definitional acrobatics do not help us much in un- derstanding the phenomenon.” — rules out the possibility that the problem dissolves by redefining who or what does the presupposing— “An utterance U presupposes P (at t) iffone can reasonably infer from U that the speaker S accepts P and regards it as uncontroversial, either because a.” | controls[1] |
| control | a set of candidate common grounds ordered by plausibility, as in Beaver 2001 — partial— “But there is a way of interpreting the proposal that I can make sense of.” — rules out the possibility that uncertainty about the common ground, rather than adjustment of it, explains the data— “He proposes a system where a participant’s model of a conversation is associated with a set of common ground candidates, ordered in terms of how plausible it is that a particular common ground candidate is in fact the common ground assumed or intended by the speaker.” | controls[2] |
| control | the survey of alternatives to accommodation in Part 1 section 4 — held— “In conclusion: we have seen no viable alternative to the common ground + accommodation view explicated earlier.” — rules out the possibility that accommodation is superfluous because some other account does the same work— “In this section, we will go over some attempts to not use the process we explicated above.” | controls[3] |
| weight | Burton-Roberts (1989) and Gauker (1998), that informative presuppositions are fatal to the common ground theory — 0.9— “Some people, including Burton-Roberts (1989) and Gauker (1998), have thought that this is indeed a fatal problem for the common ground theory.” | claim_relations[0] |
| weight | Soames (1982), that informative presuppositions undermine every definition requiring the presupposed proposition to be present before the utterance — 0.85— “But note that this in fact is not what the common ground theory of presupposition says, at least not once we look very closely at what it tries to do.” | claim_relations[1] |
| weight | Stalnaker (1998) on the time-dependence of context — 0.9— “This perspective on the time-dependent nature of presuppositional as- sumptions is made clear by Stalnaker in his more recent work on context dynamics (Stalnaker 1998), emphases added by me:” | claim_relations[2] |
| weight | the definitional repair by Soames via utterance presupposition — 0.85— “It is left open why one would be able to reasonably that infer that the speaker thinks that the audience is prepared to add the presupposed proposition P, without objection, to the context against which U is evaluated.” | claim_relations[3] |
| weight | Beaver (2001), that a set of candidate common grounds handles informative presupposition — 0.8— “On the confused view, the candidate common grounds are those that for all it is known might be the actual common ground.” | claim_relations[4] |
| weight | Berman (1991), that nuclear-scope presuppositions are accommodated into the restrictor — 0.9— “Beaver (2004) and I argue that there is no such process.” | claim_relations[5] |
| weight | Geurts (1996), that the Proviso Problem should be solved by abandoning weak conditional presuppositions — 0.85— “his recommendation is to give up on theories of presupposition that predict these weak conditional presuppositions.” | claim_relations[6] |
| note | local accommodation —distinct-from→ accommodation — the sharpest claim in the paper - the two share a name and not a mechanism— “So, the kind of “local accommodation” appealed to here is not really the same kind of accommodation that we have discussed before.” | concept_edges[0] |
| relation | local accommodation —distinct-from→ accommodation — the paper denies that the local process is the same kind of thing as accommodation proper— “So, the kind of “local accommodation” appealed to here is not really the same kind of accommodation that we have discussed before.”— “is not really the same kind of accommodation that we have discussed before” | concept_edges[0] |
| weight | local accommodation —distinct-from→ accommodation — 0.95— “So, the kind of “local accommodation” appealed to here is not really the same kind of accommodation that we have discussed before.” | concept_edges[0] |
| audit | pretense —contrasted-with→ accommodation — Audit 2026-09-28: DOUBTFUL - read against its span and kept, but the span says pretense is not a mental attitude; contrasted-with 'accommodation' is loose.— “Presupposing is thus not a mental attitude like believing, but it is rather a linguistic disposition — a disposition… | concept_edges[1] |
| relation | pretense —contrasted-with→ accommodation — presupposing is recast as a disposition to behave rather than a belief, which is what pretense makes of it | concept_edges[1] |
| weight | pretense —contrasted-with→ accommodation — 0.85 | concept_edges[1] |
| outcome | control — failed | controls[0] |
| outcome | control — failed Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | controls[1] |
| outcome | control — partial Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | controls[2] |
| outcome | control — held Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | controls[3] |
| evidence status note | mechanism — A FOOTNOTE IS JOINED INTO THIS QUOTE after 'actions, the common ground is': footnote 8 and a page number are spliced in, and the paper's sentence resumes after them ('more easily changed…'). Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | mechanisms[2] |
| no type for this | common ground → context set — A FORMAL DEFINITION WITH NOTHING MEASURED, AND THE EIGHT-TYPE VOCABULARY HAS NO SLOT FOR IT. The context set IS the common ground stated extensionally - the paper restates one as the other in its own words. I tagged it 'operationalised-as' and the gate refused: that type requires a MEASUREMENT OR DEFINITION cue, and it was right, because nothing here is measured. 'same-as' is wrong too - a set of propositions and a set of worlds are different objects. What is needed is 'defined-in-terms-of', which does not exist. Dropped from concept edges 2026-08-26 rather than forced into the nearest type. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | unhoused_relations[0] |
| no type for this | intermediate accommodation → local accommodation — A RENAMING INSIDE ONE FIELD, AND THE ONLY SENTENCE THAT STATES IT IS DAMAGED. The paper says the process 'was sometimes called “local accommodation” but is now more usually termed “intermediate accommodation”' - and the staged text carries the page number 30 wedged inside the phrase, 'termed “intermediate 30 accommodation”'. Quoted as an edge label that would read as a tagging error forever. 'renamed-across-fields' is also the wrong type: this is one field renaming its own term, not a name crossing between fields. Evidence here is Berman's formulation instead, which states the process without naming it. A DAMAGED SENTENCE IS NOT THE ONLY SENTENCE - except when it is the only one that says the thing, and then the relation goes here. Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | unhoused_relations[1] |
| limitation | the paper cannot explain the very principle it relies on - why new information may be presupposed only when it is uncontroversial - and says so Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | limitations[0] |
| limitation | declared and left open: the author hands the challenge to future work rather than answering it here Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | limitations[1] |
| limitation | the account assumes hardwired semantic presuppositions and declines to defend that assumption against pragmatic-derivation approaches Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | limitations[2] |
| limitation | it is agnostic about the semantic implementation, taking either a three-valued or a ccp-based wiring Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | limitations[3] |
| limitation | the analysis of the grammatical process it separates off is explicitly not given Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | limitations[4] |
finding · quantity · variable · definition · key-term — grounded in the full text| finding | accommodation is not mysterious once the presupposition is understood as falling due at update time rather than before the utterance Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.findings[0] |
| finding | there is no local accommodation; what is called that is either a grammatical process or global accommodation about the quantifier domain Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.findings[1] |
| finding | no alternative to the common ground plus accommodation picture survived examination Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.findings[2] |
| finding | what gets accommodated is fixed by the best guess of the hearers at the intended new common ground, not by minimality Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.findings[3] |
| finding | the stronger unconditional proposition cannot be accommodated for being more plausible, because it asymmetrically entails the weaker conditional one Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.findings[4] |
| variable | C variable Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.variables[0] |
| definition | pragmatic presupposition Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[0] |
| definition | bridge principle Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[1] |
| definition | Rule of Accommodation for Presupposition Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | content_tags.definitions[3] |
| concept | common ground — not defined in this paper's own words; the set of propositions the participants mutually assume to be taken for granted and not up for further discussion Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[0] |
| concept | context set — not defined in this paper's own words; the worlds in which every proposition in the common ground is true - the common ground seen extensionally Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[1] |
| concept | accommodation — not defined in this paper's own words; the quiet, unfussed adjustment of the common ground so that an asserted sentence's presuppositions are met before its content is added Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[2] |
| concept | Rule of Accommodation — not defined in this paper's own words; Lewis's formulation - the presupposition simply COMES INTO EXISTENCE when required; the phrasing von Fintel says makes the process look magical Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[3] |
| concept | local accommodation — not defined in this paper's own words; Heim's context adjustment INSIDE the computation of a complex sentence; this paper argues it does not exist as accommodation at all Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[4] |
| concept | intermediate accommodation — not defined in this paper's own words; the later name for copying a nuclear-scope presupposition into a quantifier restrictor; argued here to be no process at all Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[5] |
| concept | Utterance Presupposition — not defined in this paper's own words; Soames's repair - the UTTERANCE, not the speaker, presupposes P when one can infer the speaker accepts P and regards it as uncontroversial Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[6] |
| concept | Proviso Problem — not defined in this paper's own words; Geurts's name for the gap between the WEAK conditional presupposition the theory computes and the STRONG unconditional one hearers actually accommodate Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[7] |
| concept | context change potential — not defined in this paper's own words; a sentence meaning as a partial function from contexts to contexts, whose definedness condition IS its presupposition Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[8] |
| concept | Common Ground Target — not defined in this paper's own words; von Fintel's bridging principle: what an asserted sentence is FOR is updating the common ground, which is why the requirements land there Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[9] |
| concept | pretense — not defined in this paper's own words; Stalnaker's alternative - the speaker only ACTS AS IF the proposition is already shared; rejected here as not fitting run-of-the-mill cases Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[10] |
| concept | Informative Presuppositions — not defined in this paper's own words; the troublesome case: a presupposition used to CONVEY information rather than to rely on it Quotation withheld — this paper is not ours to reproduce, and the page has already quoted as much of it as the rights layer allows. The tag, its field and its confidence stand; the sentence is at the publisher. | concepts[11] |
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